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1.
A version of the small‐union Meade model is presented to analyze the illegal immigration problem in the context of import tariffs. Two possible host nation objectives are considered: (i) to control the level of illegal immigration to a given target; or (ii) to choose an illegal immigration level that maximizes national welfare. Available policy instruments are import tariffs/subsidies, border, and internal enforcement levels. The second‐best tariff on imports from the source nation (for illegal immigration) can be of either sign. It depends on the effect of the tariff on the wage rate and the pattern of substitutability in consumption. In scenario (ii), greater enforcement may be justified if it reduces labor inflow and thereby contracts the protected sector. If enforcement is too costly, tariff policy may substitute for it to exploit monopsony power in the labor market and to counter the distortionary effects of labor flows. 相似文献
2.
This paper presents a two-country general equilibrium model where international mobility of labor is prohibited. Illegal immigration nevertheless occurs. The probability of success at illegal immigration depends on resources allocated to border control and domestic enforcements. We examine the effects of switching resources form border control to domestic enforcement on illegal immigration and on welfare levels. We characterize the allocation of resources between the two methods of immigration control, that minimizes illegal immigration, and find that, starting from this allocation, moving resources from border control to domestic enforcement is unambiguously welfare improving for the destination country. 相似文献
3.
The paper analyzes the effects of government policy upon illegal immigration. The model used as a vehicle for this analysis is an extension of Ethier's one-small-country model of illegal immigration to a two-country context. We distinguish between the cases of capital immobility and free capital mobility, and consider illegal immigration when there are border patrols by the government and when there are internal enforcement procedures in effect. Unlike previous researchers who have assumed risk neutrality, we examine the impacts of government policy when prospective illegal immigrants exhibit risk averse and risk loving behavior. The relaxation of the risk neutrality assumption leads to the possibility of multiple and unstable equilibria. Moreover, attitudes to risk and the probability of detection are shown to have implications for some equilibrium responses to tighter surveillance. 相似文献
4.
The paper analyzes the effects of government policy upon illegal immigration. The model used as a vehicle for this analysis is an extension of Ethier's one-small-country model of illegal immigration to a two-country context. We distinguish between the cases of capital immobility and free capital mobility, and consider illegal immigration when there are border patrols by the government and when there are internal enforcement procedures in effect. Unlike previous researchers who have assumed risk neutrality, we examine the impacts of government policy when prospective illegal immigrants exhibit risk averse and risk loving behavior. The relaxation of the risk neutrality assumption leads to the possibility of multiple and unstable equilibria. Moreover, attitudes to risk and the probability of detection are shown to have implications for some equilibrium responses to tighter surveillance. 相似文献
5.
"This paper develops a simple two-country model of illegal immigration in an attempt to examine the interaction among variables such as the stock of migrant labor, the unemployment rates of the two economies, and the rate of spending by the host country on the enforcement of its immigration restrictions. The focus of the analysis is on the dynamics of immigration policy and on its role in determining the nature of the mechanism by which disturbances to the labor market of one country are transmitted to that of the other in the short run and in the long run." 相似文献
6.
This paper deals with a sanctions policy toward reducing illegal immigration. Using a single-period game, it shows that by
imposing a penalty on each apprehended illegal alien, the host country will increase the motivation of the source country
to expend money for preventing illegal immigration. It is also shown that although the sanctions are allowed to go only one
way, by increasing the efficiency of catching illegal aliens, both parties will be motivated to expend money for restraining
illegal immigration.
The author thanks Gideon Hollander, Eliakim Katz, and an anonymous referee for their valuable help. All errors are the author's
responsibility. 相似文献
7.
This paper provides an alternative explanation for why illegal immigration can exhibit substantial volatility. We develop a model economy where migrants make decisions in the face of uncertain border enforcement and transfers from the host country. The uncertainty is extrinsic, a sunspot, and arises due to ambiguity regarding government policy; the sunspot manifests itself as uncertainty in the commodity price of money. Immigration volatility stems from both the trade‐off between the marginal benefits and costs (transfers and enforcement) to migrating and the existence of a sunspot. Finally, we examine the impact of changes in government policies on migration levels. 相似文献
8.
This paper incorporates efficiency wages into the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The capital intensive sector pays higher wages than the other sector. One result is that tariffs to attract capital increase welfare by increasing the quality, not quantity, of jobs available. However, there are distributional effects among laborers. Some see an increase in wages, others become unemployed. The paper also investigates policies in the presence of illegal immigration. If immigration cannot be limited, a high wage country is best served by a capital outflow that eliminates the incentive for the labor inflow. Again, there are distributional effects among the workers. [F20] 相似文献
9.
"This paper develops a general equilibrium framework of a two-sector economy which incorporates illegal immigration in the presence of labor unions. It demonstrates that stricter enforcement of immigration laws, by reducing the demand for or supply of illegal aliens, benefits all legal workers in the economy. The model is used to evaluate the impact of these policy changes on national income. Results indicate that national income does not necessarily fall when immigration controls are tightened. The existence of a union mitigates the negative welfare impact of a reduction in the number of illegal immigrants." 相似文献
10.
Freeman (2006 ) suggested that auctioning immigration visas and redistributing the revenue to native residents in the host country would increase migration from low-income to high-income countries. The effect of the auctioning of immigration visas, in the Ricardian model from Findlay (1982 ), on the optimal level of immigration for the host country is considered. It is shown that auctioning immigration visas will lead to a positive level of immigration only if the initial wage difference between the host country and the source country is substantial. The cost of the immigration visa is more than half the earnings of the immigrant worker. 相似文献
11.
This paper examines the effects of capital account liberalization on the long-run growth of a developing economy. A general-equilibrium, endogenous growth model is constructed in which corruption forms an integral part of the governance system of the country. By undermining the profitability of innovations, corruption lowers the rate of return to capital and reduces the rate of technological change. The impact of international financial liberalization on long-run growth in this model can be either positive or negative. A drop in growth is obtained when the level of corruption is high enough to cause domestic rates of return to capital before liberalization to drop below those in the rest of the world. In this case, liberalization generates capital outflows, which act as a constraining force on innovation, reducing the rate of technological change and lowering output growth. On the other hand, if the level of corruption is sufficiently low, the capital account liberalization will serve as a boost to the country's technical change and growth. 相似文献
12.
This paper uses a heterogeneous‐firms model to examine the pro‐competitive channel through which FDI affects national welfare. The model shows that the country from which FDI originates experiences a welfare gain following liberalization. However, a counterintuitive finding is that the welfare of the host country deteriorates. This is explained by the production relocation process that leads to an increase in the mass of domestic firms in the source country and a decrease in the host country. The model also confirms that unilateral trade liberalization brings a similar result even in the presence of bilateral FDI flows. 相似文献
13.
This paper extends the standard (one-good, two-factor) model of international capital and labor mobility by incorporating a nontraded good within a small capital-exporting, labor-importing country. It examines, from this country's perspective, the effects of capital taxes and temporary immigration on the nominal wage, and on welfare, and derives the optimal policy toward capital. It demonstrates, among other things, that (i) the optimal policy toward capital may be a tax on its domestic rate of return, depending on the factor intensity of the nontraded good and on the relationship between capital and labor in production, and (ii) the distinction between temporary and permanent immigration is important in evaluating its effects on various economic variables. [F20, F22] 相似文献
14.
This paper evaluates the quantitative impact of capital liberalization on the taxation structure and welfare of the liberalizing countries when governments conduct fiscal policy optimally but without commitment (time-consistent policies). The transition from a regime of capital autarky to a regime of free mobility leads to a decrease in the long-term tax rate on capital of 13 percent and an increase in the tax rate on labor of 2 percent. As a consequence of this taxation shift, welfare increases by about 1 percent. The reduction in capital taxation induced by capital market liberalization is welfare improving because, in the absence of capital mobility, the time-consistent policies over-tax capital. 相似文献
15.
This paper aims to assess the impacts of the temporary movement of workers on the illegal immigration. It uses a discrete time, forward-looking model with heterogeneous agents, in order to describe the decision made by illegal migrants from developing countries. Illegal migrants are supposed to accede only to the informal sector and are price takers, as they have no negotiating power. Taking into account these specifications, the theoretical model is solved analytically and illustrated numerically. It demonstrates that under some conditions, the liberalization of temporary movement of workers could lead to a decrease of illegal migration. 相似文献
16.
We examine the ability of immigrants to transfer the occupational human capital they acquired prior to immigration. We first augment a model of occupational choice to study the implications of language proficiency on the cross‐border transferability of occupational human capital. We then explore the empirical predictions using information about the skill requirements from O *NET and a unique dataset that includes both the last source country occupation and the first four years of occupations in Canada. We supplement the analysis using Census estimates for the same cohort with source country occupational skill requirements predicted using detailed human capital related information such as field of study. We find that male immigrants to Canada were employed in source country occupations that typically require high levels of cognitive skills, but rely less intently on manual skills. Following immigration, they find initial employment in occupations that require the opposite. Consistent with the hypothesized asymmetric role of language in the transferability of previously acquired cognitive and manual skills, these discrepancies are larger among immigrants with limited language fluency. 相似文献
17.
We present a two-country OLG economy in which international capital mobility exists in the presence of moral hazard in financial contracts. The difference in the extent of asymmetric information is a source of capital movement and capital flows from the South to the North. Even though there exists a unique steady state under autarky, multiple locally stable steady states may emerge in a world economy with an integrated capital market. However, the integration may drive the South down to further impoverishment. The South's government therefore should take into account seriously the timing of capital market liberalization as a conduit of economic development. 相似文献
18.
The saving behavior of temporary migrants when the duration of their stay abroad is set by the immigration policy of the host country is studied in this paper. The focus is on the implied flow of savings back to the source country and how it depends on migration costs, duration of the work permit, and international wage, interest and price‐level differentials. The amount of time that migrants are allowed to work in the host country is shown to be a key policy variable that affects the flow of savings repatriated to the source country. 相似文献
19.
This paper investigates the welfare consequences of immigration policies in a model with two types of labor, skilled and unskilled, and international capital mobility. The paper examines the effect of government policies, which change the immigration cost and cause immigration of one type of labor, on the welfare of natives, when the other types of labor and/or capital are also mobile. It is shown, for example, in the absence of capital mobility, if skilled and unskilled labor are highly complementary in production, then a decrease in the immigration cost of the net fiscal contributor skilled labor that causes its immigration, decreases the welfare of natives. 相似文献
20.
This paper deals with illegal immigration via two distinct activities—smuggling and trafficking of workers. A destination–source model determines economic pay‐offs and a standard labor market policy works as a deterrent. Tax paid by legal unskilled workers at the destination is determined endogenously and it finances inland monitoring against illegal immigration, holding the border patrol at a given level. The tax also finances unemployment benefit to legal workers at the destination. The number of immigrant smugglers and traffickers is also determined endogenously along with employer penalty and market wage for illegal immigrants. Higher unemployment benefits may reduce illegal wages, raise traffickers’ rent and reduce flow of illegal immigrants from the source countries. 相似文献
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