Who is afraid of disposition of financial assets? The moderating role of regulatory focus in the disposition effect

The disposition effect refers to the tendency of financial consumers to sell winning assets (e.g., stocks) too early and to hold losing assets for too long. This effect implies that investors behave asymmetrically under the conditions of paper gains and losses. Although prior research on the disposition effect drew primarily on prospect theory as the explanatory mechanism, we focus on regulatory focus, an alternative mechanism. Regulatory focus theory suggests that people pay distinctive attention to profits and losses depending on self-regulation orientations (i.e., promotion focus vs. prevention focus). We argue that regulatory focus has different influences on financial consumers’ investment behavior in the gain and loss domains. In three experimental studies, we demonstrate that regulatory focus moderates the disposition effect. The results of the current studies imply that the disposition effect is primarily driven by prevention- (vs. promotion-) focused individuals who behave asymmetrically in the gain and loss domains.     

OPTIMAL TIMING FOR AN INDIVISIBLE ASSET SALE

In this paper, we investigate the pricing via utility indifference of the right to sell a non‐traded asset. Consider an agent with power utility who owns a single unit of an indivisible, non‐traded asset, and who wishes to choose the optimum time to sell this asset. Suppose that this right to sell forms just part of the wealth of the agent, and that other wealth may be invested in a complete frictionless market. We formulate the problem as a mixed stochastic control/optimal stopping problem, which we then solve. We determine the optimal behavior of the agent, including the optimal criteria for the timing of the sale. It turns out that the optimal strategy is to sell the non‐traded asset the first time that its value exceeds a certain proportion of the agent's trading wealth. Further, it is possible to characterize this proportion as the solution to a transcendental equation.     

GREED,LEVERAGE, AND POTENTIAL LOSSES: A PROSPECT THEORY PERSPECTIVE

This paper quantifies the notion of greed, and explores its connection with leverage and potential losses, in the context of a continuous‐time behavioral portfolio choice model under (cumulative) prospect theory. We argue that the reference point can serve as the critical parameter in defining greed. An asymptotic analysis on optimal trading behaviors when the pricing kernel is lognormal and the S‐shaped utility function is a two‐piece CRRA shows that both the level of leverage and the magnitude of potential losses will grow unbounded if the greed grows uncontrolled. However, the probability of ending with gains does not diminish to zero even as the greed approaches infinity. This explains why a sufficiently greedy behavioral agent, despite the risk of catastrophic losses, is still willing to gamble on potential gains because they have a positive probability of occurrence whereas the corresponding rewards are huge. As a result, an effective way to contain human greed, from a regulatory point of view, is to impose a priori bounds on leverage and/or potential losses.     

Disappointment aversion equilibrium in a futures market

This article examines the effect of disappointment aversion on the equilibrium in a commodity futures market. Consider a commodity market with a producer and a speculator. We show that the equilibrium price is positively related to either agent's risk or disappointment aversion, and to the market volatility. The market trading volume is positively related to the producer's risk or disappointment aversion, but negatively related to the speculator's risk or disappointment aversion. The producer lowers his or her reference point in response to an increase in the risk aversion or disappointment aversion of either agent, and to an increase in spot price volatility. The speculator raises his or her reference point when the producer becomes more risk averse or disappointment averse, or when the spot price becomes more volatile. A more disappointment‐averse speculator will lower his or her reference point. However, a more risk‐averse speculator raises (lowers) the reference point if he or she is less (more) risk averse than the producer. Numerical examples are provided to further support the above analytical results. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 23:135–150, 2003     

指数期货套利交易策略设计

在期货市场上 ,指数期货是一种股票的避险工具。由于时间及其它因素 ,使得指数期货市场发生不平衡的现象 ,此一不平衡我们称之为套利空间。如何运用金融工程和信息技术来计算出其套利空间 ,为投资人赢得更多的利润 ,正是本研究的宗旨。本文针对指数期货的特性来寻找实时套利机会 ,明确地指出了买低卖高的方向及套利空间的大小 ,并给投资者设计了指数期货套利的交易策略。     

Anchor Points, Reference Points, and Counteroffers in Negotiations

Based on the theoretical assumptions that counteroffers are generated through an anchoring-and-adjustment process and that offers are perceived as gains or losses relative to a reference point, predictions were made of how, in a price negotiation, the size of counteroffers vary with proposed selling prices and reservation prices. The predictions were confirmed in two experiments. In Experiment 1, 64 undergraduate students of business administration playing the role of buyers of condominiums were presented proposed selling prices and asked to give a counteroffer which a hypothetical seller would accept or reject. A reference point was induced by telling subjects their reservation price. Before giving a counteroffer subjects were asked to indicate whether it was higher or lower than an arbitrary anchor point. In four different groups of subjects, high vs. low reference point was crossed with high vs. low anchor point. The results showed as expected that the counteroffers were higher for a high than for a low anchor point, and higher for a high reference point when the anchor point was perceived as a gain than for a low reference point when the anchor point was perceived as a loss. In Experiment 2 in which another 48 undergraduate students of business administration participated, the anchor points were the proposed selling prices and the reference point (reservation price) was manipulated by providing estimates of the market price. The results were as predicted, thus suggesting that the proposed selling prices operated as anchor points and that the estimated market prices affected the reservation prices (reference points) so that the selling prices and estimated market prices jointly affected the counteroffers.     

交易效用理论破解消费者心理“黑匣子”

获得交易效用是消费者产生购买行为的根本原因,而交易效用的获得与消费者的参照物有密切关系。对商品或购物环境产生的第一印象就像"锚"一样很容易成为消费者的参照物,参照的结果决定消费者是否能够获得交易效用,进而影响购买决策。本文在阐述交易效用理论的基础上,分析企业或商家应该如何从产品角度、购物环境角度、销售渠道角度以及消费者思维习惯角度来设计消费者的参照物,使消费者获得交易效用,产生购买行为。     

BidPacket: trading bandwidth in public spaces

Smart devices such as smartphones and tablets are used extensively in public spaces for the transmission and reception of content in the form of text, photos and streaming videos. Since the bandwidth provided for wireless access is limited in public areas, it becomes an issue for users to gain access to the bandwidth they need at the right times. While an omniscient controller could assign bandwidth to each device on the basis of their needs and overall availability, imperfect information about the instantaneous state of the wifi access patterns and needs of users make for a very inefficient allocation of such bandwidth. This paper provides a solution for bandwidth allocation by creating a market among users of smart devices so that they can bid for extra bandwidth when they need it and sell it when they don’t. They do so by using a virtual currency that is conserved so that each device owner maximizes his own utility. This utility function is composed of both the benefit accrued from accessing bandwidth and the loss of the currency incurred in bidding for such bandwidth. Extensive simulations show that this market-based method outperforms an omniscient model when demand is uncertain, while minimizing bandwidth consumption.     

中国股市制度套利分析

由于制度性缺陷,我国上市公司法人股、国家股与二级市场普通股股价存在巨大差异。套利者、可以通过受让低价非流通股控制上市公司,在这之前购入低价的普通股,在重组公布时抛售套取利润,或者在重组成功后通过再融资套取利润。     

The effect of physical possession on preference for product warranty

Peck and Shu (2009) found that touching a product causes greater endowment effect. We seek to replicate and extend this finding to the case that whether touching a product consumers have just bought may increase the willingness to pay (WTP) for warranty. Loss aversion, the tendency to prefer avoiding losses over obtaining equivalent monetary gains, often explains product warranty purchases. This tendency will be stronger when the buyers consider the product as part of their endowment. Touching the product promotes stronger ownership perception and thus shifts consumer's reference point. The new reference point causes consumers to anticipate greater pain from the loss of the product and thus leads to higher WTP for product warranty protection. We find support for this hypothesis in two field studies with a total of 104 participants.     

On utility maximization under model uncertainty in discrete‐time markets

We study the problem of maximizing terminal utility for an agent facing model uncertainty, in a frictionless discrete‐time market with one safe asset and finitely many risky assets. We show that an optimal investment strategy exists if the utility function, defined either on the positive real line or on the whole real line, is bounded from above. We further find that the boundedness assumption can be dropped, provided that we impose suitable integrability conditions, related to some strengthened form of no‐arbitrage. These results are obtained in an alternative framework for model uncertainty, where all possible dynamics of the stock prices are represented by a collection of stochastic processes on the same filtered probability space, rather than by a family of probability measures.     

OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO, CONSUMPTION-LEISURE AND RETIREMENT CHOICE PROBLEM WITH CES UTILITY

We study optimal portfolio, consumption-leisure and retirement choice of an infinitely lived economic agent whose instantaneous preference is characterized by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function of consumption and leisure. We integrate in one model the optimal consumption-leisure-work choice, the optimal portfolio selection, and the optimal stopping problem in which the agent chooses her retirement time. The economic agent derives utility from both consumption and leisure, and is able to adjust her supply of labor flexibly above a certain minimum work-hour, and also has a retirement option. We solve the problem analytically by considering a variational inequality arising from the dual functions of the optimal stopping problem. The optimal retirement time is characterized as the first time when her wealth exceeds a certain critical level. We provide the critical wealth level for retirement and characterize the optimal consumption-leisure and portfolio policies before and after retirement in closed forms. We also derive properties of the optimal policies. In particular, we show that consumption in general jumps around retirement.     

Buy and buy again: The impact of unique reference points on (re)purchase decisions

Behavioral finance has uncovered that investor engage emotionally when trading. We investigate how three psychological factors influence purchase and repurchase decisions: representativeness, the influence of prior gains, and reference points. Using trading data of 7200 UK investors we find that purchase decisions are influenced by representative heuristic and repurchase decisions are influenced by both representative heuristic and prior profitability. Further survival analysis showed that investors use the prior selling price as a unique reference point. Investors are more likely to repurchase a stock when trading above its reference point, but more likely to initiate the repurchase when trading below. Investors are influenced by previous experience and engage learning behavior when they seek to reinforce past success. As reference points are inferred but infrequently researched, this research adds to the literature and provides important and robust results for those engaging with financial planning clients.     

Simulated Negotiations in the Hiring of a Salesforce Manager: Tests of Two-Person Bargaining Solutions

This paper examines the ability to predict bargaining outcomes consistent with Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky, and Gupta-Livne bargaining models as well as two heuristic solutions based on interpersonal (cardinal) comparisons of utility. Equal earning and equal loss solutions are developed from bargainers' multi-attribute utility functions. An experimental test of these bargaining solutions is conducted for simulated negotiations between a representative of sales force management and a representative of sales force employees over the hire of a regional sales manager. Results show that proportional (Kalai-Smorodinsky) solutions are generally more likely when bargaining is conducted in attribute space, and equal loss solutions are more likely in utility space.     

DO ARBITRAGE‐FREE PRICES COME FROM UTILITY MAXIMIZATION?

In this paper we ask whether, given a stock market and an illiquid derivative, there exists arbitrage‐free prices at which a utility‐maximizing agent would always want to buy the derivative, irrespectively of his own initial endowment of derivatives and cash. We prove that this is false for any given investor if one considers all initial endowments with finite utility, and that it can instead be true if one restricts to the endowments in the interior. We show, however, how the endowments on the boundary can give rise to very odd phenomena; for example, an investor with such an endowment would choose not to trade in the derivative even at prices arbitrarily close to some arbitrage price.     

DYNAMIC PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATION WITH A DEFAULTABLE SECURITY AND REGIME‐SWITCHING

We consider a portfolio optimization problem in a defaultable market with finitely‐many economical regimes, where the investor can dynamically allocate her wealth among a defaultable bond, a stock, and a money market account. The market coefficients are assumed to depend on the market regime in place, which is modeled by a finite state continuous time Markov process. By separating the utility maximization problem into a predefault and postdefault component, we deduce two coupled Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations for the post‐ and predefault optimal value functions, and show a novel verification theorem for their solutions. We obtain explicit constructions of value functions and investment strategies for investors with logarithmic and Constant Relative Risk Aversion utilities, and provide a precise characterization of the directionality of the bond investment strategies in terms of corporate returns, forward rates, and expected recovery at default. We illustrate the dependence of the optimal strategies on time, losses given default, and risk aversion level of the investor through a detailed economic and numerical analysis.     

Investigating the effect of status changes in review platforms

Review platforms often use transient status reward systems where the granted status is not permanent, and reviewers can experience gains and losses in status. To evaluate the effectiveness of such systems, review platforms need to consider a trade-off between the potential positive effects of a status gain and the potential negative effects of a status loss on the quantity and characteristics of reviewers’ contributions. This article examines this trade-off. The results of an empirical study that uses matched difference-in-differences analysis of data from Yelp show that: (i) the positive effect of a status gain on the number of reviews is about three times greater than the negative effect of a status loss; (ii) these effects are more pronounced for reviewers with less experience; and (iii) status changes also change the valence and elaborateness of reviews.     

PORTFOLIOS OF AMERICAN OPTIONS UNDER GENERAL PREFERENCES: RESULTS AND COUNTEREXAMPLES

We consider the optimal exercise of a portfolio of American call options in an incomplete market. Options are written on a single underlying asset but may have different characteristics of strikes, maturities, and vesting dates. Our motivation is to model the decision faced by an employee who is granted options periodically on the stock of her company, and who is not permitted to trade this stock. The first part of our study considers the optimal exercise of single options. We prove results under minimal assumptions and give several counterexamples where these assumptions fail—describing the shape and nesting properties of the exercise regions. The second part of the study considers portfolios of options with differing characteristics. The main result is that options with comonotonic strike, maturity, and vesting date should be exercised in order of increasing strike. It is true under weak assumptions on preferences and requires no assumptions on prices. Potentially the exercise ordering result can significantly reduce the complexity of computations in a particular example. This is illustrated by solving the resulting dynamic programming problem in a constant absolute risk aversion utility indifference model.     

DYNAMIC INDIFFERENCE VALUATION VIA CONVEX RISK MEASURES

The (subjective) indifference value of a payoff in an incomplete financial market is that monetary amount which leaves an agent indifferent between buying or not buying the payoff when she always optimally exploits her trading opportunities. We study these values over time when they are defined with respect to a dynamic monetary concave utility functional, that is, minus a dynamic convex risk measure. For that purpose, we prove some new results about families of conditional convex risk measures. We study the convolution of abstract conditional convex risk measures and show that it preserves the dynamic property of time-consistency. Moreover, we construct a dynamic risk measure (or utility functional) associated to superreplication in a market with trading constraints and prove that it is time-consistent. By combining these results, we deduce that the corresponding indifference valuation functional is again time-consistent. As an auxiliary tool, we establish a variant of the representation theorem for conditional convex risk measures in terms of equivalent probability measures.     

Sequential Betting Behavior: A Test of Asymmetric Inconsistencies in Group Decision Making

Previous research has shown that individual decision makers tend to bet more than initially planned after experiencing a loss but not after a gain. This research tests whether groups in consensus decision‐making contexts also demonstrate similar asymmetric inconsistencies. Two experiments, one at the individual level and one with three‐person groups, were carried out based on a gambling‐type betting task. Although individuals planned more conservatively than groups regarding their betting behavior after the first outcome, both individuals and groups misestimated their own betting behavior after losses but not after gains. Negative, but not positive, emotional reactions to previous decision outcomes were also misestimated, leading to incorrect predictions of future behavior. Implications for theory and future research are discussed.