Supplier incentives and resource constraints under uncertainty

Procurement in environments of cost uncertainty and asymmetric information require special arrangements such as the linear incentive contract. Usually the buyer is motivated to make investments that can relieve temporary supplier resource constraints during the procurement. Special problems arise, however, due to interactions between investments in suppliers and the risk-incentive trade-off achieved by the incentive contract. A cost signaling model is proposed to overcome these problems, where a supplier offers an equity share in the profit from the incentive contract to the buyer in return for a priori investment. The equity share signals the supplier's private cost information, and forms the basis for the buyer's investment decision. Under equilibrium the buyer can expect to recover the entire amount provided to the supplier through his or her share of the profit.     

Private and Social Incentives for Vertical Contract Disclosure

We follow the framework in Arya and Mittendorf's 2011 Rand Journal of Economics paper but extend their analysis by investigating supplier(s)' equilibrium choices of disclosure or confidentiality regarding their contract terms with the downstream retailers. In the case of a common supplier, we find that the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is for the supplier to choose disclosure. This private incentive is opposite to social incentive, which calls for the regulator to choose confidentiality. In the case of dedicated suppliers, however, there are multiple SPNE due to coordination issues between the suppliers. The case which maximizes social surplus – disclosure – can be supported as a SPNE, together with the case of confidentiality, which maximizes supplier profits at the cost of everyone else. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Contingent Chicago: Restructuring the Spaces of Temporary Labor

Hiring‐halls, specializing in the placement of day‐laborers in temporary jobs, have in recent years been proliferating along major transport arteries in Chicago's low‐income neighborhoods. This article examines the phenomenon of low‐wage temporary work in Chicago from the perspective of the principal institutional actors in these highly ‘flexibilized’ or ‘contingent’ labor markets – the ‘temp’ agencies. Particular emphasis is placed on the labor‐market effects of temp‐agency strategies, both in respect to patterns of labor segmentation and in terms of the spatial (re)constitution of urban job markets. It is suggested that temp agencies are actively engaged in both the exploitation and facilitation of contingent labor‐market conditions. In this sense, they are assuming important new roles as privatized ‘labor‐market intermediaries’, with apparently deleterious effects for job security and social segregation in the lower reaches of urban labor markets. Their strategies can also be related to the social and geographic restructuring of these job markets, because the growth and polarization of temp employment has been associated with a ‘hardening’– and indeed ‘stretching’– of extant ethnic, gender and spatial inequalities. Des bureaux d'embauche, spécialisés dans le placement de journaliers sur des postes temporaires, ont récemment proliféré le long des grands axes de transport dans les quartiers défavorisés de Chicago. Cet article étudie le phénomène du travail temporaire à faible revenu dans cette ville, et ce, du point de vue des principaux acteurs institutionnels sur ces marchés du travail hautement ‘flexibilisés’ ou ‘aléatoires’: les agences de travail temporaire. Il insiste sur les conséquences des stratégies de ces agences pour le marché de l'emploi, à la fois au niveau des schémas de segmentation du travail et en termes de (re)constitution spatiale des marchés du travail urbains. Aussi peut‐on suggérer que ces agences sont activement impliquées dans l'exploitation et la facilitation des conditions aléatoires du marché du travail. En ce sens, elles jouent un rôle important et nouveau comme ‘intermédiaires du marché du travail’ privatisés, avec des effets apparemment néfastes pour la sécurité de l'emploi et la ségrégation sociale dans les circuits inférieurs des marchés urbains. Leurs stratégies peuvent aussi être liées à la restructuration sociale et géographique de ces marchés, la croissance et la polarisation de l'emploi temporaire ayant ètè associées à un ‘durcissement’, et assurément à une ‘extension’, des inégalités existantes au plan ethnique, spatial et des sexes.     

Screening‐oriented recruitment messages: Antecedents and relationships with applicant pool quality

The ability of firms to attract qualified job applicants is a critical component of the human resource management process. However, while a large body of research has examined the relationship between firm recruitment practices and applicant pool attributes, very little research has investigated what factors are associated with organizational decision makers' utilization of specific recruitment tactics. We draw on labor economics, sociological, and agency theoretical perspectives to make predictions regarding the use of screening‐oriented recruitment messages in actual web‐based job advertisements. Results suggest that perceptions of labor supply, recruiting firm reputation, and the use of quality‐based compensation incentives are associated with use of screening‐oriented messages, which in turn are associated with applicant pool quality. These findings hold important theoretical insights into the factors shaping firm recruitment activity and provide practical strategic implications for managing firm recruitment objectives. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

大客户兼供应商与企业融资约束

基于2009—2021年我国沪深A股上市公司前五大客户与供应商的信息数据，探究大客户兼是主要供应商这一特殊情形对企业融资约束的影响及其作用机制。研究发现，大客户兼供应商的存在会加剧企业融资约束，且这一效应对于非国有控股和非制造业企业以及当该类客户销售占比低于采购占比和与企业位于同一行业时更为显著。机制检验结果表明，关联交易是大客户兼供应商加剧企业融资约束的作用渠道，而非财务造假行为和真实经营模式带来的弱势市场地位和高经营效率，表明大客户兼主要供应商在我国情境下是一种供应链风险信号，其背后往往隐藏着关联交易，这不仅拓展了学术界和实务界对企业大客户与供应商的认知，也从供应链视角为我国企业“融资难、融资贵”提供了新的解释。     

Decentralized Supply Chain Decisions on Lead Time Quote and Pricing with a Risk‐averse Supplier

We consider a decentralized supply chain containing a risk‐averse supplier and a risk‐neutral retailer with lead time‐sensitive and price‐sensitive demands. A Stackelberg game is employed to model the lead time quote and pricing decision process between the two members under the conditional value‐at‐risk criterion. A unique equilibrium is obtained. Using the corresponding centralized mode as a benchmark, we find that a less risk‐averse supplier is better to cooperate and share risk with the retailer to improve the entire supply chain's efficiency. With a uniformly distributed realized lead time, the impact of the supplier's risk aversion on the decisions can be characterized by a few threshold values of the late delivery penalty cost. In particular, when the unit delay penalty cost exceeds a certain level, a more risk‐averse supplier will counter‐intuitively quote a shorter lead time by risking a higher delay penalty cost. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Graduates' reactions to recruitment process outsourcing: A scenario‐based study

This study examines how successive outsourcing of recruitment activities to an external provider—also known as recruitment process outsourcing (RPO)—affects graduates' reactions. Using an experimental scenario technique, a total of 158 graduates participated in four hypothetical scenarios that have been developed as an experimental between‐subject design. Results provide support for negative effects of the extent of RPO on graduates' satisfaction with the recruitment process and company attractiveness. More‐over, mediated by graduates' satisfaction with the recruitment process and company attractiveness, an increasing extent of RPO negatively influences job‐acceptance intentions. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Information and profit sharing between a buyer and a supplier: Theory and practice

This paper is about aspects of an optimal relationship between 2 firms, a supplier and a retailer, in a 2‐party supply chain. The focus is on sharing private information when demand uncertainty exists so as to better coordinate the supply chain. It draws inspiration from a real case in Ireland of a new fish‐processing company, Oceanpath, and a supermarket chain, Superquinn, in which information was shared. The argument is that sharing the retailer's information increases supply chain profit, as well as benefiting consumers. Profit sharing will be needed to guarantee that both the retailer and the supplier gain when information is shared.     

Recruitment Process Outsourcing and Applicant Reactions: When Does Image Make a Difference?

Many organizations transfer parts of their recruitment process to external service providers—often referred to as recruitment process outsourcing (RPO)—to save costs and enhance the quality of their recruitment procedures. However, contrary to the expectations regarding RPO, Wehner, Giardini, and Kabst (2012) found that RPO might cause negative reactions to recruitment procedures among graduates. We extend that study by incorporating a brand equity perspective in examining whether employer image and service provider image counterbalance negative reactions among graduates. Utilizing a scenario‐based, between‐subject design, we obtain results that show that the extent of RPO negatively influences applicant reactions regardless of the employer's or service provider's image. Furthermore, we find negative mediating effects of RPO on job acceptance intention. However, the perceived fit between employer image and service provider image positively influences applicant reactions. Moreover, employer image positively influences employer attractiveness and service provider image positively influences applicants’ satisfaction with the recruitment process. Thus, a strong employer image and service provider image partially compensate for the negative effects of RPO on applicant reactions. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Strategic inventory in capacitated supply chain procurement

We study the strategic role of inventory in a sequential two‐period procurement setting, where the supplier's capacity in the first period is limited and the retailer has the option to hold inventory. We compare the equilibrium under a dynamic contract, where the decisions are made at the beginning of each period, and a commitment contract, where the decisions for both periods are made at the beginning of the first period. We show that there is a critical capacity level below which the outcomes under both types of contracts are identical. When the first period capacity is above the critical level, the retailer holds inventory in equilibrium and the inventory is carried due to purely strategic reasons; as capacity increases, so does the strategic role of inventory. The supplier always prefers lower capacity than the retailer, and the difference between supplier‐optimal and supply‐chain optimal capacities, and the corresponding profits, can be significant. Finally, we find that the retailer's flexibility to hold inventory is not always good for the participants or for the channel. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

One‐Stop Shopping as a Cause of Slotting Fees: A Rent‐Shifting Mechanism

Consumers increasingly prefer to bundle their purchases into a single shopping trip, inducing complementaries between initially independent or substitutable goods. Taking this one‐stop shopping behavior into account, we show that slotting fees may emerge as a result of a rent‐shifting mechanism in a three‐party negotiation framework, where a monopolistic retailer negotiates sequentially with two suppliers about two‐part tariff contracts. If the goods are initially independent or sufficiently differentiated, the wholesale price negotiated with the first supplier is upward distorted. This allows the retailer and the first supplier to extract rent from the second supplier. To compensate the retailer for the higher wholesale price, the first supplier pays a slotting fee as long as its bargaining power vis‐à‐vis the retailer is not too large.     

Do stakeholder groups influence environmental management system development in the Dutch agri‐food sector?

This paper presents the results of a survey that included 492 companies in the Dutch agri‐food sector with respect to the influence of stakeholder groups on the companies' level of environmental management system (EMS) implementation. It is concluded that primary stakeholders (government, clients) are more relevant for EMS development than secondary stakeholders (such as environmental organizations). The results suggest that small and medium‐sized companies are able to accommodate to demands with respect to the implementation of internally oriented care systems (I‐EMSs). I‐EMSs focus at the single firm or location. In general, they are predominantly influenced by governmental and other ‘non‐commercial’ stakeholder groups. For the implementation of externally oriented EMSs (E‐EMSs), which focus on the supply chain and network, qualitative rather than quantitative relationship characteristics between companies and the government are important. Moreover, commercial stakeholder groups (such as suppliers, clients and competitors) influence E‐EMS levels significantly. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

The Role of Human Resource Management in Strategy Making

Among the strategy scholars, there is general consensus that responsive‐integrative strategy making is essential for ensuring a competitive advantage in contemporary dynamic environments. What is the role of HR in this process, and how can HR support responsive‐integrative strategy making? To answer these questions, we use illustrative experiences from Chr. Hansen, a global supplier of bioscience‐based ingredients to the food, health, and animal feed industries. We argue that HR's strategic role lies in providing support for both centralized and decentralized strategy making by offering aspirations for strategic decisions and by gathering various sources of inspiration for strategy discussions. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Individualistic philanthropy: the paradox of embodied participation for health‐related fund‐raising campaigns

• Movember and Julyna have emerged as examples of health‐related fund‐raising and awareness campaigns that require embodied participation in the form of temporary body modification. Reaching a younger demographic not traditionally motivated by appeals to altruism, these campaigns have capitalized on the signifying power of the body to reflect and construct identities and self‐perceptions to motivate participation. Taking a cultural studies approach and employing visual, textual, and discursive analyses of the campaigns' websites, a primary vector for information dissemination and recruitment, this study highlights how philanthropic activity has been successfully coded as making participants more physically, sexually, and socially desirable. In promoting such individualistic motives for philanthropy, however, these campaigns further a mentality that philanthropy is foremost about personal gain. The challenge these initiatives pose is how to convert participants from individualistic to altruistic models of philanthropy.

Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The strategic use of managerial incentives in a non‐profit firm mixed duopoly

A mixed duopoly setting is examined where a private non‐profit firm (NPO) competes with a private profit‐maximizer. The NPO's stakeholders select a contract for their managers. A novel NPO objective function is utilized which takes into account all the likely returns to the NPO's stakeholders (NPO profits and the surplus accruing to the NPO stakeholders) in such a commercial setting. In sub‐game perfect equilibria, it is shown that the NPO's managers generally will not be given the NPO's true objective to optimize. It is also shown that aggregate social welfare may increase or decrease due to this managerial contracting behavior or the use of NPO membership fees. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dilemmas in the management of temporary work agency staff

Temporary jobs account for an increasing proportion of new engagements in the UK labour market, with temporary work agencies or 'labour market intermediaries' occupying a central role in the regulation of entry into some organisations. Such evolving arrangements have been found to have their contradictions, even for the host organisation. This article explores the internal and external pressures to use a temporary work agency as a means of recruiting labour at host organisations. It considers some of the HRM issues that stem from the use of such workers, including the tendency to devolve HRM to the managers of such agencies operating within the host organisation. Central to this article is a consideration of the potential sustainability of organisations' use of temporary agency workers, engaging with this concern from the perspective of organisational cost‐effectiveness.     

The mediating role of leader–member exchange: a study of job satisfaction and turnover intentions in temporary work

This paper focuses on turnover intentions in temporary work. Specifically, we analyse whether job satisfaction and leader–member exchange (LMX) play the same role as antecedents of turnover intentions for both temporary and permanent employees. Results from a total‐effects moderation model based on a survey of 593 individuals placed by a temporary work agency suggest that temporary work lessens the impact that high job satisfaction has in terms of reducing turnover intentions. Furthermore, while for permanent employees, high‐quality LMX relationships play a central role in the link between job satisfaction and turnover intentions; for temporary employees, job satisfaction is less important in the formation of high‐quality LMX relationships. Therefore, we contribute to knowledge on turnover intentions in temporary work by showing that within this context, turnover intentions cannot be directly remedied by high job satisfaction and that temporary work inhibits LMX's reinforcing role in the relationship between job satisfaction and turnover intentions.     

Forecast Rationality Tests in the Presence of Instabilities,with Applications to Federal Reserve and Survey Forecasts

This paper proposes a framework to implement regression‐based tests of predictive ability in unstable environments, including, in particular, forecast unbiasedness and efficiency tests, commonly referred to as tests of forecast rationality. Our framework is general: it can be applied to model‐based forecasts obtained either with recursive or rolling window estimation schemes, as well as to forecasts that are model free. The proposed tests provide more evidence against forecast rationality than previously found in the Federal Reserve's Greenbook forecasts as well as survey‐based private forecasts. It confirms, however, that the Federal Reserve has additional information about current and future states of the economy relative to market participants. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Externalizing the core: Firms' use of employment intermediaries in the information and communication technology industries

Recent research suggests that nonstandard employment relations may be a source of innovation for the firm. In this article, we analyze firms' strategic correlates and perceived benefits from using two types of employment in‐termediaries—consulting firms and temporary help agencies—in their core activities. Organizations with an innovation strategy are more likely to use consulting firms in their core activities, while organizations that compete on the basis of low cost are more apt to use temporary help agencies. Moreover, managers say that consulting firms are more likely than temporary help agencies to provide them with special competencies in their core activities. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Neoliberalism and casualization of public sector services: the case of waste collection services in Cape Town,South Africa

This article focuses on the waste collection strategies of the municipal government in Cape Town, South Africa, using the case as a point of entry to a wider critique of global neoliberalism and the privatization of municipal services. The analysis of the case sheds light on the links between the cost recovery agenda of the neoliberal state and the casualization of labor. To minimize costs, local governments, like private sector firms, rely on and have enhanced the casualization of labor. This strategy further blurs the conceptual distinction between the public and private sectors, in that the local governments treat citizens as, instead, customers with stratified entitlements to basic services. Stressing the continuities of apartheid under the neoliberal policies, the article identifies specific ways in which the neoliberal government in its post‐apartheid moment uses gender ideologies and the rhetoric of voluntarism and empowerment to justify its use of residents' underpaid and precarious labor for municipal services in poor black townships. Cet article aborde les stratégies de ramassage des ordures établies par la municipalité de Cape Town (Afrique du Sud) et utilise ce cas comme point de départ d'une critique plus large sur le néolibéralisme ambiant et la privatisation des services municipaux. L'analyse révèle les liens entre le programme de recouvrement des coûts de l'État néolibéral et la précarisation de la main‐d'?uvre. En effet, pour minimiser les coûts, les gouvernements locaux, à l'instar des entreprises privées, s'appuient sur une précarisation (qu'ils accroissent) de l'emploi. Cette stratégie atténue encore la distinction conceptuelle entre secteurs public et privé, les gouvernements locaux traitant les habitants plutôt comme des clients ayant droit, selon leur strate d'appartenance, à tel ou tel service de base. Soulignant les prolongements de l'apartheid sous une politique néolibérale, l'article identifie les modalités spécifiques grâce auxquelles le gouvernement néolibéral de post‐apartheid recourt aux idéologies sexistes et au discours sur le bénévolat et l'habilitation pour justifier son utilisation d'une main‐d'?uvre précaire et mal rémunérée parmi les habitants, pour les services municipaux dans les quartiers noirs pauvres.