The pricing of the prime rate

The prime business loan rate has become widely viewed as one of the chief barometers of credit market conditions, yet we know little about how this rate is determined. The objective of this paper is to attempt to further our understanding of the prime rate through an analysis of recent prime rate movements in order to determine if the prime reacts immediately to changes in money market conditions, as would be the case of a competitively-determined price, or whether the prime demonstrates properties of an oligopolistic price. The empirical findings contained herein appear to support the hypothesis that the prime rate is an average of a bank's cost of its currently- and previously-issued, but still outstanding, managed liabilities. This type of pricing minimizes the interest rate risk in the bank's balance sheet and facilities coordination and discipline in an oligopolistic market. Furthermore, it also appears that banks may be using the prime rate in conjunction with below prime lending to price discriminate between customers on the basis of whether these customers have alternative channels of short-term financing.     

Optimal financial crises: A note on Allen and Gale

This note provides an example of an optimal banking panic. We construct a model in which a banking panic is triggered by the banker, not the depositors. When the banker receives a pessimistic information on the return on the bank’s assets, he liquidates them prematurely in order to protect his capital. In the face of this liquidation, all depositors withdraw their funds prematurely. The premature liquidation of the bank’s assets strengthens the bank’s balance sheet. As a result, the banking panic does not cause bank failure and the government should not try to prevent the panic. Such a panic occured in 1857 in the United States. JEL Classification G21     

Long-term bank balance sheet management: Estimation and simulation of risk-factors

We propose a dynamic framework which encompasses the main risks in balance sheets of banks in an integrated fashion. Our contributions are fourfold: (1) solving a simple one-period model that describes the optimal bank policy under credit risk; (2) estimating the long-term stochastic processes underlying the risk factors in the balance sheet, taking into account the credit and interest rate cycles; (3) simulating several scenarios for interest rates and charge-offs; and (4) describing the equations that govern the evolution of the balance sheet in the long run. The models that we use address momentum and the interaction between different rates. Our results enable simulation of bank balance sheets over time given a bank’s lending strategy and provides a basis for an optimization model to determine bank asset–liability management strategy endogenously.     

Optimizing international portfolios with options and forwards

We develop a stochastic programming model to address in a unified manner a number of interrelated decisions in international portfolio management: optimal portfolio diversification and mitigation of market and currency risks. The goal is to control the portfolio’s total risk exposure and attain an effective balance between risk and expected return. By incorporating options and forward contracts in the portfolio optimization model we are able to numerically assess the performance of alternative tactics for mitigating exposure to the primary risks. We find that control of market risk with options has more significant impact on portfolio performance than currency hedging. We demonstrate through extensive empirical tests that incremental benefits, in terms of reducing risk and generating profits, are gained when both the market and currency risks are jointly controlled through appropriate means.     

The demand for and supply of deposits by credit unions: The Caisses populaires' case

The aim of the study is to explain Quebec major credit union's deposit market by way of intergrating its public demand function with the institution's rate-setting operation. The demand for Caisses' deposits is specified as a dynamic stock adjustment model. On the other hand, the intermediary's rate-setting reduced form is derived from a risk-return portfolio balance model which the managers maximize the expected utility of reserves. The two models are integrated by means of a liability composite rate. Econometric estimates of the integrated model provide us with interesting policy insights. For instance, the Quebecois public views chartered banks' deposits as a weak substitute for Caisses' deposits; it is also more responsive to non-rate arguments, such as loan eligibility or the institution's ethnic appeal. On the supply side, competitive liability rates are more important than returns on assets when the Caisses set its deposit rate. Finally, the impact growth imbalance between loans and deposits is well captured by a flow variable, without infringing on the steady-state determination based on rates.     

Repeated lending under contractual incompleteness

We consider a model of repeated (relationship) lending in which some contingencies that are relevant for a bank’s decision to finance a project cannot be described contractually. The hazards related to this lack of contractibility can be magnified by actions taken by an entrepreneur. The continuation value of a lending relationship induces borrowers to take actions that minimize the ex-post conflict of interests resulting from contractual incompleteness. The optimal lending relationship is stationary on the equilibrium path. A robust feature of an optimal lending relationship is that the action schedule (as a function of project types) adopted by the entrepreneur is either a constant or a step function. Hence, the bank imposes to the entrepreneur a finite set of decisions from which he can pick his action, bounding his discretion over decisions. This leads to lower interest rates charged by the bank and to efficient refinancing in a lending relationship when compared to arm’s length financing.     

Fiscal Consequences of Paying Interest on Reserves

We review the role of the central bank's balance sheet in a textbook monetary model and explore what changes if the central bank is allowed to pay interest on its liabilities. When the central bank (CB) cannot pay interest, away from the zero lower bound its (real) balance sheet is limited by the demand for money. Furthermore, if securities are not marked to market and the central bank holds its bonds to maturity, it is impossible for the CB to make losses, and it always obtains profits from being a monopoly provider of money. When the option of paying interest on liabilities is allowed, the limit on the CB's balance sheet is lifted. In this case, the CB is free to take on interest‐rate risk – for example, by buying long‐term securities and financing those purchases with short‐term debt that pays the market interest rate. This is a risky enterprise that can lead to additional profits but also to losses. To the extent that losses exceed the profits of the monopoly operations, the CB faces two options: either it is recapitalised by Treasury or it increases its monopoly profits by raising the inflation tax.     

Financial Aspects of Business Cycles: An Analysis of Balance Sheet Adjustments of U.S. Nonfinancial Enterprises over the Twentieth Century

This paper formulates and tests a model of asset and financing adjustments of nonfinancial enterprises over the twentieth century. Asset adjustments change the expected income and operating risk of firms while financing adjustments change financial risk. To protect debt and equity investors from a conflict of interest problem, an up‐front contract develops an “assignment” rule for managing the firm's balance sheet whereby managers make investment decisions that conform to the risk aversion of stockholders and financing decisions that offset changes in operating risk resulting from investment decisions. Empirical evidence gathered in this paper fails to reject the predictions of the model.     

The determinants of shareholder value in European banking

This paper examines the determinants of shareholder value creation for a large sample of European banks between 1998 and 2005. As the recent turmoil in global banking systems has illustrated, bank performance can have a substantial influence on efficient capital allocation, company growth and economic development. We use a dynamic panel data model where the bank’s shareholder value is a linear function of various bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic variables. We show that shareholder value has a positive relationship with cost efficiency changes, while economic profits are linked to revenue efficiency changes. Credit losses, market and liquidity risk and leverage are also found to substantially influence bank performance. These results are robust to a variety of different model specifications.     

Stochastic reserve losses,bank credit expansion and Bayesian information

In standard bank credit expansion models the optimal amount of new demand deposits to create is derived for a given level of uncertainty of reserves losses. In this paper, I analyze in detail, the microeconomics of bank credit expansion in which the degree of uncertainty is a decision variable for the bank to determine. First, the role of information in adjusting the bank's expected profit is established and its impact on demand deposit creation is discussed. I then derive the optimal demand for information and its comparative static behavior is examined. Finally, I discuss the major implications of considering the level of uncertainty as a decision variable in the bank credit expansion literature.     

A wicksellian indicator of monetary policy

This paper compares actual U.S. monetary policy with an ideal policy based upon Wicksell's theory of natural and market rates of interest. For the period 1952–1971, this comparison indicates that actual policies behaved in a distinctly pro-cyclical manner with the result that monetary policies amplified the magnitude of the business cycles. The explanation offered suggests that this stems from the central bank's attempt to stabilize the interest rate which is consistent with one of the paper's findings of a highly significant positive relationship between changes in the natural rate of interest and changes in the monetary base.     

A computational approach to pricing a bank credit line

Using trended Brownian motion to characterize borrower cash needs over time, we are able to derive a probability density function for the time to depletion of a bank credit line as well as the likelihoods for the time to exhausting the sources of liquidity that fund the loan. Armed with these analytic results, we solve for the credit line mark-up rate and the configuration of stored liquidity that maximizes the bank’s intertemporal expected profits from the loan. The optimality conditions produce a system of integral differential equations whose solutions we then simulate over a host of scenarios.     

Capital and Earnings Management: Evidence from Alternative Banking Business Models

This paper examines whether institutional characteristics distinguishing Islamic from conventional banks lead to distinctive capital and earnings management behavior through the use of loan loss provisions. In our sample countries, the two banking sectors operate under different regulatory frameworks: conventional banks currently apply the “incurred” loan loss model until 2018 whereas Islamic banks mandatorily adopt an “expected” loan loss model. Our results provide significant evidence of capital and earnings management practices via loan loss provisions in conventional banks. This finding is more prominent for large and loss-generating banks. By contrast, Islamic banks tend not to use loan loss provisions in either capital or earnings management, irrespective of the bank's size, earnings profile, or the structure of their loan loss model. This difference may be attributed to the constrained business model of Islamic banking, strict governance, and ethical orientation.     

The impact of bank ownership concentration on impaired loans and capital adequacy

This paper examines the impact of bank ownership concentration on two indicators of bank riskiness, namely banks’ non-performing loans and capital adequacy. Using balance sheet information for around 500 commercial banks from more than 50 countries averaged over 2005–2007, we find that concentrated ownership (proxied by different levels of shareholding) significantly reduces a bank’s non-performing loans ratio, conditional on supervisory control and shareholders protection rights. Furthermore, ownership concentration affects the capital adequacy ratio positively conditional on shareholder protection. At low levels of shareholder protection rights and supervisory control, ownership concentration reduces bank riskiness.     

税收规避与财务报告成本的权衡研究——来自中国2008年所得税改革的证据

本文以我国2008年所得税改革为契机,借鉴Shackelford和Shevlin(2001)的税与非税因素权衡模型,实证考察有减税预期的上市公司在税收规避中是否权衡了财务报告成本。本文发现,有减税预期的公司存在将减税之前期间的利润推迟确认到未来低所得税率期间的盈余管理行为,且为避免这一行为过于明显而遭致惩罚,利润跨期转移的期间宽度较长。但有着高财务报告成本的公司明显降低了这一跨期利润转移的动机。研究证实了我国上市公司在税收规避决策中权衡了税与财务报告成本。研究结论有助于进一步丰富盈余管理文献,对当前我国税收制度改革具有一定参考意义。     

Heterogeneous multiple bank financing: does it reduce inefficient credit-renegotiation incidences?

Small and medium-sized firms often obtain capital via a mixture of relationship and arm’s-length bank lending. We show that such heterogeneous multiple bank financing leads to a lower probability of inefficient credit foreclosure than both monopoly relationship lending and homogeneous multiple bank financing. Yet, in order to reduce hold-up and coordination-failure risk, the relationship bank’s fraction of total firm debt must not become too large. For firms with intermediate expected profits, the probability of inefficient credit-renegotiation is shown to decrease along with the relationship bank’s information precision. For firms with extremely high or extremely low expected returns, however, it increases.

BALANCE SHEET STRUCTURE AND THE MANAGERIAL-DISCRETION HYPOTHESIS: AN EXPLORATORY EMPIRICAL STUDY OF NEW ZEALAND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES

The managerial-discretion hypothesis states that in mutual insurance companies policyholders will seek to protect their interests by limiting managerial discretion in investment and financing decisions. Therefore, mutuals are predicted to introduce restrictive mechanisms (e.g., company by-laws) that promote precautionary investment, such as government securities. In stock companies, shareholders are expected to increase their wealth at the expense of policyholders' interests by investing in more speculative assets, such as equities. Differences in investment activity also affect policy valuation and reserving decisions reflected in the liability side of the insurance company balance sheet. The managerial-discretion hypothesis implies that systematic differences in the structure of balance sheets between mutual and stock insurance companies are likely to exist. To carry out an exploratory test of this aspect of the managerial-discretion hypothesis, the present study employs canonical correlation analysis on New Zealand life insurance company data for 1991. However, the empirical evidence does not appear to support the proposition that balance sheet structure varies systematically between mutual and stock companies.     

Banks,bankruptcy, and public regulation

In a simple state-preference model with a complete capital market, some surprising implications of equilibrium in the banking industry are derived. For example, to limit a bank's probability of bankruptcy, it is sufficient for public regulators to control the composition and relative size of its portfolio or marketable securities. Generally, its loans need not be restricted. Also, under most publicly subsidized deposit insurance, bankers select very risky portfolios of bonds and loans with or without any risk adjustment in the insurance premium. In fact, with many types of subsidized insurance, public monitoring of bank loans is essential.     

Competition and Strategic Information Acquisition in Credit Markets

We investigate the interaction between banks’ use of informationacquisition as a strategic tool and their role in promotingthe efficiency of credit markets when a bank’s abilityto gather information varies with its distance to the borrower.We show that banks acquire proprietary information both to softenlending competition and to extend their market share. As competitionincreases, investments in information acquisition fall, leadingto lower interest rates but also to less efficient lending decisions.Consistent with the recent wave of bank acquisitions, we alsofind that merging for informational reasons with a competitoris an optimal response to industry consolidation.     

Search for information and portfolio selection

The paper examines the problem of how to allocate scarce resources between increasing the investor's knowledge, that is reducing his uncertainty, and the actual investment—that is a kind of an ex ante decision before the final parameters of the securities are known. Our model provides answers to questions of how the search for knowledge affects portfolio selection, to what extent additional information can improve estimates of securities' statistical parameters and how the benefits and costs of additional search alter the investor's efficient mean-variance portfolio set.