Estimating the Dynamics of Mutual Fund Alphas and Betas

This article develops a Kalman filter model to track dynamicmutual fund factor loadings. It then uses the estimates to analyzewhether managers with market-timing ability can be identifiedex ante. The primary findings are as follows: (i) Ordinary leastsquares (OLS) timing models produce false positives (nonzeroalphas) at too high a rate with either daily or monthly data.In contrast, the Kalman filter model produces them at approximatelythe correct rate with monthly data; (ii) In monthly data, thoughthe OLS models fail to detect any timing among fund managers,the Kalman filter does; (iii) The alpha and beta forecasts fromthe Kalman model are more accurate than those from the OLS timingmodels; (iv) The Kalman filter model tracks most fund alphasand betas better than OLS models that employ macroeconomic variablesin addition to fund returns.     

Bayesian Alphas and Mutual Fund Persistence

We use daily returns to compare the performance predictability of Bayesian estimates of mutual fund performance with standard frequentist measures. When the returns on passive nonbenchmark assets are correlated with fund holdings, incorporating histories of these returns produces a performance measure that predicts future performance better than standard measures do. Bayesian alphas based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) are particularly useful for predicting future standard CAPM alphas. Over our sample period, priors consistent with moderate to diffuse beliefs in managerial skill dominate more skeptical prior beliefs, a result that is consistent with investor cash flows.     

Macroeconomic Forces and Mutual Fund Betas

This paper develops and tests a model in which fund betas are linearly related to changes in macroeconomic factors. Tests using monthly returns for 171 mutual funds over 1978–1991 were run. Results indicate that equity funds betas, on average, are negatively related to inflation changes and default risk premia while bond fund betas, on average, are negatively related to changes in risk-free rates, industrial production growth, and the term structure. Betas for passive portfolios, however, are not related to the macroeconomic factors examined.     

Mutual Fund Manager Forecasting Behavior

I examine publicly released annual earnings forecasts issued in conjunction with stock recommendations by mutual fund managers of actively managed open-end mutual funds. I find that mutual fund manager annual earnings forecasts systematically overestimate the earnings number later disclosed at the annual earnings announcement. In further analyses, I attempt to distinguish between two explanations for this forecast bias: an untruthful reporting bias (market manipulation) and a truthful cognitive bias (optimism). These explanations generate different predictions about the timing of changes in fundholdings of forecasted securities between the forecast release and annual earnings announcement dates. I interpret my findings as more consistent with an optimism explanation for mutual fund manager annual forecast bias and less consistent with a market manipulation explanation for this bias. I am, however, unable to eliminate an unobservable selection bias either in the decision of the mutual fund manager to report a forecast publicly or in the media's decision to publish that forecast as an explanation for my finding that mutual fund manager forecasts are biased.     

False Discoveries in Mutual Fund Performance: Measuring Luck in Estimated Alphas

This paper develops a simple technique that controls for "false discoveries," or mutual funds that exhibit significant alphas by luck alone. Our approach precisely separates funds into (1) unskilled, (2) zero-alpha, and (3) skilled funds, even with dependencies in cross-fund estimated alphas. We find that 75% of funds exhibit zero alpha (net of expenses), consistent with the Berk and Green equilibrium. Further, we find a significant proportion of skilled (positive alpha) funds prior to 1996, but almost none by 2006. We also show that controlling for false discoveries substantially improves the ability to find the few funds with persistent performance.     

Mutual Fund Survivorship

This article provides a comprehensive study of survivorshipissues using the mutual fund data of Carhart (1997). We demonstratetheoretically that when survival depends on multiperiod performance,the survivorship bias in average performance typically increaseswith the sample length. This is empirically relevant becauseevidence suggests a multiyear survival rule for U.S. mutualfunds. In the data we find the annual bias increases from 0.07%for 1-year samples to 1% for samples longer than 15 years. Wefind that survivor conditioning weakens evidence of performancepersistence. Finally, we explain how survivor conditioning affectsthe relation between performance and fund characteristics.     

Mutual Fund Incubation

Incubation is a strategy for initiating new funds, where multiple funds are started privately, and, at the end of an evaluation period, some are opened to the public. Consistent with incubation being used by fund families to increase performance and attract flows, funds in incubation outperform nonincubated funds by 3.5% risk‐adjusted, and when they are opened to the public they attract higher flows. Postincubation, however, this outperformance disappears. This performance reversal imparts an upward bias to returns that is not removed by a fund size filter. Fund age and ticker creation date filters, however, eliminate the bias.     

Mutual Fund Family Size and Mutual Fund Performance: The Role of Regulatory Changes

We examine whether the previously documented positive association between fund family size and fund performance is affected by significant regulatory changes (i.e., Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), the Global Settlement (GS), and increased scrutiny as a result of trading scandals) that have occurred in the last decade. Using Reg FD as a beginning point for these structural changes, we find that, while fund family size was positively associated with fund performance in the period prior to the regulatory changes, this advantage is significantly weaker in the period subsequent to the regulatory changes. Consistent with the weakened advantage of fund family size in fund performance, we find that the greater stock‐picking skill of larger fund families, measured using the earnings announcement returns of the stocks they trade, also weakened subsequent to the regulatory changes. Using narrower event windows around the regulatory changes, we find that the previously documented superior return of large fund families was partly attributable to selective disclosure. We also find that fund families implicated in the trading scandals experienced a decline in their performance during the scandal period. Finally, we examine the role of large investment banks in providing an advantage to large fund families. Family size was positively associated with the extent to which funds traded in the same direction as forecast revisions by analysts from large investment banks in the period prior to Reg FD and the GS and this association declined significantly after the two regulatory events.     

Mutual Fund Liquidity Costs

One dollar in purchases or redemptions generates an average cost of $0.006 for US equity mutual funds during the period 1997‐2009, approximately 70% lower than prior estimates derived from older data. However, large cross‐sectional differences exist between funds. Many funds have costs near zero, but funds that hold relatively illiquid equities, have relatively concentrated portfolios, and manage relatively large amounts of assets have average liquidity costs significantly greater than the full sample average. Furthermore, despite a large difference in underlying asset liquidity, US bond funds and US equity funds have similar average liquidity costs.     

证券基金立法进行时

立法部门审议证券投资基金法草案 新华社 2002年8月23日 保障中国基金业高速、健康发展的重要法律<中华人民共和国证券投资基金法(草案)>,提请九届全国人大常委会第29次会议审议.草案对中国基金的组织和运作方式、保护基金份额持有人的合法权益以及外资参股中国基金管理机构等重要问题作出明确规定.     

European Mutual Fund Performance

This paper presents an overview of the European mutual fund industry and investigates mutual fund performance using a survivorship bias controlled sample of 506 funds from the five most important mutual fund countries. The latter is done using the Carhart (1997) 4-factor asset-pricing model. In addition we investigate whether European fund managers exhibit 'hot hands', persistence in performance. Finally the influence of fund characteristics on risk-adjusted performance is considered. Our overall results suggest that European mutual funds, and especially small cap funds are able to add value, as indicated by their positive after cost alphas. If we add back management fees, four out of five countries exhibit significant out-performance at an aggregate level. Finally, we detect strong persistence in mean returns for funds investing in the UK. Our results deviate from most US studies that argue mutual funds under-perform the market by the amount of expenses they charge.     

Evaluating Mutual Fund Performance

We study standard mutual fund performance measures, using simulated funds whose characteristics mimic actual funds. We find that performance measures used in previous mutual fund research have little ability to detect economically large magnitudes (e.g., three percent per year) of abnormal fund performance, particularly if a fund's style characteristics differ from those of the value-weighted market portfolio. Power can be substantially improved, however, using event-study procedures that analyze a fund's stock trades. These procedures are feasible using time-series data sets on mutual fund portfolio holdings.     

Mutual Fund Tax Clienteles

Mutual funds are held by investors in taxable and tax‐qualified retirement accounts. We investigate whether the characteristics, investment strategies, and performance of mutual funds held by these diverse tax clienteles differ. Examining both mutual fund distributions and mutual fund holdings, we find that funds held primarily by taxable investors choose investment strategies that result in lower tax burdens than funds held primarily in tax‐qualified accounts. Despite these differences, we find no evidence that any investment constraints that may arise from these tax‐efficient investment strategies result in performance differences between funds held by different tax clienteles.     

Incentives and Endogenous Risk Taking: A Structural View on Hedge Fund Alphas

Hedge fund managers are subject to several nonlinear incentives: performance fee options (call); equity investors' redemption options (put); and prime broker contracts allowing for forced deleverage (put). The interaction of these option‐like incentives affects optimal leverage ex ante, depending on the distance of fund‐value from the high‐water mark. We study how these endogenous effects influence performance measures used in the literature. We show that reduced‐form measures that do not account for these features are subject to economically significant false discovery biases. The result is stronger for low‐quality funds. We propose an alternative structural methodology for conducting performance attribution in hedge funds.     

农村资金互助社融资难题待解

我国农村金融改革的表象是供给问题,而实质是农民组织化瓶颈约束问题,也就是如何发展农村合作金融,提高农民的市场主体交易地位的问题.这个问题不解决,农村金融体系根本建立不起来.     

Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows

This paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds. Consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information, but do so asymmetrically, investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period. Search costs seem to be an important determinant of fund flows. High performance appears to be most salient for funds that exert higher marketing effort, as measured by higher fees. Flows are directly related to the size of the fund's complex as well as the current media attention received by the fund, which lower consumers' search costs.     

Learning about Mutual Fund Managers

We study capital allocations to managers with two mutual funds, and show that investors learn about managers from their performance records. Flows into a fund are predicted by the manager's performance in his other fund, especially when he outperforms and when signals from the other fund are more useful. In equilibrium, capital should be allocated such that there is no cross‐fund predictability. However, we find positive predictability, particularly among underperforming funds. Our results are consistent with incomplete learning: while investors move capital in the right direction, they do not withdraw enough capital when the manager underperforms in his other fund.     

On Mutual Fund Investment Styles

Most mutual funds adopt investment styles that cluster arounda broad market benchmark. Few funds take extreme positions awayfrom the index, but those who do are more likely to favor growthstocks and past winners. The bias toward glamour and the tendencyof poorly performing value funds to shift styles may reflectagency and behavioral considerations. After adjusting for style,there is evidence that growth managers on average outperformvalue managers. Though a fund's factor loadings and its portfoliocharacteristics generally yield similar conclusions about itsstyle, an approach using portfolio characteristics predictsfund returns better.     

印度基金托管人制度

印度把基金托管人一般具有的基金资产保管和投资运作监督两个职能分开，分别由基金托管人(Custodian)和基金受托人(Trustees)承担。……