Inequality, cooperation, and growth: An experimental study

In a three player dynamic public goods experiment, social output today determines production possibilities tomorrow. In each period, players choose to sabotage, to cooperate, or to play best response. Sabotage harms social output and growth. Mutual cooperation maximises both. The property rights to social output are distributed unequally. Extent and skew of inequality are varied. We observe equilibrium play in most cases. There is also substantial cooperation, but little sabotage. Our exogenous variations of inequality are neutral to growth, neither negatively correlated to cooperation, nor positively correlated to sabotage. The neutrality result is shown to be sensitive to the dynamic nature of the employed game.     

On the size and structure of group cooperation

When time preferences are heterogeneous and bounded away from one, how “much” cooperation can be achieved by an ongoing group? How does group cooperation vary with the group's size and structure? This paper examines characteristics of cooperative behavior in the class of symmetric, repeated games of collective action. These are games characterized by “free rider problems” in the level of cooperation achieved. The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games is a special case.We characterize the level of maximal average cooperation (MAC), the highest average level of cooperation, over all stationary subgame perfect equilibrium paths, that the group can achieve. The MAC is shown to be increasing in monotone shifts, and decreasing in mean preserving spreads of the distribution of discount factors. The latter suggests that more heterogeneous groups are less cooperative on average. Finally, in a class of Prisoner's Dilemma games, we show under weak conditions that the MAC exhibits increasing returns to scale in a range of heterogeneous discount factors. That is, larger groups are more cooperative, on average, than smaller ones. By contrast, when the group has a common discount factor, the MAC is invariant to group size.     

The role of frames,numbers and risk in the frequency of cooperation

We report on a simple experiment that addresses three factors in the frequency of cooperation: (1) framing, (2) the number of players and (3) the perceived risk of cooperating. We work with a (two-player) Prisoner’s Dilemma and with a three-player, two-strategy Public Good Game. We also consider a payoff schedule isomorphic with the latter but in a nonsocial setup. These themes have been separately studied by a large number of experimental papers, using diverse methodologies. Our experiment targets them in a common, clear-cut framework that minimizes confusion. We find three strong effects (a) framing; (b) the number of players (there is less cooperation in the three-person games than in the two-person ones); (c) the neutralization of risk (about 50% of participants cooperate when risk is neutralized). Both (a) and (c) go in the expected direction, but, in all three cases, the strength of the effect is surprising. Cooperators appear to be more motivated by efficiency or by Kantian reasoning than by altruism.     

Play locally,learn globally: group selection and structural basis of cooperation

In group-structured populations, altruistic cooperation among unrelated group members may be sustainable even when the evolution of behavioral traits is governed by a payoff-based replicator dynamic. This paper explores the importance in this dynamic of two aspects of group structure: global or local interaction in a public goods game and global or local cultural transmission (learning) of behavioral traits. To clarify the underlying dynamic, I derive an extension of the Price equation for the decomposition of changes in the population frequency of a binary trait. I use this to analyze the effect of different structures of interaction and learning on within- and between-group variances of the frequency of cooperative behaviors and thereby on the evolution of cooperation. Of the four population structures given by global/local learning and global/local interaction, local interaction with global learning provides the most favorable environment for the evolution of cooperation. This combination of learning and interaction structures supports a high level of between-group variance in the frequency of cooperative types, so that most cooperators benefit from being in groups composed mostly of cooperators. However, while global learning is essential to the evolution of cooperation, cooperation is more robust when learning is not entirely global because local learning process, ironically, limits the extent to which defectors can free ride on cooperative group members.      

Conflict technology in cooperation: The group size paradox revisited

This paper studies the implications of punishment‐induced conflict in a public goods game. It shows, under plausible assumptions, how larger group size sometimes enhances punishing behavior in social dilemmas and hence supports higher levels of cooperation. Unlike existing approaches that focus on uncoordinated punishment, I consider punishment as a coordinated activity that may be resisted by those being punished and study the implications of punishment‐induced conflict situations. Developing a conflict model of punishment and combining it with a standard public good game, I show that coordinated punishment can yield the concentration effect of punishment, leading to a larger group advantage; that is, the larger the group, the easier it becomes to organize cooperation. The key idea is that when punishers coordinate their punishment, punishers as a coalition successfully divide defectors and punish each defector one by one. Surprisingly, even when coordination among punishers decays as group size increases, as long as the rate of decaying remains relatively slow the larger group advantage still obtains.     

不平等、贫困与全球化

反全球化人士认为,世界上的不平等和贫困状况几十年来在不断加剧,一些国际组织有时也持这种观点。然而最新研究显示,从1950年代到1990年代末这段时期,情况并没有发生变化,或者还稍有好转。一项针对近两个世纪的长期研究可以使我们更好地理解不平等与贫困的演变,从而更准确地界定二者与全球化之间的关系。     

The role of ad hoc factors in policy rate settings

Policymakers do not always follow a simple rule for setting policy interest rates for various reasons. Thus their behavior can be represented by a standard Taylor type policy rule amended with an additional variable representing an ad hoc factor. Consequently, ignoring the presence of the ad hoc factor causes bias in conventional policy rule estimators. I contrast the unbiased estimates of a procedure that accounts for the ad hoc factors and the bias of least squares on a unique data set of an unconditional inflation targeting episode.     

Inequality and economic growth: the role of initial income

We estimate a panel model where the relationship between inequality and GDP per capita growth depends on countries’ initial incomes. Estimates of the model show that the relationship between inequality and GDP per capita growth is significantly decreasing in countries’ initial incomes. Results from instrumental variables regressions show that in Low Income Countries transitional growth is boosted by greater income inequality. In High Income Countries inequality has a significant negative effect on transitional growth. For the median country in the world, that in the year 2015 had a PPP GDP per capita of around 10000USD, IV estimates predict that a 1 percentage point increase in the Gini coefficient decreases GDP per capita growth over a 5-year period by over 1 percentage point; the long-run effect on the level of GDP per capita is around ??5%.     

Human Capital, Growth, and Inequality in Russia

Our model captures the fact that Russia has both much human capital and an education system that produces the wrong skills for a market economy. We define a rule for the timing of educational restructuring that is Pareto optimal and that dominates all later times in a Paretian sense while simultaneously reducing inequality. We demonstrate that failure to implement restructuring early in the transition process is likely to produce a very long delay that will significantly reduce Russia's human capital. A retreat from subsidizing public education is likely to be counterproductive. We argue that early educational restructuring should be emphasized in Russia's transition strategy. J. Comp. Econom., December 1999, 27(4), pp. 618–643. Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, N.T., Hong Kong, People's Republic of China; University of Colorado, Denver, Denver, Colorado 88217; and Royal Holloway College, University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 OEX, United Kingdom.     

Ability, Education, and Income Inequality

A model of education where the distribution of abilities is the source of heterogeneity is investigated. Ability is a key determinant of human capital accumulated when young, which in turn determines income and its distribution. The assumption of heterogeneous abilities leads to steady‐state income distributions that exhibit income inequality. Of particular interest is the result that symmetric distributions of ability generate positively skewed income distributions. Models of private and public education are analyzed and compared. It is found that private education results in higher incomes and less income inequality than observed in the public education model.     

全球化、不平等与制度改革——评阿马蒂亚·森的全球化观点

阿马蒂亚·森认为,全球化的核心问题不仅包括利益分享的不平等,而且包括安全的不平等。他把全球化问题与伦理道德以及制度分析结合在一起,强调非市场制度以及国际机构在解决不平等时所起的作用,得出不平等不可能完全依靠经济增长来解决而要依靠政策的、制度的、机构的改革来实现的结论。森的这些观点对我国应对全球化的冲击不无裨益。     

Enterprise, Inequality and Economic Development

We characterize an equilibrium development process driven by the interactionof the distribution of wealth with credit constraints and the distributionof entrepreneurial skills. When efficient entrepreneurs are relativelyabundant, a "traditional" development process emerges in whichthe evolution of macroeconomic variables accord with empirical regularitiesand income inequality traces out a Kuznets curve. If, instead, efficiententrepreneurs are relatively scarce, the model generates long-run"distributional cycles" driven by the endogenous interactionbetween credit constraints, entrepreneurial efficiency and equilibriumwages.     

Trust, Inequality and Ethnic Heterogeneity

Using a large Australian social survey, combined with precise data on neighbourhood characteristics, I explore the factors that affect trust at a local level ('localised trust') and at a national level ('generalised trust'). Trust is positively associated with the respondent's education, and negatively associated with the amount of time spent commuting. At a neighbourhood level, trust is higher in affluent areas, and lower in ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous communities, with the effect being stronger for linguistic heterogeneity than ethnic heterogeneity. Linguistic heterogeneity reduces localised trust for both natives and immigrants, and reduces generalised trust only for immigrants. Instrumental variables specifications show similar results. In contrast to the USA, there is no apparent relationship between trust and inequality across neighbourhoods in Australia.     

Inequality, inflation, and central bank independence

What can account for the different contemporaneous inflation experiences of various countries, and of the same country over time? We present an analysis of the determination of inflation from a political economy perspective. We document a positive correlation between income inequality and inflation and then present a theory of the determination of inflation outcomes in democratic societies that illustrates how greater inequality leads to greater inflation, owing to a desire by voters for wealth redistribution. We conclude by showing that democracies with more independent central banks tend to have better inflation outcomes for a given degree of inequality. JEL Classification E5, H0 Inégalité, inflation et l'indépendance de la banque centrale. Quels sont les facteurs qui pourraient expliquer les expériences inflationnistes tellement différentes des divers pays dans le passé récent, et l'expérience tellement différente d'un pays donné dans le temps? Les auteurs analysent ce problème de la détermination du taux d'inflation dans une perspective d'économie politique. Ils déterminent qu'il y a une corrélation positive entre l'inégalité et l'inflation, et présentent une théorie de la détermination de l'inflation dans les sociétés démocratiques qui montre comment une inégalité plus grande entraîne une inflation plus grande à cause du désir des électeurs de demander une redistribution de la richesse. Le mémoire montre en terminant que les démocraties e´quipées de banques centrales plus indépendantes tendent à avoir de meilleurs résultats en terme d'inflation pour un degré d'inégalité donné.     

发挥商贸平台独特作用创建区域合作更大市场

近年来,以各种制度安排,推动贸易投资自由化和便利化,降低交易成本,实现单一市场和扩大市场规模的区域经济合作,在经济全球化大背景下呈现出前所未有的发展。与此同时,中国内地越来越多地参与和推动各个层次、具有机制性的区域经济合作,这将给中国企业“走出去”提供巨大的商机     

Trust, contract and economic cooperation

After providing a brief overview of the standard economic analysisof incomplete contracts in terms of property rights, transactioncosts and self-enforcing implicit contracts, the author showswhy, in the orthodox view, trust is not a pertinent categoryto their negotiation or effectiveness. Drawing on various empiricalstudies which he has undertaken in the area of industrial relations,the author develops an alternative approach to the study ofincomplete contracts in which the concept of trust is central.In this alternative vision, boundedly rational agents with limitedforesight form provisional judgements about the trustworthinessof their trading partners based on the success of their pastencounters. A consequence of this alternative understandingof incomplete contracts is that there is no guarantee that cooperationwill succeed, even when the circumstances appear to promisemutual gain. The author argues, however, that by establishingan appropriate set of procedural rules to guide their responseto the unanticipated, agents can promote the kinds of mutuallearning that contribute to the build-up of trust and that increasethe likelihood of successful cooperation.     

Social approval,competition and cooperation

Non-monetary rewards are frequently used to promote pro-social behaviors, and these behaviors often result in approval from one’s peers. Nevertheless, we know little about how peer-approval, and particularly competition for peer-approval, influences people’s decisions to cooperate. This paper provides experimental evidence suggesting that people in peer-approval competitions value social approval more when it leads to unique and durable rewards. Our evidence suggests that such rewards act as a signaling mechanism, thereby contributing to the value of approval. We show that this signaling mechanism generates cooperation at least as effectively as cash rewards. Our findings point to the potential value of developing new mechanisms that rely on small non-monetary rewards to promote generosity in groups.     

Mortality,Human Capital and Persistent Inequality

Available evidence suggests high intergenerational correlation of economic status and persistent disparities in health status between the rich and the poor. This paper proposes a mechanism linking the two. We introduce health capital into a two-period overlapping generations model. Private health investment improves the probability of surviving from the first period of life to the next and, along with education, enhances an individual’s labor productivity. Poorer parents are of poor health, unable to invest much in reducing mortality risk and improving their human capital. Consequently, they leave less for their progeny. Despite convex preferences and technologies, initial differences in economic and health status may perpetuate across generations when annuities markets are imperfect.Additional support was provided by the National Science Foundation. Additional support was provided by the National Science Foundation.