Models, knowledge creation and their limits

Instead of modelling socio-economic situations as mechanical systems with fixed, predictable behaviour, we now see that socio-economic systems are really complex systems, in which various possible structural changes can occur giving rise to a range of different possible futures. This necessary future uncertainty automatically imposes an uncertainty on the precise pay-off that any particular action or decision that an agent may take. Because of this, the decisions that agents will make are also uncertain and this poses limits to our ability to model socio-economic systems and therefore to the knowledge that we can have at any time about the future. Because of this constant knowledge decay, what matters in real world situations of markets and business is the generation of new, current knowledge. Contrary to traditional science in which the natural laws are independent of who knows them, in social and economic systems, knowledge of system behaviour decays over time, and is in any case used up when it triggers new behaviour in the system. Several examples of evolutionary market systems are presented which demonstrate how knowledge is constantly created and destroyed, and the problem of change, innovation and design are shown to be part of a ‘boundedly rational’ view in which imperfect search gives rise to ‘good enough’ behaviour. All of this is a radical departure from the traditional approach that falsely believe in the optimisation of designs, behaviours and profits. Complexity tells us that we must accept risk and uncertainty and work loosely, keeping our options open as much as possible.     

Limits to the economy of knowledge and knowledge of the economy

In this essay, we explore the view that the growth of knowledge is a complex evolutionary process. We pay particular attention to the division of knowing in a knowledge economy, to the restless nature of knowledge and to the principle of variation and selection that makes the growth of knowledge an evolutionary phenomenon. The foundations for this discussion are located in Adam Smith's suggestion that the most fundamental aspect of the division of labour is the division of knowledge, and the consequential existence of roundabout and combinatorial ways of producing knowledge. This notion of roundaboutness also connects our discussion with the writings of the Austrian school of economists. It is this school of thought that has come closest to understanding the open-ended and evolutionary nature of knowledge based economic activity. The theory of complex adaptive systems, when applied to the economic and social domain, has enabled us to confront the distinction between knowledge and the institution of social understanding. We map the difference between knowledge, which is private, and understanding, which is social. If knowledge is a characteristic of individuals, understanding then becomes an emergent phenomenon arising from the interaction between individuals in specific contexts. Understanding has boundaries it has components that possess great heterogeneity and is sustained by the connections of information flow. It is a socially distributed process whose growth is dependent on a systemic context, on the way a given set of individuals interact to share information and thus to further develop their idiosyncratic knowledge. Recognising that understanding is necessarily distributed leads to the insight that economic activity, which is necessarily social, depends on shared understandings, that is to say, correlated knowledge. This provides a clue as to the unpredictability and unevenness of knowledge accumulation, and of course the unpredictability of capitalism as a knowledge driven system.     

Earnings announcement premia and the limits to arbitrage

We examine the factors underlying the presence of earnings announcement premia. We find that the premia persist beyond the sample period examined in prior studies (ending in 1988), although they decline in magnitude after 1988. Further, premia are lower on the expected than the actual earnings announcement dates. We document that increases in voluntary disclosures result in lower premia, despite the increase in return volatility over time. Finally, our evidence suggests that the premia are not completely eliminated because of the costs of arbitrage.     

将财务化繁为简

研究显示:有害的复杂性会为组织带来约10.2%的利润损失。因此,有必要现在就审查一下你所在企业的财务部和整个组织,看看是否可以通过降低复杂性来减少损失。在绝大多数企业中,财务部门处于复杂的系统和流程网络的中心,贯穿从财务报告一直到业绩管理。     

金融风险复杂性应引起重视

<正>党的十九大把防范化解重大风险作为三大攻坚战之一。几年来,在党中央坚强领导下,防范化解重大金融风险攻坚战取得重要成果,守住了不发生系统性金融风险的底线,有力维护了国家经济金融稳定和人民财产安全。当前金融风险宏观上总体可控,趋势上趋于收敛,但维护金融安全和金融稳定没有休止符。习近平总书记指出防止发生系统性金融风险是金融工作的永恒主题。我们必须进一步增强底线思维和忧患意识,密切关注金融风险的新形势、新变化,主动研判,精准拆弹,居安思危,有备无患。     

The fragile capital structure of hedge funds and the limits to arbitrage

During a financial crisis, when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices, hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash. The paper explains this phenomenon. We argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds, combined with low market liquidity, creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds' arbitrage capabilities. We present a model of hedge funds' optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors. We show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions. The model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage.     

A case study of short-sale constraints and limits to arbitrage

This paper uses a unique data set of trades in a unique pair of securities that enables the precise identification of individual broker activity and the trade direction of that activity. We find direct evidence that the imposition (removal) of short-sale constraints limits (generates) trading activity consistent with brokers exploiting apparent mispricing.     

Institutional investors and the limits of arbitrage

The returns and stock holdings of institutional investors from 1980 to 2007 provide little evidence of stock-picking skill. Institutions as a whole closely mimic the market portfolio, with pre-cost returns that have nearly perfect correlation with the value-weighted index and an insignificant CAPM alpha of 0.08% quarterly. Institutions also show little tendency to bet on any of the main characteristics known to predict stock returns, such as book-to-market, momentum, or accruals. While particular groups of institutions have modest stock-picking skill relative to the CAPM, their performance is almost entirely explained by the book-to-market and momentum effects in returns. Further, no group holds a portfolio that deviates efficiently from the market portfolio.     

Complexity, concentration and contagion

This paper develops a network model of interbank lending in which unsecured claims, repo activity and shocks to the haircuts applied to collateral assume centre stage. We show how systemic liquidity crises of the kind associated with the interbank market collapse of 2007–2008 can arise within such a framework, with funding contagion spreading widely through the web of interlinkages. Our model illustrates how greater complexity and concentration in the financial network may amplify this fragility. The analysis suggests how a range of policy measures – including tougher liquidity regulation, macro-prudential policy, and surcharges for systemically important financial institutions – could make the financial system more resilient.     

Futures studies in Italy and The limits to growth

This article describes the introduction of futures studies to Italy and especially the contribution of Aurelio Peccei, the founder of the Club of Rome and an inspiration behind The limits to growth. To set the scene, the author shows how Italian futures studies absorbed technocratic and visionary ideas from prospective studies in France, particularly those of Bertrand de Jouvenel and Gaston Berger. The author explains Aurelio Peccei's role in promoting Limits and the Club of Rome. She reflects also on her own personal involvement with Peccei, as a friend, as member of the Club of Rome, and as a long-standing participant in the Italian and worldwide futures movement.     

Prospect theory and the effectiveness of price limits

Assuming that traders are risk-neutral, Brennan (1986) shows that price limits are effective in improving the efficiency of futures contracts with limited accessibility to information because they obscure the exact loss when they are triggered. However, Brennan's (1986) model fails to explain why price limits also exist in contracts with abundant information like those of financial futures. We show that when traders are loss-averse, the effectiveness of price limits is strengthened even in the presence of precise information. Thus, our analysis provides a theoretical foundation explaining why price limits can be useful when market participants are not fully rational.     

Complexity science and theory development for the futures field

Complexity science unifies some forty diverse features that arise from the evolution of the civil system and these underlie theory development in the futures field. The main features of an evolutionary methodology deal with emergence, macrolaws, civil or societal transitions, macrosystem design, and the absorption of extreme events. The following principles apply: (1) The civil system is an open system in which investment capital is the system growth parameter that drives it away from equilibrium, with the formation of spatial structure. (2) The historical circumstances of human settlements provide a path dependency in respect of natural resources, defence, energy, transport, or communications. (3) Emergent properties arise within a complex adaptive system from which a theory of the system can be formulated, and these are not deducible from the features of the transacting entities. (4) Futures research identifies the conditions that will lead to an irreversible civil or societal phase transition to a new stage of development. (5) Emergent behaviour in the macrostructure at regional or continental levels can be influenced through critical intervention points in the global macrosystems.     

Knowledge, limits and boundaries

In this paper the underlying concern is the problem of knowledge. How do we understand the world, what is ‘scientific’ knowledge, and to what extent is this knowledge limited by the fact that the world in which we live is complex? The problems associated with the status of our knowledge of the world have been central to philosophy all along. Here I will focus on the way in which the acknowledgement of complexity transforms some of the traditional conceptions of (especially scientific) knowledge. I will also examine the notions of boundaries and limits, arguing that these notions are not problems we have to get out of the way, but that they are inevitable as soon as we start talking of ‘knowledge’.     

Complexity and contradiction in NHS computing

The National Health Service (NHS) has entered a new world of managed competition, where the purchasing and provision of services are formally separated. Accompanying the changes are major investments in computer systems, which will continue for at least the first half of the 1990s. However, the performance of the NHS in implementing computer systems has been variable, so that now is an appropriate time to review the current status of NHS computing, and to consider the key issues for computing in the new environment.     

Just-in-time delivery comes to knowledge management

Like all primary care physicians, Dr. Bob Goldszer must stay on top of approximately 10,000 different diseases and syndromes, 3,000 medications, 1,100 laboratory tests, and many of the 400,000 articles added each year to the biomedical literature. That's no easy task. And it is, quite literally, a matter of life and death. The Institute of Medicine's 1999 report, To Err Is Human, suggests that more than a million injuries, and 90,000 deaths are attributable to medical errors annually. Something like 5% of hospital patients have adverse reactions to drugs, another study reports, and of those, 43% are serious, life threatening, or fatal. Many knowledge workers have problems similar to Dr. Goldszer's (though they're usually less life threatening). No matter what the field, many people simply can't keep up with all they need to know. In the early years of knowledge management, companies established knowledge networks and communities of practice, built knowledge repositories, and attempted to motivate people to share knowledge. But each of these activities involved a great deal of additional labor for knowledge workers. A better approach, say the authors, is to bake specialized knowledge into the jobs of highly skilled workers. Partners HealthCare has started to embed knowledge into the technology that doctors use in their jobs so that consulting it is no longer a separate activity. Now when Dr. Goldszer orders medicine or a lab test, the order-entry system automatically checks his decision against a massive clinical database as well as the patient's own medical record. Knowledge workers in other fields could likewise benefit from a just-in-time knowledge-management system tailored to deliver the right supporting information for the job at hand.     

Evidence Complexity and Information Search in the Decision to Restate Prior‐Period Financial Statements

Framed in the decision to restate financial statements, this study addresses whether behavior predicted by competing theories depends on the complexity of evidence. Two experiments observe the information‐search behavior of auditors responsible for investigating their firm's prior opinion. Experiment 1 shows that auditors confronted with few (many) summarized statements that replicate in form the materials used in prior research prefer to first search statements that are inconsistent (consistent) with the prior‐period accounting. This result generally corroborates research in accounting and confirms the predictions of information‐quantity theory in psychology. In contrast, experiment 1 also shows that, when materials mimic the detailed documents common in practice, the results are different: Auditors confronted either with few or with many detailed documents prefer to search inconsistent documents first. This result confirms the predictions of evidence‐complexity theory in psychology and shows that, compared to the materials on which prior research relies, detailed documents, such as memos, emails, letters, and analyses, drive information search toward inconsistent evidence. Experiment 2 probes further and finds that auditors evaluate documents bearing notes inscribed after the documents were prepared to be more inconsistent with the prior‐period accounting, and that the dispersion in search behavior may be reliably conditional on the presence of notes.     

Testing limits to policy reversal: Evidence from Indian privatizations

We examine the effect of regime change on privatization. In the 2004 Indian election, the pro-reform BJP was unexpectedly defeated by a less reformist coalition. Stock prices of government-controlled companies that had been slated for privatization by the BJP dropped 3.5% relative to private firms. Government-controlled companies that were under study for possible privatization fell 7.5% relative to private firms. This is consistent with investor belief of a “point of no return,” where advanced reforms are more difficult to reverse. Further analysis suggests that layoffs, combined with the privatization announcement, served as a credible commitment to privatize.