Foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries and U.S. Treasury yields

Foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasuries increased from $400 billion in January 1994 to about $3 trillion in June 2010. Most of this growth is accounted for by a handful of emerging market economies that have been running large current account surpluses. These countries are channeling their savings through the official sector, which is then acquiring foreign exchange reserves. Any shift in policy to reduce their current account surpluses or dampen the rate of reserves accumulation would likely slow the pace of foreign official purchases of U.S. Treasuries. Would such a slowing of foreign official purchases of Treasury notes and bonds affect long-term Treasury yields? Most likely yes, and the effects appear to be large. By our estimates, if foreign official inflows into U.S. Treasuries were to decrease in a given month by $100 billion, 5-year Treasury rates would rise by about 40–60 basis points in the short run. But once we allow foreign private investors to react to the yield change induced by the shock to foreign official inflows, the long-run effect is about 20 basis points.     

Foreign Under‐Investment in US Securities and the Role of Relational Capital

Over 70 academic papers attempt to explain why foreigners invest in US securities. All ignore the vital role of the US broker‐dealer. Macroeconomic factors like a trade balance or corporate governance may guide foreign investors toward certain markets. But US broker‐dealers provide information to foreign investors and execute the actual trades. We hypothesize that particular foreign investors under‐invest in US securities because of a lack of relational capital with US broker‐dealers. We find that broker‐dealer marketing intensity in foreign markets partly explains foreigners’ decisions to invest in US securities. We also estimate “pent‐up” demand for US securities in developing countries – like China, Argentina, Turkey and Russia –equals roughly half‐a‐trillion dollars. Such pent‐up demand – represented as a convergence gap with investment‐to‐GDP ratios in highly developed capital markets – helps predict which markets these broker‐dealers are likely to invest marketing effort in the future. As such, broker‐dealers interested in assisting foreign investors find the right securities for their portfolios should not focus on big, rich economies. They should focus on economies with the largest convergence gaps. We also find that broker‐dealers must take in account the effect their marketing effort has on the typical variables (like relative returns, risks, asymmetric shocks and communication with the US) when they use these screening variables in deciding where to build their relational capital (and place their sales effort) in any year.     

FISCAL DEFICITS AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Although fiscal adjustment was urged on developing countriesduring the 1980s to lead them out of economic malaise, considerableuncertainty remains about the relations between fiscal policyand macroeconomic performance. To illustrate how financial markets,private spending, and the external sector react to fiscal policies,the behavior of holdings of money and public debt, private consumptionand investment, the trade balance, and the real exchange rateis modeled for a sample of ten developing countries. The studiesfind strong evidence that over the medium term, money financingof the deficit leads to higher inflation, while debt financingleads to higher real interest rates or increased repressionof financial markets, with the fiscal gains coming at increasinglyunfavorable terms. Consumers respond differently to conventionaltaxes, unconventional taxes (through inflation or interest andcredit controls), and debt financing, in ways that make fiscaladjustment the most effective means of increasing national saving.Private investment—but not private consumption—issensitive to the real interest rate, which rises under domesticborrowing to finance the deficit. Contrary to the popular presumption,in some countries private investment increases when public investmentdecreases. There is strong evidence that fiscal deficits spillover into external deficits, leading to appreciation of thereal exchange rate. Fiscal deficits and growth are self-reinforcing:good fiscal management preserves access to foreign lending andavoids the crowding out of private investment, while growthstabilizes the budget and improves the fiscal position. Thevirtuous circle of growth and good fiscal management is oneof the strongest arguments for a policy of low and stable fiscaldeficits.      

Deleveraging Corporate America: Job and Business Recovery Through Debt Restructuring

When the Great Recession roiled capital and labor markets in early 2009, up to a third of U.S. public corporations, and nearly 60% of privately owned companies, reported high levels of financial distress resulting from frozen credit markets. And the problems of “debt overhang” and corporate underinvestment were clearly in evidence as the combination of default risk and a relatively new provision of the tax code restricted the ability of distressed companies to deleverage their capital structures. But as described in this article, at least 110 U.S. companies used a little known provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to defer taxes on the cancellation of debt income (CODI) resulting from exchanges or repurchases of significant amounts of debt. This suspension of tax policy gave many distressed U.S. companies the flexibility to cut costs, shore up balance sheets, and boost liquidity, thereby keeping themselves in business and their workers employed throughout the economic crisis. The 110 companies examined either repurchased or exchanged a total of $32.5 billion of corporate debt. The deleveraging of these companies, which represented more than $2.2 trillion in total assets and $520 billion in market capitalization, helped them to remain solvent throughout the downturn and retain their collective 2.2 million employees. The resulting tax savings are estimated to have saved (or in some cases created) almost 90,000 jobs, while contributing $3.2 billion to total corporate earnings and $10.7 billion of output to the national gross domestic product. Although this approach could be criticized as adding to the federal budget deficit, the deferral of taxes on CODI is viewed as a targeted financial policy tool aimed directly at boosting the productive capacity and employment of corporate enterprises.     

Trade, Jobs, and the Economic Outlook for 2005

From newspaper accounts, one might think that the U.S. economy is on the verge of collapse. But the economy performed well in 2004, with real GDP growth of 3.9%, inflation at only 2.2%, unemployment down to 5.4%, and over two million jobs added to the payrolls (performance that is the envy of America's trade partners in Europe). And much the same, perhaps with moderate increases in interest rates, is expected in 2005.
Concerns about the trade deficit in particular have given rise to familiar calls to protect U.S. industries and jobs. But job losses due to "offshoring" amount to just 1% of total job losses each year, with little effect on the growth in overall employment. Manufacturing jobs have declined, but the value of manufactured goods as a share of real GDP has remained steady because of productivity growth in the manufacturing sector. Rather than spending vast amounts of money to protect jobs that are destined to go overseas, the correct policy response is to help people retrain and find employment elsewhere.
Trade deficits arise in countries that experience either investment booms or declines in savings. Thus, trade deficits are not necessarily an indication of economic failure. Foreigners invest in America because the U.S. is still the world's largest and most productive economy. And provided that the U.S. continues to offer such investment opportunities, foreign investors' search for low-risk assets will continue to be a major (if not the main) cause of the U.S. trade deficit.     

External Debt, Inflation, and the Public Sector: Toward Fiscal Policy for Sustainable Growth

Which tradeoffs are involved in formulating an external debtstrategy? Should expenditure be cut to improve the current account,or will this reduce future output growth, thus undermining thebenefits of any debt reduction? Are there alternatives thatallow satisfactory output growth without jeopardizing creditworthiness?How can the necessary surplus of savings over investment bebrought about at levels of investment high enough to sustainoutput growth? Should the government contribute to the internal adjustmentby reducing its deficit? Macroeconomic targets for inflationand growth, and creditworthiness constraints on debt issue,impose restrictions on the extent to which deficits can be financed.Can the government cover the deficit within these targets andconstraints? The absence of such consistency forebodes futurepolicy change and so undermines the credibility of the adjustmentprogram. The author uses empirical work on Turkey to illustratethe interactions between fiscal deficits and the macroeconomicvariables upon which fiscal consistency hinges.     

A practitioner's perspective: Comments on “Analysis of U.S. savings bonds”

In this issue, Potts and Reichenstein describe features of U.S. savings bonds and discuss their evaluation. The article can serve as a reference for busy practitioners who may not follow changes in the savings bond market closely, especially those who tend to rely on product-related education for updates on financial instruments.Savings bonds remain an important investment for individuals; on March 31, 1994, individuals held $174.9 million in U.S. savings bonds, a 7% increase from one year prior (Williams, 1994). Further, as Table 1, “Demographic Characteristics of Individual Savings Bond Holders,” indicates, the holding of savings bonds is not exclusive to any particular age group or income level (Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1994).     

Whither Capitalism?*

The global financial crisis and policy responses to it have led many to question their fundamental belief in market‐based capitalism. In the U.S., the epicenter of the crisis and poster child of capitalism, signs of creeping nationalization of the financial system have raised fears that the basic model is being turned inside out. In this essay, the author argues that, with more than 90% of the U.S. private sector still operating “largely as a free‐enterprise system,” concerns about nationalization and government involvement in the marketplace are greatly exaggerated. More troubling are the diminishing prospects for a prompt post‐crisis normalization of fiscal and monetary policy, and for a decisive and transparent exit strategy from the present “policies of crisis containment.” In the absence of such decisiveness and transparency, the debate over the efficacy of market‐based capitalism will continue. The longer‐run challenge is to learn from the crisis and take measures designed to limit risk‐taking to acceptable levels in today's global financial environment, with its continuous cross‐border flow of information, trade, and human as well as financial capital. Making Wall Street the villain is the path of least resistance in a politically charged environment, but any fix must be grounded in shared responsibility. As the author says in closing, “Governance, or the lack thereof—both within the private sector as well as by those charged with regulation and oversight—proved to be the weak link in the chain. Fix that, and capitalism will be just fine.”     

Capital Inflows and the U.S. Housing Boom

We estimate an open‐economy vector autoregressive (VAR) model to study the effect of capital‐inflow shocks on the U.S. housing market. We look at different external shocks that generate capital inflows to the U.S., in particular “saving‐glut” shocks and foreign monetary‐policy expansions. The shocks are identified with theoretically robust sign restrictions derived from an open‐economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Our findings suggest that capital inflows that result from “saving‐glut” shocks have a positive and persistent effect on real house prices and real residential investment.     

How to Promote Fed Independence: Perspectives from Political Economy and History

In two short histories of the independence of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank since its creation in 1913—the first with respect to the Fed's monetary policymaking, the second focused on its regulatory policymaking—the author shows that the range of the Fed's powers has varied greatly over time, and that changes in those powers have had major effects on the extent of Fed independence. Moreover, the shifts over time in Fed powers reflect, to a significant degree, conscious trade‐offs by Fed leaders. A large number of somewhat surprising Fed positions on important regulatory matters can be explained as more or less deliberate attempts to preserve the Fed's monetary powers from political interference by yielding some of its independence in exercising its regulatory authority. In a case involving one of the most destructive U.S. financial regulatory policies, the Fed's effective neutrality on, and thus failure to support, the elimination of restrictions on interstate branch banking is seen as contributing to the chronic instability of the U.S. banking system, which has suffered some 20 major crises since the early 1800s (as compared to the crisis‐free Canadian system, with its nationwide banking from its inception). The Fed's reluctance to intervene is attributed to its unwillingness to antagonize powerful Congressional supporters of state banking interests and, more generally, to a “game of bank bargains” that can be seen at work in the political economy of virtually all countries. In more recent times, the most costly episode in this time‐honored game features a series of implicit or, in some cases, explicit agreements between large U.S. banks and urban activist groups—under the aegis of the Community Reinvestment Act, and with the oversight and implicit blessing of the Fed—to make on the order of $4.6 trillion loans to “subprime” borrowers in exchange for the activists’ (and the Fed's) support in Congressional merger hearings. The resulting nationwide debasement of mortgage underwriting standards and sheer volume of “toxic assets,” in combination with clearly inadequate capital requirements (which the Fed also failed to correct), are viewed as if not the principal cause of the crisis, a far bigger contributor than, say, the Fed's widely criticized unwillingness to tighten monetary policy in the early 2000s. To prevent the Fed from continuing to sacrifice its independence in regulatory matters to preserve its freedom to conduct monetary policy, the author proposes that authority for regulatory and monetary policy be vested in two separate regulatory bodies. If carried out, such a policy change would enact a proposal made by then Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson in 2008, just before the global financial crisis hit.     

Are U.S. Companies Really Holding That Much Cash—And If So,Why?

Non‐financial S&P 500 companies are now estimated to hold a total of $2.1 trillion of “cash,” a figure that is larger than the annual GDP of all but eight countries. In this report, J.P. Morgan's Corporate Finance Advisory team notes that while many observers have attributed the buildup to offshore cash growth alone, onshore cash levels are also up significantly. To be sure, the companies that have shown the greatest increases also tend to be highly successful, with strong cash flow and business performance. And the managers of such companies tend to prefer to retain much if not most of this cash to take advantage of investment opportunities and to maintain the flexibility to respond to the next economic downturn. Also adding to the cash build‐ups, the executives of large MNCs with significant overseas cash holdings typically try to avoid the higher tax bill triggered by repatriating funds to the U.S. Nevertheless, investors continue to expect growth and high returns on capital; and corporate distributions of capital in the form of dividends and stock buybacks can play an important role in encouraging companies to operate efficiently. While pursuing both of these goals—preservation of enough cash to weather downturns and invest in all positive‐NPV projects, and commitment to paying out excess capital—boards and senior decision makers should continuously reexamine their cash holdings and capital allocation policies to ensure they are appropriate not only for today's environment, but throughout the economic cycle.     

Value Creation by Active Investors (and Its Potential for Addressing Social Problems)

A distinguished Columbia academic discusses the methods and outcomes of “active investing” with the co‐founder of a leading private equity firm and a former senior partner of a well‐known hedge fund. In the case studies used by both panelists to illustrate their investment selection and management processes, the investors provided not only capital, but oversight and expertise that helped bring about significant increases in the productivity and value of their portfolio companies. What's more, in both cases, the changes that contributed to high returns for investors also ended up having major benefits for the companies' non‐investor stakeholders, especially their consumers. In the first of the two cases, Paul Hilal explains the thinking behind Pershing Square's $1.1 billion purchase of 14% of the Canadian Pacific Railway in 2012. With the help of intensive “fundamental” analysis of the company, Hilal recognized that Canadian Pacific was substantially underperforming its rival, the Canadian National Railway, in a number of important ways. And when CP's management and board rejected his plan for changes, Hilal led a proxy battle that ended in a landslide victory for the proposed slate of directors, including Hilal himself. Then, after bringing in a new CEO, the restructured board presided over operating changes that, during Pershing's four‐year ownership, increased the market value of CP from $8 billion to $30 billion. By 2016, when Pershing sold its investment (for $4 billion), Canadian Pacific was “shipping 20% more freight … 40% faster than ever before, with record on‐time performance, 40% fewer locomotives, 35% fewer people, and 14% improved fuel efficiency—all while maintaining an industry‐leading safety record.” In the second case, Russ Carson describes the success of Welsh, Carson, Anderson, and Stowe in turning its purchase in 1998 of a single oncology practice in Denver into a publicly traded company with more than 90 outpatient cancer centers throughout the U.S. When it was sold in 2011, US Oncology was producing $4 billion in revenue while employing 1,000 oncologists, who, as significant equity owners, shared in the success of Welsh Carson. Using modern management techniques to create “enormous efficiencies out of an extraordinarily fragmented system,” Carson and his colleagues created “the single largest—and, by all accounts, most reputable—outpatient provider of cancer services in the country.” One of the keys to this success was “getting the doctors to spend their time seeing patients, not looking for records,” which contributed greatly to Welsh Carson's ability to improve “both the quantity and quality of cancer care in the 90 communities that we were operating in.”     

Current Accounts and Global Adjustment: The Long and Short of It

Global rebalancing is underway, but still quite a distance from being done. Current account imbalances have been a persistent feature of the global economy for over 100 years, especially during the two eras of globalization—the period 1870 to 1914 and the present. Such imbalances have reflected underlying imbalances between savings and investment as well as the prevailing international monetary regime. One important lesson from the past 150 years is that capital flows play an important role in funding global investment opportunities—a role that would be harmed if policy makers responded to the perceived threat of global imbalances by imposing any sort of cap. During those periods when capital flows have been relatively unhindered, investment opportunities around the world have been financed by capital flows. Such flows have financed the growth of many erstwhile “emerging market” economies, including the U.S. in the early part of this century. And global capital flows are doing much the same for many emerging markets today, even though purchases of reserves by some countries have been offsetting inbound private capital flows in the aggregate. The other main lesson of history is that imbalances do not last forever, and tend to lead to adjustments and reversals. Experience shows that such adjustments are much easier for surplus countries than for deficit countries.     

危机前的美国负债型经济增长模式

本轮金融危机爆发前,美国债务增加与经济增长并存。经济增长的重要动力是资产价格泡沫下的过度信贷消费,巨大的消费使得公、私储蓄率系统性下降,在投资率上升的情况下造成其经常项目赤字,而美元本位给了美国用资本项目顺差来平衡经常项目赤字的便利,华尔街的金融衍生债券成为填平美国经常项目赤字的重要手段。当双赤字状态无法延续时,美国以危机形式和货币贬值形式抖落其负债包袱。牙买加体系下的＂国际经济双循环＂结构注定危机的发展是发散而非收敛的。这种充分利用美元本位机制,靠信贷促进消费、靠消费带动经济增长的消费驱动型经济增长模式走到了极端,到了不可持续的程度,应尽快对这种经济增长模式和国际收支格局进行调整。     

Global Public‐Private Investment Partnerships: A Financing Innovation with Positive Social Impact

Global bond markets, along with banks and governments, are the main source of funding for investment in environmentally friendly infrastructure and the transition to clean energy. Although such bonds are a relatively recent innovation, the green bond market has grown rapidly from its start in 2008 to around $800 billion in outstanding issues. The problem, however, is that green bonds, which represent less than 1% of global bond markets, have been issued disproportionately by government‐sponsored entities, corporations, and municipalities in developed markets. In the emerging market countries where the infrastructure investments are most needed, they barely exist. The authors describe a new investment vehicle, called the AP EGO fund, whose mission and MO are to channel the vast global pools of institutional savings that are now invested in low or (even negative) yield fixed‐income assets—as much as $17 trillion in 2019—to higher‐return emerging markets green investments, in particular sustainable infrastructure, by creating a new asset class: emerging‐market green bonds issued by banks. The AP EGO fund is premised on and involves a reworking of the public‐private partnership (PPP) into a form they call the global public‐private investment partnership (or GPPIP). Unlike the PPP, which combines a public agency with a private operator, the GPPIP has four instead of just two partners. In addition to the standard public agency and the private concession operator, there is a development bank—in this case the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which is the financial markets affiliate of the World Bank—and private investors that include emerging‐market banks as well as global institutional investors. Along with the mediating role played by a public agency like the IFC, the AP EGO Fund is fundamentally different from other PPPs in that it takes the form of a special purpose securitization vehicle whose shares are backed by a pool of green bonds issued by emerging market banks in multiple emerging market countries. And besides its application to a new asset class, the fund also breaks new ground by applying a securitization technique with a fund structure designed with an embedded “first‐loss” protection to a global pool of green bonds originated in emerging market economies. By means of this structuring, the green‐bond‐backed fund shares issued by the AP EGO are now providing developed market institutional investors with somewhat higher‐yielding fixed income securities that nevertheless carry an investment‐grade rating.     

Why Don't U.S. Issuers Demand European Fees for IPOs?

We compare fees charged by investment banks for conducting IPOs in the United States and Europe. In recent years, the “7% solution,” as documented by Chen and Ritter (2000) , has become even more prevalent in the United States, and is now the norm for IPOs raising up to $250 million. The same banks dominate both markets, but European IPO fees are roughly three percentage points lower, are much more variable, and have been falling. We review explanations for the gap in spreads and find the evidence consistent with strategic pricing. U.S. issuers could have saved over $1 billion a year by paying European fees.     

探析中美贸易逆差的原因及影响

近年来,随着中美经贸关系的日益紧密,分析不断扩大的美中贸易逆差具有十分重要的意义.本文主要研究了美中贸易逆差的原因和影响,结构安排如下:首先交代了研究背景,通过一些数据介绍了美中贸易逆差的现状,指出研究此问题的必要性.第二部分,分别采用国际收支平衡原理和要素禀赋定理两种方法进行分析,得出美国的国内政策是造成美国经常项目赤字的主要原因的结论,同时指出了一些流行说法的纰漏之处.可以看到,在全球储蓄结构巨大失衡的情况下,单单通过削减美国财政赤字或通过人民币升值,都不能解决巨额美中贸易逆差.这一问题的解决需要中美双方的政策协调.     

Transparency and Tax Evasion: Evidence from the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)

We examine how U.S. individuals respond to regulation intended to reduce offshore tax evasion. The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) requires foreign financial institutions to report information to the U.S. government regarding U.S. account holders. We first document an average $7.8 billion to $15.3 billion decrease in equity foreign portfolio investment to the United States from tax-haven countries after FATCA implementation, consistent with a decrease in “round-tripping” investments attributable to U.S. investors’ offshore tax evasion. When testing total worldwide investment out of financial accounts in tax havens post-FATCA, we find an average decline of $56.6 billion to $78.0 billion. We next provide evidence of other important consequences of this regulation, including increased expatriations of U.S. citizens and greater investment in alternative assets not subject to FATCA reporting, such as residential real estate and artwork. Our study contributes to both the academic literature and policy analysis on regulation, tax evasion, and crime.