The Role of Socioeconomic,Demographic and Behavioural Factors in Explaining the High Rates of Obesity Among Indigenous Australians

Indigenous Australians have one of the highest rates of obesity in Australia. However, little is known about the factors that are linked to obesity for Indigenous Australians. The purpose of this paper is to enhance this understanding by examining the role of behavioural characteristics, demographics and socioeconomic status in explaining Indigenous Australians' obesity rates. This study finds that the key factors that impact on the probability of being obese relate to Indigenous Australians' wealth, engagement in physical activity and diet. The factors associated with obesity also vary for Indigenous men and women and for the Indigenous population living in remote and non‐remote communities. The results identify potential target groups for policy aimed at reducing the prevalence of obesity for Indigenous Australians.     

Does Preferential Trade Benefit Poor Countries? A General Equilibrium Assessment with Nonhomothetic Preferences

We develop a Ricardian model of trade with nonhomothetic preferences to analyze preferential trade agreements (PTAs) among countries of different stages of economic development. The richer a country is, the more likely will PTAs improve its terms of trade, also when it is a non‐member. Rich non‐member countries are also less likely to incur welfare losses from PTAs. PTA membership only guarantees welfare gains for countries that are too poor to import the goods rich countries produce. For all other countries, the welfare effects of joining PTAs depend on the world income distribution and on the strength of comparative advantages.     

A Socio‐Economic Profile of Families in the First Wave of the Longitudinal Study of Indigenous Children

‘Footprints in time’, the Longitudinal Study of Indigenous Children (LSIC), has been developed to provide insights into how Indigenous children's early years affect their development. Socio‐economic factors are at the core of many analyses of child development and well‐being and this article provides a socio‐economic profile of Indigenous families in the first wave of the LSIC. Utilising 12 indicators that are organised into three groups—primary carer, family income and financial stress—the article provides an extensive overview of the full range of socio‐economic data available in the LSIC. The article examines whether, when taken together, the different indicators tell a consistent story. It finds that, broadly, they do. The article raises some issues about the reporting of certain government payments and highlights the importance of family size when looking at family income. The article concludes by pointing to the potential for future research that these data present.     

Fiscal policy under a minimum‐time objective

In an endogenous growth model, we characterize the fiscal policy driven by a minimum‐time objective of economic development. We find that in equilibrium government should levy the highest possible consumption taxes, reduce public expenditures to the lowest possible level, and keep labor income tax rate and capital income tax rate satisfy a substitution relationship at the balanced budget constraint. We also identify the condition under which income tax rate should be set to zero. We further find that the equilibrium fiscal policy is equivalent to the growth‐maximizing fiscal policy, whereas it generally deviates from the welfare‐maximizing fiscal policy. We hence identify a circumstance where setting the policy goal of reaching an economic‐performance target as soon as possible cannot be justified in the sense of maximizing the welfare of households.     

On the Provision of Insurance against Search‐Induced Wage Fluctuations*

Should workers be provided with insurance against search‐induced wage fluctuations? To answer this question, I rely on the numerical simulations of a model of on‐the‐job search and precautionary savings. The model is calibrated to low‐skilled workers in the United States. The extent of insurance is determined by the degree of progressivity of a non‐linear transfer schedule. The fundamental trade‐off is that a more generous provision of insurance reduces incentives to search for better‐paying jobs, which increases the cost of providing insurance. I show that progressivity raises the search intensity of unemployed workers, which reduces the equilibrium rate of unemployment, but it lowers the search intensity of employed job seekers, which reduces the output level. I also solve numerically for the optimal non‐linear transfer schedule. The optimal policy is to provide little insurance up to a monthly income level of $1350, so as to preserve incentives to move up the wage ladder, and nearly full insurance above $1450. This policy reduces the standard deviation of labor income net of transfers by 34 per cent and generates a consumption‐equivalent welfare gain of 0.7 per cent. The absence of private savings does not fundamentally change the shape of the optimal transfer function, but tilts the optimal policy towards more insurance, at the expense of a less efficient allocation of workers across jobs.     

A TALE OF TAX POLICIES IN OPEN ECONOMIES

To evaluate fiscal policy reforms for Euro‐area countries, this article develops and calibrates a small open economy model. Debt reduction reforms require higher tax rates in the short term in exchange for lower rates in the long term as the debt‐servicing burden falls. Using the capital income tax to implement such a policy leads to welfare gains; the consumption tax, a very small welfare gain; and the labor income tax, a welfare loss. Holding fixed the long‐run debt–output ratio, offsetting a lower capital income tax with either a higher labor income or consumption tax generally yields welfare gains.     

SELF‐REPORTED ECONOMIC CONDITION AND HOME PRODUCTION: INTRA‐HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION IN ITALY

This paper applies a collective model of intra‐household welfare distribution using individual self‐reported data. The model accounts for household production, and self‐reported information on economic condition is used to identify the sharing rule governing the bargaining process in the family. The theoretical framework implies a broad concept of full income, which includes household production as time allocated to domestic activities. We find that self‐reported data on economic status are useful in recovering individual shares of household income and that both wages and non‐strictly‐economic individual variables play an important role in the bargaining process determining the sharing rule in Italy.     

Monetary and fiscal policies in a heterogeneous‐agent economy

We study the effects of long‐run inflation and income taxation in an economy where households face uninsurable idiosyncratic risks. We construct a tractable competitive‐search framework that generates dispersion of prices, income and wealth. We analytically characterize the stationary equilibrium and the policy effects on individual choices. Quantitative analysis finds that monetary and fiscal policies have distinct effects on macro aggregates, such as output, savings and wealth, income and consumption inequalities. There is a hump‐shaped relationship between welfare and the respective policies. Overall, welfare is maximized by a deviation from the Friedman rule, paired with distortionary income taxation.     

USING FUNCTIONINGS TO ESTIMATE EQUIVALENCE SCALES

Equivalence scales are used to enable welfare comparisons across heterogeneous households. In this paper, we propose to use the achievement of a certain level of functioning as the identifying assumption for the derivation of equivalence scales. This will allow us not only to deal with welfare comparisons between households of different size and composition, but will also enable us to incorporate other characteristics (such as location and employment status) in the creation of equivalence scales for welfare comparisons. The paper applies this approach to create equivalence scales for the functioning “shelter” using Belgian and Italian data. The analysis shows that the income differences associated with different characteristics only play a small role in explaining differences in functionings. An important policy message is therefore that compensating people for functioning shortfalls in monetary terms may not be sensible.     

TARIFF POLICY AND WELFARE IN AN INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY WITH CONSUMER‐FRIENDLY INITIATIVE

The purpose of this paper is to explore how strategic tariff policy and welfare are affected by the consumer‐friendly initiative of foreign exporting firms. We define a firm that is consumer‐friendly or non‐profit‐based if it considers both its own profit and consumer surplus. This paper extends Brander and Spencer by taking the consideration of consumer‐friendly firms into an international duopoly, and within such context examining the tariff policy and welfare. The consumer‐friendly initiative that leads to trade liberalization is a ‘Win‐Win‐Win’ solution in the sense that it is not only beneficial for foreign exporting firms, but also for the government and consumers of the importing country.     

What Stops Dutch Households from Taking Up Much Needed Benefits?

It is common for individuals not to take up welfare benefits. The most common explanation is that people make a rational choice between the utility they expect from the benefit and the effort required to take‐up. Most studies utilize surveys, which are subject to misreporting and measurement errors, to determine eligibility and non‐take‐up rates. This study uses a novel dataset based on administrative data sources, which provides a more accurate identification of eligible households and take‐up. Furthermore, this study documents non‐take‐up of a compensation to which nearly 5 million Dutch households are entitled. The richness of the data allowed us to conduct a detailed analysis of key drivers of non‐take‐up. The analysis largely confirms the transaction‐costs hypotheses. However, we found an unexpected effect. Although, in general, the probability of take‐up increases when income decreases, those with the lowest income or wealth do not have the highest probability of take‐up.     

RESTRICTING EMPLOYMENT OF LOW‐PAID IMMIGRANTS: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ASSESSMENT OF THE SOCIAL WELFARE IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL U.S. WAGE‐EARNERS

This paper builds on earlier work that used a general‐equilibrium model to show that reducing employment of unauthorized immigrants in the United States through a tighter border‐security policy lowers the average income of legal residents. Here we exploit further the detail available in the general‐equilibrium model to look at distributional effects, recognizing that the policy increases wage rates for low‐paid legal workers. We assess the social welfare effect on legal workers using a constant elasticity of substitution social welfare function. We contrast our general‐equilibrium approach to immigration analysis with the more commonly used partial‐equilibrium, econometric approach. (JEL D63, J61, C68)     

Disentangling the Poverty Effects of Sectoral Output,Prices, and Policies in India

This paper attempts to disentangle the poverty effects of key policy variables that directly affect the poor (namely the government‐led channel of development spending and financing) in both agricultural and non‐agricultural sectors after accounting for the effect of respective sectoral per capita income and prices, using data from India over five decades. The paper emphasizes the sectoral composition of income and prices as mechanisms influencing the level of poverty and establishes empirically that it is the rise in non‐agricultural per capita income that reduces rural poverty via the channel of internal migration, after having controlled for the variation in key components of fiscal spending and monetary/financial policy via the availability of credit. Uneven sectoral growth pattern explains why urban poverty becomes a spill‐over of persistent rural poverty when the agricultural sector shrinks. While checking for robustness, there is evidence that the rise in non‐agricultural income alone may not reduce rural poverty, when measured in terms of rural infant mortality rate as a non‐income indicator of well‐being.     

Financial Openness,Aggregate Consumption and Threshold Effects

We analyse the influence of financial openness on the level of aggregate consumption, a research question that has been left surprisingly unexplored by the previous literature. We construct a complete and balanced panel data set of 88 countries for the period 1980–2010, and then differentiate between four groups of countries. Models for non‐stationary heterogeneous panels, as well as panel threshold regression models, are used to estimate the determinants of aggregate consumption. The core finding of the paper is that the financial openness effect on consumption changes in the course of economic development, with the level or per capita income acting as a threshold which is consistently estimated within the model. The openness effect is non‐homogeneous across groups, stronger for low levels of per capita income and diminishes as income rises. These findings provide new insights into the welfare effect of financial liberalization.     

Optimal Monetary Policy and Sectoral Shocks: Is International Monetary Cooperation Beneficial?

A stochastic general‐equilibrium model is used to explore the welfare effects of optimal monetary policy and the potential benefits of policy coordination. Cross‐country perfectly symmetric shocks in the traded goods sectors and imperfectly correlated shocks in the non‐traded goods sectors are considered. In this set‐up, monetary policy may not be able to achieve efficient sectoral resource allocations within countries and avoid inefficient relative price changes across countries. Welfare gains from coordination are sizable if the shocks to the traded and non‐traded goods sectors are negatively correlated and both sectors are of roughly equal size.     

Tax Policy When Countries Compete for Third Market Exports

We examine the welfare and other consequences of tax policy in a third market export model where duopolists located in two countries compete in prices. With tax competition between governments, we allow for welfare‐maximizing governments in the two countries to delegate tax setting responsibility to policy‐makers who have different objectives than the governments. The unique equilibrium in the tax competition environment involves both governments delegating tax setting responsibility to tax revenue‐maximizing policy‐makers. This equilibrium yields higher welfare for both countries than the outcome when the governments delegate to welfare‐maximizing policy‐makers. The paper also compares tax competition with tax harmonization and shows that when the entire export market is served, tax harmonization improves the welfare of the country that houses the low cost firm, while the other country may be immiserized.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization between Heterogeneous Countries on Endogenous Mergers

This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization on merger behavior. We endogenize merger choice among owners in an oligopolistic industry in asymmetric countries to analyze the consequences of trade cost reductions on competitiveness and welfare. In this context, the non‐cooperative game supports asymmetric market structures. We also find that trade liberalization is not necessarily pro‐competitive in countries with the competitive advantage, even if trade costs are completely abolished. Moreover, the tariff‐jumping explanation of international mergers does not necessarily apply. The welfare analysis shows that merger behavior can significantly alter any gains from liberalization. Countries should consider enforcing competition in regional agreements. Specifically, to avoid a reduction in domestic welfare following trade‐liberalizing reductions in trade costs, a high‐cost country's optimal policy may be to ban international mergers.     

NON‐UNIFORM STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND AGGREGATE PROFIT CREATION EFFECT

This paper illustrates a new theoretical case for a strategic R&D policy in a two‐country third‐market international oligopoly model. Asymmetric treatment of domestic firms through a non‐uniform R&D policy can create aggregate profits without a foreign retaliation concern and further improve national welfare in addition to what a uniform policy accomplishes. This effect occurs when the conventional Brander–Spencer incentive is entirely absent as well as when the uniformly optimal R&D policy initially prevailed. The superiority of non‐uniform policy to uniform‐policy is not guaranteed, however, when the number of firms becomes endogenous.     

Inequality and Trade Policy: The Pro‐Poor Bias of Contemporary Trade Restrictions

This paper studies the pro‐poor bias of trade policy in India by estimating the household welfare effects of removing the current protection structure. The elimination of a pro‐poor trade policy is expected to have a negative differential welfare effect at the low end of the distribution. The paper first constructs trade restrictiveness indexes for household consumption items and industries using both tariffs and non‐tariff barriers. The results indicate that Indian trade policy is regressive through the expenditure channel as it disproportionately raises the cost of consumption for poorer households, while it is progressive through the earnings channel. Based on the net welfare effects, the elimination of the current trade protection structure is estimated to reduce inequality. These results indicate that a trade policy that is progressive through the earnings channel may induce a price effect that is regressive through the expenditure channel.