Learning about monetary policy rules when the cost-channel matters

We study how monetary policy may affect determinacy and expectational stability (E-stability) of rational expectations equilibrium when the cost channel of monetary policy matters. Focusing on instrumental Taylor-type rules and optimal target rules, we show that standard policies can induce indeterminacy and expectational instability when the cost channel is present. A naïve application of the traditional Taylor principle could be misleading, and expectations-based reaction function under discretion does not always induce determinate and E-stable equilibrium. This result contrasts with the findings of Bullard and Mitra [2002. Learning about monetary policy rules. Journal of Monetary Economics 49, 1105–1129] and Evans and Honkapohja [2003. Expectations and stability problem for optimal monetary policies. Review of Economic Studies 70, 807–824] for the standard new Keynesian model. The ability of the central bank to commit to an optimal policy is an antidote to these problems.     

Full pooling in multi-period contracting with adverse selection and noncommitment

This paper analyses multi-period regulation or procurement policies under asymmetric information between the regulator and regulated firms. As well known in the literature, some degree of separation is always optimal under any form of commitment. In contrast, we show that full pooling is optimal under noncommitment when the discount factor is sufficiently high. We also discuss the meaning of full pooling under double randomization. Finally, we provide a graphical analysis of the second-best policy in terms of the regulator's commitment capacity. Received: 4 December 1996 / 7 October 1999     

基于成本差异的最佳贸易与产业政策选择

本文讨论了存在成本差异的第三国市场模型的最佳贸易与产业政策选择问题，讨论了社会成本和私人成本、本国和外国成本差异情况下的Cournot竞争和Bertrand竞争的情况。本文发现，在Cournot竞争下，政府首先行动时，当政府基金影子价格低于4／3时，政府对出口进行补贴，并且本国越有成本优势，补贴越高，补贴的利润转移效应越大；当政府基金影子价格高于4／3时，政府对出口征收出口税，且本国越有成本优势，征税越多。在Bertrand竞争下，当政府先行动时，对出口征收出口税；当政府后行动时，对出口进行补贴。当本国企业具有劣势时，事后补贴是最佳政蓑。     

美国支持本国企业的政府采购政策研究

美国长期运用政府采购政策来支持本国产业发展,积累了大量的经验和成功案例。文章通过对美国目前的政府采购政策的分析,归纳出美国政府采购政策的特点,为我国如何制定合理政府采购政策来发展我国产业提供了借鉴。     

Optimal dividend policy with random interest rates

Several recent papers have studied the impact of macroeconomic shocks on the financial policies of firms. However, they only consider the case where these macroeconomic shocks affect the profitability of firms but not the financial markets conditions. We study the polar case where the profitability of firms is stationary, but interest rates and issuance costs are governed by an exogenous Markov chain. We characterize the optimal dividend policy and show that these two macroeconomic factors have opposing effects: all things being equal, firms distribute more dividends when interest rates are high and less when issuing costs are high.     

Corporate social responsibility and public procurement: How supplying government affects managerial orientations

How does government drive the corporate social responsibility of firms that supply it with goods and services? This paper reviews relevant theory and practice to describe ways in which public procurement shapes corporate social responsibility, and it builds upon theory to develop testable propositions to describe these influences. Using the case of U.S. defense procurement, statistical analysis indicates a significant relationship between the extent to which firms engage in defense procurement and the corporate social responsibility orientations of their managers. The findings have application both for social responsibility theory and for public procurement policy and practice.     

中国工业发展与政府采购政策法规研究

工业发展离不开国家政策的扶持。政府采购作为重要的财政手段之一,对国家的工业发展具有重要的意义。文章对GPA参加方利用政府采购扶持工业发展的政策进行总结,在此基础上确定我国政府采购支持工业发展的目标和方向,最终明确有关政策的具体内容。     

A public choice model of the role of multinational firms in international relations

Multinational firms play a crucial role in the transmission of international policies across sovereign states. The present paper models the international policy equilibrium when conflict arises between two states, in which one state wishes to modify the policy choices of another state, and both the governments and their policy choices are subject to a self-interest maximization process on the part of voters, firms and government agents. Multinational firms are able to engage in lobbying activity in both their home countries and host countries in order to maximize firm-level profits. The analysis examines cases of both democratic and autocratic host countries.     

REGULATION BY DUOPOLY

This paper analyzes, within the framework of the new regulatory economics that emphasizes asymmetries of information, the optimal structure of an industry. The duplication of fixed costs incurred in a duopoly structure may be socially justified in a static model by three effects: the sampling effect, the yardstick competition effect, and the increasing marginal cost effect.
We show that in general, asymmetric information favors duopoly when the market structure is decided before firms discovers their cost characteristics (a common situation in dual sourcing for procurement), and favors monopoly when the market structure is decided after firms discover their cost characteristics (the case of split-award auctions).     

Franchise bidding,regulation and investment costs

This paper analyzes the design of an optimal monopoly franchise policy when firms incur investment costs. We show how this policy depends on the timing of entry. When the investment cost is a fixed cost or a sunk cost paid after knowing the marginal cost parameter, the optimal policy consists of a Baron-Myerson type pricing rule and a lowest cost awarding rule. When the investment cost is a sunk cost paid before knowing the marginal cost parameter, auctioning the right to serve the market eliminates the need for an incentive regulation: the price is given by the complete information Ramsey formula and the subsidy is a Loeb-Magat type subsidy, while an entry fee yields first best entry.     

Addressing the sustainable development through sustainable procurement: What factors resist the implementation of sustainable procurement in Pakistan?

Sustainable Public Procurement is an integral part of sustainable development because of ever increasing government expenditures. Most of the developing countries lack the required infrastructure which may support public sector sustainability. The aim of this study is to assess the critical factors which resist the implementation of sustainable procurement in public sector of Pakistan. We used Interpretive Structural Model to investigate and rank the interrelationships among different factors of sustainable procurement. With the help of literature and Likert scale instrument, we found twelve key barriers that resist sustainable procurement implementation. We also examined tender documents of 75 different public sector universities of Pakistan but found absence of sustainability element in the documents. External factors namely government legislation and stakeholders' pressure are found most critical barriers as compared to inter organizational factors. The study is also important to highlight the hurdles in the way of sustainable development. First, the government must introduce rules and regulations to implement the sustainable procurement. Stakeholders and donors must put pressure on organizations for adopting sustainable procurement. Sustainability education should be made mandatory part of curriculum and employees should be given regular training on sustainability. Further, public procurement policies at government and institutional levels are required to be revisited towards a circular economy.     

Search frictions,real wage rigidities and the optimal design of unemployment insurance

In this paper, we study the optimal unemployment benefits financing scheme when the economy is subject to labor market imperfections characterized by real wage rigidities and search frictions. The US unemployment insurance financing is such that firms are taxed proportionately to their layoffs to finance unemployment benefits. Using DSGE methodology, we investigate how policy instruments should interact with labor market imperfections. It is shown that wage rigidities in a search and matching environment cause welfare costs, especially in the absence of an incentive-based unemployment insurance. This cost is mainly due to the distorting effect of wage rigidities which generate inefficient separations. We show that the optimal unemployment benefits financing scheme – corresponding to the Ramsey policy – offsets labor market imperfections and allows implementation of the Pareto allocation. The second-best allocation brings the economy close to the Ramsey allocation. The implementation of the optimal policies clearly highlights the role of labor market institutions for short-run stabilization.     

Long-term interest rates,risk premia and unconventional monetary policy

We study two kinds of unconventional monetary policies: announcements about the future path of the short-term rate and long-term nominal interest rates as operating instruments of monetary policy. We do so in a model where the risk premium on long-term debt is, in part, endogenously determined. We find that both policies are consistent with unique equilibria, that, at the zero lower bound, announcements about the future path of the short-term rate can lower long-term interest rates through their impact both on expectations and on the risk premium and that long-term interest rate rules perform as well as, and at times better than, conventional Taylor rules. With simulations, we show that long-term interest rate rules generate sensible dynamics both when in operation and when expected to be applied.     

Bribery and inspection technology

The e-government movement advocates increased use of technology to improve government efficiency and reduce corruption by reducing the discretionary power of government officials. This paper studies the relationship between improvements in inspection technology within a Principal-Supervisor-Agent model, where the supervisor is an inspector who is hired by the principal to investigate the agent’s potentially illegal actions. We show that when technology increases the marginal or total productivity of the supervisor’s effort, improvements in inspection technology encourage some types of bribery. Although such technological improvements induce an equilibrium with bribery, compliance and social welfare can still rise. However, when technology and supervisory effort are sufficiently substitutable, improvements in technology may reduce compliance when bribery occurs in equilibrium even when those same technological improvements would have raised compliance in the absence of bribery. We also characterize the relationship between the principal’s socially optimal technology and the anti-corruption policy available to the principal and find that the socially optimal inspection technology may be a substitute for or a complement to the anti-corruption policy. Finally, we show that for any set of policies that optimally induces a no-bribe equilibrium, there exists another set of policies that induces an equilibrium with bribery that is pareto superior to it.     

Using Subjective Risk Adjusting to Prevent Patient Dumping in the Health Care Industry

We examine how to procure health care services at minimum cost while preventing suppliers from refusing to care for high-cost patients. A single risk-adjusted prospective payment is optimal only when it is particularly costly for the supplier to discover likely treatment costs. Cost sharing is optimal when these screening costs are somewhat smaller. When screening costs are sufficiently small, screening is optimally accommodated and subjective risk adjusting is implemented. Under subjective risk adjusting, the supplier classifies patients according to his personal assessment of likely treatment costs, and payments are structured accordingly. Optimal procurement policies are contrasted with prevailing industry policies.     

政府采购促进自主创新的经济学分析

自主创新是关系我国社会经济发展大局的问题,自主创新能力直接决定国家经济竞争力。政府可以采取多种政策措施促进自主创新,政府采购以其独特的优势在理论上和实践上被证明是一种十分有效的政策手段。本文从经济学的角度对政府采购促进自主创新的机理进行分析,试从理论上说明政府采购是促进自主创新的较好的政策手段,并从公共管理理论、政府干预理论、技术创新理论追溯了政府采购促进自主创新的理论渊源。     

Have a Go or Lay Low? Predicting Firms’ Rhetorical Commitment versus Avoidance in Response to Polylithic Governmental Pressures

This study extends prior research on corporate political behaviour (CPB) and firms’ pursuit of political legitimacy in response to monolithic government pressures by developing and testing a framework for analysis of CPB in response to polylithic pressures. We suggest that traditional forms of CPB may be ill-suited to polylithic governmental pressures, such as when firms need to navigate between conflicting home- and host-country political worldviews and policies. We posit that in such complex political situations, firms will turn to a more subtle form of CPB (i.e., rhetorical commitment versus avoidance) as a hoped-for solution to their international political legitimacy challenge. Our contingency perspective also highlights how geopolitical factors (i.e., whether governments of home and host countries are clearly aligned versus misaligned) will influence whether firms express their support for a home government’s foreign policy or avoid any such expression of support. We empirically test the predictive power of our framework by analysing how these political factors led Chinese firms to opt for rhetorical commitment versus rhetorical avoidance vis-à-vis the Chinese government’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). We conclude with a discussion of how our framework for analysis and our supportive findings can inform and extend research on CPB and political legitimacy.     

Implementing optimal procurement auctions with exogenous quality

In this paper, we consider the implementation of the optimal procurement auction outcome when there is a trade-off between price and quality for the buyer. The quality proposals of the competing firms are assumed to be exogenous and common knowledge. After defining the optimal auction, we characterize the discriminatory first score auction and the modified second score auction implementing it when the buyer is assumed to have the same information as the firms. Then we consider an auction which requires no specific information from the buyer and show that a second score auction followed by a negotiation stage can implement the optimal auction outcome under this more realistic assumption. Received: 30 March 2001 / Accepted: 14 December 2001 I am grateful to the anonymous referees for comments on an earlier version of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Macroeconomic and financial stability in a monetary union: The case of Lithuania

In this paper, we study the implications of macroprudential policies in a monetary union for macroeconomic and financial stability. For this purpose, we develop a two-country monetary union new Keynesian general equilibrium model with housing and collateral constraints, to be calibrated for Lithuania and the rest of the euro area. We consider two different scenarios for macroprudential policies: one in which the ECB extends its goals to also include financial stability and a second one in which a national macroprudential authority uses the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) as an instrument. The results show that both rules are effective in making the financial system more stable in both countries, and especially in Lithuania. This is because the financial sector in this country is more sensitive to shocks. We find that an extended Taylor rule is indeed effective in reducing the volatility of credit, but comes with a cost in terms of higher inflation volatility. The simple LTV rule, on the other hand, does not compromise the objective of monetary policy. This reinforces the “Tinbergen principle”, which argues that there should be two different instruments when there are two different policy goals.