When Does Information Asymmetry Affect the Cost of Capital?

This paper examines when information asymmetry among investors affects the cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors. When equity markets are perfectly competitive, information asymmetry has no separate effect on the cost of capital. When markets are imperfect, information asymmetry can have a separate effect on firms’ cost of capital. Consistent with our prediction, we find that information asymmetry has a positive relation with firms’ cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors when markets are imperfect and no relation when markets approximate perfect competition. Overall, our results show that the degree of market competition is an important conditioning variable to consider when examining the relation between information asymmetry and cost of capital.     

权益资本成本的行业特征研究

以2004~2011年沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究权益资本成本的行业差异以及行业特征对权益资本成本的影响。研究发现:行业门类层面和制造业次类层面的权益资本成本差异显著,这种差异在时序上较为稳定。行业竞争程度越低,权益资本成本越小,体现了产品市场竞争的特质性风险效应,行业收益波动和行业成长性分别对权益资本成本产生显著的正向影响和负向影响。企业会计准则的改革强化了行业因素对权益资本成本的影响。     

Local product market competition and bank loans

We investigate the influences of local product market competition on the cost of private debt. Our evidence suggests that the cost of bank loans is significantly higher for firms headquartered in states with greater local product market competition measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for resident industries. To establish causality, we examine the recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and firm relocations to identify exogenous shocks to local product market competition. We find that the cost of bank loans is lower for firms facing less intense local product market competition after the adoption of IDD and higher for firms relocated to states with more competitive product markets. The results imply that banks value the characteristics of a firm's local product market when approving loan contracts.     

Segment Disclosure and Cost of Capital

We investigate whether segment disclosure influences cost of capital. Improved segment reporting is expected to decrease cost of capital by reducing estimation risk. However, in a competitive environment segment disclosure may also generate uncertainties about future prospects and lead to a larger cost of capital. Asset‐pricing tests confirm that segment disclosure is a priced risk factor. Also, segment disclosure reduces ex‐ante estimates of cost of equity capital and other measures connected to risk. These results suggest a negative relation between segment disclosure and cost of capital. Our results also show that competition reduces, but does not eliminate, the previous relationship.     

资本市场开放与股权资本成本——基于沪港通、深港通的实证研究

本文基于沪港通和深港通研究资本市场开放对中国内地股权资本成本的影响。研究发现,受政策风险和市场环境等因素所限,沪港通在初始阶段并未对沪市公司的股权资本成本产生显著影响,但随着政策进一步完善、市场逐渐稳定和交易不断活跃,其对股权资本成本的降低效果于实施两年后开始显现;深港通建立在沪港通的制度基础和运行经验上,其在开通后显著降低了标的公司的股权资本成本。本文还进一步分析了资本市场开放影响股权资本成本的竞争渠道和信息渠道,发现深港通对股权资本成本的降低作用主要集中在投资者竞争程度较高,或是公开信息质量较高、信息不对称程度较低的股票样本。     

Annual report readability and the cost of equity capital

Using a large panel of U.S. public firms, we examine the relation between annual report readability and cost of equity capital. We hypothesize that complex textual reporting deters investors' ability to process and interpret annual reports, leading to higher information risk, and thus higher cost of equity financing. Consistent with our prediction, we find that greater textual complexity is associated with higher cost of equity capital. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks, including use of multiple estimation methods, alternative proxies of annual report readability and cost of equity capital measures, and potential endogeneity concerns. In addition, we hypothesize and test whether the nature of the relation between readability and cost of capital depends on the tone of 10-K filings. Our results show that the effect of annual report complexity on cost of equity is greater when disclosure tone is more negative or more ambiguous. We also find that the effect of annual report readability on cost of equity capital depends on the degree of stock market competition, level of institutional investors' ownership, and analyst coverage.     

Product Market Competition, Insider Trading, and Stock Market Efficiency

How does competition in firms' product markets influence their behavior in equity markets? Do product market imperfections spread to equity markets? We examine these questions in a noisy rational expectations model in which firms operate under monopolistic competition while their shares trade in perfectly competitive markets. Firms use their monopoly power to pass on shocks to customers, thereby insulating their profits. This encourages stock trading, expedites the capitalization of private information into stock prices and improves the allocation of capital. Several implications are derived and tested.     

资本市场开放与股权资本成本——基于沪港通、深港通的实证研究

本文基于沪港通和深港通研究资本市场开放对中国内地股权资本成本的影响。研究发现,受政策风险和市场环境等因素所限,沪港通在初始阶段并未对沪市公司的股权资本成本产生显著影响,但随着政策进一步完善、市场逐渐稳定和交易不断活跃,其对股权资本成本的降低效果于实施两年后开始显现;深港通建立在沪港通的制度基础和运行经验上,其在开通后显著降低了标的公司的股权资本成本。本文还进一步分析了资本市场开放影响股权资本成本的竞争渠道和信息渠道,发现深港通对股权资本成本的降低作用主要集中在投资者竞争程度较高,或是公开信息质量较高、信息不对称程度较低的股票样本。     

资产专用性与公司资本结构——来自中国制造业股份有限公司的经验证据

交易成本经济学视角下的公司融资理论指出,债务与权益应该视为不同类型的“治理结构”,而这种治理结构的具体选择又主要取决于公司资产专用性。我们以2001—2003年我国制造业股份有限公司为研究对象,运用多元线性回归计量模型实证表明,公司资本结构与资产专用性和盈利能力负相关,但公司盈利能力与资产专用性正相关。因此,公司资本结构的决策不仅要考虑公司资产投资具有专用性的特点,而且还要考虑其自身的盈利能力,才可能在激烈的产品市场竞争中获得可持续竞争优势与优良绩效。     

The UK equity release market: Views from the regulatory authorities,product providers and advisors

This study investigates the factors constraining the development of the UK equity release market. The results of a thematic review of interviews with industry stakeholders (product providers, advice providers and regulators) suggest that the attractiveness of the equity market for insurance companies (the main funders of the market), has diminished following a decline in annuity business and complications around the capital maturity matching requirements under Solvency II. Product costs (interest charges, and the cost of financial advice) are high. Trust in the market has improved, but remains fragile. Increased entry into the market by recognised brand names, (such as the traditional mortgage providers) would increase competition, reduce costs and promote trust. The risk of reputational damage limits the appeal of the market to new entrants. The no negative equity guarantee, a cost in terms of lower than otherwise loan-to-value ratios, promotes demand by way of the protection it affords to customers and their beneficiaries. Equity release is unsuitable for funding long-term care and policymakers advocating it as such damage the market.     

资本成本、可持续增长与国有企业分红比例估算——模型构建及检验

本文以股利理论、资本成本理论与可持续增长理论分析为基础,构建了国有企业可持续分红比例估算模型,并进行了检验和分析。检验结果表明,国有企业在样本期间股东权益报酬率(即留存收益再投资收益率)总体能够满足国有股东必要报酬率(即股权资本成本)的要求,适度留存利润将有利于国有企业的价值创造。文章建议,国有企业应努力提高自身的盈利能力、营运能力,并保持合理的资本结构,在应对和处置市场风险方面发挥积极作用,从而在兼顾国有股权资本成本和可持续增长的基础上制定科学的分红政策。     

Firm internationalization and cost of equity: Evidence from China

This paper examines the relationship between firm internationalization and cost of equity. We find that firms with a higher degree of international operations have a significantly lower cost of equity, which is more pronounced for firms in provinces with a weak institutional environment or firms experiencing intense domestic competition. Our results are robust after adopting a firm fixed effect model, propensity score matching, difference-in-difference regressions and alternative measurements of key variables. Further, international operations help firms to break through their institutional constraints in the domestic market, which reduces the cost of equity and improves resource allocation efficiency in the capital market. Our paper enriches the literature on firm internationalization and the cost of equity from the perspective of emerging markets.     

Agency costs and product market competition: The case of audit pricing in Greece

Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency costs are not dependent on product market competition. However, elsewhere in the economics literature, theoretical analysis and empirical research have indicated that product market competition reduces agency costs by reducing the marginal cost of eliciting effort from agents. We investigate the relationship between product market competition and audit fee, as an example of agency cost. Taking advantage of a proprietary data set for Greek audit firms, we find that the audit fee and audit hours are inversely associated with client firm product market competition. We conclude that audit effort, as an agency cost, is reduced where competitive forces reduce the need for shareholders to bear the costs of monitoring agents.     

Disclosure Interactions and the Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence From the Spanish Continuous Market

Abstract:  The purpose of this paper is to provide some new evidence on the relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity capital. We propose a new specification for the empirical test based on the idea that in the previous models one crucial variable was missing: accounting policy choice. We test our theoretical hypothesis using a sample of Spanish firms quoted on the Spanish continuous market from 1999 to 2002. We adopt the ex-ante approach to measure the cost of equity capital, taking analysts predictions as a proxy for expected earnings. As an explanatory variable we use an index measuring annual report disclosure quality. This measure of disclosure is combined with a proxy for the accounting policy choice of the firm. We measure firms' conservatism using the modified Jones model of Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate discretionary accruals. Our results confirm that the relationship between disclosure and cost of capital is affected by the choice of accounting policy.     

Controlling shareholder share pledging and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from China

We propose and test the incentive view—that the margin call pressure and ownership-control discrepancy associated with insider share pledging increase investors’ perceived risk, and thus also the cost of equity capital, in an emerging market. Using a controlling shareholder share pledging sample for Chinese listed firms, we find that firms with share pledging have a cost of equity capital that is 23.7 basis points higher than firms without share pledging. Further, share pledging increases the cost of equity capital through the information risks and agency conflicts channels. Cross-sectional analyses show that share pledging has a stronger effect on the cost of equity capital in non-state-owned enterprises, firms without monitoring of multiple large shareholders, firms with controlling shareholders assuming the position of chairperson, and firms with a weak institutional environment. In addition, using the global financial crisis and the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) as quasi-natural experiments, we disentangle the potential confounding effect of firm fundamentals and show that share pledging is positively associated with the cost of equity capital. Overall, the results are consistent with our incentive view that share pledging increases the cost of equity capital in an emerging market.     

行业特征、金融加速与企业债务融资

在政策择优供给、产业转型升级的关键阶段,考察特定行业的企业债务融资及其宏观、微观层面的影响因素,对于资金、资源的行业优化配置意义重大。本文以我国2003~2017年沪深A股上市公司为样本,检验企业受到货币政策冲击时行业特征对其银行债务获取的影响。研究发现,对于行业劳动力越密集、行业竞争越激烈的企业,货币政策紧缩对于债务融资的不利影响会被显著削弱。进一步研究发现,行业劳动要素在货币政策紧缩时引起的企业债务融资效应随着行业资本密集度的下降而增强;对于产出是耐用品的行业,货币政策的企业债务融资效应与产品市场竞争较弱的行业一致。本文是对货币政策传导机制下金融加速分析的拓展,补充了货币政策行业债务融资效应的经验证据。     

Management earnings forecast disclosure policy and the cost of equity capital

We examine the relation between management earnings forecast disclosure policy and the cost of equity capital in a cross-section of 1,355 firms over a 4-year post-Regulation Fair Disclosure period (2001 through 2004). We find evidence of a negative association between the quality of management earnings forecasting policy and cost of equity capital, and we document that the strength of the association is greater for firms with higher disclosure costs and for firms with more relevant quarterly management earnings forecasts. Our results are robust to the use of multiple methods to address both endogeneity and the measurement error in firm-specific estimates of implied cost of equity capital.     

Product market competition and the disclosure of supply chain information

We investigate how product market competition affects corporate voluntary disclosure decisions, specifically regarding supply-chain information. Our results, based on a sample of manufacturing companies listed in China from 2010 to 2016, show that companies in more competitive industries disclose less customer/supplier information. The main results stand through several robustness tests. Further analyses show that the negative relationship between product market competitiveness and supply-chain information disclosure is stronger when the disclosure contains more incremental information and when competitors are more capable of gaining competitive advantage using the disclosed information. Our study contributes to the understanding of both the relationship between product market competition and voluntary disclosure decisions and the regulation of information disclosure to build a transparent capital market.     

Governance,product market competition and cash management in IPO firms

This study evaluates the link between CEO governance heterogeneity, power structure of the firm, and product market competition on various facets of post-IPO cash policy. Our results suggest that post-IPO cash holdings as well as marginal value of cash reserves are higher under a founder CEO governance regime relative to non-founder CEOs. Concentrating board power in the hands of founder CEOs however, reduces their ability to maintain higher post-IPO cash reserves. Our results also suggest that product market competition influences both the level and marginal value of cash reserves in the hands of founder CEOs. Further, we find that stronger internal governance reduces the tendency of IPO firms to deploy excess cash reserves to fund internal investments in excess of industry rivals. Finally, our results suggest that excess cash reserves in competitive industry environments lead to superior post-IPO operating performance.     

The reaction of firm ex ante cost of equity capital to the resolution of shareholder class action lawsuits

Existing research provides evidence that providers of capital (banks, public debt, and equity) all increase the expected return on securities after the initiation of a shareholder lawsuit. Many of these lawsuits are dismissed or settled with trivial monetary penalties, which suggests that an across-the-board permanent increase in the cost of capital is misguided. After estimating the probable outcome of a shareholder lawsuit using only information available at the time the shareholder lawsuit is filed, we study the resolution of shareholder lawsuits to determine if market participants adjust their expected return after a case is resolved. We find an increase (decrease) in the ex ante cost of equity capital when there is a surprise settlement (dismissal), which is consistent with an efficient market. Further, we present evidence consistent with equity market participants monitoring the progress of shareholder lawsuits prior to resolution. Overall, our results suggest that firm ex ante cost of equity capital only changes after the resolution of a shareholder lawsuit if the outcome of the case is different than initially predicted.