税务代理的现状及发展对策研究

税务代理在我国经过１０多年的实践,从无到有,从小到大,已形成了一定规模。但民世界上许多国家相比,我国税务代理的发展速度是比较缓慢的,巨大的市场需求潜力有待于进一步挖掘。建议从我国实际情况出发,分析影响税务代理发展的因素,探讨推动税务代理的具体对策。     

Agency costs and tax planning when the government is a major Shareholder

In state owned enterprises (SOEs), taxes are a dividend to the controlling shareholder, the state, but a cost to other shareholders. We examine publicly traded firms in China and find significantly lower tax avoidance by SOEs relative to non-SOEs. The differences are pronounced for locally versus centrally-owned SOEs and during the year of SOE term performance evaluations. We link our results to managerial incentives through promotion tests, finding that higher SOE tax rates are associated with higher promotion frequencies of SOE managers. Our results suggest managerial incentives and tax reporting are conditional on the ownership structure of the firm.     

大股东资金占用与审计师的监督

本文研究审计师对大股东占用上市公司资金行为的监督作用。通过对1997年到2002年间的上市公司进行分析,我们发现随着大股东资金占用程度的加大,审计师更加倾向于出示非标准意见。在大股东占用资金最多的10%的公司年度中,审计师出示非标准意见的概率高达近50%。在控制了其他影响审计师意见的变量以后,大股东资金占用程度仍然是决定审计意见的一个非常显著的因素。这说明我国的审计师对中国资本市场出现的大股东资金占用问题有一定的认识,并且将其反映到审计师意见中去。我们进一步的分析发现: (1)被审计师出具了非标准意见的公司,其大股东占用资金反而更加持续。这说明审计师意见对公司的监督意义不大,公司并没有因为审计师的意见而减轻占用程度。(2)被审计师出具了非标准意见的公司,其大股东占用对未来的股票收益的负影响与其他公司并没有区别。这说明投资者对审计师的意见并没有给予足够的重视。本文的研究结果说明,审计师对大股东盘剥中小股东的现象进行了监督、对大股东资金占用严重的公司出示了更多的非标准意见,然而这些非标准意见并没有引起各方面的重视,一方面公司的治理并没有改善,另一方面投资者也没有因审计师的意见而避免更多的损失。     

次贷危机中评级机构的角色及影响

美国次贷危机发生过程中,信用评级机构的信誉受到了极大的挑战,各方对评级机构的评级能力和风险预警能力提出了质疑。本文从次贷危机影响因子入手,分析了信用评级机构在次贷危机中扮演的角色以及出现的误差。同时,将这些教训与当前我国的评级产业问题相结合,提出避免发生相同危机的建议。     

大股东侵占博弈框架下的信息披露作用探析

本文从博弈论的角度,分析了信息披露在上市公司大股东侵占模型中对大股东的抑制作用、对小股东的保护作用以及对监管的促进作用。研究分别构建了基于大股东侵占行为的大股东-小股东、大股东-监管者的博弈模型,对模型中行动人的均衡策略结果进行了分析。就大股东而言,信息披露因素能够通过影响行动人的收益策略,起到抑制大股东侵占行为的作用;就小股东而言,信息披露能够有效增加大股东的侵占成本,降低小股东的监督成本,并能借助市场作用形成小股东对大股东行为的有效监督,有利于保护小股东权益;就监管而言,信息披露可促进以证券投资机构为代表的市场中介机构不断改善信息披露质量,从而发挥降低监管者成本、提高监管效率的作用。在完美的信息披露制度下,行动人的均衡策略可以达到帕累托最优状态。     

内蒙古旅行社发展和经营中的问题与对策

内蒙古旅行社数量增长超过全国平均增长速度.但无论是从宏观的制度层面还是微观的管理层面,内蒙古旅行社业的生存和发展都面临一系列问题.对内蒙古旅行社业的发展和经营的现状进行评析,从政府宏观调控、人力资源开发、产品和服务的创新以及企业信息化建设等几个方面提出内蒙古旅行社业发展的思路.     

Waiving Technical Default: The Role of Agency Costs and Bank Regulations

Abstract:  This paper examines whether the characteristics of banks and borrowers are associated with banks' decisions to waive violations of debt covenants. The findings suggest that banks possess sufficient private information about firms, and they use this information in their waiver decisions. Banks' decisions to waive violations vary with the borrowers' agency costs, debt features, the banks' characteristics and regulatory circumstances, and the bank-firm business relationship. There is no evidence that syndicated loans, bank structure, and adverse economic conditions are significant determinants of the waiver decision. Research findings offer valuable insight into the theoretical and practical implications of debt covenants and agency costs.     

The Role of Profitability in Divisional Decision Making and Performance Evaluation

The use of profitability, typically in the form of return on investment, to assess divisional financial performance has been widely criticised, since it involves the allocation to divisions of central fixed costs. The measure is, however, extensively used. Prior surveys have indicated economic reasons for use of the measure, but the justification supplied has been incomplete. The survey reported in this paper found evidence for the same economic reasons, but it has also provided additional justification. The new finding is that the measure is widely used for making inter-division and inter-firm comparisons.     

The Rise and Rise of Evidence in Health Care

Health care practitioners (especially doctors) have always given assurances that what they do is efficacious. But in the past 50 years justification of the effectiveness of health care interventions has attained a new prominence. Evidence, at least notionally, now lies at the heart of health care policy and practice. This article provides an overview of the generation and use of evidence on effectiveness in health care. It explains why rigorous methodologies have taken hold and describes the major preoccupation with trying to ensure that research evidence has an impact on clinical practice. The strengths and weaknesses of evidence-based health care are explored to identify the opportunities for profitable transfer of experience across the public sector.     

最终控制人利益侵占的条件分析——对LLSV模型的扩展

本文以少数所有权控制结构(controlling minority structure)形成的最终控制人所有权与控制权分离为研究对象,通过对LLSV模型的扩展,分析最终控制人在什么条件下会实施侵占少数股东利益的经济行为。模型分析结果显示,投资者法律保护程度、相对所有权和相对投资收益率是最终控制人实施利益侵占与否以及利益侵占程度的重要影响因素。本文模型的分析结论与已有公司治理经验研究的发现一致。     

Shareholder proposals in the new millennium: Shareholder support,board response,and market reaction

Although the owners of publicly traded companies have had the right to offer shareholder proposals using Rule 14a-8 for several decades, the effectiveness of the rule has been frequently questioned because few of these proposals received substantial support from other shareholders and even fewer have been implemented by boards. Using new data from the 2002–2004 proxy seasons, we analyze shareholder voting patterns on these proposals, board reactions to them, and market responses. We find some big changes from earlier periods: many more proposals are receiving majority shareholder support during our sample period relative to earlier studies, and this support has translated into directors implementing more of the actions called for by shareholders. In particular, boards are increasingly willing to remove important anti-takeover defenses, such as the classified board and poison pill, in response to shareholders' requests, something rarely seen in the past. Despite the increase in support for shareholder proposals and board action in response, we find small and insignificant stock market reaction. We conclude that shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 have an emerging role in reducing agency costs by increasing director responsiveness to shareholder concerns to open the market more fully to corporate control.     

Getting the Unemployed Back to Work: The Role of Targeted Wage Subsidies

This paper examines alternative approaches to wage subsidy programmes. It does this in the context of a recent active labour market reform for the young unemployed in Britain. This New Deal reform and the characteristics of the target group are examined in detail. We discuss theoretical considerations, the existing empirical evidence and propose two strategies for evaluation. The first suggests an ex-post trend adjusted difference in difference estimator. The second, relates to a model based ex-ante evaluation. We present the conditions for each to provide a reliable evaluation and fit some of the crucial parameters using data from the British Labour Force Survey. We stress that the success of this type of labour market programmes hinge on dynamic aspects of the youth labour market, in particular the pay-off to experience and training.     

教师在研究性学习中的角色转换

研究性学习是以学生为主的学习,这就需要教师进行相应的角色转换,成为学生开展研究性学习的促进者、组织者、参与者和指导者.教师的职责应当转变为帮助学生认清研究性学习的理论意义,积极指导学生完成学习情境的构建,参与到学生的研究性学习课题中并加以督促和鼓励,对学生在研究性学习过程中的态度、表现、能力、收获进行全面、客观、细致地观察和记录并作出评价.     

第一大股东性质、控制模式与公司业绩

本文以上海证券交易所A股上市公司为研究对象，以第一大股东在股东会和董事会两个层面的控制权组合界定为控制模式，考察在各种控制模式下，第一大股东为政府和自然人的上市公司业绩差异。研究结果表明，对于第一大股东超强控制和完全竞争的控制模式，政府和自然人性质的上市公司业绩不存在差异；在第一大股东高股权低控制模式下，政府性质的上市公司业绩优于自然人性质的上市公司；而在第一大股东低股权高控制模式下，自然人性质的上市公司业绩优于政府性质的上市公司。     

The Effect of Shareholder Approval of Equity Issuances Around the World

Mandatory shareholder approval of equity issuances varies considerably across and within countries. In the United States and a few other countries, management typically needs the approval of only its board of directors to issue common stock. In most countries, however, by law or stock exchange rule, shareholders must vote to approve equity issuances when using certain methods or contemplating offers that exceed a specified fraction of outstanding shares. In some countries, shareholders must approve all equity issuances. Even in the United States, shareholder approval is mandatory under certain circumstances. The differences in the stock market reaction to shareholder‐approved equity issuances and to issues undertaken unilaterally by management are strikingly and consistently large. When shareholders approve stock issuances, whether public or rights offerings, or private placements, the average announcement returns are significantly positive, on the order of 2%. But when managers issue stock without shareholder approval, as in the case of U.S. public offerings, returns are significantly negative and 4% lower, on average, than for shareholder‐approved issues. What's more, the closer in time the shareholder vote is to the issue date, and the greater the required plurality (say, two‐thirds instead of half the vote required for approval), the more positive is the market reaction to the issue—and these findings hold for each of the three main kinds of offerings that take place in all 23 countries in the author's sample. Also telling, in countries where shareholder approval is required, such as Sweden and Malaysia, rights offers predominate over public issues. But in countries like the U.S. and Japan, where managers may generally issue stock without shareholder approval, public offers predominate over rights issues. These findings suggest that agency problems—the tendency of corporate managements to put their own interests before their shareholders'—play a major role in equity issuances. Such findings are also largely inconsistent with the adverse selection, market timing, and signaling explanations that currently dominate academic thinking about equity issuances by public corporations.     

The Rise and Rise of Public Private Partnerships: Challenges for Public Accountability

The increasing popularity of public private partnerships (PPPs) thrusts on to centre stage the inherent tension between accountability and transparency on the one hand, and efficiency and commerciality on the other. This paper explores a number of accountability issues that are exacerbated by a public private partnership structure. The organisational structure of a PPP, where much of the activity associated with the delivery of a public service is embedded in a private-sector entity, increases the likelihood that public scrutiny of decisions and actions is significantly inhibited