A Note on Selecting a Response Measure for Financial Distress

Since 1966, researchers have examined financial distress prediction models to determine the usefulness of accounting information to lenders. These researchers primarily used legal bankruptcy as the response variable for economic financial distress, or included legal bankruptcy with other events in dichotomous prediction models. However, theoretical models of financial distress normally define financial distress as an economic event, the inability to pay debts when due (insolvency). This study uses a loan default/accommodation response variable as a proxy for the inability to pay debts when due. The purpose of this note is to empirically test whether or not using the inability of a firm to pay debts when due, loan default/accommodation, as a response measure produces different results than using legal bankruptcy as the response measure. The study's empirical results show that legal bankruptcy and loan default/accommodation financial distress prediction models produce different statistical results, thus suggesting that the responses measure different constructs. A loan default/accommodation model also fits the data better than a bankrupt model. Our results suggest that a loan default/accommodation response may be a more appropriate measure to determine which accounting information is most useful to lenders in evaluating a firm's credit risk.     

Strategic Bankruptcies and Price Reactions to Bankruptcy Filings

This study investigates whether the stock market differentiates between firms that file bankruptcy petitions for strategic reasons and firms that file bankruptcy petitions for financial reasons. We perform both univariate and regression tests on a sample of 245 firms that filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions between 1981 and 1996. After controlling for bankruptcy outcome, probability of bankruptcy, firm financial condition, and firm size, we find that, in the period around bankruptcy filing, firms that file bankruptcy petitions for financial reasons have significantly larger stock price declines than firms that file bankruptcy petitions for strategic reasons.     

增发融资市场运行中的问题及制度完善研究

目前中国增发融资出现了市场融资功能错位、发行监管效率不高、发行折价幅度偏大、内幕交易和利益输送频发以及信息披露不完善等问题。借鉴国外成熟市场制度,从上市审核、发行主体、发行定价、发行对象、流动性限制、信息披露制度等方面完善中国增发融资市场的相关制度,从而提高市场的运行效率。     

Valuing Debt in a Complex Capital Structure

This article extends previous bond valuation models to account for more realistic assumptions regarding financial distress. Realized value of an individual bond under severe financial distress will reflect the expected outcome of credit-event negotiations and the relative priority listing of the security. We explicitly represent the probability rate of credit-event occurrence as a function of firm value relative to the fixed overall debt obligations of the firm. Risk premiums generated under reasonable parameter value choices fall within the range of observed bond risk premiums. Our model also provides an explanation as to why observed bond risk premia are positive after adjustment for default.     

Employee Relations and the Likelihood of Occurrence of Corporate Financial Distress

Abstract:   In this paper, we investigate the association of employee relations with the occurrence of onset of financial distress. We argue that if adverse economic conditions arise, firms that have maintained good employee relations will be more effective in obtaining temporary labor concessions. As a result, firms with good employee relations, to the extent they are dependent on labor in the conduct of business operations, should be more likely to avoid the onset of future financial distress. The empirical findings we document support this prior.     

Incomplete contracts,renegotiation, and the choice between bank loans and public debt issues

In a two-period model where an investment project is funded with standard debt, the probability distribution of final cash flow is determined, at the interim date, by an unverifiable state of nature together with a choice by the controlling party (entrepreneur or creditor). With a control allocation contingent on a noisy default signal, renegotiation may improve efficiency in two ways: (i) reduce excessive risk-taking – due to the entrepreneur's moral hazard – through debt forgiveness; (ii) avoid the costs of financial distress associated with excessive liquidation or underinvestment by debt-holders, by letting them receive an equity stake in the firm. Such efficiency gain is an advantage of bank loans over publicly traded debt, given that the former are more easily renegotiated than the latter. The difference between the two types of debt is increasing in the degree of contractual incompleteness (noise present in the default signal) and in the portion of project value accounted for by future discretionary investment options.     

An Analysis of the Underreported Magnitude of the Total Indirect Costs of Financial Distress

In this paper we examine 1,041 ongoing firms over the time period 1982–92. Using quarterly data for the detection and measurement of the magnitude of the indirect costs of financial distress, we find three important explanatory factors: (a) the distinctiveness of the pattern of increasing financial distress over time, (b) the degree of leverage in the capital structure and (c) the size of the firm. For those firms with a distinctive pattern of increasing financial distress over time, the average annual losses as a percentage of market value is –10.3%. The maximum loss is –76%. Even if the firm never fails, its market value can be severely impacted by the presence of the indirect costs of bankruptcy over time. This study finds a significantly positive relationship between Altman's Z-score and the firm capital investment growth rate. This relation holds after controlling for other variables such as leverage, firm size and market/book ratio. This implies that lost investment opportunities may be also an important part of the total indirect costs of financial distress, which appear now to be much larger than previously recorded.     

Political Connections and Government Subsidies: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms in China

Previous studies report mixed evidence regarding the effect of political connections on firm value. We seek new evidence in China, an important emerging market with a hallmark of a relationship-based economy. Using financially distressed firms (special treatment or ST firms) as a unique sample, we identify a direct channel through which political connections enhance firm value by showing that politically connected firms receive more government subsidies. Moreover, such effect becomes stronger for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for firms with a better chance of survival, and after the government implemented a new policy to more strictly enforce the delisting in 2012.     

The Relevance of Stock and Flow-Based Reporting Information In Assessing the Likelihood of Emergence from Corporate Financial Distress

A number of recent studies have shown that earnings information is less useful and value relevant when firms are financially troubled. This finding has given rise to the consideration of alternatives. In this paper, we examine the contributions of book value-based proxies (normal earnings and abandonment value) and flow-based proxies (earnings and operating accruals) to the assessment of the likelihood of emergence from financial distress. Our prior reasoning is that while book value-based proxies may provide information about potential future cash resources, flow-based proxies, because they capture the progress of reorganization efforts underway, as opposed to mere potential, should be relatively more useful in assessing the likelihood of emergence from distress. Our findings are consistent with this explanation. We document that the primary predictors of emergence are flow-based proxies—in particular, cash from operations, net of earnings.     

Sound Money and Sound Financial Policy

Anna Schwartz has long promoted a policy of stable money. She also has advocated sound financial policy. The financial environment, according to her work, is strongly influenced by the degree of aggregate price stability. In this article historical evidence for the U.S. is presented that shows a strong association between aggregate price movements and measures of financial distress. Even in an environment of aggregate price stability in the face of shocks, however, a monetary authority should follow the financial policies of a lender of last resort as advocated over a century ago by Walter Bagehot—to promote adequate funds to allay the public's demand for means of payment in the face of a real financial crisis. Other circumstances involving asset market reversals that Schwartz calls pseudo crises should not be the subject of the monetary authorities' actions.     

Asset Liquidity,Moral Hazard,and Bank Loan Rescheduling

We analyze the bank's decision to reschedule or to foreclose on a loan in default and the borrower's decision to divert lender-financed assets to personal use, i.e., to consume the assets. We show that the debt of borrowers in financial distress that have substantial intangible or highly specialized assets—i.e., illiquid assets—is likely to be rescheduled. Alternatively, banks will likely foreclose on borrowers in distress that have assets that are difficult to monitor. It is the interaction of the asset's liquidity and the borrower moral hazard that helps determine the nature of the equilibrium. When the condition of the borrower upon default is observable, we find that suboptimal foreclosures are possible but reschedulings are always optimal; when the borrower's condition is private information, however, reschedulings may also be suboptimal. Additionally, borrowers whose lenders foreclose are more impaired then those whose debt is rescheduled. Finally, we show that randomization of the rescheduling/foreclosure decision by the bank and the decision to consume by the borrower may be optimal for particular assets.     

Share Holder Wealth Effects of Corporate Selloffs: Impact of Growth Opportunities, Economic Cycle and Bargaining Power

Most of the existing empirical evidence on corporate selloffs documents significant wealth gains for the seller's shareholders. We investigate the sources of these wealth gains by examining the impact of business and financial strategy, the economic environment during selloff, and the bargaining advantages of the seller including information asymmetry. We find evidence that sellers with growth opportunities and financially strong sellers enjoy higher returns. Selloffs during recessions generate larger wealth gains than those during economic boom. Information asymmetry due to the buyer's location being different from the purchased division's gives the seller a bargaining advantage leading to larger wealth gains. Relatively large divestments are more beneficial to seller shareholders than small ones. The study highlights the importance of both firm specific and environmental factors in explaining the wealth gains associated with corporate selloffs.