The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans

This study examines the effects of shareholder support for equity compensation plans on subsequent CEO compensation. Using cross‐sectional regression, instrumental variable, and regression discontinuity research designs, we find little evidence that either lower shareholder voting support for, or outright rejection of, proposed equity compensation plans leads to decreases in the level or composition of future CEO incentive compensation. We also find that, in cases where the equity compensation plan is rejected by shareholders, firms are more likely to propose, and shareholders are more likely to approve, a plan the following year. Our results suggest that shareholder votes for equity pay plans have little substantive impact on firms’ incentive compensation policies. Thus, recent regulatory efforts aimed at strengthening shareholder voting rights, particularly in the context of executive compensation, may have limited effect on firms’ compensation policies.     

Inflation Targeting Around the World

This paper examines the inflation record of twenty-nine inflation- and noninflation-targeting economies. Both industrial and emerging market economies are considered. Empirical evidence is based on a comparison of actual and forecasted inflation, an econometric analysis that estimates changes in inflation persistence, and an estimate of the probability of a breach in the inflation target as a proxy for the fragility of the targeting regime. I find that inflation persistence has fallen in only a handful of emerging market economies. However, the inflationtargeting regime is not especially fragile in emerging market economies. As these economies gain experience with inflation targets and respond appropriately to forecast errors generated by the private sector, the likelihood of breaches in the target ranges tends to fall.     

Debt Tax Shields Around the OECD World

Taxes affect a company’s optimal capital structure, value, and cost of capital, but their impact depends on the tax regime of the country where the company operates. The OECD classifies the tax regimes of its member countries in seven groups. In this paper we offer a general model that encompasses those seven groups. We show that tax benefits of debt vary significantly across tax systems, and that using either Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) or Miller’s (1977) formulas in other tax regimes can lead to quantitatively important mistakes. We also find a significantly positive relationship between average leverage in OECD countries and our indicator of tax shields.     

The Determinants of Long‐Term Corporate Debt Issuances

A significant proportion of the debt issued by investment‐grade firms has maturities greater than 20 years. In this paper we provide evidence that gap‐filling behavior is an important determinant of these very long‐term issues. Using data on individual corporate debt issues between 1987 and 2009, we find that gap‐filling behavior is more prominent in the very long end of the maturity spectrum where the required risk capital makes arbitrage costly. In addition, changes in the supply of long‐term government bonds affect not just the choice of maturity but also the overall level of corporate borrowing.     

Risk-Adjusted Performances of World Equity Indices

This article investigates whether equity indices of twenty-four emerging and twenty-eight developed markets compensate their investors equally after adjusting for total or downside risk, and examines the predictive power of reward-to-risk ratios for expected market returns. We find that when all fifty-two markets are ranked based on their alternative reward-to-risk ratios, almost all of the countries in the top (bottom) quartile are emerging (developed) markets. The pooled means of the reward-to-risk ratios are also significantly higher for emerging markets. Both portfolio and regressions analysis reveal that there is a significantly positive relation between various reward-to-risk metrics and expected market returns.     

The Effect of Voluntary Sell-off Announcements on Shareholder Wealth

Sell-off activities arise when a firm sells part of its assets (e.g., a segment, a division, etc.) but continues to exist in essentially the same form. This study investigates the effect of voluntary sell-offs on stock returns. From a sample of over 1000 sell-off events (first public announcements), the evidence shows that both sellers and buyers earn significant positive excess returns from these transactions. The excess returns earned by buyers are smaller than those earned by sellers. There is also evidence that sell-off announcements are preceded by a period of significant negative returns for the sellers which suggests that the sellers, on average, performed poorly prior to their sell-off activities.     

The Effect of Board Independence on Target Shareholder Wealth

We seek insights into whether, and if so how, an independent board enhances the bid premiums offered to target firm shareholders during a takeover. The results indicate that the presence of an independent board enhances the initial bid premium by, on average, 21.1%. However, the results of more refined analysis suggest that the enhanced bid premium is in fact driven by independent boards comprising non-executive directors who have reputation capital at stake. We also find that independent boards that resist takeovers or include voluntary independent expert reports in target statements, increase the bid premium revision by, on average, 15.6% and 16.2%, respectively.     

Shareholder Disputes and Commonality in Liquidity: Evidence from the Equity Markets in China

Asia-Pacific Financial Markets - This paper examines liquidity commonality is caused by correlation in institutional herding and shareholder disputes due to irrational investors over the period...     

私募股权投资业务发展

私募股权投资的简介 私募股权投资,即Private Equity,一般是指通过私募形式对私有企业,即非上市企业进行的权益性投资或者上市公司非公开交易股权投资的一种投资方式,并在交易实施过程中附带考虑了将来的退出机制,即通过上市、并购或管理层回购等方式,出售所持股份而获利.从国外私募股权投资基金的发展来看,主要有两类公司,第一类是独立的公司,其主要组织形式是有限合伙制;另一类称为"创新子公司",即金融公共机构(如证券公司、银行等)的内部PE投资部门或子公司.     

The Effect of Voluntary Spin-off Announcements on Shareholder Wealth

This paper presents estimates of the effect of a voluntary spin-off announcement on shareholder wealth. The results show that spin-off announcements have a positive influence on stock prices and that the relative increase in share price is greater for large spin-offs than for small ones.     

Board Structures Around the World: an Experimental Investigation

We model and experimentally examine the board structure–performancerelationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards,insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled boards. Wefind that even insider-controlled boards frequently adopt institutionallypreferred rather than self-interested policies. Two-tiered boardsadopt institutionally preferred policies more frequently buttend to destroy value by being too conservative, frequentlyrejecting good projects. Outsider-controlled single-tiered boards,both when they have multiple insiders and only a single insider,adopt institutionally preferred policies most frequently. Inthose board designs where the efficient Nash equilibrium producesstrictly higher payoffs to all agents than the coalition-proofequilibria, agents tend to select the efficient Nash equilibria.     

Electronic Finance: Reshaping the Financial Landscape Around the World

In recent years, the emergence of electronic finance—especially online banking and brokerage services, and new trading systems—has reshaped the financial landscape around the world. This paper reviews these developments and finds that they are greatly impacting the structure of and competition in financial services industries and will have a large impact on incumbents. Its assessment of how e-finance, and globalization more generally, affects countries highlights the need for changes in four financial sector policy areas—safety and soundness, competition policy, consumer and investor protection, and global public policies—to mitigate risks and reap as much as possible the potential benefits of e-finance.     

Shelf Registrations and Shareholder Wealth: A Comparison of Shelf and Traditional Equity Offerings

This study examines the effect of issuing common stock on shareholder wealth under two alternative methods of registration, shelf registration under the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 415 and the traditional method of registering shares for immediate sale. The stock price reactions accompanying security registrations and offerings over the period from March 1982 through November 1983 are examined for over two hundred issues. A negative price reaction is observed for traditional and shelf registrations for both utility and non-utility issuers. No statistically significant difference is observed between shelf and traditional registrations. Further negative price reactions precede the offerings of these securities.     

The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value

This paper investigates whether improvements in the firm's internal corporate governance create value for shareholders. We analyze the market reaction to governance proposals that pass or fail by a small margin of votes in annual meetings. This provides a clean causal estimate that deals with the endogeneity of internal governance rules. We find that passing a proposal leads to significant positive abnormal returns. Adopting one governance proposal increases shareholder value by 2.8%. The market reaction is larger in firms with more antitakeover provisions, higher institutional ownership, and stronger investor activism for proposals sponsored by institutions. In addition, we find that acquisitions and capital expenditures decline and long‐term performance improves.     

The Effect of Golden Parachutes on Shareholder Wealth and Takeover Probabilities

This study seeks to determine whether stockholders experience increases in wealth due to a company's adoption of a golden parachute and resulting increased takeover bid probability. Market reaction to golden parachute adoption is examined by employing event analysis, logit analysis and metric regression. Our findings indicate that the adoption of a golden parachute does not signify an increased probability of a takeover bid, and stockholders experience a decrease in wealth.     

Efficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and Markets Around the World

We analyze cross‐sectional and time‐series information from 46 equity markets around the world to consider whether short sales restrictions affect the efficiency of the market and the distributional characteristics of returns to individual stocks and market indices. We find some evidence that prices incorporate negative information faster in countries where short sales are allowed and practiced. A common conjecture by regulators is that short sales restrictions can reduce the relative severity of a market panic. We find strong evidence that in markets where short selling is either prohibited or not practiced, market returns display significantly less negative skewness.     

Shareholder Taxes in Acquisition Premiums: The Effect of Capital Gains Taxation

We exploit cross‐temporal differences in capital gains tax rates to test whether shareholder‐level capital gains taxes are associated with higher acquisition premiums for taxable acquisitions. We model acquisition premiums as a function of proxies for the capital gains taxes of target shareholders, taxability of the acquisition, and tax status of the price‐setting shareholder as represented by the level of target institutional ownership. Consistent with a lock‐in effect for acquisition premiums, results suggest a unique positive association between shareholder capital gains taxes for individual investors and acquisition premiums for taxable acquisitions, which is mitigated by target institutional ownership.     

最终控制人利益侵占的条件分析——对LLSV模型的扩展

本文以少数所有权控制结构(controlling minority structure)形成的最终控制人所有权与控制权分离为研究对象,通过对LLSV模型的扩展,分析最终控制人在什么条件下会实施侵占少数股东利益的经济行为。模型分析结果显示,投资者法律保护程度、相对所有权和相对投资收益率是最终控制人实施利益侵占与否以及利益侵占程度的重要影响因素。本文模型的分析结论与已有公司治理经验研究的发现一致。