HOW TO FIX ACCOUNTING—MEASURE AND REPORT ECONOMIC PROFIT

Bending accounting rules has become so ingrained in our corporate culture that even ethical business leaders succumb to the temptation to “manage” their earnings in order to meet analysts' demands for smoothly rising results. The author of this article argues that such behavior reflects not a general decline in ethical standards so much as executives' growing sense that accounting itself has become “unhinged from value.” For example, clearly valuable expenditures on R&D, customer acquisition, and employee training are generally expensed immediately against earnings. And reported corporate income is often further reduced by provisions for losses that most companies never expect to incur, by “book” taxes they never expect to pay, and by depreciation charges on assets that are actually increasing in value. At the same time, the opportunity costs associated with employee stock options and the corporate use of equity capital are not reflected in the accountant's measure of profit. To improve the quality of corporate governance and revitalize the public's faith in reported earnings, the author proposes a complete overhaul of GAAP accounting to measure and report economic profit, or EVA. Stated in brief, the author's concept of economic profit begins with an older, but now seldom used, definition of accounting income known as “residual income,” and then proposes a series of additional adjustments to GAAP accounting that are designed to produce a reliable measure of a company's annual, sustainable cash‐generating capacity. Besides expensing the cost of equity capital as well as stock options, the author recommends bringing off‐balance‐sheet items such as pension assets and liabilities back onto the balance sheet, eliminating reserve accounting, capitalizing R&D and other expenditures on intangible assets, and recording economic rather than accounting depreciation. Such changes, by replacing the accountants' current flawed definition of earnings with a comprehensive new statement of value added, could restore investor confidence in financial statements. Even more important, managers would be less likely to pursue their now common practice of boosting earnings by making value‐reducing operating and investment decisions and more likely to use financial reporting not to mislead the market but as an opportunity to communicate relevant, forward‐looking information.     

EVA,not EBITDA: A New Financial Paradigm for Private Equity Firms

Private equity firms have boomed on the back of EBITDA. Most PE firms use it as their primary measure of value, and ask the managers of their portfolio companies to increase it. Many public companies have decided to emulate the PE firms by using EBITDA to review performance with investors, and even as a basis for determining incentive pay. But is the emphasis on EBITDA warranted? In this article, the co‐founder of Stern Stewart & Co. argues that EVA offers a better way. He discusses blind spots and distortions that make EBITDA highly unreliable and misleading as a measure of normalized, ongoing profitability. By comparing EBITDA with EVA, or Economic Value Added, a measure of economic profit net of a full cost‐of‐capital charge, Stewart demonstrates EVA's ability to provide managers and investors with much more clarity into the levers that are driving corporate performance and determining intrinsic market value. And in support of his demonstration, Stewart reports the finding of his analysis of Russell 3000 public companies that EVA explains almost 20% more than EBITDA of their changes in value, while at the same time providing far more insight into how to improve those values.     

Why EVA Bonus Plans Failed—and How to Revive Them

Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure their financial performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings growth may come at the expense of future earnings through, say, shortsighted cutbacks in corporate investment, including R&D or advertising. But growth in earnings per share can also be achieved by “overinvesting”—that is, committing ever more capital to projects with expected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, exceed the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance, and often fails to motivate corporate managers who believe that meeting consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA often doesn't work well because increases in current EVA often come with reduced expectations of future EVA improvement—and reductions in current EVA are often accompanied by increases in future growth values. Since EVA bonus plans reward current EVA increases without taking account of changes in expected future growth values, they have the potential to encourage margin improvement that comes at the expense of business growth and discourage positive‐NPV investments that, because of longer‐run payoffs, reduce current EVA. In this article, the author demonstrates the possibility of overcoming such short‐termism by developing an operating model of changes in future growth value that can be used to calibrate “dynamic” EVA improvement targets that more closely align EVA bonus plan payouts with investors’ excess returns. With the use of “dynamic” targets, margin improvements that come at the expense of business growth can be discouraged by raising EVA performance targets, while growth investments can be encouraged by the use of lower EVA targets.     

Incentives and Investor Expectations

This article argues that the Expectations‐Based Management (EBM) measure proposed by Copeland and Dolgoff (in the previous article) is essentially the same measure that EVA companies have used for years as the basis for performance evaluation and incentive compensation. After pointing out that the analyst‐based measures cited by Copeland and Dolgoff do not provide a basis for a workable compensation plan, the authors present the outline of a widely used expectations‐based EVA bonus plan. In so doing, they demonstrate the two key steps in designing such a plan: (1) using a company's “Future Growth Value”—the part of its current market value that cannot be accounted for by its current earnings— to calibrate the series of annual EVA “improvements” expected by the market; and (2) determining the executive's share of those improvements and thus of the company's expected “excess” return. One of the major objections to the use of EVA, or any single‐period measure, as the basis for a performance evaluation and incentive comp plan is its inability to reflect the longer‐run consequences of current investment and operating decisions. The authors close by presenting a solution to this “delayed productivity of capital” problem in the form of an internal accounting approach for dealing with acquisitions and other large strategic investments.     

What Determines TSR

Researchers have long wrestled with the question of what determines a company's total shareholder return, or TSR, and their results have been decidedly mixed. Some empirical studies come down in favor of dividends or earnings per share, while others favor return on capital or other profitability measures. In this article, the author takes a “first principles” approach that begins by demonstrating that TSR should be a function of a company's economic profit, or its Economic Value Added (or EVA). He shows that, from a theoretical standpoint, the sum of dividends and share price appreciation—which is the definition of TSR—is ultimately a function of increasing EVA and, along with it, a company's “aggregate NPV.” He further shows that if stock prices are determined by discounting expected cash flows, corporate NPV will equal the discounted value of EVA, and increasing NPV will come down to increasing EVA. In developing his argument, the author demonstrates that TSR is actually a leveraged version of a measure he calls “TIR,” or total investor return, which is the blended return that an investor would earn from owning the entire capital structure of a company, bonds as well as stock. He then presents the findings of regression analysis showing that a company's TIR and TSR are both strongly positively correlated with its EVA performance plus the change in its aggregate NPV (with R²s equal to 1.0 and 0.94, respectively). In a final step, the author shows that the change in EVA provides a better statistical explanation than other financial measures for changes in aggregate NPV and, hence, actual TSR     

EVA® FOR BANKS: VALUE CREATION, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND PROFITABILITY MEASUREMENT

This article presents a complete ranking of America's 100 largest bank holding companies according to their shareholder value added. This research, the first of its kind for the banking industry, defines an EVA measurement for banks and presents evidence of EVA's stronger correlation with bank market values than traditional accounting measures like ROA and ROE. Besides developing EVA and MVA as analytical tools for viewing the economic performance of the organization from a shareholder perspective, the authors also present a framework for calculating EVA at all levels of the organization, including lines of business, functional departments, products, customer segments, and customer relationships. The implementation of an EVA profitability measurement system at the business unit (or lower) level requires methods for three critical tasks: (1) transfer pricing of funds; (2) allocation of indirect expenses; and (3) allocation of economic capital. Although solutions to the first two are fairly straightforward, the allocation of capital to business units is a major challenge for banks today. In contrast to the complex, “bottom-up” approach used by a number of large banks in implementing their RAROC systems, the authors propose a greatly simplified, “top-down” approach that requires calculation of only the volatility of a business's operating profit (or NOPAT). The advantage of using NOPAT volatility is that it allows EVA analysis at any level of the organization in a way that captures the volatility effects from all sources of risk (credit, interest rates, liquidity, or operations). While such a top-down approach is clearly not meant to take the place of a comprehensive, bottom-up RAROC analysis, it is intended to provide a complement–a high-level “check” on the detailed, bottom-up risk management procedures and controls now in place at most banks. Moreover, for those banks that have developed extensive funds transfer pricing, cost allocation, and RAROCstyle capital allocation systems, the EVA financial management system can either be integrated with those systems or serve as an independent economic assessment of the bank's business risks and returns.     

A Better Way to Measure Operating Performance (or Why the EVA Math Really Matters)

Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure operating performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings can come at the expense of future earnings through, for example, short‐sighted cutbacks in investment, including spending on R&D. But growth in EPS can also be achieved by investing more capital with projected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, are higher than the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem with earnings because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance—and often fails to provide the intended incentives for the (many) corporate managers who believe that meeting current consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA doesn't work well when new investments take time to become profitable because the higher capital charge comes before the related income. In this article, the author presents two new operating performance measures that are likely to work better than either earnings or EVA because they reflect the value that can be lost either through corporate underinvestment or overinvestment designed to increase current earnings. Both of these new measures are based on the math that ties EVA to discounted cash flow value, particularly its division of current corporate market values into two components: “current operations value” and “future growth value.” The key to the effectiveness of the new measures in explaining changes in company stock prices and market values is a statistical model of changes in future growth value that captures the expected effects of significant increases in current investment in R&D and advertising on future profits and value.     

A Look Back at Merton Miller's “Financial Markets and Economic Growth”

The author begins by agreeing with Miller's characterization of the fragility of U.S. banks and of the shortcomings of the Asian model of bank finance‐driven growth. The article also expresses “emphatic agreement” with Miller's arguments that the protection of banks through deposit insurance, regulatory forbearance, and other forms of “bailout” have created costly moral‐hazard problems that encourage excessive risk‐taking. And the author endorses, at least in principle, Miller's main argument that the development of capital markets that do not require the direct involvement of banks should make economies if not less prone to financial crises, then at least more resilient in recovering from them. But having acknowledged the limitations of bank‐centered systems and the value of developing non‐bank alternatives for savers and corporate borrowers, the author goes on to point to the surprising durability of some banking systems outside the U.S.—notably Canada's, which has not experienced major problems since the 1830s. And even more important, the author views banks and capital markets not as “substitutes” for one another, but as mutually dependent “complements” whose interdependencies and interactions must be recognized by market participants and regulators alike.     

The Evolution of Executive Pay Policy at General Motors, 1918–2008

This article documents the gradual movement of General Motors away from the partnership concept that dominated U.S. corporate pay policy in the first half of the 20th century and toward the “competitive pay” concepts that have prevailed since then. The partnership concept was achieved by paying managers bonuses in the form of GM shares, with the amounts paid out of a single company‐wide bonus pool and based on a fixed share of profit (after subtracting a charge for the cost of capital). Thanks to this “EVA‐like” bonus scheme, GM's managers effectively became “partners” with the company's shareholders, sharing the wealth in good times but also the pain in troubled times. What's more, the authors also show that, from the establishment of the program in 1918 through the 1950s, the directors went to great lengths—including several bouts of innovative (and often complex) problem‐solving—to achieve their compensation objectives while maintaining such fixed‐share bonuses. But the sharing philosophy and associated compensation practices were gradually supplanted by competitive pay practices from the 1960s onward. The authors show that by the late 1970s, GM had a board of directors with modest shareholdings, in contrast to the board in the early post‐war period, whose directors had large stakes. As a consequence, directors began acting less like stewards of capital and more like employees whose financial rewards came not from returns on GM's stock but from the fees they received for their services. This fundamental change in board compensation almost certainly contributed to the gradual abandonment of fixed‐profit sharing for GM's managers. In its place, the board implemented competitive pay policies that, while coming to dominate executive pay policy in the U.S. and abroad, have largely divorced executive pay from changes in shareholder wealth. In the case of GM, this growing separation of pay from performance was accompanied by a significant decline in corporate returns on operating capital as well as stock returns over time.     

Enterprise Risk Management: Theory and Practice

The Chief Risk Officer of Nationwide Insurance teams up with a distinguished academic to discuss the benefits and challenges associated with the design and implementation of an enterprise risk management program. The authors begin by arguing that a carefully designed ERM program—one in which all material corporate risks are viewed and managed within a single framework—can be a source of long‐run competitive advantage and value through its effects at both a “macro” or company‐wide level and a “micro” or business‐unit level. At the macro level, ERM enables senior management to identify, measure, and limit to acceptable levels the net exposures faced by the firm. By managing such exposures mainly with the idea of cushioning downside outcomes and protecting the firm's credit rating, ERM helps maintain the firm's access to capital and other resources necessary to implement its strategy and business plan. At the micro level, ERM adds value by ensuring that all material risks are “owned,” and risk‐return tradeoffs carefully evaluated, by operating managers and employees throughout the firm. To this end, business unit managers at Nationwide are required to provide information about major risks associated with all new capital projects—information that can then used by senior management to evaluate the marginal impact of the projects on the firm's total risk. And to encourage operating managers to focus on the risk‐return tradeoffs in their own businesses, Nationwide's periodic performance evaluations of its business units attempt to refl ect their contributions to total risk by assigning risk‐adjusted levels of “imputed” capital on which project managers are expected to earn adequate returns. The second, and by far the larger, part of the article provides an extensive guide to the process and major challenges that arise when implementing ERM, along with an account of Nationwide's approach to dealing with them. Among other issues, the authors discuss how a company should assess its risk “appetite,” measure how much risk it is bearing, and decide which risks to retain and which to transfer to others. Consistent with the principle of comparative advantage it uses to guide such decisions, Nationwide attempts to limit “non‐core” exposures, such as interest rate and equity risk, thereby enlarging the firm's capacity to bear the “information‐intensive, insurance‐ specific” risks at the core of its business and competencies.     

Should Asset Managers Hedge Their “Fees at Risk”?

Although the recent financial crisis afflicted all asset managers, the problem of general market exposure was in some respects worse for the long-only funds that rely almost completely on asset-based fees than for the “absolute return” and other kinds of hedge funds that also receive performance-based fees. While the revenue generated by performance-based fees is expected to be volatile, asset-based fees tend to be viewed as an “annuity” stream that involves little or no earnings risk. But, especially in the case of long-only funds, large shortfalls in asset fees were caused by the combination of significant redemptions and sharp reductions in assets under management that accompanied the plunge in asset prices. In this article, the author attempts to quantify the expected effect of market fluctuations on the asset fees and profitability of long-only asset managers. Having done so, he then argues that traditional long-only asset managers—managers whose only reason for being is their ability to generate above-market returns (or “alpha”) on a fairly consistent basis—routinely retain too much beta risk in their primarily asset-based fee structures. The author offers two main reasons for long-only asset managers to hedge beta risk: (1) it would reduce the need for fund management firms to hold liquid capital to ensure solvency and fund important projects during market downturns; (2) it would provide the firm's current and prospective clients with a clearer signal of whether its managers are succeeding in the firm's mission of generating alpha, as well as the possibility of more equity-like and cost-effective incentive compensation systems for those managers.     

A Tale of Leadership in Value Creation

In this prologue to his new book, Curing Corporate Short‐Termism, the founder and CEO of Fortuna Advisors presents a fictional account of a corporate turnaround—a “composite” reflection of the author's many years of consulting experience that dramatizes the pressure to meet near‐term earnings targets and other kinds of “agency” problems facing a public company called Blue Dynamics Corp. The tale begins with the puzzlement of the incoming CEO, Betty Manning, at finding the company's highest‐return business unit starved for investment, even as the low‐return units continue to receive and spend capital with little success. At the core of the company's capital allocation and “underinvestment” problems, she finds a corporate‐wide performance measurement and reward system focused on setting and beating budgets and growth in EPS and ROE. Manning's solution is to divorce the performance and reward system entirely from the budgeting process and implement new annual incentives and target‐setting practices that result in both more reliable budgeting and forecasting and a longer‐term view of value creation. The new measure of economic profit, called BDVA (short for Blue Dynamics Value Added), is based on a customized measure of EBITDA less a capital charge. The adoption of the new measure has the effect of encouraging her team to take a number of decisive steps: make an objective, “fact‐based” case for a strategic acquisition whose price appears to be too high (at least using conventional measures like EPS accretion); pull the trigger on a divestment that appears to have been adding value, but is more valuable outside the firm; and, more generally and most important, guide operating managers toward an ideal balance of overall growth and return on capital.     

EVA AND THE "NEW ECONOMY"

Some have observed that the new economy means the end of the EVA performance measurement and incentive compensation system. They claim that although the EVA system is useful for oldline companies with heavy investments in fixed assets, the efficient management of investor capital is no longer an imperative for newage firms that operate largely without buildings and machinery–and, in some cases, with negative working capital. This article argues that EVA is not only suitable for the emerging companies that lead the new economy, but even more important for such firms than for their “rust belt” predecessors. While there may be a new economy in terms of trade in new products and services, there is no new economics– the principles of economic valuation remain the same. As in the past, companies will create value in the future only insofar as they promise to produce returns on investor capital that exceed the cost of capital. It has made for sensational journalism to speak of companies with high valuations and no earnings, but this is in large part the result of an accounting framework that is systematically flawed. New economy companies spend much of their capital on R&D, marketing, and advertising. By treating these outlays as expenses against current profits, GAAP accounting presents a grossly distorted picture of both current and future profitability. By contrast, an EVA system capitalizes such investments and amortizes them over their expected useful life. For new economy companies, the effect of such adjustments on profitability can be significant. For example, in applying EVA accounting to Real Networks, Inc., the author shows that although the company reported increasing losses in recent years, its EVA has been steadily rising–a pattern of profitability that corresponds much more directly to the change in the company's market value over the same period. Thus, for stock analysts that follow new economy companies, the use of EVA will get you closer to current market values than GAAP accounting. And for companies intent on ensuring the right level of investment in intangibles– neither too much nor too little– EVA is likely to send the right message to managers and employees. The recent decline in the Nasdaq suggests that stock market investors are starting to look for the kind of capital efficiency encouraged by an EVA system.     

China Adopts EVA: An Essential Step in the Great Leap Forward*

At the start of 2010, the Central SASAC initiated a three‐year “Performance Assessment Policy” that has the potential to transform Chinese business practices. Since 2010, return on capital has been a major criterion in the performance evaluation and compensation of the senior managements of the 100 largest Chinese state‐owned enterprises. Although sales growth will still count for 60% of executive assessment, 40% will be determined by a simplified version of EVA, or Economic Value Added. The guiding principle behind the new policy is simple and straightforward: Executives of state‐owned enterprises are now being asked to manage capital more efficiently than they have in the past—and in much the same way that private enterprises are now expected to do. Observers might be inclined to downplay this change. The assessed cost for capital, at 5.5%, is well below the market's required rate of return. And SASAC may not allow the firms to close plants, make positions redundant, and lay off employees. Veteran managers may try to outlive the interest in EVA, expecting SASAC's new standards to be unenforced. But SASAC's leaders expect a few pioneering companies to take the framework farther than the guidelines demand. To the extent they succeed in creating value for their shareholders, these companies could help bring about important change at many other Chinese companies.     

EVA IN THE E&P INDUSTRY: THE CASE OF NUEVO ENERGY

This article presents a case study illustrating some aspects of the new business model discussed in the roundtable above. Continuing a major theme in the roundtable, the authors begin by arguing that the long‐run failure of the E&P industry to create shareholder wealth stems to a large degree from weak or distorted incentives held out to the top executives and managers of most large, publicly traded companies. This article traces the incentive problem to the lack of an effective wealth creation metric to guide the financial management process. Although the industry employs a variety of accounting‐based performance measures, none is a reliable measure of wealth creation. In place of traditional financial metrics such as earnings, annual cash flow, and return on capital, this article recommends a performance evaluation and incentive compensation system that is tied to the use of a “reserve‐adjusted” EVA measure—one that exhibits a strong statistical correlation with changes in shareholder wealth in the E&P business. The greater explanatory power of this new measure reflects the reality that changes in the value of reserves in the ground can greatly outweigh changes in annual earnings or cash flows. As the focal point of a compensation plan, EVA has advantages over stock options in that it can be calculated at various levels in the organization, even at the level of a single well, whereas stock prices only exist for the company as a whole. For this reason, an EVA incentive system permits a clearer “line of sight” between pay packages and the performance of the part of the business for which managers are directly accountable. Perhaps even more important, EVA can be calculated (using an “internal hedging” mechanism) in a way that removes the impact of changes in oil prices on the incentive outcome. And, as demonstrated in the case study of Nuevo Energy, such internal hedging allows companies to give their employees a much greater share of wealth created with far less cost than by simply granting stock or stock options.     

The Contributions of Stewart Myers to the Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance*

In a 40‐plus year career notable for path‐breaking work on capital structure and innovations in capital budgeting and valuation, MIT finance professor Stewart Myers has had a remarkable influence on both the theory and practice of corporate finance. In this article, two of his former students, a colleague, and a co‐author offer a brief survey of Professor Myers's accomplishments, along with an assessment of their relevance for the current financial environment. These contributions are seen as falling into three main categories:

• ? Work on “debt overhang” and the financial “pecking order” that not only provided plausible explanations for much corporate financing behavior, but can also be used to shed light on recent developments, including the reluctance of highly leveraged U.S. financial institutions to raise equity and the recent “mandatory” infusions of capital by the U.S. Treasury.
• ? Contributions to capital budgeting that complement and reinforce his research on capital structure. By providing a simple and intuitive way to capture the tax benefits of debt when capital structure changes over time, his adjusted present value (or APV) approach has not only become the standard in LBO and venture capital firms, but accomplishes in practice what theorists like M&M had urged finance practitioners to do some 30 years earlier: separate the real operating profitability of a company or project from the “second‐order” effects of financing. And his real options valuation method, by recognizing the “option‐like” character of many corporate assets, has provided not only a new way of valuing “growth” assets, but a method and, indeed, a language for bringing together the disciplines of corporate strategy and finance.
• ? Starting with work on estimating fair rates of return for public utilities, he has gone on to develop a cost‐of‐capital and capital allocation framework for insurance companies, as well as a persuasive explanation for why the rate‐setting process for railroads in the U.S. and U.K. has created problems for those industries.

     

Expectations‐Based Management

The authors begin by summarizing the results of their recently published study of the relation between stock returns and changes in several annual performance measures, including not only growth in earnings and EVA, but changes during the year in analysts' expectations about future earnings over three different periods: (1) the current year; (2) the following year; and (3) the three‐year period thereafter. The last of these measures—changes in analysts' expectations about three‐ to five‐year earnings—had by far the greatest explanatory “power” of any of the measures tested. Besides being consistent with the stock market's taking a long‐term, DCF approach to the valuation of companies, the authors' finding that investors seem to care most about earnings three to five years down the road has a number of important implications for financial management: First, a business unit doesn't necessarily create shareholder value if its return on capital exceeds the weighted average cost of capital—nor does an operation that fails to earn its WACC necessarily reduce value. To create value, the business's return must exceed what investors are expecting. Second, without forecasting returns on capital, management should attempt to give investors a clear sense of the firm's internal benchmarks, both for existing businesses and new investment. Third, management incentive plans should be based on stock ownership rather than stock options. Precisely because stock prices reflect expectations, the potential for prices to get ahead of realities gives options‐laden managers a strong temptation to manipulate earnings and manage for the short term.     

ESG Investing in Graham & Doddsville

The author describes how and why the world's best “business value investors” have long incorporated environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations into their investment decision‐making. As the main source of value in companies has increasingly shifted from tangible to intangible assets, many followers of Graham & Dodd have delivered exceptional investment results by taking an “earnings‐power” approach to identifying high‐quality businesses—businesses with enduring competitive advantages that are sustained through significant ongoing investment in their core capabilities and, increasingly, their important non‐investor “stakeholders.” While the ESG framework may be relatively new, it can be thought of as providing a lens through which to view the age‐old issue of “quality.” Graham & Dodd's 1934 classic guide to investing, Security Analysis, and Phil Fisher's 1958 bestseller, Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, both identify a number of areas of analysis that would today be characterized as ESG. Regardless of whether they use the labels “E,” “S,” and “G,” investors who make judgments about earnings power and sustainable competitive advantage are routinely incorporating ESG considerations into their decision‐making. The challenge of assessing a company's sustainable competitive advantage requires analysis based on concepts such as customer franchise value, as well as intangibles like brands and intellectual property. For corporate managers communicating ESG priorities, and for investors analyzing ESG issues, the key is to focus on their relevance to the business. In this sense, corporate reporting on sustainability issues should be viewed as analogous to and an integral part of financial reporting, with a management focus on materiality and relevance (while avoiding a “promotional” approach) that is critical to credibility.     

FREE CASH FLOW AND PUBLIC GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF ALASKA

In a widely cited 1986 article in the American Economic Review, Michael Jensen gave the concept of free cash flow (FCF) a new twist by redefining it as cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects with positive net present values. Put another way, FCF represents funds available in the firm that managers may choose to hold as idle cash, return to shareholders, or invest in projects with returns below the firm's cost of capital. In redefining FCF in this way, Jensen converted FCF from a measure of economic income and value into a measure of corporate assets available for discretionary, and potentially value‐destroying, use by firm managers. And, as he argued in his important article, managers in mature businesses with substantial free cash flow have a tendency to destroy value by plowing too much capital back into those businesses or, often worse, making ill‐advised acquisitions in unrelated businesses. Several methods have been developed in financial markets and internal corporate governance systems to discourage managers from wasting FCF. Better monitoring by boards of directors, large ownership blocks, and properly aligned management compensation contracts are all parts of the solution. And the extraordinary increase in stock repurchases in recent years, invariably applauded by investors, is another illustration of the market's success in encouraging companies to address their free cash flow problems. But if the “FCF problem” of the private sector has attracted considerable attention from finance scholars, the problem is even more acute in the public sector, where FCF can be thought of as tax revenue in excess of what is required to finance well‐defined and generally accepted levels of public services. Unlike the private sector, in the public sector there are neither measures nor mechanisms by which to monitor and constrain wasteful spending by elected officials. In this article, the authors attempt to measure the costs to taxpayers of government FCF using the case of Alaska, which since 1969 has received a huge windfall of tax revenue from North Slope oil leases. After examining the state's public finances from 1968 through 1993, the authors offer $25 billion as a conservative estimate of the social losses from Alaska's waste of free cash flow during that 25‐year period.     

Bridging Sustainability and Finance: The Value Driver Adjustment Approach

Even though most large corporations view sustainability considerations and concerns as having the potential to affect their revenue and profits, and studies have shown that sustainability can affect stock returns, investors and corporate managers continue to struggle to incorporate such concerns into their financial decision‐making. As a consequence, the valuation effects of sustainability issues are not fully reflected in either the valuation of companies by investors or in capital investment decisions by corporate managers. The author argues that sustainability can be integrated into both of these kinds of financial decision‐making by linking it to business models, competitive positions, and value drivers using what the author calls a “value‐driver adjustment” (VDA) approach. The basic idea is simple: material sustainability issues affect business models and competitive positions, which in turn affect the company's value drivers—notably, sales, margins, and capital. The VDA approach explicitly considers these linkages by taking three steps: (1) identifying a company's material sustainability issues; (2) analyzing how these issues are expected to affect the company's business model and competitive position; and (3) quantifying the effects of such changes in business model and competitive position on the company's value drivers, including its cost of capital. In the first part of the article, the author provides an investor perspective that shows how sustainability can be integrated into investment decisions by asset managers. There he explains how and why ESG integration has so far failed to become mainstream, and what needs to be done to make it successful. The second part of this article takes the corporate perspective and shows how sustainability can be linked to value drivers using much the same ingredients as in asset management, but slightly different tools that can help corporate managers incorporate sustainability concerns into strategy and operations, including the finance function. And in closing, the author brings together corporate and investor perspectives while showing how sustainability programs can be used to make the relationship between companies and their shareholders both stronger and longer‐lasting.