Social Capital,Trust, and Firm Performance: The Value of Corporate Social Responsibility during the Financial Crisis

During the 2008–2009 financial crisis, firms with high social capital, as measured by corporate social responsibility (CSR) intensity, had stock returns that were four to seven percentage points higher than firms with low social capital. High‐CSR firms also experienced higher profitability, growth, and sales per employee relative to low‐CSR firms, and they raised more debt. This evidence suggests that the trust between a firm and both its stakeholders and investors, built through investments in social capital, pays off when the overall level of trust in corporations and markets suffers a negative shock.     

危机时期企业社会责任与股票收益的关系研究

通过对2014-2018年我国A股市场的数据进行分析,发现在股灾危机时期,企业社会责任报告的披露质量与股票收益率呈现正相关关系,且这种关系在社会信任水平较高的地区表现得更加显著.在危机后的较长时间里,企业履行社会责任对股票收益的影响同样显著.因此,企业若能超越短期利益最大化的行为局限,严格履行社会责任,积累声誉和社会资本,不仅能够使企业在危机中获得投资者青睐,而且在长期上也有助于公司财务绩效的提升,这对于在后危机时期稳定股市、重构社会信用体系具有重要的意义.     

Lessons from the Financial Crisis on Risk and Capital Management: The Case of Insurance Companies

This article proposes that risk management be viewed as an integral part of the corporate value‐creation process— one in which the concept of economic capital can provide companies with the financial cushion and confidence to carry out their strategic plans. Using the case of insurance and reinsurance companies, the authors discuss three main ways that the integration of risk and capital management creates value:

• 1 strengthening solvency (by limiting the probability of financial distress);
• 2 increasing prospects for profitable growth (by preserving access to capital during post‐loss periods); and
• 3 improving transparency (by increasing the “information content” or “signaling power” of reported earnings).

Insurers can manage solvency risk by using Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) models to limit the probability of financial distress to levels consistent with the firm's specified risk tolerance. While ERM models are effective in managing “known” risks, we discuss three practices widely used in the insurance industry to manage “unknown” and “unknowable” risks using the logic of real options—slack, mutualization, and incomplete contracts. Second, risk management can create value by securing sources of capital that, like contingent capital, can be used to fund profitable growth opportunities that tend to arise in periods following large losses. Finally, the authors argue that risk management can raise the confidence of investors in their estimates of future growth by removing the “noise” in earnings that comes from bearing non‐core risks, thereby making current earnings a more reliable guide to future earnings. In support of this possibility, the authors provide evidence showing that, for a given level of reported return on equity (ROE), (re)insurers with more stable ROEs have higher price‐to‐book ratios, suggesting investors' willingness to pay a premium for the stability provided by risk management.     

Corporate Transparency, Financial Development and the Allocation of Capital: Empirical Evidence

There is controversy regarding the role of financial development in promoting economic growth. Lucas (1988 ) suggests that the role of financial intermediation in economic growth has been very badly over-stressed in the popular and professional discussion. Levine et al . (2000 ), on the other hand, show that in a cross-country setting the exogenous component of financial intermediary development is positively and robustly linked to economic growth. Although empirical methodologies to investigate the finance-growth nexus have been refined, there is a lack of understanding about the exact mechanisms through which the financial system could affect economic performance in the real sector. Wurgler (2000 ) investigates one such mechanism of economic growth: whether capital is allocated efficiently. He then empirically shows that countries with well-developed financial architecture improve capital allocation. This article extends Wurgler (2000 ) by investigating the role of an important economic institution, the financial reporting system, on the efficiency of capital allocation. Financial reporting provides the primary source of independently verified information to the capital providers about the performance of managers and facilitates efficient resource allocation decisions. Results show that financial transparency is positively and significantly related to capital allocation efficiency. Further, this result holds after controlling for the impact of stock price synchronicity, state-owned enterprises and investor protection rights.     

Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis

We use a sample of 800 firms in eight East Asian countries to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the region's financial crisis. The crisis negatively impacted firms' investment opportunities, raising the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors. Crisis period stock returns of firms in which managers have high levels of control rights, but have separated their control and cash flow ownership, are 10–20 percentage points lower than those of other firms. The evidence is consistent with the view that ownership structure plays an important role in determining whether insiders expropriate minority shareholders.     

How “Competitive Pay” Undermines Pay for Performance (and What Companies Can Do to Avoid That)

Almost all proxy statements say that the company's pay programs are designed to achieve pay for performance and to provide competitive pay. While companies assume that these objectives are perfectly compatible, attempts to provide competitive pay often have the effect of undermining pay for performance. As currently practiced, competitive pay means that the company's target pay levels match the pay levels of its peer companies regardless of past performance. By targeting the dollar value of an equity award each year, competitive pay plans effectively reward poor performance in a given year by increasing equity grant shares in the following year—and, conversely, such plans penalize superior performance in one year by reducing the number of shares in the next. Likewise, the target share of the annual incentive award increases with poor performance and decreases with superior performance. In this fashion, the competitive pay approach distorts incentives and weakens the link between cumulative pay and cumulative performance. The authors show that the focus on competitive pay is a modern development that replaced the sharing formulas that governed executive pay in the first half of the twentieth century. Companies adopt the competitive pay model because they believe it does a better job of achieving the three main objectives of executive pay: strong incentives; retention; and limited shareholder cost. While competitive pay directly addresses retention risk, it can greatly weaken management incentives. Furthermore, boards tends to rely on competitive pay data to set target compensation because they have no meaningful measure of incentive strength and the actual cost to shareholders. Without quantitative measures of incentive strength and shareholder cost, boards run the risk of retaining poor performers and losing superior performers. Using a case study of Dow Chemical, the authors show how companies can measure the incentive strength of their executive pay plans, and how a simple pay plan using annual grants of performance shares can provide “perfect” pay for performance.     

Corporate Restructuring and Corporate Dissolution of Companies in Financial Distress: Ensuring Creditor Protection. A Comparison of the US,UK and Dutch Models

Where a company is in financial distress, there are two options: rescue of the (viable) company by restructuring or liquidation of the (unviable) company by dissolution. In practice, the most important restructuring procedure is the US Chapter 11. Many European jurisdictions have used Chapter 11 as a source of inspiration for the enactment of their restructuring proceedings. However, in Europe, national restructuring rules vary greatly in respect of the range of procedures available to companies in financial distress aiming at restructuring. Some European jurisdictions do not provide for formal restructuring procedures at all. Unviable companies in financial distress are too broke to restructure. In most European jurisdictions, unviable companies can be dissolved very quickly and cheaply. However, these procedures also differ from each other. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Financial Crisis,Politically Connected CEOs,and the Performance of State-Owned Enterprises: Evidence from Korea

This study examines under specific situations the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from two points of view—business performance and public performance. We find that SOEs with a politically connected CEO perform well even during a financial crisis as the SOEs are able to obtain more favorable treatment. However, the results imply that politically connected CEOs perform poorly when government subsidies are excluded as they may lack the skills for successful management. The results also confirm that SOEs encourage more corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities during a financial crisis in an effort to gain legitimacy by demonstrating that they are committed to social responsibility. However, politically connected CEOs have a negative effect on CSR performance during a financial crisis.     

中小企业板上市公司股权结构、公司治理与企业绩效:基于随机前沿生产函数的分析

本文通过构建深圳中小企业板上市公司股权结构影响企业绩效的复合随机前沿生产函数,利用2006—2008年面板数据对中小企业的股权结构和企业绩效的关系进行了经验研究,结果表明中小企业的股权集中度与企业绩效之间显著正相关,这与国内文献中对大公司的经验研究结果一致,表明当前上市公司的股权集中有利于公司治理改善和企业绩效的提高。但是第一大股东持股比率却与绩效负相关,这与对大公司的研究结论相反,表明在中小企业中存在较为明显的"隧道挖掘"现象,"一股独大"在中小企业中并不利于公司治理。研究结果还表明,国家、法人、外资或个人对公司治理的绩效无显著差异;流通股比重、高管持股、研发人员投入等都与企业绩效不相关;中小企业具有较强的股权融资倾向,不符合"啄食顺序"的资本结构理论。     

How Firms Make Capital Expenditure Decisions: Financial Signals, Internal Cash Flows, Income Taxes and the Tax Reform Act of 1986

This paper empirically assesses the determinants of future net capital expenditures for a broad cross-section of COMPUSTAT firms from 1973 to 1989. We explore three general categories of factors expected to affect investment: (1) external equity financing, (2) internally generated accounting information, and (3) tax incentives. We find that external financing and information plays a role in that both positive stock returns and equity issuances indicate future increases in investment. The results suggest that high stock prices not only lower the cost of capital, but also signal good investment opportunities. Accounting information about internal sources and uses of funds are also important in the investment decision. In particular, net income and depreciation are positive indicators of future investment while there is a tradeoff between the payment of dividends and investment. Further, positive changes in available cash liquidity also motivate future investment. While taxes are not important in the investment decision on average, we find that firms with previously higher income taxes invested substantially more in 1985 and 1986. This coincides with the repeal of the investment tax credit and the accelerated depreciation schedules in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. We view this as evidence that federal tax policy in the 1980's induced firms with high income tax obligations to accelerate capital expenditures just before the favorable tax treatment of capital expenditures was eliminated.     

资本成本、可持续增长与国有企业分红比例估算——模型构建及检验

本文以股利理论、资本成本理论与可持续增长理论分析为基础,构建了国有企业可持续分红比例估算模型,并进行了检验和分析。检验结果表明,国有企业在样本期间股东权益报酬率(即留存收益再投资收益率)总体能够满足国有股东必要报酬率(即股权资本成本)的要求,适度留存利润将有利于国有企业的价值创造。文章建议,国有企业应努力提高自身的盈利能力、营运能力,并保持合理的资本结构,在应对和处置市场风险方面发挥积极作用,从而在兼顾国有股权资本成本和可持续增长的基础上制定科学的分红政策。