A Two–Tier Wage Structure in a Nonunion Firm

This study examines the perceptions of nonunion workers in a permanent two–tier wage structure. Consistent with the predictions of equity and justice theories, low–tier employees are found to be more likely to perceive the wage structure as unfair, have lower pay satisfaction and organizational commitment, and report poorer worker–management relations than high– tier employees. These attitudes may make nonunion firms more vulnerable to certification campaigns since they are the same factors that have been repeatedly linked to employee intentions to vote for a union.     

Job Satisfaction in Britain

Little recent empirical work in economics or industrial relations has examined job satisfaction, despite its demonstrated correlation with labour market behaviour such as quits, absenteeism and productivity. This paper uses information from a study of 5000 British employees to investigate the relationship between three measures of job satisfaction and a wide range of individual and job characteristics. Notably, men, workers in their thirties, the well-educated, those working longer hours and workers in larger establishments have lower levels of job satisfaction. The estimated job satisfaction equations are used to calculate a measure of the shadow wage and to provide some evidence that is consistent with the existence of non-compensating differentials in the industry and occupational wage structure.     

The role of the workplace in ethnic wage differentials

Using linked employer–employee data for Britain, we examine ethnic wage differentials among full-time employees. We find substantial ethnic segregation across workplaces. However, this inter-workplace segregation does not contribute to the aggregate wage penalty in Britain. Instead, most of the ethnic wage gap exists within the workplace, between observationally-equivalent co-workers. Lower pay satisfaction and higher levels of skill mismatch among ethnic minority workers are consistent with discrimination in wage-setting on the part of employers. The presence of recognized trade unions and the use of job evaluation schemes within the workplace are associated with a smaller ethnic wage gap. These findings indicate that more attention should be placed on ensuring fairness in wage determination.     

Underwork,Work‐Hour Insecurity,and A New Approach to Wage and Hour Regulation

When it was passed in 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) sought to address the “evils” of underpay and overwork by establishing an hourly minimum wage and requiring premium overtime pay. However, today's low‐wage, hourly workers more often face underwork than overwork, as well as fluctuating, unstable schedules, neither of which is addressed by the FLSA. This paper presents and assesses the effectiveness of an alternative approach to wage and hour regulation, the “reporting pay” guarantee. We begin by examining the problem of work‐hour insecurity, particularly employers’ practice of sending workers home early from scheduled shifts. We then move to a detailed assessment of state laws that require reporting pay, as well as reporting pay guarantees in union contracts and private‐employer practices that attempt to address the problem of work‐hour insecurity. We conclude by considering paths for strengthening such protections in law.     

Free To Choose? Dimensions of Private-Sector Wage Determination, 1979–1994

Deregulation of the system of pay determination in Britain was started in 1979 with the removal of incomes policy. The objective was to give employers the freedom to determine wage increases without the restrictions of pay norms or statutory limits. Instead, companies would be able to link changes in pay to the fortunes of the individual enterprise or establishment. By the mid-1990s, had these attempts to decentralize wage negotiations changed the determinants of wage settlement outcomes in Britain? We address the influence of industrial relations institutions and labour market pressures on wage increases between 1979 and 1994 using evidence from the CBI’s Pay Databank. Despite the direction of the Conservative Government’s policy, the external institutional forces of the labour market, particularly the rate of inflation and comparability, appear to exert an enduring influence, both qualitatively and quantitatively, on pay determination.     

Who Fared Better? The Fortunes of Performance Pay and Fixed Pay Workers through Recession

Using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, we explore whether the fortunes of employees paid for performance differ from those of fixed pay workers during recession. Only in the bottom quintile of the wage distribution were performance pay employees more likely to experience greater falls in real wages than fixed pay employees. Accounting for fixed unobserved worker characteristics suggests that this was not due to the wage‐setting mechanism itself, but that other factors are likely to be at play. While across most of the earnings distribution there was little evidence of greater wage flexibility among performance pay employees, they did have longer job tenure than fixed pay employees over the recession.     

Does Wage Rank Affect Employees’ Well‐being?

How do workers make wage comparisons? Both an experimental study and an analysis of 16,000 British employees are reported. Satisfaction and well‐being levels are shown to depend on more than simple relative pay. They depend upon the ordinal rank of an individual's wage within a comparison group. “Rank” itself thus seems to matter to human beings. Moreover, consistent with psychological theory, quits in a workplace are correlated with pay distribution skewness.     

Market Structure, Strike Activity, and Union Wage Settlements

We attempt a synthesis of the industrial relations market structure hypothesis with the modern asymmetric information theory of wage and strike outcomes. The industrial relations literature contains arguments indicating that wage settlements should be positively related to the degree of product market sales concentration and the degree of product market coverage by the union. In our empirical analysis of the periods 1970–1980 (strikes) and 1976–1980 (wages), we find that the relation between trade-adjusted sales concentration and wage settlements is positive at low and intermediate levels of concentration but negative at the highest levels of concentration. The relation is always negative for strike probabilities. We also find that the trade-adjusted per cent of the product market covered by the same union and the percentage covered by other unions are positively related to both wage settlements and strike probabilities.     

Trade Union Concentration and the Determination of Wages: The Case of Teachers in England and Wales

Multi-unionism is a common feature of the industrial relations scene, yet to date there has been relatively little economic analysis of its effects, in particular on the outcome of wage negotiations. In this paper, we examine the impact of multi-unionism—specifically, the degree of union membership concentration—on the determination of the relative pay of a particular occupational group, namely that of schoolteachers in England and Wales. We measure teacher trade union concentration using the Herfindahl index of concentration, and find that, after controlling for other possible influences, changes in the value of this index have a positive impact on schoolteachers' relative pay. In addition, we find union membership concentration to be a better indicator of 'union pushfulness' effects in wage determination than the traditional measure, union density. These findings are potentially of wider significance for the analysis of wage determination in multi-union environments.     

Occupational Stereotypes and Gender‐Specific Job Satisfaction

Using representative data containing information on job satisfaction and workers’ gender‐specific prejudices, we investigate the relationship between stereotyping and job satisfaction. We show that women in stereotypically male jobs are significantly less satisfied with their work climate and job content than in stereotypically female jobs but more satisfied with their income in those same jobs. Our findings indicate that women trade off their higher income satisfaction against the negative consequences of stereotyping. As long as we take into account that stereotypically male jobs are physically more demanding than stereotypically female jobs, men are generally more satisfied with stereotypically male jobs.     

The Role of the State in Balancing the Minimum Wage in Turkey and the USA

In this article, the direct role of the state in industrial relations is scrutinized by focusing on the political basis of decisions regarding the minimum wage. We argue that in order to ensure stability and growth, any state must balance the interests of capital and labour when taking this kind of distributional decision. This idea is operationalized using O'Connor's concepts of accumulation and legitimation as the basis for an analytical model. Application to Turkey and comparison with the USA reveals that in Turkey, governments take account of legitimacy concerns in their minimum wage decisions due to the large number of workers directly dependent on minimum wages and weak collective bargaining institutions. In the USA, despite rather similar industrial relations conditions, this tendency is not present, probably due to the much smaller number of minimum wage earners and their weakness in the political process. However, in the USA, too, we observe that there is a difference between political parties and historical periods in the way in which the minimum wage is determined.     

Collective Bargaining and the Evolution of Wage Inequality in Italy

Italian male wage inequality has increased at a relatively fast pace from the mid‐1980s until the early 2000s, while it has been persistently flat since then. We analyse this trend, focusing on the period of most rapid growth in pay dispersion. By accounting for worker and firm fixed effects, it is shown that workers' heterogeneity has been a major determinant of increased wage inequalities, while variability in firm wage policies has declined over time. We also show that the growth in pay dispersion has entirely occurred between livelli di inquadramento, that is, job titles defined by national industry‐wide collective bargaining institutions, for which specific minimum wages apply. We conclude that the underlying market forces determining wage inequality have been largely channelled into the tight tracks set by the centralized system of industrial relations.     

Entry deregulation,firm organization,and wage inequality

This paper identifies a causal link between changes in product market competition, firm reorganization and within-firm wage inequality. We exploit a unique episode of comprehensive firm entry deregulation as a quasi-natural experiment and use exceptionally detailed linked employer-employee data for the universe of private sector firms and workers in Portugal. Following deregulation affected firms flatten their hierarchies: the number of layers is reduced and managers’ span of control increased. Dropping a hierarchy layer is accompanied by a significant reduction in wage inequality within the firm, by 8% for the average pay ratio between the top and the bottom layer and 4.4% for the 90-50 percentile wage ratio, showing that there are real changes arising from firm reorganization. Overall wage dispersion, measured by the standard deviation of hourly pay, is also reduced. We discuss mechanisms and interpretations for these changes.     

Evaluating Pay Equity in Michigan: A Strategic Choice Perspective

The strategic choice model provides one framework for analyzing pay equity reform in the public sector. Michigan was experiencing many of the same political and economic forces as other state civil services implementing comparable worth. However, the institutional structure of civil service industrial relations, coupled with the values of officials, undermined the reform process. Rather than adjusting relative wage rates to reflect the new Equitable Classification Plan, civil service officials reaffirmed market criteria in wage setting.     

Poverty,Legal Status,and Pay Basis: The Case of U.S. Agriculture

U.S. farmworkers primarily are paid either on a piecerate or on a timerate basis. This article studies relationships among wage contracts, legal status, and poverty using a representative survey of employed farmworkers, which includes detailed information on legal status, including whether a worker is illegal. Results indicate that while piecerate workers earn more per hour on average, they work fewer hours and face greater poverty risk than their timerate counterparts. Furthermore, foreign‐born workers, especially those who are undocumented, are overrepresented in piecerate positions, and analysis shows that the effect of piecerate pay on poverty is positive and correlated with being foreign‐born.     

The Coverage of Collective Pay-setting Institutions in Britain, 1895–1990

Fewer than 50% of British employees now have their pay and conditions affected by collective pay-setting institutions — collective bargaining or wages councils. This paper charts the historical context for the current picture of a decollectivized Britain, constructing a time series on coverage from 1895 to 1990. Extant estimates and sources of coverage data are presented and discussed alongside estimates drawn from a source used only sparingly before now — the number of workers affected by changes in wage rates of national agreements or wage orders. The recent decline in collective bargaining coverage is the most prolonged ever recorded and has been noticeably steeper than the fall in union density, such that the proportion of British workers covered is lower now than in the 1940s. With the abolition of wages councils in 1993, collective pay-setting machinery now affects the pay and conditions of fewer workers than it did in the 1930s.     

Effects of Occupational Licensing and Unions on Labour Market Earnings in Canada

Using longitudinal data from the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics from 1999 to 2011, the article compares the pay and benefits of licensed and unionized workers. In a cross section of respondents and using ordinary least squares estimates, it finds a pay premium of 0.155 log points for those with an occupational licence compared to those without one; the comparable union wage premium is slightly more than half, that is 0.085 log points. Fixed‐effects estimates go in the opposite direction (0.028 and 0.046 log points for licensing and unionization, respectively), suggesting the existence of unobservable factors correlated with licensing and union status. Unionized workers are more likely to access standard benefits, such as medical insurance and pension plans, but licensed workers benefit little from their licensing status in access to benefits. Finally, union workers are significantly less likely to receive incentive pay, such as profit sharing, while the association between occupational licensing and incentive pay is close to zero and statistically insignificant.     

Minimum Cash Wages,Tipped Restaurant Workers,and Poverty

This is the first study to examine the effect of increases in the tipped minimum cash wage—the wage employers must pay to tipped employees—on poverty. Using March Current Population Survey data (1988–2014), we find that tipped minimum cash wage increases are associated with declines in the risk of a tipped restaurant worker living in a poor family (elasticities around –0.2). However, we find little evidence of poverty‐alleviating effects when using the household rather than the family as the sharing unit. This result is consistent with evidence that a substantial share of tipped workers who live in a poor family live in a nonpoor household with persons unrelated by blood, marriage, or adoption who contribute to the household's income. Furthermore, we find that tipped minimum cash wage hikes are associated with increases in the risk of a younger, less‐educated individual living in a poor family or household. Adverse labor demand effects that redistribute income among low‐skilled individuals drive these results. We conclude that raising the tipped minimum cash wage is a poorly targeted policy to deliver income to poor restaurant workers.     

The Wage–Health Insurance Trade‐off and Worker Selection: Evidence From the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 1997 to 2006

Key provisions within healthcare reform will likely further increase the cost of employer‐sponsored insurance. Theory suggests that workers pay for their health insurance through a wage offset. We investigate this issue using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. GMM estimates aimed at correcting for endogenous worker mobility reveal evidence of a trade‐off for workers who are offered health insurance as the only fringe benefit. On the other hand, employees in establishments with a more comprehensive set of benefits enjoy higher wages relative to employees in establishments that offer no benefits. Health also affects the wage–health insurance trade‐off.     

Pay Secrecy and the Gender Wage Gap in the United States

Legislators and advocates claim that pay secrecy perpetuates the gender wage gap and that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) should be amended to outlaw these practices. Using a difference‐in‐differences fixed‐effects human‐capital wage regression, I find that women with higher education levels who live in states that have outlawed pay secrecy have higher earnings, and that the wage gap is consequently reduced. State bans on pay secrecy and federal legislation to amend the FLSA to allow workers to share information about their wages may improve the gender wage gap, especially among women with college or graduate degrees.