The Influence of Nonaudit Service Revenues and Client Pressure on External Auditors' Decisions to Rely on Internal Audit*

This paper investigates how external auditor provision of significant nonaudit services and client pressure to use the work of internal audit influence external auditors' use of internal auditors' work. More specifically, we study how external audit evidence gathering choices are influenced by nonaudit fees and client pressure. Our research is motivated by an observation that the magnitude of nonaudit services provided to audit clients introduces the risk that client management may leverage its position with the external auditor and potentially affect the audit process. We address this issue by extending prior research and focusing on the importance of various explanatory variables, including nonaudit service revenues, client pressure, internal audit quality, and coordination, to the external auditor's decision to rely on the work of internal audit. We use data primarily obtained through surveys completed by internal and external auditors. The survey responses represent 74 separate audit engagements. Our findings reveal that when significant nonaudit services are not provided to a client, internal audit quality and the level of internal‐external auditor coordination positively affect auditors' internal audit reliance decisions. However, when the auditor provides significant nonaudit services to the client, internal audit quality and the extent of internal ‐ external auditor coordination do not significantly affect auditors' reliance decisions. Furthermore, when significant nonaudit services are provided, client pressure significantly increases the extent of internal audit reliance. Thus, external auditors appear to be more affected by client pressure and less concerned about internal audit quality and coordination when making internal audit reliance decisions at clients for whom significant nonaudit services are also provided.     

Do Auditors Accurately Predict Litigation and Reputation Consequences of Inaccurate Accounting Estimates?

To effectively manage audit risk, auditors must correctly predict the potential litigation and reputation consequences associated with inaccurate accounting estimates. Accurate predictions are critical because underestimation of negative consequences leads to excess legal exposure and overestimation leads to overauditing. Our paper examines whether auditors correctly anticipate these litigation and reputation outcomes. We provide manager‐ and partner‐level auditors with case facts from an auditor negligence lawsuit and ask them to predict the proportion of juries that will return verdicts against their firm. We then compare auditors' predictions to the actual verdicts we observe when we provide the same set of case facts to mock jurors who deliberate as part of juries. We find that auditors overestimate the likelihood of negligence verdicts, especially when audit quality is relatively high. Our supplemental measures help explain the reasons for this overestimation: auditors tend to underestimate jurors' perceptions of audit quality and willingness to attribute inaccurate estimates to situational factors. Finally, we examine auditors' predictions about how a news article about the litigation will affect their reputation with the general public. Similar to our litigation results, we find that auditors tend to overestimate the article's negative impact on auditor reputation. Collectively, our findings suggest that auditors overestimate litigation and reputation consequences resulting from inaccurate accounting estimates. This overestimation is consequential as it leads to inefficient allocation of audit resources.     

Whistleblowing Allegations,Audit Fees,and Internal Control Deficiencies*

We investigate whether audit fees and auditors' opinions on internal controls are associated with whistleblowing allegations externally filed to regulatory agencies. We find that firms subject to whistleblowing allegations have significantly higher audit fees, regardless of the substance of these allegations, whereas an auditor is more likely to issue an adverse opinion on internal controls when the allegation is substantiated, rather than frivolous. Further, our findings suggest that auditors are involved in the auditing of whistleblowing when the allegation is still in an internal stage. We also show that firms subject to external whistleblowing allegations have a lower likelihood of restating financial statements prepared in the allegation year when greater audit effort is made in that year. Our study is among the first to demonstrate the role of auditors in the context of whistleblowing.     

Outsourcing and Audit Risk for Internal Audit Services*

Some companies now outsource their internal audit function to public accountants. Internal auditors and accounting firms disagree about the merits of outsourcing. Each type of auditor claims to provide more cost‐effective services and appears to claim superior expertise. This paper uses agency theory to examine outsourcing and reconciles the outsourcing debate without resorting to differential auditor expertise. Under the assumptions that public accountants' “deep pockets” provide incentives to outsource and their higher opportunity cost provides a disincentive, we characterize the optimal employment contract with each auditor. We find that public accountants provide higher levels of testing, but possibly for a higher expected fee. This result supports both the internal auditor's claim as the lower cost provider, and the public accountant's claim of higher quality. We also find that incentives to outsource generally increase in various measures of risk, including the risk that a control weakness exists and the size of the loss that can result from an undetected control weakness.     

Improving Jurors' Evaluations of Auditors in Negligence Cases*

Prior research indicates that individuals acting as jurors experience outcome effects in audit negligence litigation. That is, jurors evaluate auditors more harshly in light of negative outcomes, even when audit quality is constant. I posit that outcome effects in this setting are caused by jurors using their negative affect (i.e., feelings) resulting from learning about negative audit outcomes as information relevant to auditor blameworthiness. I tested this hypothesis in an experiment in which I manipulated audit quality, outcome information, and provision of an attribution instruction. The attribution instruction was designed to discredit negative affect as a cue to auditor blameworthiness. Consistent with expectations, attribution participants' evaluations of auditors exhibited less reliance on outcome information and more reliance on audit quality information than did evaluations made by control participants. In fact, outcome effects were eliminated for attribution participants. Courts may be able to improve the quality of jurors' decisions in such cases by employing an attribution instruction.     

制度背景、审计师特征与审计质量研究

利用2011-2015年的A股上市公司财务数据,以及中国注册会计师协会网站手工收集的注册会计师的信息,采用固定效应回归模型,考察审计师特征对审计质量的影响。研究发现,女性、高学历、合伙人和接受过会计专业教育的注册会计师主持项目的审计质量高。进一步研究发现,政府监管和媒体监督在审计师特征影响审计质量中发挥着正向调节作用,主要研究结论在一系列稳健性测试后依然成立。研究表明,审计师特征和制度背景是影响审计质量的重要因素,研究对会计师事务所、政府监管部门具有重要启发意义。     

Independence Threats,Litigation Risk,and the Auditor's Decision Process*

This study examines the effect of independence threats and litigation risk on auditors' evaluation of information and subsequent reporting choices. Using a Web‐based experiment, I tracked auditors' information gathering and evaluation leading to a going‐concern reporting decision. Specifically, 48 audit managers assessed client survival likelihood, gathered additional information, and suggested audit report choices. I found that auditors facing high independence threats (fear of losing the client) evaluated information as more indicative of a surviving client and were more likely to suggest an unmodified audit report, consistent with client preferences. In contrast, auditors facing high litigation risk evaluated information as more indicative of a failing client and were more likely to suggest a modified audit report. In addition, the association between risk and report choice was fully mediated by final information evaluation. This suggests that it is unlikely that different reporting choices resulted from a conscious choice bias, but rather that motivated reasoning during evidence evaluation plays a key role in the effect of risk in auditor decision making.     

Decomposition of Fraud‐Risk Assessments and Auditors' Sensitivity to Fraud Cues*

Practitioners and regulators are concerned that when auditors perceive management's attitude or character as indicative of low fraud risk, they are not sufficiently sensitive to high levels of incentive or opportunity risks in their overall fraud‐risk assessments. In this study, we examine whether a fraud‐triangle decomposition of fraud‐risk assessments (that is, separately assessing attitude, opportunity, and incentive risks prior to assessing overall fraud risk) increases auditors' sensitivity to opportunity and incentive cues when perceptions of management's attitude suggest low fraud risk. In an experiment with 52 practicing audit managers, we find that auditors who decompose fraud‐risk assessments are more sensitive to opportunity and incentive cues when making their overall assessments than auditors who simply make an overall fraud‐risk assessment. However, this increased sensitivity to opportunity and incentive cues appears to happen only when those cues suggest low fraud risk. When opportunity and incentive cues suggest high fraud risk, auditors are equally sensitive to those cues whether they use a decomposition or a holistic approach. We discuss and examine potential explanations for this finding.     

Auditing Goodwill in the Post‐Amortization Era: Challenges for Auditors

The elimination of goodwill amortization in 2001 brought about significant change in how companies are required to account for goodwill. This change in accounting also brought with it new challenges for auditors, namely evaluating the reasonableness of management's assumptions related to goodwill valuation. In addition to introducing technical challenges, this task is particularly difficult given the misalignment in incentives it creates between managers who likely prefer to avoid recording an impairment and auditors who seek to minimize the bias in management's impairment testing. This study focuses on the consequences of the misaligned incentives that auditors face under the current goodwill assessment process. We find that the decision to record a goodwill impairment is associated with an increase in the probability of auditor dismissal. Consistent with the presence of significant friction with clients, our results also indicate that the likelihood of auditor dismissals is negatively related to the favorability of the impairment decision. Furthermore, we find that companies impairing goodwill prior to dismissing auditors subsequently employ auditors that are, on average, more favorable to clients in their impairment decisions.     

Can Audit Committee Expertise Increase External Auditors' Litigation Risk? The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Independence

This study examines whether the perceived independence and financial expertise of audit committee members affect external auditors' exposure to legal liability. We use an experiment in which potential jurors make judgments about auditor independence and legal liability for a case involving an audit failure. We find that perceptions of audit committee independence from management are positively associated with judgments of auditor independence and negatively associated with auditor liability. However, financial expertise of audit committee members can be a double-edged sword. Our experiment finds that judgments of auditor liability are higher when the audit committee is perceived to have higher financial expertise but lower independence from management. In assessing litigation risk of current and prospective clients, auditors may want to carefully consider the independence of audit committee members from management, particularly when audit committee members have financial expertise. In the event of an audit failure, the financial expertise of nonindependent audit committee members can negatively affect jurors' perceptions of auditor independence and liability.     

Auditors' Use of Formal Advice from Internal Firm Subject Matter Experts: The Impact of Advice Quality and Advice Awareness on Auditors' Judgments

When subject matter experts are consulted during an audit, the quality of the expert's advice depends upon their ability to fully understand and incorporate client‐specific facts into their advice. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports suggest that auditors are neglecting to perform the required work to assess the quality of experts' recommendations. This study examines how characteristics of the audit, notably staffing decisions, can impede auditors' ability to discern advice quality. In an experiment, we examine how receiving advice of different levels of quality (lower or higher incorporation of relevant client facts) and awareness at the planning stage of the use of a subject matter expert (a priori aware or unaware) impacts auditors' effort, utilization of the advice, and judgment accuracy. We find that awareness of an expert being employed led to a social facilitation effect such that auditors who were a priori aware put forth more effort prior to receiving the expert advice and were initially in less agreement with management's aggressive revenue recognition position than auditors who were unaware. Upon receiving the expert advice, auditors who were a priori aware were more accurate than auditors who were unaware. These results should interest both audit regulators and practitioners by demonstrating how the timing and communication of consulting decisions affect auditors' assessments of advice received from subject matter experts.     

媒体负面报道对审计延迟的影响研究

利用2012—2020年我国A股非金融类上市公司相关数据，通过中国研究数据服务平台手工搜集整理中国上市公司财经新闻数据库（CFND）中的网络媒体负面报道次数，实证检验了媒体负面报道对审计延迟的影响。研究发现，媒体负面报道会增加审计延迟，这一效应在非行业专长子样本（Expert=0）的样本中显著存在。在控制了内生性偏差后，结论依旧不变。进一步研究了媒体负面报道对审计延迟的影响机制，发现媒体负面报道会通过提高审计师的风险感知度对审计延迟产生影响，具体表现为，当企业面临的媒体负面报道次数增加时，审计师为降低审计风险会选择加大审计资源的投入，审计延迟随之增加。     

Auditor Responses to Shareholder Activism

In this paper, we investigate how auditors respond to shareholder activism against their clients. Our study is important because activism may be viewed by auditors as a source of increased engagement risk, thereby impacting audit outcomes. The potential relationship between shareholder activism and audit outcomes leads us to predict that activism targets will pay higher audit fees and also will be more likely to receive adverse internal control opinions (ICOs) and first‐time going concern opinions (GCOs). Our results, which support all three predictions, suggest that the public scrutiny associated with activism campaigns heightens auditors' concerns about reputational damage and litigation risk. Consistent with this notion, we find that activism targets are more likely to experience accounting‐related lawsuits. We also find that the increased likelihood of adverse ICOs documented in our baseline tests reflects higher‐quality reporting rather than increased auditor conservatism. Overall, our findings suggest that activism campaigns spur auditor diligence while also increasing the possibility of negative outcomes that may not be fully anticipated by activist investors.     

Common Auditors and Private Bank Loans*

We show that when banks and borrowers share the same audit firm, borrowers receive lower interest rates, after controlling for potentially confounding director connectedness. The common auditor effect is observed only for opaque borrowers, and is greatest when the same audit engagement office audits the bank and borrower. A common auditor connection also matters more for longer‐tenured auditors, for geographically proximate borrowers, and when the syndicate involves fewer lenders. The effect does not hold for auditors recently sanctioned by the PCAOB. Finally, the interest rate discount is not the consequence of homophily or biased decision making, based on a comparison of postloan performance of firms with common auditor loans versus those with noncommon auditor loans.     

浅析内部审计风险的成因与防范

随着市场经济的发展和审计环境的日益复杂化,审计风险已成为企业内部审计一个无法回避的问题。本文从内部审计自身的特点、组织的日趋多元化经营、审计资源、审计人员的自身素质、审计项目管理情况、新审计技术方法的利用等六个方面分析了扩大审计风险的因素,同时从积极实施内部审计体制改革、加强审计队伍建设、规范审计程序、加大审计技术的创新、树立风险审计观念等五个方面介绍降低审计风险的方法和途径。     

Managing Perceptions of Technical Competence: How Well Do Auditors Know How Others View Them?*

We investigate factors that influence an auditor's accuracy in knowing how subordinates, peers, and superiors view his or her own technical competence (metaperception). Extant literature on reputation management in auditing contexts depicts preparers of audit workpapers as strategic agents (subordinates) who stylize workpapers and engage in behaviors that enhance their reputations with reviewers (superiors). These superiors, in turn, are represented as strategically engaging in coping behaviors in response to such stylization attempts. One of the necessary conditions for auditors to enhance their reputations on a sustainable basis is accurate metaperception. We report the results of an experiment that investigates determinants of auditors' metaperception accuracy. Our participants comprise teams of audit partners, managers, and seniors who work together in the field. Each auditor performs two tasks of varying complexity and then predicts whether other team members can accurately perform the task and how other team members assess his or her performance on the tasks. Results show that accuracy in knowing what others think of one's technical proficiency (metaperception) is generally high, particularly when the predictor auditors are partners and managers; however, metaperception accuracy is asymmetric and varies depending on the predictor auditor, the target auditor being predicted, and task complexity. Implications are discussed.     

Resource Allocation Decisions in Audit Engagements*

Abstract. We examine the empirical relationship between auditors' resource allocations and selected engagement characteristics. Our measure of resources is hours of grades of labor (partner, manager, etc.) “charged” to audit activities (planning, internal control evaluation, etc.). Engagement characteristics examined are client size, industry affiliation, client complexity, risk, auditor provision of management advisory services to the auditee, and degree of control reliance. The data were obtained from publicly available sources and a survey developed and administered by an international public accounting firm. We find the cross-sectional variation in the labor charged to various audit activities can be explained by engagement characteristics found to be important in prior studies on audit fees, total labor inputs, and the mix of labor inputs. Measures of client size, industry, complexity, risk, and services provided are associated with changes in the allocation of labor among audit activities. We find no substitution of internal control review/testing for substantive testing on reliance audits. Task assignments vary by rank. Measures of client size, complexity, risk, and services provided are associated with activity-specific changes in the labor mix.     

The Impact of R&D Intensity on Demand for Specialist Auditor Services*

The audit fee research literature argues that auditors' costs of developing brand name reputations, including top‐tier designation and recognition for industry specialization, are compensated through audit fee premiums. Audited firms reduce agency costs by engaging high‐quality auditors who monitor the levels and reporting of discretionary expenditures and accruals. In this study we examine whether specialist auditor choice is associated with a particular discretionary expenditure ‐ research and development (R&D). For a large sample of U.S. companies from a range of industries, we find strong evidence that R&D intensity is positively associated with firms' choices of auditors who specialize in auditing R&D contracts. Additionally, we find that R&D intensive firms tend to appoint top‐tier auditors. We use simultaneous equations to control for interrelationships between dependent variables in addition to single‐equation ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression models. Our results are particularly strong in tests using samples of small firms whose auditor choice is not constrained by the need to appoint a top‐tier auditor to ensure the auditor's financial independence from the client.     

Independence in Appearance and in Fact: An Experimental Investigation*

In this study, we use experimental markets to assess the effect of the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) new independence rule on investors' perceptions of independence, investors' payoff distributions, and market prices. The new rule requires client firms to disclose in their annual proxy statements the amount of nonaudit fees paid to their auditors. The new disclosure is intended to inform investors of auditors' incentives to compromise their independence. Our experimental design is a 2 3 between‐subjects design, where we control the presence (unbiased reports) or absence of auditor independence in fact (biased reports). While independence in fact was not immediately observable to investors, we controlled for independence in appearance by varying the public disclosure of the extent of nonaudit services provided by the auditor to the client. In one market setting, investors were not given any information about whether the auditor provided such nonaudit services; in a second setting, investors were explicitly informed that the auditor did not provide any non‐audit services; and in a third setting, investors were told that the auditor provided nonaudit services that could be perceived to have an adverse effect on independence in fact. We found that disclosures of nonaudit services reduced the accuracy of investors' beliefs of auditors' independence in fact when independence in appearance was inconsistent with independence in fact. This then caused prices of assets to deviate more from their economic predictions (lower market efficiency) in the inconsistent settings relative to the no‐disclosure and consistent settings. Thus, disclosures of fees for nonaudit services could reduce the efficiency of capital markets if such disclosures result in investors forming inaccurate beliefs of auditor independence in fact ‐ that is, auditors appear independent but they are not independent in fact, or vice versa. The latter is the maintained position of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), which argued against the new rule. Further research is needed to assess the degree of correspondence between independence in fact and independence in appearance.