防范逃废债:制度约束的缺陷--重庆市九龙坡区企业逃废银行债务的案例考察

企业利用改制改组逃废银行债务是90年代以来人们较关注的一个问题.从实地考察情况看,在企业改制改组过程中,银行的参与权力既无制度保障措施,也未被企业认同,即被排除在实施过程之外.故银行自身权益的维护,只能寄托于缺乏债务约束意识的其他当事人身上.从我国现有管理制度看,虽对银行债务转移的结果有着诸多规定,但对转移过程的控制与管理,缺乏系统性和可操作性的具体措施,从而大大降低了制度规范的实际效能.有鉴于此,本文建议开展对企业逃废债的系统研究,特别是对企业逃债行为的研究,并建立具有权威性、系统性和可操作性的管理制度,以及商业银行建立相关的操作规程.     

TRADING COSTS OF NON‐U.S. STOCKS ON THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE: THE EFFECT OF INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP,ANALYST FOLLOWING,AND MARKET REGULATION

We investigate the differences in market microstructure between U.S. and non‐U.S. stocks cross‐listed on the New York Stock Exchange using a sample of 316 pairs of matched stocks. We find that non‐U.S. stocks have wider spreads and larger adverse‐selection costs than U.S. stocks even after controlling for macro‐level institutional differences. Regression analysis shows that spreads and adverse‐selection costs are negatively correlated with institutional ownership and analyst followings. Thus, the higher spreads and adverse‐selection costs for non‐U.S. stocks can be partly explained by the lower institutional ownership and analyst following of non‐U.S. stocks. In addition, we find that although the spreads and adverse‐selection costs for non‐U.S. stocks are significantly higher before the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), the differences become even greater after Regulation FD, suggesting that Regulation FD has improved the information environment for U.S. stocks.