Attracting Long‐Term Shareholders

Corporate CEOs often say they don't hear enough from shareholders about strategic issues related to long‐term value creation. At the same time, they claim to hear with predictable regularity from short‐term investors about their success (or failure) in hitting consensus earnings targets. But as the authors of this article begin by noting, there is mounting evidence that companies get the shareholders they deserve—that companies that provide quarterly earnings guidance and otherwise focus investor attention on near‐term earnings targets tend to attract more transient investors. The authors go on to argue that companies with a compelling long‐term vision can expect to benefit not only from more farsighted managerial decision‐making, but also from building a base of longer‐term investors who share management's view of success, and how it can and ought to be achieved. Such a shift in strategic focus and disclosure toward longer‐run performance creates a virtuous cycle—one in which companies that gain the interest and backing of investors with longer horizons end up reinforcing management's confidence to undertake value‐adding investments in their company's future. Even if most companies can't pick their shareholders, they can develop an investor engagement strategy designed to attract long‐term investors. In this article, the chairman and president of FCLTGlobal outline the underlying strategy behind long‐term investor relations and the four key components of such an approach.     

The Determinants of Long‐Term Corporate Debt Issuances

A significant proportion of the debt issued by investment‐grade firms has maturities greater than 20 years. In this paper we provide evidence that gap‐filling behavior is an important determinant of these very long‐term issues. Using data on individual corporate debt issues between 1987 and 2009, we find that gap‐filling behavior is more prominent in the very long end of the maturity spectrum where the required risk capital makes arbitrage costly. In addition, changes in the supply of long‐term government bonds affect not just the choice of maturity but also the overall level of corporate borrowing.     

Institutional Trade Persistence and Long‐Term Equity Returns

Recent studies show that single‐quarter institutional herding positively predicts short‐term returns. Motivated by the theoretical herding literature, which emphasizes endogenous persistence in decisions over time, we estimate the effect of multiquarter institutional buying and selling on stock returns. Using both regression and portfolio tests, we find that persistent institutional trading negatively predicts long‐term returns: persistently sold stocks outperform persistently bought stocks at long horizons. The negative association between returns and institutional trade persistence is not subsumed by past returns or other stock characteristics, is concentrated among smaller stocks, and is stronger for stocks with higher institutional ownership.     

Labor‐Market Institutions and Long‐Term Effects of Youth Unemployment

Graduating from a school during a time of adverse economic conditions has a persistent, harmful effect on workers’ subsequent employment opportunities. An analysis of panel data from OECD countries during the 1960–2010 periods reveals that a worker who experiences a 1 percentage point higher unemployment rate while the worker is 16–24 years old has a 0.14 percentage point higher unemployment rate at ages 25–29 years and 0.03 percentage points higher at ages 30–34 years. The persistence of this negative effect is stronger in countries with stricter employment protection legislation. A composite index for labor‐market rigidity is constructed and the index is shown to have positive correlation with the persistence. Moderating macroeconomic fluctuations is more important in countries that have more persistent labor‐market entry effects on subsequent outcomes.     

Long‐Term Return Reversals: Overreaction or Taxes?

Long‐term reversals in U.S. stock returns are better explained as the rational reactions of investors to locked‐in capital gains than an irrational overreaction to news. Predictors of returns based on the overreaction hypothesis have no power, while those that measure locked‐in capital gains do, completely subsuming past returns measures that are traditionally used to predict long‐term returns. In data from Hong Kong, where investment income is not taxed, reversals are nonexistent, and returns are not forecastable either by traditional measures or by measures based on the capital gains lock‐in hypothesis that successfully predict U.S. returns.     

CEO Overconfidence and Long‐Term Performance Following R&D Increases

We examine the relation between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) overconfidence and significant increases in research and development (R&D) expenditures. Although prior studies reveal a significantly positive market reaction to increases in R&D expenditures in both the long and short run, we find that long‐run stock performance is positive only for firms whose CEOs are not overconfident. Our findings, which may be attributable to overinvestment and the overestimation of future cash flows, imply that R&D resulting from overconfident behavior does not provide any value to firms.     

Long‐Term Evidence on the Effect of Aggregate Earnings on Prices

We examine the time‐series properties and determinants of the relation between aggregate earnings information and stock prices (aggregate earnings response coefficient or AERC) employing return decompositions with data since 1871. We confirm that AERC is negative even though firms respond positively to individual firm earnings information, but we also find that AERC is time varying. Furthermore, we show that AERC components based on expected earnings, cash flows, and discount rates are also time varying and differ in relative importance.     

Greenspan's Conundrum and the Fed's Ability to Affect Long‐Term Yields

In February 2005 Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan noticed that the 10‐year Treasury yields failed to increase despite a 150‐basis‐point increase in the federal funds rate and called it a “conundrum.” This paper investigates the historical relationship between the 10‐year Treasury yield and the federal funds rate and finds that the relationship changed dramatically in the late 1980s, well in advance of Greenspan's observation. The paper evaluates three competing hypotheses for the change. The evidence from a variety of sources supports the conclusion that the most plausible explanation is that the change occurred because the FOMC began using the federal funds rate as a policy instrument.     

Long‐Term post‐merger announcement performance. A case study of Australian listed real estate

This study examines the long‐term postmerger performance of Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (A‐REITs). The A‐REIT sector is used as a case study being less vulnerable to agency issues due to its regulatory structure (Eichholtz and Kok, 2008; Ratcliffe et al., 2009). Research on conventional firms has shown, on average, shareholders are worse off in the long run (Alexandridis et al., 2012). In contrast, we find that shareholders experience significantly positive abnormal returns, after accounting for the financial crisis. This outcome suggests that when managers are restricted with the use of retained earnings and the type of investment, they may be less susceptible to hubris and/or agency issues.     

Does the Failure of the Expectations Hypothesis Matter for Long‐Term Investors?

We solve the portfolio problem of a long‐run investor when the term structure is Gaussian and when the investor has access to nominal bonds and stock. We apply our method to a three‐factor model that captures the failure of the expectations hypothesis. We extend this model to account for time‐varying expected inflation, and estimate the model with both inflation and term structure data. The estimates imply that the bond portfolio of a long‐run investor looks very different from the portfolio of a mean‐variance optimizer. In particular, time‐varying term premia generate large hedging demands for long‐term bonds.     

Who Will Pay for Long‐Term Care in the UK? Projections Linking Macro‐ and Micro‐Simulation Models

The long‐term care funding system continues to attract much debate in the UK. We produce projections of state and private long‐term care expenditure and analyse the distributional impact of state‐financed care, through innovative linking of macro‐ and micro‐simulation models. Variant assumptions about life expectancy, dependency and care costs are examined and the impact of universal state‐financed (‘free’) personal care, based on need but not ability to pay, is investigated. We find that future long‐term care expenditure is subject to considerable uncertainty and is particularly sensitive to assumed future trends in real input costs. On a central set of assumptions, free personal care would, by 2051, increase public spending on long‐term care from 1.1 per cent of GDP to 1.3 per cent, or more if it generated an increase in demand. Among the care‐home population aged 85 or over, the immediate beneficiaries of free personal care would be those with relatively high incomes.     

A CEO's Playbook for Creating Long‐Term Value: Ten Essential Resource Allocation Practices

A former CEO of a large and successful public company teams up with a former chief investment strategist and a well‐known academic to suggest ten practices for public companies intent on creating long‐run value:

1. Establish long‐term value creation as the company's governing objective.
2. Ensure that annual plans are consistent with the company's long‐term strategic plan.
3. Understand the expectations embedded in today's stock price.
4. Conduct a “premortem”—and so gain a solid understanding of what can go wrong—before making any large capital allocation decisions.
5. Incorporate the “outside view” in the strategic planning process.
6. Reallocate capital to its highest‐valued use, selling corporate assets that are worth more to or in the hands of others.
7. Prioritize strategies rather than individual projects.
8. Avoid public commitments, such as earnings guidance, that can compromise a company's capital allocation flexibility.
9. Apply best private equity practices to public companies.
10. CEOs should work closely with their boards of directors to set clear expectations for creating long‐term value.

These practices, as the authors note in closing, “are meant to provide a starting point for public companies in carrying out their mission of creating long‐run value—and in a way that earns the respect, if not the admiration and support, of all its important stakeholders.”     

A Fireside Chat with Raj Gupta: What It Takes to Create Long‐Term Value

The chairman of two public companies (and former chair and CEO of Rohm and Haas) draws on his experience as a director of five private and 15 public companies in discussing the challenges and opportunities facing today's corporate boards. Perhaps the most formidable challenge is the pace of technological change, which is making business models ‘in all industries and countries’ obsolete and forcing companies to adapt much more quickly than in the past. Along with the risk of obsolescence is the increase in ‘reputational risk’ associated with an ‘information age’ in which companies are forced to monitor the nearly continuous flow of fact, hearsay, and outright fabrication. The author recommends that public company boards adopt a new ‘partnership’ model. Besides ensuring an ‘ethical tone at the top,’ corporate directors should aim to become partners with the senior management team by playing more active roles in strategic planning, risk management, and the design of performance evaluation and incentive pay systems. In the most striking departure from current practice, the author urges directors to seize the opportunity created by the ‘reconcentration’ of ownership of U.S. public companies by actively engaging large institutional investors in a strategic dialogue about the companies' strengths and vulnerabilities. In so doing, proactive directors can help their management teams preempt shareholder activists and create long‐run value by creating a more effective two‐way channel of communication, one with the potential to give management more confidence when undertaking large strategic investments with longer‐run payoffs.     

The Case for Maximizing Long‐Run Shareholder Value

Criticism of the shareholder model of corporate governance stems in part from misunderstanding about what shareholder wealth maximization means for the other stakeholders of public companies. The corporate goal of shareholder wealth maximization does not imply that such stakeholders “do not matter.” Managers maximize shareholder value by maximizing the total expected cash flows available to distribute to all of their stakeholders. To maximize such cash flows, managers must provide their customers with desirable goods and services at attractive prices—which in turn requires that managers attract the employees, suppliers, and financial capital needed to conduct their businesses by providing each of these groups with market‐determined returns on their contributions to firm value. In this way, successful corporations benefit all of their stakeholders, and what is good for the corporation is generally good for society. External forces such as the media and government exert considerable influence on corporate actions and, in so doing, they play a role in helping to limit negative corporate “externalities” such as pollution and climate change. But direct regulation of productive activities should be used sparingly, and subjected to ongoing cost‐benefit analysis. Government regulation replaces the collective decisions of a broad marketplace of stakeholders using their own resources to act in their own interests with decisions made by government officials with complicated incentives and using resources generated by others. More generally, government should seek to regulate corporate actions only in the limited situations in which there are no market solutions for reducing the effects of externalities. For example, government plays a critically important role in identifying and deterring corporate fraud, and in ensuring competition and a level playing field for companies and all their stakeholders.     

A Glimpse Behind a Closed Door: The Long‐Term Investment Value of Buy‐Side Research and Its Effect on Fund Trades and Performance

We examine proprietary research produced by buy‐side analysts working for a large fund management company. We find that the buy‐side research has investment value for a one‐year horizon, and the analysts producing this research exhibit differential ability that tends to persist over time. The buy‐side research strongly influences trades made by the company's funds, especially when it coveys information that is independent of the fund managers' own information, when it is produced by buy‐side analysts with good track records, and when the underlying stocks have little sell‐side coverage. The influence of sell‐side research is concentrated primarily in stocks not followed by buy‐side analysts and in funds with low overall buy‐side coverage. The company's funds that rely more heavily on buy‐side research generate superior performance.     

Underwriter Quality and Long‐Run IPO Performance

We analyze the relationship between the quality of underwriters and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in light of underwriter marketing, certification and screening, and information production. We find that higher underwriter quality (measured by the number of managing underwriters, underwriter reputation, and absolute price adjustment) predicts better long‐run performance, even when returns are value weighted. We compare underwriter quality measures and find that the effects of the number of managing underwriters and underwriter reputation are mutually complementary and are especially strong among IPOs with high uncertainty, while absolute price adjustment, which is more likely to be associated with information production than marketing or certification/screening, loses significance. Our findings are consistent with the marketing and certification and screening roles of investment banks but lend little support for the information production role of underwriters.     

Private Equity and Long‐Run Investment: The Case of Innovation

A long‐standing controversy is whether leveraged buyouts (LBOs) relieve managers from short‐term pressures from public shareholders, or whether LBO funds themselves sacrifice long‐term growth to boost short‐term performance. We examine one form of long‐run activity, namely, investments in innovation as measured by patenting activity. Based on 472 LBO transactions, we find no evidence that LBOs sacrifice long‐term investments. LBO firm patents are more cited (a proxy for economic importance), show no shifts in the fundamental nature of the research, and become more concentrated in important areas of companies' innovative portfolios.     

Understanding the Distributional Impact of Long‐Run Inflation

The impact of fully anticipated inflation is systematically studied in heterogeneous agent economies with an endogenous labor supply and portfolio choices. In stationary equilibrium, inflation nonlinearly alters the endogenous distributions of income, wealth, and consumption. Small departures from zero inflation have the strongest impact. Three features determine how inflation impacts distributions and welfare: financial structure, shock persistence, and labor supply elasticity. When agents can self‐insure only with money, inflation reduces wealth inequality but may raise consumption inequality. Otherwise, inflation reduces consumption inequality but may raise wealth inequality. Given persistent shocks and an inelastic labor supply, inflation may raise average welfare. The results hold when the model is extended to account for capital formation.     

Linear‐Rational Term Structure Models

We introduce the class of linear‐rational term structure models in which the state price density is modeled such that bond prices become linear‐rational functions of the factors. This class is highly tractable with several distinct advantages: (i) ensures nonnegative interest rates, (ii) easily accommodates unspanned factors affecting volatility and risk premiums, and (iii) admits semi‐analytical solutions to swaptions. A parsimonious model specification within the linear‐rational class has a very good fit to both interest rate swaps and swaptions since 1997 and captures many features of term structure, volatility, and risk premium dynamics—including when interest rates are close to the zero lower bound.     

Long‐Run Stockholder Consumption Risk and Asset Returns

We provide new evidence on the success of long‐run risks in asset pricing by focusing on the risks borne by stockholders. Exploiting microlevel household consumption data, we show that long‐run stockholder consumption risk better captures cross‐sectional variation in average asset returns than aggregate or nonstockholder consumption risk, and implies more plausible risk aversion estimates. We find that risk aversion around 10 can match observed risk premia for the wealthiest stockholders across sets of test assets that include the 25 Fama and French portfolios, the market portfolio, bond portfolios, and the entire cross‐section of stocks.