ANOMALOUS BIDDING IN SHORT‐TERM TREASURY BILL AUCTIONS*

We show that Treasury bill auction procedures create classes of price‐equivalent discount rates for bills with less than 72 days to maturity. We argue that it is inefficient for market participants to bid at a discount rate that is not the minimum rate in its class. The inefficiency of bidding at other than the minimum rate is related to a quantity shortfall rather than an unexploited profit opportunity. Auction results for weekly offerings of four‐week bills and occasional offerings of cash management bills show that market participants frequently bid at inefficient rates. However, they are more likely to bid at efficient rates than chance would suggest.     

THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF CONDITIONING INFORMATION ON PORTFOLIO EFFICIENCY IN THE PRESENCE OF COSTLY SHORT‐SELLING

The economic significance of conditioning information in the presence of costly short‐selling is investigated. Using a compact testing framework, results demonstrate that fixed‐weight stock‐bond portfolios appear inefficient with respect to stock‐bond portfolios with weights determined by extant predictors. However, this result is highly dependent on ex ante knowledge of the predictor set and the ability to short‐sell at low cost. In the absence of such conditions, fixed‐weight stock‐bond portfolios appear efficient with respect to conditioning information.     

THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS ON FIRMS’ OPERATING PERFORMANCE AND FINANCING DECISIONS

We investigate the impact that the political connections of publicly traded firms have on their performance and financing decisions. Using a long‐term event study covering a sample of 234 politically connected firms headquartered in 12 developed and 11 developing countries from 1989 to 2003, we find that firms increase their performance and indebtedness after the establishment of a political connection. We also find that the political connection is more strongly associated with changes in leverage and operating performance for firms with closer ties to political power. Overall, our study confirms that politically connected firms gain easier access to credit and reap benefits in terms of performance from their ties with politicians.     

THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEMS ON THE OPERATING BEHAVIOUR OF NURSING HOMES

Nursing home care in Australia is provided by both for-profit and not-for-profit nursing homes. Operating expenditure in nursing homes is funded by the Commonwealth Government. The reimbursement system currently in operation is linked to ownership structure. This paper examines differences in operating behaviour as a result of a reimbursement system based on ownership structure. The results of this study indicate that differences in behaviour occur as a result of ownership differences, ineffective controls and the lack of incentives in the reimbursement system to operate efficiently. These differences have important implications for policy change affecting the funding of nursing home care.     

THE EFFECTS OF SPIN-OFFS ON CORPORATE INVESTMENT AND PERFORMANCE

We examine characteristics of firms involved in spin-offs and test whether these spin-offs induce changes in investment incentives and economic performance. We find that firms engaging in spin-offs are larger, more highly leveraged, and have higher asset turnover and lower real asset growth than their industry rivals. We also find that spin-offs generate significant increases in real asset growth and cash flow margin on sales for combined firm measures (spun-off firm plus parent firm). The gains result from increases in real asset growth for parent and spun-off firms, and improvements in cash flow margin on sales for parents. Our evidence is consistent with models in which spin-offs create value by improving investment incentives and economic performance.     

ON THE INFORMATIONAL EFFECT OF SHORT‐SALES CONSTRAINTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE

Using a database of stock lending fees for Japanese centralized margin transactions, I show that short‐sales constraints reduce the adjustment speed of stock prices to negative information before the announcements of revised earnings forecasts disclosed by firms in the Tokyo Stock Exchange from July 1998 to December 2001. I find that the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the stocks with high short‐sales costs are insensitive to negative information on pre‐announcement days, but the CARs of these stocks become significantly lower than the CARs of the stocks with low short‐sales costs when the announcements reveal negative information to the public.     

DIVERGENCE OF OPINION AND LONG‐TERM PERFORMANCE OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

Miller's hypothesis posits that divergence of opinion can lead to asset overvaluation and subsequent long‐term underperformance in markets (such as initial public offerings [IPOs]) with restricted short‐selling. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that early‐market return volatility, a proxy for divergence of opinion, is negatively related to subsequent IPO long‐term abnormal returns. This relation holds after accounting for other factors that previous studies suggest affect long‐term abnormal returns for IPOs (including another proxy for divergence of opinion). Moreover, we find that this relation is stronger in IPO markets than in non‐IPO markets (where short‐selling restrictions are less stringent), again consistent with Miller's hypothesis.     

EXTENSIONS OF THE STANDARDIZED CROSS‐SECTIONAL APPROACH TO SHORT‐HORIZON EVENT STUDIES

Strong evidence indicates that short‐horizon event‐induced abnormal returns and volatility vary significantly over event days. Event‐study methods that assume constant event‐induced abnormal returns and volatility over event days have potentially inflated Type I error rates and poor test power. Our simple extensions of the Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) approach scale abnormal returns with conditional variance, which is estimated with GARCH(1,1) and an indicator of the event in a two‐stage estimation. Our method improves the Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen approach on model specification and test power, even under challenging event‐induced mean and volatility structures, and could standardize short‐horizon event studies.     

THE TERM PREMIA RELATIONSHIP IMPLICIT IN THE TERM STRUCTURE OF TREASURY BILLS

This paper considers a single coefficient representation of the term premia relationship that appears in treasury bill yield curves. Term premia are defined as positive or negative maturity-dependent differentials versus the instantaneous nominal spot rate. The term premia function is developed in the context of the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross [ 3 ] Risk-Averse Preferred Habitat Model and proxies for the degree of risk aversion exhibited by the universe of treasury bill investors at a point in time. Empirical results indicate that term premia are influenced by a set of macroeconomic variables in the expected manner.     

THE JOINT EFFECTS OF BUDGETARY SLACK AND TASK UNCERTAINTY ON SUBUNIT PERFORMANCE

Even though managers may build slack into their budgets to enhance their prospects for reward, the literature proposes that there may be circumstances when budgetary slack may be utilized by subunits to provide them with a degree of flexibility in responding effectively to changes in operating conditions. This suggests that the use to which budgetary slack is put, in contrast to any dysfunctional reason for its creation, may have implications for subunit performance particularly when task uncertainty is high. A theory was developed and an empirical assessment was conducted to evaluate whether slack moderates the relation between task uncertainty and subunit performance, paying specific attention to the effects of the task difficulty and task variability dimensions of task uncertainty. The results of the study suggest that slack has a positive role to play in Influencing the relation between task difficulty and subunit performance. There was no evidence, however, that slack and task variability jointly influence performance.     

THE INTERVENING EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE

Prior studies have suggested that the subordinates’ perception of fairness in their organizations’ procedures is related to improvements in the subordinates’ performance. However, the positive relationship between perception of justice and performance may not be a direct one, but is indirect via the intervening variable of participation. It is likely that the importance of maintaining procedural fairness in the organization will lead senior managers (superiors) to select procedures that allow their subordinates more participation privileges in the organization’s affairs because high participative procedures are perceived to be fair. This increase in participation, in turn, is likely to improve the subordinates’ performance. The results, based on a path analytical model and a sample of 83 senior managers, indicate that procedural justice has an indirect effect on performance via participation. On the basis of these results, it is possible to conclude that the importance of procedural fairness in the organization leads to the selection of procedures with high subordinates’ participation, which, in turn, leads to high managerial performance.     

论优化二级分行经营目标综合考评系统

本文依据衡量一个经营管理目标综合考评系统是否优良的五项基本原则和基本标准,指出现行二级分行的综合考评系统模式存在的缺陷性:指标体系、比较标准设定、指标权重分配、计分方法缺乏科学合理性,动力机制不够完善等.为此,作者提出指标体系设计、权重分配、比较标准和计分方法的具体构想,探讨了指标计划核定、激励机制、数据质量保障机制的改善方法.最后,从理论和实践上对当前出现的"行长经营管理目标考核取消计划论"进行了分析,认为考核指标计划是目标管理内在的本质要求,具有很强的科学合理性和现实必要性,非但不可取消,反而要在实践中更有效地发挥其积极作用.     

金融在中心城市高新技术产业发展中的作用探讨

高新技术产业对中心城市的经济发展具有重要的现实意义.本文以江苏南京市为例,从理论和实证两个角度全面分析了金融在中心城市高新技术产业发展中的作用.理论分析显示,金融发展可以为高新技术产业的成长提供各种必要的金融工具,并有利于形成高新技术产业发展所必需的分散生产性风险、流动性风险管理和项目评估等机制,是实现高新产业发展的必要条件之一;实证结果也支持这一结论,金融发展在投入和产出两个方面对高新技术产业的发展都具有促进作用.因此,今后各中心城市应着手建立一个有利于高新产业发展的金融体系,通过金融发展水平的提高促进中心城市高新技术产业的成长.     

THE PERFORMANCE OF BANK‐MANAGED MUTUAL FUNDS

The ability of banks to offer proprietary mutual funds has expanded over recent years, and the mutual fund industry has been a significant growth area for banks. I examine the growth and performance of bank proprietary bond mutual funds. The empirical results show no evidence that bank‐managed mutual funds underperform nonbank funds. I find some evidence that bank managers are more conservative than nonbank managers in terms of investment strategy and that banks appear more likely to target individual rather than institutional investors. Also, I find that abnormal fund performance does not appear to be a significant determinant of the net asset flows into and out of bank‐managed mutual funds. Rather, the results suggest bank investors rely mainly on past marketing information and the general reputation of the bank. JEL classification: G11, G21     

DOES PRIVATIZATION FOSTER CHANGES IN THE QUALITY OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS?

We analyze the effect of privatization on the quality of legal institutions of governance. Our findings suggest that large-scale privatization (in terms of progress and volume) increases the risk of corruption in developing countries but has no effect on the legal institutions of governance (i.e., law and order and investor protection). The method of privatization (public share issues versus private sales) helps curb corruption and improve the quality of law enforcement and of investor protection. In developed countries, the progress and volume of privatization reduce the risk of corruption, and the method of privatization enhances the quality of law enforcement.