Uncovering asset stripping during China's privatization

This paper empirically studies the occurrence and extent of asset stripping via undervaluing public assets during the mass privatization of state-owned and collectively owned enterprises in China. Using three waves of a national survey of private firms, we provide evidence that state-owned and collectively owned assets were substantially underpriced, indicating the presence of corruption during privatization. Further analysis shows that the extent of underpricing is more severe in regions with less market competition or weaker property rights protection, and more pronounced for intangible assets such as intellectual property rights and land use rights. When comparing firm efficiency between privatized firms and de novo private firms, we find that the former group continues to enjoy considerable preferential treatments, yet significantly underperforms the latter, possibly due to continued government control and intervention. Finally, we provide evidence that insider privatization is an important source of corruption during the privatization process.     

构建农民与农村经济长期发展的财产权基础——基于成都市改革经验的理论分析

在现行的农村土地产权制度下,农民并没有真正意义或物权意义上的土地财产权利。从成都市改革的实践经验来看,在这场改革中,农民个体表达出对土地承包经营权和宅基地使用权权能的完整性及"私有化"的强烈追求,以"还权赋能"为指向的成都市的土地制度改革适应了农民的这一要求。农村土地产权制度改革是完善社会主义市场经济体制的一项重要内容,我们需要在中国特色社会主义理论创新的指导下进行新的实践探索,改革的方向是在不改变土地集体所有权的制度框架下使物权化的土地产权向农民回归,重新构建农民与农村经济长期发展的财产权基础。     

A Dynamic Model of Privatization with Endogenous Post-Privatization Performance

This paper presents a dynamic model of privatization, driven by improved institutional protection of private property rights and constrained by the buyer's financial constraints. Government ownership is more efficient than private ownership when private property rights are insecure. Improved institutional protection of property rights over time creates the need to privatize. The buyer's financial constraints affect the timing of privatization, causing the firm's post-privatization performance either to improve or to deteriorate in the short run. Financial constraints also have the possibility of inducing an underpricing phenomenon during privatization where the firm is priced below both what the buyer is willing to pay and the buyer's ability to pay. Faster institutional development calls for earlier privatization, but it also has the potential to either create or exacerbate deadweight losses associated with inefficient privatization. A host of empirically testable implications are derived.     

Squatting as a transition problem in South Africa

This paper applies principles of transition to land tenure and squatting in South Africa. Political transition in South Africa reassigned political property rights, which produced contestable, and rent‐seeking incentives for squatting as a means to privatize land and redistribute wealth. Government failure to establish and protect private property rights in a squatter camp resulted in common‐pool problems that resisted private and public resolution with consequent rent dissipation and social loss. In response to this retreat from duty, informal agents emerged to claim their own share of the prize. Without enforceable rules of capture, the growth of squatter camps in South Africa will continue. JEL classification: D7, H8, K1, K4, R1, R4.     

Bank efficiency in South‐Eastern Europe

This study examines the cost and profit efficiency of banking sectors in six transition countries of South‐Eastern Europe over the period 1998–2008. Using a stochastic frontier approach, our analysis reveals that the average cost efficiency of South‐Eastern European banks is 68.59 percent, and the average profit efficiency is 53.87 percent. Regressions on the determinants of bank efficiency show that foreign banks are characterized by higher profit efficiency but lower cost efficiency, and government‐owned banks are associated with lower profit efficiency than domestic private banks. However, the efficiency gap between foreign‐, domestic private‐ and government‐owned banks narrows over time. We also find that the market power of a bank has a positive association with both cost and profit efficiency. Institutional development, proxied by progress in banking regulatory reforms, privatization and enterprise corporate governance restructuring, also has a positive impact on bank efficiency.     

Land rights,rental markets and the post-socialist cityscape

Inefficiently organized, factory-dominated cityscapes have been one of the more enduring legacies of the twentieth century experiment with socialist central planning in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Drawing on a unique survey of large, formerly state-owned urban industrial firms in Russia, we explore how land tenure reforms affect the pace at which this legacy is being erased. For various historical, political, and economic reasons, there is substantial variation across firms as to their ownership of the land on which they sit. Despite facing no additional formal constraints, those that do not own their plots rent them out at a lower frequency than those that have acquired private tenure to their land. The privatization of plots, in other words, promotes the development of a rental market that transfers land use rights away from socialist-era industrial users. We address the potential endogeneity of land tenure using a measure of regional variation in urban land policy and Communist party vote shares as instrumental variables.     

The effect of privatization on wealth distribution in Russia

The paper considers the Russian privatization process and examines how its deviation from the competitive sale standard was likely to affect wealth inequality. (Privatization here is defined narrowly as the transfer of existing assets from government ownership to private hands.) While empirical evaluation is all but impossible due to the dearth of reliable data, it is feasible to analyze the institutional features of Russian privatization in terms of their effect on redistribution of wealth. The paper argues that the most relevant and interesting issue is to evaluate privatization's distributional consequences relative to the informal pre-reform property rights. In light of this, privatization is modelled as a rent-seeking contest with incumbency advantage of enterprise managers who initially held the greatest informal rights over assets. The rent-seeking contest is shown to strongly magnify this pre-reform wealth inequality reflected in the incumbency advantage.
In addition, the paper analyzes the distributional consequences for various wealth groups of the differences in the composition of their pre-reform informal wealth, most importantly a relatively large share of housing assets in the wealth of the poor. The effect of wealth redistribution on economic growth in Russia is also discussed.     

Methods of privatization and economic growth in transition economies1

We examine how different methods of privatization might have affected growth in transition economies. Using several econometric specifications, including fixed effects and GMM, we estimate a cross‐country panel growth model for 1990–2003. We find only voucher privatization to have been significantly associated with faster growth. Moreover, neither private sector development per se nor capital market development exercised a significant influence. We speculate that voucher privatization may have been effective because of the speed with which links between firms and the state were severed.     

Postsocialist privatization and agency-related property: from Coase to Locke

Differing concepts of private property and the state (Hobbes, Locke, and Smith) are discussed on an abstract level as well as to their relevance regarding transition in the countries of Soviet socialism. This discussion provides arguments to support the following claim: to gain an adequate understanding of what privatization means in the context of Eastern European reforms, it is essential to use models of thought which (1) relate property rights to agency and production and (2) treat political, judicial, organizational and spontaneous processes of establishing and enforcing rights as endogenous elements of the analysis. This would imply that for an attempt to conceptualize ‘transition’ and ‘privatization’, traditional neoclassical analysis might be misleading: it treats private property rights (‘endowments’) as related to exchange only and holds that they exhibit no patterns which are relevant to the analysis of a market society. It treats them as exogenous and hence arbitrary.     

Property rights imperfections and asset allocation: Co-ownership in Bulgaria

This paper analyzes how imperfections of property rights affect households’ allocation of assets using micro-survey data from Bulgaria. Co-ownership of assets is widespread in many countries due to inheritance. Central and Eastern Europe offers an interesting natural experiment to assess the effects of this type of property rights imperfection because of the asset restitution process in the 1990s. In Bulgaria, where co-ownership is very prominent and land is strongly fragmented, the land reform and inheritance legislation allows identifying the impact of co-ownership by taking advantage of a discontinuity created by a minimum plot size law. We find that land in co-ownership is more likely to be used by less efficient farm organizations or to be left abandoned, and that it is related to significant welfare losses. The paper hence provides evidence of sub-optimal land allocation following a privatization that established formal but imperfect property rights.     

Agricultural intensification, irrigation and the environment in South Asia: Issues and policy options

High population pressure and the rapid pace of human activity including urbanization, industrialization and other economic activities have led to a dwindling supply of arable land per capita and a process of agricultural intensification in South Asia. While this process has significantly increased food production to feed the growing population, it has also entailed considerable damage to the physical environment, including degradation and depletion of natural resources and unsustainable use of land and water resources. This paper employs the analytical tools of economic theory, environmental and ecological economics to model the impact of irrigation in South Asia. It underscores the need for an eclectic approach to policy responses stemming from private and common property rights theories, externality theory and sustainability theory with a view to environmentalizing agricultural development.     

Privatization, Land Reform, and Property Rights: the Mexican Experience

This paper is concernedwith rural property rights in Mexico. Consideration of this issuewas occasioned by the liberal program of reform adopted in 1992by the government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari, which providesfor a gradual privatization of the Mexican ejidos, a form ofcommunally administered property. The present contribution examinesto what extent this reform project is theoretically founded andwhich practical problems it encounters in implementation. Thegenesis and structure of rural property rights in Mexico is outlined.The problems associated with implementing the reform projectare discussed for an empirical case example in the Soconuscoregion (Chiapas) in Mexico. Finally, a number of consequencesare drawn.     

The Coevolution of Finance and Property Rights: Evidence from Transition Economies

The transition from communism to capitalism was necessarily accompanied by a sudden and abrupt increase in the financialization of society. This increase occurred in an environment that, even now, still has little experience with or expertise in financialization. Given that financialization occurred simultaneously with the growth and evolution of other political and economic institutions, the question arises: What was the effect on these other nascent institutions like property rights? This article empirically analyzes the relationship between financialization and property rights in transition countries. Using a unique monthly database of twenty transition countries over a period from 1989 to 2012, this article finds that the influence of financialization depends on which definition of “financialization” is used. In particular, increases in basic financial intermediation improved property rights. However, higher-order “financialization,” proxied here by the size of capital markets and the wages in the financial sector, appeared to have a negative impact on the development of broad-based property rights in transition.     

Land use rights,market transitions,and labour policy change in China (1980–84)

This paper provides a systematic analysis of the way shifts in property utilization rights in China induced another sequence of institutional changes that led to the rise of rural–urban labour migration from 1980 to 1984, a critical period in the country’s market transition. The paper shows that the 1980s’ Household Responsibility System (HRS), which brought family farming back from the communal system, endowed rural households not only with land use rights, but also with de facto labour allocation rights. These shifts in property relations promoted a growth in agricultural market size as well as the emergence of intraprovincial non‐hukou rural–urban migration, which may have made labour retention policies such as the small township strategy ineffective, and may have given the government an incentive to deregulate its subsequent labour market policy.     

A history of resistance to privatization in Russia

We investigate the connection between privatization in post-communist Russia and a mass privatization reform in Imperial Russia, the 1906 Stolypin land reform. Specifically, we relate historical measures of conflicts associated with the Stolypin reform to contemporary views on whether the privatization of the 1990s should be revised. These historical measures could influence contemporary views in two ways: first, differences in privatization-related conflicts in the past could have directly altered attitudes towards privatization in the 1990s and, second, these differences could merely reflect pre-determined dissimilarities in preferences. We first show that historical measures of resistance to privatization are associated with views that favor state ownership. One standard deviation increase in the historical resistance to privatization explains a quarter of the negative sentiment toward private property today. We also find that negative experiences with the Stolypin reform are associated with views on the procedural unfairness of modern privatization reforms, suggesting that pre-determined preferences cannot fully explain the weight of history.     

Optimal Privatization Design and Financial Markets

This paper provides a simple general equilibrium analysis of privatization, exploring its real effects. They derive from the expansion of risk‐sharing opportunities (within an incomplete markets setting) that are created by the addition of a market in the public project property rights. The principal conclusion is that an optimal combination of voucher and share issue privatization can implement the first‐best.     

Does technology licensing matter for privatization?

In mixed oligopolies, technology licensing from a cost‐efficient firm to a cost‐inefficient firm has been widely observed. This paper examines the relationship between privatization and licensing (by public or private firms) with the consideration of either a domestic or a foreign private firm. We find that (a) in the case of a domestic private firm, public licensing facilitates privatization, but private licensing hinders privatization; (b) in the case of a foreign private firm, both public and private licensing facilitate privatization. Our results yield important policy implications on privatization.     

Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights: Implications for economic development and growth

The key institution that determines sustained growth in R&D-based growth models is the strength of intellectual property rights, which are usually assumed to be exogenous. In this paper we endogenize the strength of the intellectual property rights and show how private incentives to protect these rights affect economic development and growth. Our model explains endogenous differences in intellectual property rights across countries as private incentives to invest in property rights generate multiple equilibria. We show that the resulting institutional threshold offers an explanation for why the effect of a transfer of institutions from one country to another depends on the quality of the institutions that were imported.     

POST‐PRIVATIZATION OWNERSHIP AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: A LARGE META‐ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSITION LITERATURE

This paper aims to perform a large‐scale meta‐analysis of the relationship between post‐privatization ownership and firm performance in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Baseline estimation of a meta‐regression model that employs a total of 2,894 estimates drawn from 121 previous studies indicated the superior impact of foreign ownership on firm performance in comparison with state and domestic private entities. Furthermore, the estimation of an extended meta‐regression model that explicitly controls for the idiosyncrasies of transition economies and privatization policies strongly suggested that differences between countries in location, privatization method, and speed of policy implementation strongly influence the link between post‐privatization ownership structure and firm performance. We also found that these factors not only cause a remarkable gap between countries in terms of ex post improvement in firm performance but also significantly affect the interrelationship between foreign investors, domestic outsider owners, and firm managers, and the relative superiority of various domestic outsiders. Conclusive evidence of the harm caused to ex post firm performance by voucher privatization is one of the most noteworthy empirical findings in this paper.     

经济共和主义视角下的地权改革—以林权改革为例

林权改革尝试始于20世纪80年代,于2003年加快了改革的步伐,具有了某种激进的色彩。本文认为,这种改革受到效率优先、市场至上、产权私有、强制变迁等信条的影响,有可能使公平和效率出现张力。作者认为在中央政府的改革思想进一步成熟的背景下,林权改革的指导理论需要实现经济共和主义的转向,并提出了四项替代性原则,即处境公平原则、产权有限原则、民主治理原则和法律平衡原则。经济共和主义并不一般地反对私有林权,也不一般地主张公有林权,而是依据具体条件和上述四项原则来形成不同的权利安排。