PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE AND THE INTERACTION BETWEEN SYSTEMATIC RISK,FIRM SIZE AND PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO: THE CANADIAN EVIDENCE

While some American studies relate portfolio performance to P/E ratios, others reject such a hypothesis or find evidence of a confounded P/E-size effect. This prevents conclusive inferences. Canadian markets are structurally different from American ones; thus American evidence may not apply to Canadian stocks. This study examines how interaction between P/E ratio, beta and firm size affects the portfolio performance of Canadian stocks. The results show a relative support for the firm size effect, even after proper adjustment for risk and alternate change in control variables. This evidence is not uniform across different quarters of the year but not restricted to year-end effect. The findings also demonstrate a positive correlation among the three variables. However, one cannot generalize conclusions since the analysis may not capture all other pertinent factors.     

EVIDENCE THAT GREATER DISCLOSURE LOWERS THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL

The effect of corporate disclosure on the cost of equity capital is a matter of considerable interest and importance to both corporations and the investment community. However, the relationship between disclosure level and cost of capital is not well established and has proved difficult for researchers to quantify. As described in this article, the author's 1997 study (published in The Accounting Review) was the first to measure and detect a direct relationship between disclosure and cost of capital. After examining the annual reports of 122 manufacturing companies, the author concluded that companies providing more extensive disclosure had a lower (forward‐looking) cost of equity capital (measured using Value Line forecasts with an EBO valuation formula that derives from the dividend discount model). For companies with extensive analyst coverage, differences in disclosure do not appear to affect cost of capital. But for companies with small analyst followings, differences in disclosure do appear to matter. Among this group of companies, the firms judged to have the highest level of disclosure had a cost of equity capital that was nine‐percentage points lower than otherwise similar firms with a minimal level of disclosure. Closer analysis of some of the specific disclosure practices also suggests that, for small firms with limited analyst coverage, there are benefits to providing more forward‐looking information, such as forecasts of sales, profits, and capital expenditures, and enhanced disclosure of key non‐financial statistics, such as order backlogs, market share, and growth in units sold. In closing, the article also discusses an interesting new study (by Lang and Lundholm) that suggests there is an important distinction between effective corporate disclosure and “hyping the stock.” The findings of this study show that while higher levels of disclosures are associated with higher stock prices, sudden increases in the frequency of disclosure are viewed with skepticism.     

VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE OF SEGMENT INFORMATION: FURTHER AUSTRALIAN EVIDENCE

This study provides further empirical evidence on incentives for Australian firms to voluntarily report segment information. Various economic reasons why firms may elect to present segment information have been hypothesised in previous research. Bradbury [1992] and McKinnon and Dalimunthe [1993] found firm size, minority interest and industry membership as significant identifiable characteristics motivating voluntary segmental disclosure. Variables found to be insignificant in Bradbury [1992] which were not examined by McKinnon and Dalimunthe [1993] are tested in this paper. Hypotheses relating to size, financial leverage, assets-in-place, earnings volatility, ownership diffusion, outside equity (minority) interest, overseas association as well as diverse and mining and oil classification hypotheses are empirically examined. Univariate tests and multivariate logit analysis suggest that for a extensive sample of diversified firms, voluntary segment disclosure is significantly related to size, leverage and involvement in mining or oil activities.     

THE MOTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES OF DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS AND DEFEASANCES: MORE EVIDENCE THAT IT DOES NOT PAY TO MANIPULATE EARNINGS

On February 9,1982, Hammermill Paper registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission to swap as many as 400,000 common shares for $13.4 million of the company's 8.07% promissory notes due February 1, 1997. The resulting swap increased Hammermill's 1st quarter earnings by $3.7 million, accounting for more than a third of its earnings for that period. Between February 9 and 10, the market value of Hammermill's equity fell by 4.5%.
On January 28, 1985, United Airlines announced that its preceding 4th quarter earnings included a $3 million extraordinary gain from the defeasance of $38 million of outstanding notes, and that earnings for all of 1984 included a defeasance gain of $21.5 million, representing 7.6% of UAL's 1984 net income. Between January 28 and 29, the market value of UAL's equity declined by 4.6%.     

OPTIONS LISTING, MARKET LIQUIDITY AND STOCK BEHAVIOUR: SOME CANADIAN EVIDENCE

This study examines the price behaviour, trading volume and liquidity of stocks in the Canadian market at the time of options listing. Unlike some studies examining similar effects in the United States, the present one finds no evidence to indicate that either daily return volatility or trading volume is affected by the listing. Similarly, liquidity, as measured by the bid-ask spread, is unaffected. At the same time, cross-sectional tests indicate an inverse relationship between before-to-after trading volume and the before-to-after bid-ask spread.     

VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL SEGMENT DATA: NEW ZEALAND EVIDENCE

This paper reports on the voluntary financial disclosure of segment data by New Zealand companies and relates the extent of quantified segment disclosure to firm-specific characteristics. The extent of voluntary segment disclosure varies across a sample of 29 firms listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange. The extent of quantified segment disclosure is significantly related to firm size, financial leverage, but not to assets in place, earnings volatility or a the importance of foreign funding to the firm.     

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REGULATION AND INDIRECT ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SALES DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT OF THE 1934 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT

This study analyzes an indirect economic consequence of accounting regdations - that of inducing inter-firm wealth transfers. This analysis is applied to the sales disclosure requirement of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act. Using daily returns to the New York Stock Exchange and over-the-counter stocks, it was found that when Congressional deliberations favored passage of the 1934 Act, mturns to h s which had previously disclosed sales significantly exceeded those of non-sales-disclosing firms. This result is consistent with a wealth transfer having occurred from the latter to the former through an unexpected shift in competitive advantage.     

THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN LEASE DISCLOSURE AND THE LESSEE'S SYSTEMATIC RISK

This paper investigates the effect of a firm's lease commitment disclosure under Accounting Series Release 147 on its systematic risk. The three hypotheses are: (1) there will be no change in the lessee's systematic risk; (2) the lessee's systematic risk will increase because the disclosure increases the debt ratio; and (3) the lessee's systematic risk decreases because the disclosure reduces the uncertainty related to risk-assessment. A hedge portfolio approach is used to test these hypotheses. The results indicate that the null hypothesis is to be rejected in favor of the third hypothesis.     

HEADS I WIN,TAILS YOU LOSE: INSTITUTIONAL MONITORING OF EXECUTIVE PAY RIGIDITY

Agency theory argues that pay for performance alleviates the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. Furthermore, the literature finds that institutional monitoring tends to promote the performance–pay linkage, thus aligning the two parties’ incentives. We find that executive compensation rigidity is negatively and significantly associated with firm value. Moreover, ownership by long‐term institutional investors reduces the pay rigidity of top managers in underperforming firms, thus decreasing the value‐destroying effect of the rigidity. Overall, these results reaffirm the role of institutional monitoring in mitigating managerial rent extraction.     

金融企业上市的必然性、风险性及信息披露制度

自管理层明确表示支持金融企业上市以来,国内不少金融机构纷纷加快上市步伐,争取早日进入证券市场.上市是我国金融企业自身发展的需要,也是国际竞争环境变化的需要,对我国证券市场的发育成熟有着极大的促进作用.但同时我们也不应忽视,金融企业上市意味着风险的增加,而风险又主要来自于我国目前证券市场的缺陷、上市金融企业的经营压力、股价波动风险以及全球金融自由化背景下的被并购风险等.鉴于我国目前证券市场现状及金融企业的特殊性,信息披露制度的严格制定及实施显得尤为关键,近期出台的<公开发行证券公司信息披露编报规则>对上市金融企业的信息披露提出了特殊的要求.     

VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE BY FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES: EVIDENCE FROM AUSTRALIAN LIFE INSURERS PROMOTING INVESTMENT-RELATED CONTRACTS

Voluntary financial disclosure by Australian life insurers promoting investment-related contracts is predicted to be related to fees, funds under management, investment risk and return, liability risk and marketing costs factors. The decision to voluntarily disclose various forms of financial data in documents promoting investment-related contracts was studied during 1989-90. Life insurance managers providing financial disclosures tend to: (a) charge lower fees, (b) hold larger funds under management, (c) are exposed to higher investment risk, (d) are exposed to lower liability risk and (e) bear lower marketing costs. This evidence supports Mayers and Smiths' [1981] positive theory of insurance-related contracting.     

THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF EXECUTIVE AGENCY FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

This paper reports the results of a survey of the published financial statements of executive agencies entering the Price Waterhouse Best Agency Report and Accounts Competition. The survey illustrates the application of GAAP designed for one environment in a different context and the difficulties that result under these circumstances from the absence of direct analogies for some classes of event. Some suggestions for improvements in reporting are made, includ- ing: the publication of standardised, sector-wide, guidance; standardisation of formats and terminology; the use of the 'expenditure less income' format for the operating statement in appropriate cases; and the clarification of insur- ance arrangements.