Bridging Sustainability and Finance: The Value Driver Adjustment Approach

Even though most large corporations view sustainability considerations and concerns as having the potential to affect their revenue and profits, and studies have shown that sustainability can affect stock returns, investors and corporate managers continue to struggle to incorporate such concerns into their financial decision‐making. As a consequence, the valuation effects of sustainability issues are not fully reflected in either the valuation of companies by investors or in capital investment decisions by corporate managers. The author argues that sustainability can be integrated into both of these kinds of financial decision‐making by linking it to business models, competitive positions, and value drivers using what the author calls a “value‐driver adjustment” (VDA) approach. The basic idea is simple: material sustainability issues affect business models and competitive positions, which in turn affect the company's value drivers—notably, sales, margins, and capital. The VDA approach explicitly considers these linkages by taking three steps: (1) identifying a company's material sustainability issues; (2) analyzing how these issues are expected to affect the company's business model and competitive position; and (3) quantifying the effects of such changes in business model and competitive position on the company's value drivers, including its cost of capital. In the first part of the article, the author provides an investor perspective that shows how sustainability can be integrated into investment decisions by asset managers. There he explains how and why ESG integration has so far failed to become mainstream, and what needs to be done to make it successful. The second part of this article takes the corporate perspective and shows how sustainability can be linked to value drivers using much the same ingredients as in asset management, but slightly different tools that can help corporate managers incorporate sustainability concerns into strategy and operations, including the finance function. And in closing, the author brings together corporate and investor perspectives while showing how sustainability programs can be used to make the relationship between companies and their shareholders both stronger and longer‐lasting.     

Analysts' Roundtable on Integrating ESG into Investment Decision‐Making

In this third of the three discussions that took place at the SASB 2016 Symposium, practitioners of a broad range of investment approaches—active as well as passive in both equities and fixed‐income—explain how and why they use ESG information when evaluating companies and making their investment decisions. There was general agreement that successful ESG investing depends on integrating ESG factors with the methods and data of traditional “fundamental” financial statement analysis. And in support of this claim, a number of the panelists noted that some of the world's best “business value investors,” including Warren Buffett, have long incorporated environmental, social, and governance considerations into their investment decision‐making. In the analysis of such active fundamental investors, ESG concerns tend to show up as risk factors that can translate into higher costs of capital and lower values. And companies' effectiveness in managing such factors, as ref lected in high ESG scores and rankings, is viewed by many fundamental investors as an indicator of management “quality,” a reliable demonstration of the corporate commitment to investing in the company's future. Moreover, some fixed‐income investors are equally if not more concerned than equity investors about ESG exposures. ESG factors can have pronounced effects on performance by generating “tail risks” that can materialize in both going‐concern and default scenarios. And the rating agencies have long attempted to reflect some of these risks in their analysis, though with mixed success. What is relatively new, however, is the frequency with which fixed income investors are engaging companies on ESG topics. And even large institutional investors with heavily indexed portfolios have become more aggressive in engaging their portfolio companies on ESG issues. Although the traditional ESG filters used by such investors were designed mainly just to screen out tobacco, firearms, and other “sin” shares from equity portfolios, investors' interest in “tilting” their portfolios toward positive sustainability factors, in the form of lowcarbon and gender‐balanced ETFs and other kinds of “smart beta” portfolios, has gained considerable momentum.     

Responsible Investors: Who They Are,What They Want

This article by a long‐time partner in Domini Social Investments, a well‐known socially responsible investment firm, begins by describing four different approaches that institutional investors have currently adopted as they account for environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations in their investment decisions: (1) the incorporation of internationally accepted ESG norms and standards (as set forth in, for example, the FTSE4Good Indexes); (2) the use of industry‐specific ESG ratings and rankings (such as those used for the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes); (3) the integration of ESG considerations into stock valuation (as advocated, for example, in the Principles of Responsible Investment); and (4) the identification of companies whose business models successfully address the most pressing societal needs (often referred to as “impact investing”). The article then seeks to answer the question: what corporate ESG programs and policies can be most effectively used by managers seeking to attract institutional investors using these different approaches? The author describes three kinds of corporate ESG programs. In one approach, corporate managers focus on strengthening relations with non‐investor stakeholders, including employees, the environment, and local communities. In the second approach, corporations seek to create “shared value” by emphasizing products and services that help address society's most pressing needs. The third approach focuses on identifying and addressing the firm's industry‐specific ESG performance indicators (KPIs) that are most material to stockholders and other stakeholders. Given institutional investors' growing commitment to the incorporation of ESG concerns, corporate managers should understand the range of investors' approaches to ESG and how to account for them in their strategic planning. At the same time, they are encouraged to develop comprehensive ESG policies and goals, devote adequate resources to their implementation, and communicate efforts effectively to these investors and to the public.     

The end of ESG

ESG is both extremely important and nothing special. It's extremely important because it's critical to long-term value, and so any academic or practitioner should take it seriously, not just those with “ESG” in their research interests or job title. Thus, ESG doesn't need a specialized term, as that implies it's niche—considering long-term factors isn't ESG investing; it's investing. It's nothing special since it's no better or worse than other intangible assets that create long-term financial and social returns, such as management quality, corporate culture, and innovative capability. Companies shouldn't be praised more for improving their ESG performance than these other intangibles; investor engagement on ESG factors shouldn't be put on a pedestal compared to engagement on other value drivers. We want great companies, not just companies that are great at ESG.     

ESG Investing in Graham & Doddsville

The author describes how and why the world's best “business value investors” have long incorporated environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations into their investment decision‐making. As the main source of value in companies has increasingly shifted from tangible to intangible assets, many followers of Graham & Dodd have delivered exceptional investment results by taking an “earnings‐power” approach to identifying high‐quality businesses—businesses with enduring competitive advantages that are sustained through significant ongoing investment in their core capabilities and, increasingly, their important non‐investor “stakeholders.” While the ESG framework may be relatively new, it can be thought of as providing a lens through which to view the age‐old issue of “quality.” Graham & Dodd's 1934 classic guide to investing, Security Analysis, and Phil Fisher's 1958 bestseller, Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, both identify a number of areas of analysis that would today be characterized as ESG. Regardless of whether they use the labels “E,” “S,” and “G,” investors who make judgments about earnings power and sustainable competitive advantage are routinely incorporating ESG considerations into their decision‐making. The challenge of assessing a company's sustainable competitive advantage requires analysis based on concepts such as customer franchise value, as well as intangibles like brands and intellectual property. For corporate managers communicating ESG priorities, and for investors analyzing ESG issues, the key is to focus on their relevance to the business. In this sense, corporate reporting on sustainability issues should be viewed as analogous to and an integral part of financial reporting, with a management focus on materiality and relevance (while avoiding a “promotional” approach) that is critical to credibility.     

Sustainability priorities,corporate strategy,and investor behavior

Using a sequential experiment, this study examines whether integration of material environmental, social, and governance (ESG) priorities into corporate strategy impacts investors’ short‐ and long‐term stock price assessments and investment allocation. In our examination, we consider the potential moderating effect of financial performance. We find that integration of ESG priorities into strategy does not have a significant effect on investors’ price assessments or investment allocation. This is true regardless of the trend in the company's financial performance. Our results hold across various demographics and the levels of investment knowledge and investment experience. Investors’ perception of relevance and reliability of material ESG information, however, has a mediating effect on their long‐term price assessment and investment allocation. Overall, our findings suggest that any future requirements on disclosure of ESG information by regulators and standard setters should aim to improve investors’ perception of the relevance and reliability of that information.     

Valuing Companies with Cash‐Flow@Risk

The classic DCF approach to capital budgeting—the one that MBA students in the world's top business schools have been taught for the last 30 years—begins with the assumption that the corporate investment decision is “independent of” the financing decision. That is, the value of a given investment opportunity should not be affected by how a company is financed, whether mainly with debt or with equity. A corollary of this capital structure “irrelevance” proposition says that a company's investment decision should also not be influenced by its risk management policy—by whether a company hedges its various price exposures or chooses to leave them unhedged. In this article, the authors—one of whom is the CFO of the French high‐tech firm Gemalto—propose a practical alternative to DCF that is based on a concept they call “cash‐flow@risk.” Implementation of the concept involves dividing expected future cash flow into two components: a low‐risk part, or “certainty equivalent,” and a high‐risk part. The two cash flow streams are discounted at different rates (corresponding to debt and equity) when estimating their value. The concept of cash‐flow@risk derives directly from, and is fully consistent with, the concept of economic capital that was developed by Robert Merton and Andre Perold in the early 1990s and that has become the basis of Value at Risk (or VaR) capital allocation systems now used at most financial institutions. But because the approach in this article focuses on the volatility of operating cash flows instead of asset values, the authors argue that an internal capital allocation system based on cash‐flow@risk is likely to be much more suitable than VaR for industrial companies.     

Session I: Corporate Purpose and Governance

In this first of five sessions of a recent Columbia Law School symposium devoted to discussion of his new book, Prosperity—and The Purpose of the Corporation, Oxford University's Colin Mayer begins by calling for a “radical reinterpretation” of the corporate mission. For all but the last 50 or so of its 2,000‐year history, the corporation has combined commercial activities with a public purpose. But since Milton Friedman's famous pronouncement in 1970 that the social goal of the corporation is to maximize its own profits, the gap between the social and private interests served by corporations appears to have grown ever wider, helping fuel the global outbreaks of populist protest and indictments of capitalism that fill today's media. In Mayer's reinterpretation, the boards of all companies will produce and publish statements of corporate purpose that envision some greater social good than maximizing shareholder value. To that end, he urges companies to make continuous investments of their financial capital and other resources in developing other forms of corporate capital—human, social, and natural—and to account for such investments in the same way they now account for their investments in physical capital. Although the author appears to prefer that such changes be mandatory, enacted through new legislation and enforced by regulators and the courts, his main efforts are directed at persuading the largest institutional owners of corporations—many of whom are already favorably predisposed to ESG—to support these corporate initiatives. Marty Lipton, after expressing enthusiasm about Mayer's proposals, suggests that mandating such changes is likely neither feasible nor desirable, but that attempts—like his own New Paradigm—to gain the acceptance and support of large shareholders is the most promising strategy. Ron Gilson, on the other hand, after voicing Lipton's skepticism about the enforceability of such statements of purpose, issues a number of warnings. One is about the political risks associated with ever more concentrated ownership of public companies in a world where populist distrust of all concentrations of wealth and power is clearly on the rise. But most troubling for the company themselves is the confusion such proposals could create for corporate boards whose responsibility is to limit two temptations facing corporate managements: short‐termism, or underinvestment in the corporate future to boost near‐term earnings (and presumably stock prices); and what Gilson calls hyperopia, or overinvestment designed to preserve growth (and management's jobs) at all costs.     

ESG for All? The Impact of ESG Screening on Return,Risk, and Diversification

A large body of research has documented a positive relationship between different measures of sustainability—such as indicators of employee satisfaction and effective corporate governance—and corporate financial performance. Nevertheless, many investors still struggle to quantify the value of ESG to investment performance. To address this issue, the authors tested the effects of using different ESG filters on an investable universe that serves as the starting point for a fund manager. In this way, they attempted to determine the extent to which ESG data can add value to any investment approach, regardless of preferences towards sustainable investing. The authors report “an unequivocally positive” contribution to risk‐adjusted returns when using a 10% best‐in‐class ESG screening approach (one that effectively removes companies with the lowest 10% of ESG rankings), both on a global and a developed markets universe. More specifically, as a result of such screening, both the global and developed markets portfolios show higher returns, lower (tail) risk, and no significant reduction of diversification potential despite the reduction in the number of companies. Use of a 25% screening filter was also found to add value, especially by reducing tail risks, but with a larger deviation from the unscreened universe. Overall, then, the authors’ finding is that the incorporation of ESG information contributes to better decision‐making in every investment approach, with the optimal configuration depending on a fund manager's preferences and willingness to deviate from an unscreened benchmark.     

Four Things No One Will Tell You About ESG Data

As the ESG finance field and the use of ESG data in investment decision‐making continue to grow, the authors seek to shed light on several important aspects of ESG measurement and data. This article is intended to provide a useful guide for the rapidly rising number of people entering the field. The authors focus on the following:

1. The sheer variety, and inconsistency, of the data and measures, and of how companies report them. Listing more than 20 different ways companies report their employee health and safety data, the authors show how such inconsistencies lead to significantly different results when looking at the same group of companies.
2. ‘Benchmarking,’ or how data providers define companies' peer groups, can be crucial in determining the performance ranking of a company. The lack of transparency among data providers about peer group components and observed ranges for ESG metrics creates market‐wide inconsistencies and undermines their reliability.
3. The differences in the imputation methods used by ESG researchers and analysts to deal with vast ‘data gaps’ that span ranges of companies and time periods for different ESG metrics can cause large ‘disagreements’ among the providers, with different gap‐filling approaches leading to big discrepancies.
4. The disagreements among ESG data providers are not only large, but actually increase with the quantity of publicly available information. Citing a recent study showing that companies that provide more ESG disclosure tend to have more variation in their ESG ratings, the authors interpret this finding as clear evidence of the need for ‘a clearer understanding of what different ESG metrics might tell us and how they might best be institutionalized for assessing corporate performance.’

What can be done to address these problems with ESG data? Companies should ‘take control of the ESG data narrative’ by proactively shaping disclosure instead of being overwhelmed by survey requests. To that end, companies should ‘customize’ their metrics to some extent, while at the same time seeking to self‐regulate by reaching agreement with industry peers on a ‘reasonable baseline’ of standardized ESG metrics designed to achieve comparability. Investors are urged to push for more meaningful ESG disclosure by narrowing the demand for ESG data into somewhat more standardized, but still manageable metrics. Stock exchanges should consider issuing—and perhaps even mandating—guidelines for ESG disclosures designed in collaboration with companies, investors, and regulators. And data providers should come to agreement on best practices and become as transparent as possible about their methodologies and the reliability of their data.     

Sustainability and Capital Markets—Are We There Yet?

The High Meadows Institute issued a report in 2016 called ‘Charting the Future of Capital Markets’ that surveyed the mainstream capital market ecosystem by soliciting the views and practices of its key stakeholders around the issue of long‐term value creation. In this follow‐up report, the authors report that much has changed during the past three years. The role of investors in proactively shaping corporate practices is gaining more attention as ESG issues and responsible investment have become mainstream concerns, as new responsible investment regulations and frameworks have been implemented, and as shifting demographics continue to pressure capital market participants and stakeholders to change their practices. At the same time, the report notes significant remaining challenges. The lack of a standard industry definition and framework for ESG data and reporting on ESG continues to be a significant impediment, as does the shortage of qualified ESG analysts and infrastructure to support true ESG integration. Surveys also suggest most corporate boards have yet to recognize the full significance of ESG integration or its value to the firm.     

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ROUNDTABLE ON: Enterprise‐Wide Risk Management

For many years, MBA students were taught that there was no good reason for companies that hedge large currency or commodity price exposures to have lower costs of capital, or trade at higher P/E multiples, than comparable companies that choose not to hedge such financial price risks. Corporate stockholders, just by holding well‐diversified portfolios, were said to neutralize any effects of currency and commodity price risks on corporate values. And corporate efforts to manage such risks were accordingly viewed as redundant, a waste of corporate resources on a function already performed by investors at far lower cost. But as this discussion makes clear, both the theory and the corporate practice of risk management have moved well beyond this perfect markets framework. The academics and practitioners in this roundtable begin by suggesting that the most important reason to hedge financial risks—and risk management's largest potential contribution to firm value—is to ensure a company's ability to carry out its strategic plan and investment policy. As one widely cited example, Merck's use of FX options to hedge the currency risk associated with its overseas revenues is viewed as limiting management's temptation to cut R&D in response to large currency‐related shortfalls in reported earnings. Nevertheless, one of the clear messages of the roundtable is that effective risk management has little to do with earnings management per se, and that companies that view risk management as primarily a tool for smoothing reported earnings have lost sight of its real economic function: maintaining access to low‐cost capital to fund long‐run investment. And a number of the panelists pointed out that a well‐executed risk management policy can be used to increase corporate debt capacity and, in so doing, reduce the cost of capital. Moreover, in making decisions whether to retain or transfer risks, companies should generally be guided by the principle of comparative advantage. If an outside firm or investor is willing to bear a particular risk at a lower price than the cost to the firm of managing that risk internally, then it makes sense to lay off that risk. Along with the greater efficiency and return on capital promised by such an approach, several panelists also pointed to one less tangible benefit of an enterprise‐wide risk management program—a significant improvement in the internal corporate dialogue, leading to a better understanding of all the company's risks and how they are affected by the interactions among its business units.     

ESG Integration in Investment Management: Myths and Realities

The number of public companies reporting ESG information grew from fewer than 20 in the early 1990s to 8,500 by 2014. Moreover, by the end of 2014, over 1,400 institutional investors that manage some $60 trillion in assets had signed the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI). Nevertheless, companies with high ESG “scores” have continued to be viewed by mainstream investors as unlikely to produce competitive shareholder returns, in part because of the findings of older studies showing low returns from the social responsibility investing of the 1990s. But studies of more recent periods suggest that companies with significant ESG programs have actually outperformed their competitors in a number of important ways. The authors’ aim in this article is to set the record straight on the financial performance of sustainable investing while also correcting a number of other widespread misconceptions about this rapidly growing set of principles and methods: Myth Number 1: ESG programs reduce returns on capital and long‐run shareholder value. Reality: Companies committed to ESG are finding competitive advantages in product, labor, and capital markets; and portfolios that have integrated “material” ESG metrics have provided average returns to their investors that are superior to those of conventional portfolios, while exhibiting lower risk. Myth Number 2: ESG is already well integrated into mainstream investment management. Reality: The UNPRI signatories have committed themselves only to adhering to a set of principles for responsible investment, a standard that falls well short of integrating ESG considerations into their investment decisions. Myth Number 3: Companies cannot influence the kind of shareholders who buy their shares, and corporate managers must often sacrifice sustainability goals to meet the quarterly earnings targets of increasingly short‐term‐oriented investors. Reality: Companies that pursue major sustainability initiatives, and publicize them in integrated reports and other communications with investors, have also generally succeeded in attracting disproportionate numbers of longer‐term shareholders. Myth Number 4: ESG data for fundamental analysis is scarce and unreliable. Reality: Thanks to the efforts of reporting and investor organizations such as SASB and Ceres, and of CDP data providers like Bloomberg and MSCI, much more “value‐relevant” ESG data on companies has become available in the past ten years. Myth Number 5: ESG adds value almost entirely by limiting risks. Reality: Along with lower risk and a lower cost of capital, companies with high ESG scores have also experienced increases in operating efficiency and expansions into new markets. Myth Number 6: Consideration of ESG factors might create a conflict with fiduciary duty for some investors. Reality: Many ESG factors have been shown to have positive correlations with corporate financial performance and value, prompting ERISA in 2015 to reverse its earlier instructions to pension funds about the legitimacy of taking account of “non‐financial” considerations when investing in companies.     

THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT: A DECADE OF INNOVATIONS IN PROCESS AND PRODUCTS

The explosion of corporate risk management programs in the early 1990s was a hasty and ill‐conceived reaction by U.S. corporations to the great “derivatives disasters” of that period. Anxious to avoid the fate of Barings and Procter & Gamble, most top executives were more concerned about crisis management than risk management. Many companies quickly installed (often outrageously priced) value‐at‐risk (VaR) systems without paying much attention to how such systems fit their specific business requirements. Focused myopically on loss avoidance and technical risk measurement issues, the corporate risk management revolution of the '90s thus got underway in a disorganized, ad hoc fashion, producing a curious amalgam of policies and procedures with no clear link to the corporate mission of maximizing value. But as the risk management revolution unfolded over the last decade, the result has been the “convergence” of different risk management perspectives, processes, and products. The most visible sign of such convergence is a fairly recent development called “alternative risk transfer,” or ART. ART forms consist of the large and growing collection of new risk transfer and financing products now being offered by insurance and reinsurance companies. As just one example, a new class of security known as “contingent capital” gives a company the option over a specified period—say, the next five years—to issue new equity or debt at a pre‐negotiated price. And to hold down their cost, such “pre‐loss” financing options are typically designed to be “triggered” only when the firm is most likely to need an infusion of new capital to avoid underinvestment or financial distress. But underlying—and to a large extent driving—this convergence of insurance and capital markets is a more fundamental kind of convergence: the integration of risk management with corporate financing decisions. As first corporate finance theorists and now practitioners have come to realize, decisions about a company's optimal capital structure and the design of its securities cannot be made without first taking account of the firm's risks and its opportunities for managing them. Indeed, this article argues that a comprehensive, value‐maximizing approach to corporate finance must begin with a risk management strategy that incorporates the full range of available risk management products, including the new risk finance products as well as established risk transfer instruments like interest rate and currency derivatives. The challenge confronting today's CFO is to maximize firm value by choosing the mixture of securities and risk management products and solutions that gives the company access to capital at the lowest possible cost.     

ESG performance and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from China

Corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) is vital for sustainable growth, while the motivation of corporate ESG engagement could decide whether ESG participation is green or greenwashing behavior. This paper attempts to understand the motivation of corporate ESG engagement from the firm's risk-taking perspective. Using Chinese publicly listed firm data from 2010 to 2020, we find that ESG rating significantly reduces corporate risk-taking. This finding still holds after a series of robustness tests to address potential endogeneity concerns and alternative risk-taking proxies. Furthermore, the marginal inhibitory impact of ESG on corporate risk-taking is more pronounced in firms with lower information transparency, weaker corporate governance and less external monitoring pressure. Our results shed essential insight on the trade-off between sustainable growth and corporate risk-taking behavior in a relatively weak investor protection institutional environment.     

The Real and Financial Implications of Corporate Hedging

We study the implications of hedging for corporate financing and investment. We do so using an extensive, hand‐collected data set on corporate hedging activities. Hedging can lower the odds of negative realizations, thereby reducing the expected costs of financial distress. In theory, this should ease a firm's access to credit. Using a tax‐based instrumental variable approach, we show that hedgers pay lower interest spreads and are less likely to have capital expenditure restrictions in their loan agreements. These favorable financing terms, in turn, allow hedgers to invest more. Our tests characterize two exact channels—cost of borrowing and investment restrictions—through which hedging affects corporate outcomes. The analysis shows that hedging has a first‐order effect on firm financing and investment, and provides new insights into how hedging affects corporate value. More broadly, our study contributes novel evidence on the real consequences of financial contracting.     

Sustainability at Walmart: Success over the Long Haul

At the core of Walmart's corporate purpose is the principle of “shared value.” The company views its mission as increasing the value of its business by helping to address important social needs. And in this article, Walmart's Senior Director of ESG discusses how the company applies the lens of shared value to three of its most significant ESG priorities: (1) economic opportunity for Walmart associates; (2) the sustainability of its supply chains, with an emphasis on the safety and livelihoods of workers; and (3) climate change, including the reduction of plastic waste. What's more, the company sees itself playing a role in transforming society through its own business practices. In reflecting on her decades of work in sustainability, the author emphasizes the value of and potential for greater stakeholder engagement and alliances of corporations with NGOs (like the World Wildlife and Environmental Defense Funds) that aim to help both lower‐income people and the environment at the same time. But the author's vision is even more ambitious: “In upholding and seeking to maximize its principle of shared value, Walmart aims not only to run a highly efficient all‐channel retail business, but to help bring about large‐scale and lasting improvements to all the social ecosystems whose functioning is part of and critical to that business.”     

The Value of Reputation in Corporate Finance and Investment Banking (and the Related Roles of Regulation and Market Efficiency)

This article explores the roles of reputation, efficient capital markets, and capital market regulation in preserving and creating economic value. Each of these three mechanisms serves as a substitute for the other two, with each playing a role in maintaining the credibility and reliability of markets. While efficient markets and effective regulation are market-wide phenomena that affect all firms, reputation is a firm-specific corporate asset. Companies develop reputational capital by treating customers and counterparties fairly (while forgoing the temptation to achieve short-term profits at their expense). At the same time, companies seeking access to the capital markets but lacking a reputation must typically employ reputational intermediaries. Investment banks, credit rating agencies, accounting firm s, law firms, and organized stock exchanges have all served as reputational intermediaries at various times during the last 200 years. One contributor to the recent financial crisis was a kind of experimentation by some reputational intermediaries with an opportunistic and two-tiered “customer differentiation” strategy in which some customers were treated very well, while others were treated with little or no regard for their legitimate expectations as to how they would be treated. This strategy has proved to be a failure, imposing significant costs on those organizations as well as their customers. The available substitutes for reputation, capital market effciency and effective regulation, did not provide sufcient offsetting protection for investors. While the two-tiered “customer differentiation” strategy has failed, the central message of the economic theory of reputation remains intact. This message is that a company's reputation is a valuable asset that must be preserved to ensure the future of the organization. For all financial intermediaries that rely heavily on their reputations when selling their products and services, the author recommends large and continuous investment in maintaining those reputations. For investment banks in particular—a group whose reputations have held up reasonably well—the author suggests that they continue to view their role as reputational intermediaries as a core part of their businesses.     

Private Equity 4.0: Using ESG to Create More Value with Less Risk

A growing number of private equity firms have responded to the increased focus on climate change, social issues, and technology disruption by broadening their corporate mission to encompass all important stakeholders, as well as their limited partners. And in the process, the management of ESG risks and pursuit of ESG opportunities have become increasingly fundamental to the staying power and value creation potential of PE firms by reducing the risk of their investments, discovering new sources of growth, and increasing their resilience to changes in the political and regulatory environment. This article tells the story of how the Nordic PE firm, Summa Equity, has turned its ESG approach into a core competence and a source of competitive advantage that has enabled the firm to distinguish itself from its competitors and bring about significant improvements in the financial performance of its portfolio companies while providing benefits for their stakeholders. Using the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals to guide them, the firm invests in companies they perceive to be addressing major environmental or social challenges in an innovative and commercially successful way. This has led to investments in significant growth opportunities in areas such as health care, education, waste management, and acqua‐culture. And the firm's returns to its investors have been high enough—and the perceived social benefits large enough—that the firm recently closed its second fund (which was significantly oversubscribed) for 650 million euros, and received the ESG award at the 2019 Private Equity Awards in London.     

How Companies Can Use Hedging to Create Shareholder Value

This article provides a framework for designing and evaluating corporate risk management and hedging programs. Corporate risk management has the potential to create substantial shareholder wealth by protecting companies from unexpected events that could force them to put their strategic investment plans on hold or even endanger their existence. However, assessing the performance of risk management, and how it is expected to increase the value of the enterprise, is a difficult undertaking because the costs of risk management tend to be much easier to quantify—indeed, they often appear directly on the firm's bottom line—than the benefits. The author begins by discussing how to evaluate the benefits and costs of a risk management program in general terms, and then focuses more directly on the assessment of corporate hedging programs, which are generally conducted with derivatives. In practice, there are many obstacles to designing and carrying out a successful hedging program. But one of the most common has been the tendency of top managements to insist that hedging programs be “costless.” The author argues that just as the purchase of fire insurance is not viewed as waste of funds or a bad investment if the insured house does not burn down, the use of derivatives in a well‐designed hedge should not be viewed as a mistake if the derivative position produces losses. To guard against this mistake, the people who design and implement risk management strategies must ensure that their CEOs and boards understand the possible outcomes of the strategy—including losses on derivatives position—and how the strategy itself increases the (expected) value of the firm. Further, management should attempt to communicate the principles underlying its risk management program and the value created by its hedging strategy to the investment community.