试论所有权保留制度中出卖人的取回权

所有权保留买卖已被世界各国立法及判例所确认。我国《合同法》第134条虽然对此做了规定,但由于规定过于简单,尚不能解决所有权保留买卖理论及审判实践中存在的问题。在所有权保留买卖中,当买受人不依约支付价款或对标的物擅自进行处分时,出卖人可以行使取回权。出卖人应先通知买受人交回标的物,买受人拒不交回时可申请法院强制取回。出卖人行使取回权是实现契约的救济方法。但若第三人的权利存在于标的物上,将对出卖人取回权的行使产生重大影响所有权保留制度中出卖人取回权的法律性质为就物求偿。     

无权处分场合买卖合同的效力与权利瑕疵担保

《民法典》第597条第1款的主要规范目的是,无权处分不影响买卖合同的效力。只要承认权利人的追认会产生所有权变动的效果,就适宜承认存在效力未定的处分行为。区分负担行为和处分行为,在解释论上具有可取之处。在传统债法上,无权处分致使给付不能的,存在适用债务不履行责任抑或权利瑕疵担保责任的争论,两方面规定在构成要件上有实质区别。我国《民法典》合同编实行救济进路,第三人享有所有权、抵押权等权利致使所有权不能转移的,当事人可以选择适用《民法典》第597条第1款或第612条,两者在违约责任的构成要件和效果上并无实质区别。《民法典》第612条中规定的第三人“享有权利”文义范围较窄,应当对其进行目的论扩张,将第三人“过去享有权利”且主张权利的一些情形纳入其中;即使买受人构成善意取得,仍可认定出卖人违反权利瑕疵担保义务。     

消费顾问

“同心洗”成为市场新宠近期，市场上出现的一种全新的“不用皮带，直接传动”的“同心洗”洗衣机，引起了消费者和业界人士的极大关注。海尔“同心洗”洗衣机全面解决了消费者共同关心的洗衣难题，在几个重要关注点上“技高一筹”：第一关注点：洗净比。“同心洗”洗衣机“同心协力”，洗涤更有力，比普通洗衣机洗净比提高约30％。同时，采用直接传动，使洗衣机的寿命大大延长，而且可使洗净比保持10年不变，使洗衣机的洗涤质量出现革命性改变。第二关注点：噪声。“同心洗”洗衣机由于彻底攻克了皮带松动、打滑而导致传动、制动时噪声增大…     

瑞星数据安全专家简析如何保护机密信息和资料

这一段时间“艳照泄露”事件成为舆论热点，围绕着着“艳照”来源和泄露过程，计算机数据安全问题再次成为全社会关注的话题，普通用户、企事业单位应该如何保护自己的机密信息和资料也再次成为大家关注的安全问题。瑞星数据安全专家表示，“艳照”外泄可能有三种情况：第一，送修时，没把隐私信息、从硬盘上删除；第二，删除手段过于简单，如用DEL键直接删除或者格式化硬盘；第三，采用了专业的删除手段，但是被人用专业设备恢复。     

算法歧视的两副面孔及其法律规制

我国现行算法歧视的法律治理存在两个弊端，分别是算法歧视规制范围过宽和算法歧视规制工具的凌乱。弊端的消除应当追溯至歧视概念本身，通过区分歧视的法律维度和道德维度，呈现算法歧视的两副面孔。第一副面孔是“算法偏见”，在语义上采用法律维度的歧视，对其治理旨在解决算法当中的历史偏见问题，适用反歧视法的规制原理，对算法设计者和算法应用者施加基于社会法的结果义务；第二副面孔是“算法不平等”，在语义上采用道德维度的歧视，对其治理旨在解决信息时代的资源分配问题。对于“算法不平等”，既要尊重私法自治又要削弱潜在歧视风险，法律规制除了事后司法救济外还可以采取事中方案，通过价值维度和信任维度，对算法设计者和算法应用者施以适度的负担。     

区域经济发展对金融生态环境的影响

金融生态是从生态学引入的一个概念。2005年《中国城市金融生态环境评价总报告》将其界定为“由金融主体及其赖以存在和发展的金融生态环境构成，两者之间彼此依存、相互影响、共同发展的动态平衡系统”。实际上，我们可以把金融生态系统理解为两种关系：第一，整个金融行业作为一个整体因素与其所存在自然、社会环境中各因素之间相互关系；第二，金融行业内部之间的相互关系。因此，金融生态环境所指的应该是第一种关系，是各种自然、社会因素对金融行业生存发展的影响。经济基础作为各种自然、社会因素的重要组成，使其成为影响金融生态环境的要素之一。2005年《中国城市金融生态环境评价总报告》中地区经济基础对金融生态环境的贡献弹性为0．176118，仅低于法制环境的贡献弹性（0，194961）。金融是虚拟经济，它产生于实体经济的发展需要，是实体经济的发展延伸，它能提高实体经济的运行效率。因此，实体经济基础的变动对金融业的影响是直接并且巨大的。要改善金融生态环境，对经济基础的改进完善是最直接有效的。     

关于政府铸币税收入的理论探讨北大核心

本文的重点是从货币创造的角度推导出铸币税的征收机制,在不存在经济增长和货币深化的经济中,铸币税收入等于基础货币存量乘以名义利率。如果考虑经济增长和货币化过程,铸币税的税率等于经济增长贡献率、货币化速度、和名义利率的加总。对于传统意义的铸币税,其税基是基础货币存量;当铸币税概念扩展到政府所有的金融债务时,其税基为政府发行的所有“债权凭证”的名义值总量:当铸币税扩展到整个社会范围时,其税基为所有债务人发行的“债权凭证”的总名义值。第一种概念的铸币税所对应的税率是名义利率。而后两种铸币税率为“意外”通货膨胀率。政府的铸币税收入是由经济中的所有贷款人和“原始内部货币”持有人共同分担的,而且贷款人在经济中分担了过度的铸币税负。铸币税对一国经济有利有弊。铸币税的福利成本分为两类,第一类是“社会持币剩余损失”。第二类福利损失表现为通货膨胀引致的直接有形成本。同时,铸币税又是一种弹性货币供给的制度形式。它引申出了中央银行的货币政策功能。当经济增长率大于零时,铸币税保持在一定水平对经济增长是有利的。     

“偿二代”下非寿险最低资本相关矩阵情景分析——基于最接近相关矩阵的正交试验

“偿二代”下非寿险风险采用相关系数矩阵进行聚合，出于审慎监管和资本管理的目的需要对该相关系数矩阵假设进行情景测试。受限于相关系数矩阵的半正定性要求，以往研究的情景测试仅对风险完全相关、完全不相关情形得到最低资本估计，得出的结论与实际情况存在差异。针对上述问题，本文使用2022年第2季度中国保险市场58家财险公司的最低资本披露数据，在最接近相关矩阵修正下开展正交试验，生成多个压力情景下各家财险公司的最低资本并进行极差分析与异质性分析。本文结果表明：第一，使用完全相关和完全不相关情形进行情景分析可能过分夸大了最低资本的敏感性；第二，在监管部门系统性调高相关系数矩阵元素时，主营业务为特定业务线(车险、财产险、船货特险、责任险和短期意外险)且相对分散的财险公司资本压力较大；第三，财险公司业务结构极大影响最低资本对单一相关系数的敏感性；第四，与传统的矩阵分解法相比，最接近相关矩阵不涉及对矩阵特征值的讨论，能给出更合理的敏感性结果；第五，在进行相关矩阵情景分析时，正交试验法相对于随机模拟方法的时间成本更小，两种方法下的经验分布尾部特征存在一定差异。本文的研究结论展示解释了相关矩阵假设变动时财险公司...     

董事高管责任保险、公司信息披露与高管减持

资本市场频现的减持可能出于高管自利性动机从而破坏市场公平交易，因而迫切需研究其治理机制。本文基于2007～2018年A股上市公司数据实证发现，公司购买董事高管责任保险(简称“董责险”)能显著抑制高管减持，该结论经PSM、工具变量等检验后保持稳健。进一步分析表明，第一，信息披露机制厘清了董责险能有效减弱高管的相对信息优势并抑制其出于自利性动机的减持行为；第二，董责险会增加高管减持成本并降低其自利倾向；第三，董责险抑制高管减持的作用在外部审计和法律监督较弱时更为显著，表明董责险是对公司外部治理机制的有效替代；第四，安慰剂检验显示，董责险能抑制高管而非大股东的减持，《证券法》修订和股份解禁的制度性冲击也表明，董责险主要针对高管自利性动机减持而非流动性管理动机减持发挥治理作用。基于保险机构作为利益相关者参与公司治理的视角，本文揭示了高管减持的制约机制，并有助于增进对董责险治理效应的认识。     

利益共同体的胁迫与共谋行为:论金融监管腐败的一般特征与部门特征北大核心

本文就金融监管部门的腐败行为进行了理论和实证研究 ,通过建立监管当局与被监管对象的跨时博弈模型 ,分析了金融监管腐败的一般特征———胁迫与共谋 ,并进一步比较银行监管腐败与证券监管腐败的部门差异。文章的基本结论如下。第一 ,作为贿赂的供给者 ,金融机构存在两类行贿行为 ,一是为了开展新业务而不得不承受的监管当局设租盘剥 (胁迫 ) ,二是为了对自己的违规行为寻求监管庇护而进行的主动行贿 (共谋 )。第二 ,监管当局的受贿行为也相应分为两类 ,一是通过设租进行的贪赃而不枉法的行为 ,即行政审批中的受贿行为 ;二是通过收取贿赂而进行的贪赃枉法行为 ,即以保护违规机构所换取的个人好处。第三 ,在反腐败机制上 ,稽查、高薪养廉和严格惩处都是可取的措施。第四 ,金融监管腐败与被监管对象行为存在“下游关联”效应 ,下游被监管机构超额利润越高、违规动机越强 ,相应监管部门的腐败倾向越高 ,因而银行监管腐败与证券监管腐败存在量的不同。第五 ,监管腐败程度与监管权力介入市场的直接程度有关 ,能够直接决定融资便利的监管部门被腐败侵蚀的可能性更大 ,因而银行监管腐败与证券监管腐败存在质的差异。     

Strategic ex ante contracts: rent extraction and opportunity costs

This article cosiders the possibility that a seller can contract with one uninformed buyer prior to an auction involving two potential buyers. The seller's optimal strategic ex ante contract more accurately reflects joint opportunity costs of the seller and the contracted buyer, and therefore extracts more rent from the entrant. Moreover, this ex ante contract mitigates the seller's ex post rent seeking vis‐à‐vis the contracted buyer. Accordingly, it may create more social welfare than the absence of ex ante contracts, depending upon the contracted buyer's financial constraint and the distributions of trade surplus. Implementation of the optimal strategic ex ante contract and policy implications are discussed.     

Information and the hold‐up problem

We examine situations in which a party must make a sunk investment prior to contracting with a second party to purchase an essential complementary input. We study how the resulting hold‐up problem is affected by the seller's information about the investing party's likely returns from its investment. Our principal focus is on the effects of the investment's being observable by the noninvesting party. We establish conditions under which the seller's ability to observe the buyer's investment harms the seller, benefits the buyer, and reduces equilibrium investment and total surplus. We also note conditions under which investment and welfare rise when investment is observable.     

Best foot forward or best for last in a sequential auction?

Should a seller with private information sell the best or worst goods first? Considering the sequential auction of two stochastically equivalent goods, we find that the seller has an incentive to impress buyers by selling the better good first because the seller's sequencing strategy endogenously generates correlation in the values of the goods across periods. When this impression effect is strong enough, selling the better good first is the unique pure‐strategy equilibrium. By credibly revealing to all buyers the seller's ranking of the goods, an equilibrium strategy of sequencing the goods reduces buyer information rents and increases expected revenues in accordance with the linkage principle.     

An optimal auction with identity‐dependent externalities

We analyze the problem of a seller of multiple identical units of a good who faces a set of buyers with unit demands, private information, and identity‐dependent externalities. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism and characterize its main properties. We show that the probability that a buyer obtains a unit is an increasing function of the externalities he generates and enjoys. Also, the seller's allocation of the units of the good need not be ex post efficient. As an illustration, we apply the model to the problem faced by a developer of a shopping mall who wants to allocate and price its retail space among anchor and non‐anchor stores. We show that a commonly used sequential mechanism is not optimal unless externalities are large enough.     

Leverage,governance and wealth effects of asset purchasers

We examine a sample of 670 firms that announce asset purchases. We hypothesize that buyer announcement returns should be higher in the presence of better monitoring and better governance. Consistent with the monitoring hypothesis, we find that buyers with higher private debt make purchase decisions that increase shareholder value. Consistent with the governance hypothesis, we find that returns are higher for buyers that have lower antitakeover provisions in place. Consistent with the managerial discretion hypothesis, buyer announcement-period returns increase with buyer leverage. Consistent with the liquidity hypothesis, we find that announcement-period returns decrease with the seller's Z-score, suggesting that buyers benefit from the lower liquidity of assets sold by sellers with lower debt capacity and higher financial distress. We also find that buyer announcement-period returns are directly related to their operating performance in the post-purchase year.     

Middlemen: the good,the bad,and the ugly

We examine the role of a middleman as an expert in markets. A seller's effort determines the quality of the good. Buyers observe neither the seller's effort nor the good's quality. A middleman, after observing a signal about the good's quality, decides whether to purchase it and then to sell it. We show that the presence of a middleman may either reduce or exacerbate the seller's moral hazard problem. We also consider a model with multiple middlemen. We find that the seller's effort is minimized if either the middleman's signal is perfect or the number of middlemen is large.     

Do buyer‐size discounts depend on the curvature of the surplus function? Experimental tests of bargaining models

A number of recent theoretical papers have shown that, for buyer‐size discounts to emerge in a bargaining model, the total surplus function over which parties bargain must have certain nonlinearities. We test the theory in an experimental setting in which a seller bargains with a number of buyers of different sizes. Nonlinearities in the surplus function are generated by varying the shape of the seller's cost function. Consistent with the theory, we find that quantity discounts emerge only in the case of increasing marginal cost, corresponding to a concave surplus function. We provide additional structural estimates to help identify the source of remaining discrepancies between experimental behavior and theoretical predictions (whether due to preferences for fairness or other factors such as computation errors).     

Single sourcing versus multiple sourcing

We show that in contrast to results in the extant literature, single sourcing may not be the optimal strategy of a buyer facing suppliers with strictly convex costs. As we argue, previous findings relied crucially on the joint assumption that, first, there is only a single buyer and that, second, procurement takes place in an auction organized by the buyer. Relaxing these restrictions, we obtain a richer set of results. In particular, we show that even in the original setting, where suppliers bid, committing to single sourcing is only optimal if the respective buyer controls a sufficiently large fraction of the whole procurement market.     

Bidding into the Red: A Model of Post-Auction Bankruptcy

This paper investigates auctions where bidders have limited liability. First, we analyze bidding behavior under different auction formats, showing that the second‐price auction induces higher prices, higher bankruptcy rates, and lower utilities than the first‐price auction. Second, we show that the cost of bankruptcy critically affects the seller's preference over the choice of auction. If bankruptcy is very costly, the seller prefers the first‐price auction over the second‐price auction. Alternatively, if the bankrupt assets are resold among the losers of the initial auction, the seller prefers the second‐price auction.     

市场短期操纵行为与订单簿高频信息的关联研究——基于中国市场的实证分析

利用2016年11和12月中国A股市场的5秒高频数据,考量订单簿斜率指标与资产价格之间的关系。结果显示:订单簿斜率指标对存在于高频环境中的市场异象有着较好的解释力。由于订单簿斜率指标在不同市值条件下呈倒挂现象,且买卖订单簿斜率指标与资产价格呈现不同的相关关系。因此,订单簿斜率能在一定程度上捕捉市场操纵行为的信号。该研究有助于更好地理解中国股票市场中的操纵行为,也可为预警机制的建设提供有效的指标选择。