Collusion and group lending with adverse selection

In an environment with correlated returns, this paper characterizes optimal lending contracts when the bank faces adverse selection and borrowers have limited liability. Group lending contracts are shown to be dominated by revelation mechanisms which do not use the ex post observability of the partners' performances. However, when collusion between borrowers under complete information is allowed, group lending contracts are optimal in the class of simple revelation mechanisms (which elicit only the borrower's own private information) and remain useful with extended revelation mechanisms.     

Microfinance Beyond Group Lending

Microlending is growing in Eastern Europe, Russia and China as a flexible means of widening access to financial services, both to help alleviate poverty and to encourage private-sector activity. We describe mechanisms that allow these programmes to successfully penetrate new segments of credit markets. These features include direct monitoring, regular repayment schedules, and the use of non-refinancing threats. These mechanisms allow the programmes to generate high repayment rates from low-income borrowers without requiring collateral and without using group lending contracts that feature joint liability.     

Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect

We look at an economic environment where borrowers have some information about the nature of each other's projects that lenders do not. We show that joint-liability lending contracts, similar to those used by credit cooperatives and group-lending schemes, will induce endogenous peer selection in the formation of groups in a way that the instrument of joint liability can be used as a screening device to exploit this local information. This can improve welfare and repayment rates if standard screening instruments such as collateral are unavailable.     

A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions

Summary. In simple models of borrowing and lending with ex-post asymmetric information, Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986) have shown that optimal debt contracts are simple debt contracts where borrowers repay a fixed interest rate whenever possible and lenders seize all the profit when borrowers default. In this note, we depart from their works by assuming that borrowers and lenders have heterogeneous beliefs, and show that simple debt contracts do not necessarily survive as optimal contracts.JEL Classification Numbers: G3, D8.     

Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information

We study a competitive credit market equilibrium in which all agents are risk neutral and lenders a priori unaware of borrowers' default probabilities. Admissible credit contracts are characterized by the credit granting probability, the loan quantity, the loan interest rate and the collateral required. The principal result is that in equilibrium lower risk borrowers pay higher interest rates than higher risk borrowers; moreover, the lower risk borrowers get more credit in equilibrium than they would with full information. No credit is rationed and collateral requirements are higher for the lower risk borrowers.     

Is Grameen Lending Efficient? Repayment Incentives and Insurance in Village Economies

Many believe that a key innovation by the Grameen Bank is to encourage borrowers to help each other in hard times. To analyse this, we study a mechanism design problem where borrowers share information about each other, but their limited side contracting ability prevents them from writing complete insurance contracts. We derive a lending mechanism which efficiently induces mutual insurance. It is necessary for borrowers to submit reports about each other to achieve efficiency. Such cross-reporting increases the bargaining power of unsuccessful borrowers, and is robust to collusion against the bank.     

Lending policies of informal, formal and semiformal lenders

This paper compares lending policies of formal, informal and semiformal lenders with respect to household lending in Vietnam. The analysis suggests that the probability of using formal or semiformal credit increases if borrowers provide collateral, a guarantor and/or borrow for business‐related activities. The probability of using informal credit increases for female borrowers. It also appears that the probability of using formal credit increases in household welfare up to a certain threshold, but at a decreasing rate. In addition, the paper discerns the determinants of probability of default across lender types. Default risk of formal credit appears to be strongly affected by formal loan contract terms, e.g., loan interest rate and form of loan repayment, whereas default risk on informal loans is significantly related to the presence of propinquity and other internal characteristics of the borrowing household. Overall, the study raises several important implications for the screening, monitoring and enforcement instruments that may be employed by different types of lenders.     

Securitization,Social Distance,and Financial Crises

Because the process of securitizing home mortgages played a critical role in precipitating the recent financial crisis, it is widely agreed that this market must be reformed to prevent future collapses. Most proposals focus on improving the dissemination of information among securitization participants, and on strengthening incentives to discourage excessive risk-taking. This paper argues that because securitization involves the commodification of the lending relationship, it reinforces the type of self-interested behavior that often undermines regulatory efforts. What are needed are structural reforms that encourage moral behavior by narrowing the social distance between lenders and borrowers. This can be accomplished by a return to traditional banking lending, supplemented by the use of covered bonds to loosen credit constraints and to help financial intermediaries manage market risk.     

Securitization,Social Distance,and Financial Crises

Because the process of securitizing home mortgages played a critical role in precipitating the recent financial crisis, it is widely agreed that this market must be reformed to prevent future collapses. Most proposals focus on improving the dissemination of information among securitization participants, and on strengthening incentives to discourage excessive risk-taking. This paper argues that because securitization involves the commodification of the lending relationship, it reinforces the type of self-interested behavior that often undermines regulatory efforts. What are needed are structural reforms that encourage moral behavior by narrowing the social distance between lenders and borrowers. This can be accomplished by a return to traditional banking lending, supplemented by the use of covered bonds to loosen credit constraints and to help financial intermediaries manage market risk.     

Deposit rate ceiling deregulation and mortgage innovation

In many countries household financing of housing purchases has assumed a special role and as a consequence constraints have been imposed on financial institutions and on financing contracts. In addition, of course, direct subsidization of housing is pervasive. In a macroeconomic environment with inflation and variable interest rates, the constraints sometimes lead to problems for lenders and borrowers. In the U.S. these problems have resulted in pressures to change the nature of the lending institution, the financial intermediation structure and/or the mortgage contract. This paper considers the use of new, innovative, mortgage contract designs as a method of portfolio diversification when thrift institutions face deposit-rate ceiling deregulation. Since thrift institutions have been more constrained than commercial banks, changing the constraints on the former may lead to behavioral changes by the latter. Alternative scenarios about commercial bank deposit rate behavior are examined. It is found that contracts exist that minimize savings reallocation toward commercial banks, thus protecting, in a sense, the specialized mortgage lending institutions (thrift institutions). These contracts also have nice properties for mortgagors during inflationary periods. However, it is also found that certain new mortgage contracts may protect thrift institutions without maintaining the historical flow of capital into the housing sector.     

Examining the effect of IMF conditionality on natural resource policy

Can International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending improve natural resource governance in borrowing countries? While most IMF agreements mandate policy reforms in exchange for financial support, compliance with these reforms is mixed at best. The natural resource sector should be no exception. After all, resource windfalls enable short-term increases in discretionary spending, and office-seeking politicians are often unwilling to forgo this discretion by reforming the oil, gas, or mining sector. I investigate how and when borrowers go against their political interests and establish natural resource funds—a tool often promoted by the IMF—in the wake of a loan agreement. Using text analysis, statistical models, and qualitative evidence from natural resource policy and IMF conditionality for 74 countries between 1980 and 2019, I show that borrowers under an IMF agreement are more likely to create or regulate a resource fund, particularly if the agreement includes binding conditions that highlight the salience of natural resource reforms. This study contributes to extant research by proposing a new method to extract information from IMF conditions, by introducing a novel dataset on country-level natural resource policy, and by identifying under what circumstances international reform efforts can help combat the resource curse.     

Is Crowdfunding Different? Evidence on the Relation between Gender and Funding Success from a German Peer‐to‐Peer Lending Platform

According to the literature on traditional banking, lenders often discriminate against female borrowers. However, studies of Peer‐to‐Peer lending in the United States find that female borrowers have better chances of obtaining funds than do males. We provide evidence on the success of female borrowers at a large German peer‐to‐peer lending platform. Our results show that there is no effect of gender on the individual borrower's chance to receive funds on this platform, ceteris paribus. Several robustness checks confirm this finding. Hence, female discrimination seems to be eased by the ‘wisdom of the lending crowd’.     

The desire for land: Strategic lending with adverse selection

This paper deals with a setting in which borrowers and lenders place different values on an asset that can be used as collateral. Under adverse selection, lenders may rationally choose credit contracts with the object of attracting a relatively risky group of clients, so raising their chances of gaining possession of the asset through default. Contracts of differing attractiveness to borrowers can also coexist in equilibrium. When an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ lender compete, the latter placing a lower value on the collateral, and their loanable funds are sufficiently limited, a separating equilibrium may exist in which the insider offers a contract which attracts risky borrowers, whereas the outsider's contract is aimed at a safer group. If loanable funds are ample, the only equilibrium will involve pooling contracts, but the insider may still offer more attractive contracts in an entry game.     

信息、非正规金融与中小企业融资

各种形式的非正规金融在发展中国家和地区广泛存在。本文认为,由于中小企业信息不透明,且常常不能提供充分的担保或抵押,正规金融机构难以有效克服信息不对称造成的逆向选择问题,而非正规金融则在收集关于中小企业的“软信息”方面具有优势。这种信息优势是非正规金融广泛存在的根本性原因,金融抑制只是一个强化因素,同时非正规金融市场的各种特征也都源于其存在的根本逻辑。本文构建了一个包括异质的中小企业借款者和异质的贷款者(具有不同信息结构的非正规金融和正规金融部门)的金融市场模型,证明非正规金融的存在能够改进整个信贷市场的资金配置效率。     

When is the optimal lending contract in microfinance state non-contingent?

Whether a microfinance institution should use a state-contingent repayment or not is very important since a state-contingent loan can provide insurance for borrowers. However, the classic Grameen bank used state non-contingent repayment, which is puzzling since it forces poor borrowers to make their payments even under hard circumstances. This paper provides an explanation to this puzzle. We consider two modes of lending, group and individual lending, and for each mode we characterize the optimal lending and supervisory contracts when a staff member (a supervisor) can embezzle borrowers’ repayments by misrepresenting realized returns. We identify the main trade-off between the insurance gain and the cost of controlling the supervisor's misbehavior. We also find that group lending dominates individual lending either by providing more insurance or by saving audit costs.     

Information, Informal Finance, and SME Financing

Informal finance exists extensively and has been playing an important role in small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing in developing economies. This paper tries to rationalize the extensiveness of informal finance. SME financing suffers more serious information asymmetry to the extent that most SMEs are more opaque and can only provide less collateral. Informal lenders have an advantage over formal financial institutions in collecting “soft information” about SME borrowers. This paper establishes a model including formal and informal lenders and high- and low-risk borrowers with or without sufficient collateral and shows that the credit market in which informal finance is eliminated will allocate funds in some inefficient way, and the efficiency of allocating credit funds can be improved once informal finance is allowed to coexist with formal finance. Translated from Economic Research Journal, 2005, 7 (in Chinese)     

EFFICIENCY AND BARGAINING POWER IN THE INTERBANK LOAN MARKET

Using detailed transactions‐level data on interbank loans, we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market and the bargaining power of its participants. Our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core, which imposes a set of no‐arbitrage conditions on trades in the market. For Canada's Large Value Transfer System, we show that although the market is fairly efficient, systemic inefficiency persists throughout our sample. The level of inefficiency matches distinct phases of both the Bank of Canada's operations as well as phases of the 2007–8 financial crisis. We find that bargaining power tilted sharply toward borrowers as the financial crisis progressed and (surprisingly) toward riskier borrowers.     

基于K-S检验与距离相关分析的网络借贷信用评价指标体系构建

网络借贷作为一种新型互联网金融模式,提升了金融资源使用效率,缓解了小企业融资难的困局。构建合理的网络借贷信用评价指标体系,从而对网络借贷的潜在风险及时甄别与预防,对互联网金融健康持续发展意义重大。本文根据K-S检验与距离相关分析相结合,筛选对借款客户违约状态甄别能力强的指标,建立了网络借贷信用评价指标体系,通过P2P网络借贷(peer to peer lending,个人对个人借贷)平台LendingClub交易数据进行实证研究,结果表明:不仅借款金额、借款利率等借款标的特征对借贷者违约具有显著相关性,借款者年龄等个人特征、借款者年收入等财务特征以及借款者违约次数等信用特征均对借贷者违约风险产生显著影响。投资者在出借资金时,往往青睐于已婚、年龄适中、具有一定工作经历、历史违约次数较少的借款人。因此,风险监管部门应构建网络借贷违约风险评估模型,对P2P平台进行风险监测,同时建立关键信息共享机制,融合多源数据,明确审查范围,实现P2P网络借贷行业健康有序发展。     

Credit Rationing, Group Lending and Optimal Group Size

I develop a model of credit rationing with effort unobservable by lenders where borrowers can choose among projects of different riskiness. In such a set-up rationing that can be relaxed if borrowers put up physical collateral arises. Group lending proves to be a possible means to relax rationing and improve efficiency when physical collateral is not available. The optimal size of groups is here analysed as a function of social factors. It turns out that groups can be neither too small nor too large because in both cases the effectiveness of social sanctions on behaviour is too low to offset the negative effect on effort due to profit sharing and free riding. Individual sensitivity to social sanctions is the crucial element determining whether groups can be formed or not.     

On the Coexistence of Banks and Markets*

We examine the coexistence of banks and financial markets by studying a credit market where the qualities of investment projects are not observable and the investment decisions of entrepreneurs are not contractible. Standard banks can alleviate moral‐hazard problems, while financial markets operated by investment banks can alleviate adverse‐selection problems. In competition, standard banks are forced to increase repayments, since financial markets can attract the highest‐quality borrowers. This, in turn, increases the share of shirkers and may make lending unprofitable for standard banks. The coexistence of financial markets and standard banks is socially inefficient. The same inefficiency may occur with the entrance of sophisticated banks, operating with a combination of rating and ongoing monitoring technologies.