The end of economic transition

The transition from plan to market was the largest natural experiment in economics ever. Now, 20 years from the start of transition, all former socialist countries are market economies at the middle stage of economic development, and convergence with neighbours, if not with the developed world, is largely achieved. With hindsight, it is clear that economists have spent too much time debating proper sequencing of reforms and the fine‐tuning of reform packages. At the same time, the magnitude of the output and consumption fall in some countries was vastly underestimated, while the benefits of reforms have taken longer to materialize than expected. Successful practitioners of reform praise perseverance during and after the initial setbacks and willingness to make political compromises. At the conclusion of the natural experiment, transition economics has all but vanished as an academic discipline, although it played a crucial role in the formation of modern political economics.     

Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies

The paper discusses recent changes in central bank laws and the relationship between inflation and central bank independence in transition economies. Two indices of legal independence are constructed, covering political and economic aspects of independence. Most of the countries experienced high-inflation episodes in the recent past and changes introduced to the laws after, or simultaneously, with stabilization programmes strengthened the position of the central banks. In further analysis, an inverse relationship emerges between inflation and indices of central bank independence. However, the robust relationship is present only at a high level of economic liberalization. This conclusion is supported by results from regressions on time-aggregated and panel data, even after controlling for the government fiscal position and the absence/presence of an IMF stabilization package.     

DEMOCRACY IN REFORMING COLLAPSED COMMUNIST ECONOMIES: BLESSING OR CURSE?

From a political standpoint, post-communists systems include both democratic and non-democratic nations. From an economic standpoint, they include both collapsing and expanding economies. All four logical possibilities exist for post-communist political and economic systems. The Czech Republic is an example of a democratic political system and an expanding economic system. Russia is an example of a democratic political system and a collapsing economic system. China is an example of a non-democratic political system and an expanding economic system. North Korea is an example of a non-democratic political system and a collapsing economic system. The fact that all four logical possibilities exist suggests that democracy is neither necessary nor sufficient for good economic performance. However, democracy is certainly a value in itself that requires certain basic institutions, including free and fair elections, the orderly transfer of power to those elected, the rule of law and the separation of powers, and the protection of individual freedoms and basic liberties, including those of speech, press, religion, assembly, property, and economic opportunity. Economic policies, rather than the form of government, determine the results for an economy. Russia and China, the two largest socialist economies, followed very different economic policies and experienced radically different outcomes. The failure of “shock therapy” economic policies for transition to a market economy in Russia is related to its use of the Washington Consensus SLP package of stabilization, liberalization, and privatization, as recommended by the World Bank and the IMF. The success of Deng's economic policies for transition to a market economy in China is related to its rejection of the SLP in favor of the ICG approach of institutions, competition, and government. Other interesting cases are those of the Czech Republic and North Korea. Those nations in which both political and economic reforms have been simultaneously successful, such as the Czech Republic, are generally small, homogeneous European nations with a historic work ethic, with a relatively short period of socialism, and with support from neighboring advanced industrialized nations. There is great difficulty in simultaneously establishing both democracy and a market economy without a very special set of circumstances. Thus, it is necessary to determine a sequence for political and economic reform. Ultimately, however, the ideal of both democracy and a market economy may be attained even in nations without special circumstances and external assistance, with Russia eventually turning its economy around and with China eventually reforming politically into a democratic nation.     

Privatization of state-owned enterprises in Poland

The transition from centrally planned to market economies in Eastern Europe has become a field of debate in economic literature since the late 1980s. Privatization plays a very important role because it is also a sensitive political problem. Privatization is a key element of the several reform packages that are being applied in Poland. This paper examines the different ways that small- and medium-sized enterprises were privatized from 1990 to 1995 using statistical data of the Ministry of Privatization [1995]. Analyzed enterprises are presented by the following group of projects. Capital privatization, direct foreign investment, joint stock companies awaiting privatization, and other methods of privatization are connected with the special program designed for firms with bad financial standing.     

The effects of transition and political instability on foreign direct investment inflows

This paper examines the effects of transition and of political instability on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the transition economies of Central Europe, the Baltics and the Balkans. We find that FDI flows to transition economies unaffected by conflict and political instability exceed those that would be expected for comparable West European countries. Success with stabilization and reform increased the volume of FDI inflows. In the case of Balkan counties, conflict and instability reduced FDI inflows below what one would expect for comparable West European countries, and reform and stabilization failures further reduced FDI to the region. Thus, we find that the economic costs of instability in the Balkans in terms of foregone FDI have been quite high.     

Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe: Comparisons and Lessons

Abstract
There are three features which distinguish the global transition in Central and Eastern Europe: both economic and political systems are the focus of radical transformation, this institutional revolution has been largely peaceful, and a pluralistic political system emerged faster than capitalism in the economic sphere. The initial conditions, for example the inherited economic structure, the macroeconomic situation and the type of economic system, have an important impact upon the pace and effects of the subsequent market-oriented reform. There are four important reasons why the state should concentrate its activity on the sphere of its natural competence. These reasons are even more important in economies of transition. The speed of the subordinate processes of transition differs which gives rise to important issues of phasing. Macroeconomic stabilisation, microeconomic liberalisation and privatisation should be implemented at a speed close to maximum. The Polish economic reform shows that a radical and comprehensive economic program introduced in an initially socialist economy, under extremely difficult macroeconomic conditions, can be successful in spite of powerful external shocks .     

What explains persistent inflation differentials across transition economies?1

We document that a persistent inflation differential has opened across different groups of transition economies since 2001, with the CIS‐West seeing particularly high outcomes. We consider a range of non‐monetary explanations discussed in the literature (economic structure, policy and institutions), and controlling for economic shocks, we find a role for political stability, as emphasized in previous cross‐country work. However, our results suggest that lagging internal and external liberalization have been the key disincentives to disinflation. Consequently, lower inflation targets would not be credible in the absence of stronger structural and monetary policy frameworks.     

Effect of Corporate Economic Performance on Firm-Level Environmental Performance in a Transition Economy

This paper analyzes the effect of corporate economic performance, as measured by value added, on firm-level environmental performance in a transition economy. In particular, it analyzes this economic performance effect using an unbalanced panel of Czech firms for the years 1995–1998. It assesses whether successful economic performance begets or undermines good environmental performance. This connection seems especially important in transition economies since firms are dramatically restructuring their economic management approaches during transitional periods. A majority of the analytical results indicate that successful economic performance undermines good environmental performance, possibly indicating that more focused managerial efforts to improve economic outcomes may distract efforts to manage environmental matters better.     

The Uzbek Model of Economic Development, 1991–91

Uzbekistan has been difficult to classify among the thirty-plus economies in transition during the 1990s and has posed a puzzle, because it is a slow reformer but relatively good performer. This paper argues that there is no simple Uzbek model. Uzbekistan's economic reform process has been inconsistent gradualism through three different phases during the 1990s. Economic performance was due to favourable external conditions during the first half of the 1990s and to reasonably good policy-making, although policy errors in late 1996 led to negative effects. Uzbekistan illustrates the importance of policy, but sheds little light on a debate framed in terms of rapid reform versus gradualism.     

Economic Reform and Corruption: Evidence from Panel Data

The notion that economic reform can reduce corruption remains prevalent in the policy agenda of international financial institutions, especially of the World Bank. Economic reforms have, therefore, been carried out throughout various parts of the world to improve the performance of the economies. Using data from 94 low‐ and middle‐income nations for the period 1996–2015, this study employs static and dynamic panel analysis to examine whether economic reform undertaken in accordance with the World Bank's reform programs negatively affects corruption. Our findings suggest that enhancing government effectiveness (i.e. independence of civil service from political pressure, provision of quality public services, effective policy formulation and the government's commitment to such policies) and improving public rights and civil liberties could be some of the most promising policies in terms of fighting corruption. The role of economic development and growth in real per capita income is also found to be significant in some of the specifications. However, the assertion that economic reform can reduce corruption is rejected in all the specifications. We rather find evidence that economic reforms negatively affect the ability of democracy to fight corruption, although on a slim margin. The central theme of the implications of our findings is that in combating corruption, social, institutional and legal means are far more important than economic means. The finding thus is compatible with the World Bank's effort in the later years to introduce governance and democracy as effective tool against corruption.     

A Note on Initial Conditions and Liberalization during Transition

Literature explaining variations in economic performance among transition economies places a high level of importance on the role of policy. Policy differences are measured via a liberalization index used to explain differences in performance. We find that this index may be endogenous to one performance measure, e.g., output decline, and may, therefore, overstate the role of policy. This paper performs an instrumental variables (IV) estimate of the relationship between liberalization and performance that also allows us to generate a relative index of reform progress. The relative index challenges some commonly held preconceptions about which transition economies are rapid reformers and which are slow reformers.J. Comp. Econom.,December 1998, 26(4), pp. 718–734. Macalester College, 1600 Grand Avenue, St. Paul, Minnesota 55105.     

中国财政分权、金融发展、 工业化与经济增长的省际差异

本文采用1978-2006年中国28个地区的省际面板数据建立了检验财政分权、金融发展、工业化与经济增长之间长期关系的协整模型（co integration model）,并采用完全修正的最小二乘法（FMOLS）对模型进行估计。本文把地方政府官员参与政治晋升锦标赛竞争的行为影响经济绩效的假设引入对分权化改革过程的分析,对中国改革开放以来地方政府之间的竞争何以在促成经济总量高速增长的同时又导致各地区在财政分权、金融发展、工业化和经济增长方面呈现出差异的原因进行了分析,进而得出本文的分析结论并对其政策含义进行了讨论。     

Central bank independence and stock market returns in emerging economies

We investigate the effect of central bank independence on stock market returns in emerging economies. We find evidence for a positive overall effect, but economic independence of the central bank appears to be more relevant than political independence.     

Siamese Twin Troubles: Structural and Regulatory Transformations in Unequal Thailand

This paper takes an institutional approach to inequality in Thailand by exploring the country's structural and regulatory transformations. It discusses how Thailand's transition from agriculture to industry and services has been impeded by both the demand and supply sides of government subsidies since the 1950s. The relative failure of structural transformation has slowed down economic catch-up and widened the well-being gap between those inside and outside the agricultural sector. Furthermore, while regulatory transformation has mitigated state-led malaise in certain Asian economies, post-1997 reform in Thailand has incentivized unconventional political actors, such as academics, medical doctors and civil society leaders, to make collective efforts in toppling elected governments in exchange for gaining selection into oversight agencies. The case of Thailand indicates how regulatory reform may create perverse incentives that adversely affect democratization, decentralization, competition, and taxation. Dealing with inequality therefore requires a big push toward progressive structural and regulatory transformations altogether.     

Constitutionalism and credibility in reforming economies1

There has been relatively little investigation of the effect of constitutional transformations on the economic transition in post‐communist countries. We develop a simple signalling model in which constitutionalism – a commitment to limit political power and provide judicial defence of basic rights – reinforces the credibility of pro‐market candidates’ electoral promises and boosts public support for economic reforms. These findings are tested using opinion poll data on public support for reform in Central and Eastern Europe, and in the former Soviet Union, in the 1990s. In a two‐stage procedure we show that public support for market reforms is higher in countries where incumbents have taken deliberate steps to increase political accountability and judicial independence. Public support also spurs actual economic reform.     

Economic Reforms in the Aftermath of Regime Change in Malaysia

The 14th general election in May 2018 brought about an unexpected change in political rule in Malaysia for the first time since the country's independence in 1957. In its first year of rule, the new Pakatan Harapan‐led government implemented several populist economic policies that were drawn from its election manifesto. While these policies may have moderated populist politics to some extent, they have also weakened the government's fiscal capacity. Ethnic fragmentation and a strengthened opposition alliance have also made it difficult for the new government to implement its ambitious institutional reform agenda.     

文化资本、体制转轨与经济增长——兼及文化产业发展路径

本文回顾了关于经济增长的理论假说,发现围绕文化资本来解释体制转轨和经济增长以及讨论它们三者之间关系的文献较少。在此基础上提出制度是经济增长的重要但非决定性因素,适应文化资本的制度转轨才是经济绩效提高的关键,因此,文化资本中的市场观念在改革开放后被重新激发,构成中国经济增长的内在动力。最后基于结论从文化资本理论出发,兼述地域文化产业发展路径。     

经济转型理论评析

经济转型之初 ,一些经济学家基于新古典经济学信条提出 ,可以通过“激进”措施将原来的计划体制一次性破除而重建一个全新的市场经济。但迅速私有化并没有带来企业治理结构的改善和原国有资产的有效重组。与此形成鲜明对照的是 ,中国的渐进改革却取得了成功 ,并得到了越来越广泛的认可。 2 0世纪 90年代中期以来 ,经济转型理论开始发生变化 ,“制度演进主义”的影响日渐扩大 ,经济学家开始强调市场经济支持性制度的重要性以及制度变革的长期性 ,认为分权、激励、竞争、良好的司法和会计制度等比私有化更重要 ,并在政治经济学层面上分析了不确定性、利益集团、政府、改革秩序与步骤对制度变迁的影响。     

Immigration policy and the U.S. economy: an institutional perspective

The author examines some aspects of the current situation concerning immigration to the United States. He predicts that the 1990s will witness the largest flow of immigrants into the population and labor force of any decade in the country's history; furthermore, since there is no universally accepted right to immigrate, the adoption of migration policy is one area of economic policymaking that is not controlled by market forces. He also notes that while the country's need is for a highly skilled, motivated, and educated labor force, the majority of current immigrants have low skill levels and relatively little education. The need to develop and implement a migration policy that is in tune with the country's economic objectives is stressed. He concludes that "the resurrection of mass immigration from out of the nation's distant past was a political accident; its perpetuation in the 1990s is contrary to national interest. Immigration reform, therefore, needs to be [in] the forefront of the nation's economic policy agenda."     

Privatizations around the world: economic or political determinants?

The article examines economic, political, and institutional determinants of privatization using a panel of 50 countries over the period of 1988–2006. Our sample includes developed, developing, and transition economies. Privatization activity is measured by the number of privatization deals as well as the revenue raised and analyzed using the negative binomial regression and Tobit regression respectively. Although more privatization activity is usually taking place in countries displaying satisfactory economic performance in some respect, the role of economic factors turns out to be limited. The results identify a number of political and institutional determinants but some effects are specific to a particular type of economy. For example, in developing countries, right‐wing governments are associated with privatizations while new, not necessarily right‐wing governments, are behind privatization in Eastern Europe. The role of financial development is also varied, with sound financial institutions related to successful privatization in developed and developing countries but not in transition economies.