国家自主性、中央银行独立性与国际货币合作——德国国际货币政策选择的政治逻辑

政治经济学文献表明,通过将货币政策交给具有独立性的中央银行来管理,政府可以增强货币政策承诺的可信性。但是,具有独立性的中央银行在政治过程中也构成了一个否决行为体,从而有可能限制国家(政府)的自主性。根据"结构导致的均衡"的分析视角,如果国家偏好与中央银行偏好不一致,何者可以转化为权威性行为将取决于该国的政治制度。在国内政治制度的变革难以实现的情况下,国家可以通过参与国际制度与国际谈判来改变中央银行与政府之间的既有均衡,并使这种均衡朝着增强国家自主性的方向演变。作为世界上独立程度最高的中央银行之一,德国联邦银行担心欧洲货币合作会干扰其维护国内币值稳定的目标,更不愿通过放弃本国货币马克来推进货币一体化。但是,德国联邦政府通过其在国际制度与国际谈判中享有的信息优势与合法性,克服了德国联邦银行对欧洲货币合作的反对,推动建立了欧洲货币体系和欧洲货币联盟。     

Central bank cooperation under the interwar gold standard

The limits of cooperation and the failures of leadership are recurrent themes in historical accounts which seek to explain the instability of the interwar gold standard. Yet these themes are wholly incompatible with received models of the gold standard. In an attempt at reconciliation, this paper has presented a simple model of central bank interaction under the interwar gold standard, and used it to interpret Anglo-French financial relations following Britain's return to gold. The model is inspired by Keynes' and Norman's comment that the interwar system can be understood as a competitive struggle for gold. It shows that if two central banks play a noncooperative game in which they both seek to augment their gold reserves, they will tend to raise their discount rates above the level consistent with price stability, depressing incomes at home and abroad. While central bank policy was but one factor at work in the world economy in the 1920s, the model is suggestive when applied to a period marked by historically high discount rates, conflicts over the distribution of gold, and steady deflation culminating in a Great Depression.     

Land ownership in the nordic countries

Abstract

The article examines the relationship between the Norwegian State and international cartels and trusts in the interwar years. In this period, Norway was at the forefront with regard to implementing legislation regulating cartels, yet the legislation was not an antitrust legislation in the modern sense. It was aimed not only at protecting consumer interests, but more importantly at defending domestic businesses against foreign monopolies and cartels. In the article we examine how the Norwegian authorities interacted with international cartels and trusts in seven different cases in the interwar period. The study shows that although there was a deep seated scepticism towards concentration of market power in Norway, cartels received support from the Norwegian government when they were deemed to be beneficial to Norwegian economic interests. The legislation was used to foster the development of domestic cartels, while at the same time it was employed as a tool to limit the operations of foreign cartels and trusts.     

从“三元悖论”谈我国人民币汇率制度的选择

作为经典的汇率制度选择依据——“三元悖论“，长期以来一直被学术界所信奉，同样在我国，近年来关于人民币汇率制度的选择问题也是一直以此为基石。认为人民币汇率制度的选择主要依据是我国中央银行的货币政策自主。然而本文将利用Mendel-Fleming和Mendel-Fleming-Dombusch两个模型去分析，得出即使在国际资本完全不自由流动下的固定汇率政策以及在国际资本的完全自由流动情况下的浮动汇率政策都无法完全得以实现，从而理清了我国人民币汇率制度选择时依赖于中央银行货币政策自主的模糊认识。     

从“三元悖论”谈我国人民币汇率制度的选择

作为经典的汇率制度选择依据--"三元悖论",长期以来一直被学术界所信奉,同样在我国,近年来关于人民币汇率制度的选择问题也是一直以此为基石.认为人民币汇率制度的选择主要依据是我国中央银行的货币政策自主,然而本文将利用Mendel-Fleming和Mendel-Fleming-Dornbusch两个模型去分析,得出即使在国际资本完全不自由流动下的固定汇率政策以及在国际资本的完全自由流动情况下的浮动汇率政策都无法完全得以实现,从而理清了我国人民币汇率制度选择时依赖于中央银行货币政策自主的模糊认识.     

China's trilemma: monetary policy autonomy in an economy with a managed floating exchange rate

Mundell's trilemma theory says that capital flow, exchange rate stability, and monetary policy autonomy cannot be achieved simultaneously. Using monthly data from the People's Bank of China from 1999 to 2019, we find that the trilemma theory is not nearly as tight in China's practice as in theory, and the central bank can internally offset the effect of exchange rate volatility by ways other than the monetary base (such as central bank securities). Our results also indicate that, before 2012, monetary policy autonomy in China was weak due to the problem of ‘funds outstanding for foreign exchange’. With the reform of the Renminbi (RMB) exchange rate system in 2005, the effectiveness of central bank securities in compensating for the flow of foreign exchange reserves has gradually been strengthened in China.     

加强中央银行独立性的重要意义--以日本为实例的分析

以日本为实例的分析表明,如果一国的中央银行缺乏应有的独立性,一般说来并不会像“时间非一致性”理论所分析的那样,会促使政府反反复复地背弃维护物价稳定的承诺,去有意制造通货膨胀,也不会像政治商业周期理论所分析的那样,会引发政府为谋求连任而周期性地运用货币政策愚弄选民。部分西方学者以通货膨胀率的讷氏来分析是否应该加强中央银行独立性的观点是极其片面的。为了使货币政策选择免受个别政治家或某届政府不合理的干预,避免国际压力对货币政策运营产生错误影响,使货币政策真正起到稳定经济运行的作用,必须赋予中央银行以充分的独立性。     

Transforming Central Bank Liabilities into Government Debt: The Case of China

Where policy has substantially increased central bank assets, the corresponding liabilities present an opportunity to increase the breadth, depth and liquidity of the government bond market. In China's case, transformed illiquid central bank liabilities could double or triple the stock of government bonds. Central bank liabilities can be transformed into government bonds either through the government's purchase of foreign exchange reserves held by the central bank or by the government overfunding its borrowing requirement and depositing the proceeds in the central bank. The overfunding approach is preferred if, for financial stability reasons, it is judged prudent to leave the central bank with sufficient resources to serve itself as lender of last resort in foreign currency to the banking system. In the case of China, public debt consolidation could also contribute to further liberalizing the Chinese banking system, wider international use of the renminbi and more balanced holdings of key currency government bonds.     

Flight‐to‐safety and the credit crunch: a new history of the banking crises in France during the Great Depression†

Despite France's importance in the interwar world economy, the scale of the French banking crises of 1930–1 and their consequences have never been fully assessed quantitatively. The lack of banking regulation severely limited the availability of balance sheet data. Using a new dataset of individual balance sheets from more than 300 banks, this article shows that the crises were much more severe than previously thought, although they did not affect the main commercial banks. By reconstructing financial flows, this study shows that the fall in bank credit was mostly driven by a flight‐to‐safety by deposits, from banks to savings institutions and the central bank. The decrease in bank deposits due to bank runs was offset by an increase in deposits with savings institutions, with the central bank, and in cash hoarding, whereas the decrease in bank credit was not offset by an increase in loans from non‐bank financial institutions. In line with the gold standard mentality, cash deposited with savings institutions and the central bank was used to decrease marketable public debt and increase gold reserves, rather than pursuing countercyclical policies. Despite massive capital inflows and rising aggregate money supply, France suffered from a severe, persistent credit crunch.     

The Political Economy of Interwar Egyptian Cotton Policy

The optimal tariff was a central concern to economists and policymakers in interwar Egypt. The government took the position that Egypt conformed to the small-country assumption in world cotton markets. Using time-series and panel data for the period 1895–1939, this article demonstrates that Egyptian long-staple cotton commanded significant market power in international markets. An optimal export tariff would have encouraged economic diversification and generated huge government revenues, making it possible to finance industrialization plans. However, the burden of taxation would have been shared by Egyptian landlords and British interests. Thus, an optimal export tariff was incompatible with the goals of Egypt's ruling elite, who dictated the orientation of trade policy until the 1950s.     

Autonomy and Effectiveness of Chinese Monetary Policy under the De Facto Fixed Exchange Rate System

This paper uses monthly data to examine the autonomy and effectiveness of monetary policy in China under the de facto fixed exchange rate arrangement in place from 1998 to 2005. The results obtained from Granger causality tests in a vector autoregression framework indicate that： （i） China actually conducted independent monetary policy during the fixed exchange rate period; and （ii） market-oriented policy measures are impotent in influencing real output and prices. The framework of the investigation into the autonomy of monetary policy adapts to the Chinese economic condition that primary loan and deposit rates are set by the central bank. Based on the empirical results, the present paper provides alternative strategies to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy in China, including developing the financial system and solidifying microeconomic fundamentals instead of forcing the adaptation of a more flexible exchange rate regime.     

Structural Reform and Transparency in a Monetary Union

We assess how central bank transparency affects the incentives for labour market reform in a monetary union. We introduce transparency as affecting unemployment forecasts that provide information that the central bank has to the private sector and the governments. Under conditions of monetary policy opaqueness and inflation bias, we show that monetary union may induce more reform (as governments mitigate inflation surprises under idiosyncratic shocks), albeit to a lesser extent when inflation bias is only present at the national level. In the absence of inflation bias, central bank transparency, by eliminating inflation surprises in the face of idiosyncratic shocks, induces less reform in a currency union relative to monetary autonomy. Altogether, these results point to the need for a strong political commitment to reform so that member states benefit most from the combination of a credible and transparent single monetary policy with measures aimed at improving competitiveness and enhancing long-term growth.     

Big business and small states: Unilever and Norway in the interwar years1

In 1930, Unilever tried to take control of Lilleborg, Norway's most important producer of soap and vegetable oil, with the aim of wiping out most of Norway's independent margarine and soap industry. However, as the purchase was dependent on government concession, Unilever became embroiled in a power struggle with the Norwegian political authorities. The company was strongly criticized by Norwegian nationalists. The question of whether or not to let Unilever go forward became one of the most contested questions in Norwegian politics in the period. In the end, Unilever was allowed to go ahead with the purchase, but in return the company was forced to make substantial concessions. Expanding on Jones's framework for understanding the balance of power between multinationals and host governments, in this article it is argued that we must look beyond firm specific assets and a cost‐benefit oriented analysis of the relationship between multinationals and host countries to understand the end result. In this case, nationalism had a decisive impact. Unilever's acquisition of Lilleborg and the Norwegian response thus contributes to our understanding of the nature of multinational enterprise in the interwar period and of the political economy of foreign direct investment in general.     

A nonnormative theory of inflation and central bank independence

A Nonnormative Theory of Inflation and Central Bank Independence. — The authors study monetary policy under different central bank constitutions when the labor-market insiders set the minimal wage so that the outsiders are involuntarily unemployed. If the insiders are in the majority, the representative insider will be the median voter. The authors show that an independent central bank, if controlled by the median voter, does not produce a systematic inflation bias, albeit equilibrium employment is too low from a social welfare point of view. A dependent central bank, in contrast, is forced by the government to collect seigniorage and to take the government’s re-election prospects into account. The predictions of their theory are consistent with the evidence that central bank independence decreases average inflation and inflation variability, but does not affect employment variability.     

The scale of Norwegian interwar unemployment in international perspective

Abstract

The author offers revised estimates of Norwegian interwar unemployment, and argues that total unemployment as a percentage of the labour force was considerably lower than the unemployment rate for trade unionists. The new figures, suggesting annual unemployment to hover between 5 and 10 percent for most of the interwar period, seem somewhat lower than the scale of Norwegian interwar unemployment according to the conventional view. However, they correspond well with similar calculations carried out for other countries. suggesting that unemployment as a percentage of the total labour force was about 1.5-3 times lower than that among insured workers.     

Central Bank Behavior and Statutory Independence

This paper integrates the Taylor reaction function literature with the literature on central bank independence (CBI). The central bank??s policy reaction function describes its behaviors, which measures the practical CBI, as opposed to the legal CBI measured by CBI indices. By analyzing the relationship between various legal CBI indices and the central banks?? reactions to inflation for 18 OECD countries, we find that the difference of behaviors among central banks is consistent with the economic measure of independence, which measures how easy it is for the government to finance its deficits by direct access to credit from the central bank.     

论政策性银行与财政部门的配合

针对十五计划“完善和发挥政策性银行功能”的要求 ,本文认为 ,目前政策性银行功能尚未发挥出来 ,财政与政策性银行的配合不佳是最重要的制约因素。以国家开发银行为例 ,文章分析了我国财政与政策性银行配合中存在的问题 ,最后有针对性地提出了加强财政与政策性银行配合的政策建议 ,其核心建议是财政加大对政策性银行的支持 ,同时政府对财政和政策性银行加强宏观调控 ,使之形成合力 ,发挥各自效能     

中央银行利润、财政铸币税和最优铸币税的探讨

中央银行的利润主要受机会成本铸币税以及转移的机会成本铸币税二者共同作用的影响。文章定义的财政铸币税（fiscal seigniorage）包括央行上缴的利润,扣除对央行支付的利息,再加上央行对政府存款所支付的利息,以及央行对政府债权和政府存款的变动等。文章理论分析认为央行利润、财政铸币税和通货膨胀率存在非线性关系,在MIU模型下,铸币税呈U型特征或"倒U型"特征,这与铸币税因子和货币需求函数的变动特征有关。ARDL模型实证结果显示我国中央银行货币铸币税、央行利润和财政铸币税的变动存在"U型"特征;转移的机会成本铸币税呈现"倒U型"特征;机会成本铸币税既没有"U型"特征,也没有"倒U型"特征。以MIU模型中的货币需求函数为前提,铸币税的U型或倒U型特征取决于铸币税因子的变动特征。     

地方财政搭便车、财政货币承诺与地方债务治理

本文通过一个简单的理论模型说明了地方政府财政搭便车、中央银行货币政策承诺、中央政府财政政策承诺以及中央政府财政统筹协调之间的关系。研究发现,中央银行的货币承诺或中央政府的财政政策承诺对于降低地方政府的财政搭便车动机至关重要。虽然中央政府的财政统筹协调可以获得与中央银行货币政策承诺或中央政府财政政策承诺相同的结果,但其具体实施存在诸多困难。在此基础上,本文提出地方政府债务治理的政策设想和可行方法。     

中国人民银行央行票据的可持续性问题分析

自2003年我国中央银行票据开始登上公开市场的舞台,并且逐步发展成为中央银行公开市场操作的主流工具之一。本文主要从央行票据在公开市场操作中的作用、我国流动性过剩、存款准备金等货币政策的局限性和央行票据所承担的新的政策职能的角度来说明因为我国所处特殊经济金融的环境,央行票据作为我国公开市场操作的中长期工具,具有可持续性。最后本文还对完善央行票据制度提出几点政策建议。