Order, positioning, scope and outcomes of market entry

This research aims to analyze the relationships between three dimensions of the market entry strategy for new products - order, positioning and scope - and four dimensions of performance - customer satisfaction, competitive position, costs and profitability. The consideration of internal links between the entry dimensions, together with their effect on the different performance variables, will enable us to determine the existence of mediating effects, which up until now have barely been examined in the literature. We test our model on a cross-sectional sample of 136 manufacturing firms, applying structural equation modeling based on the Partial Least Squares (PLS) methodology. Our findings reveal that all the three strategic decisions included in our model of market entry do affect performance, although their influence changes according to the performance dimension being measured.     

Collusion and leadership

The paper explores the role of price or quantity leadership in facilitating collusion. It extends the standard analysis of tacit collusion by allowing firms to make their strategic choices either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that price leadership indeed facilitates collusion by making it easier to punish deviations by the leader. In case of pure Bertrand competition, price leadership restores the scope for (perfect) collusion in markets where collusion would not be sustainable otherwise. When firms face asymmetric costs or offer differentiated products, price leadership can also enhance the profitability of collusion—in case of asymmetric costs, the less efficient firm must act as the leader. Finally, such leadership is less effective in case of Cournot competition since, following an aggressive deviation by the leader, the follower would rather limit its own output, making it more difficult to punish the deviation. Still, quantity leadership may enhance collusion when it is already somewhat effective in a simultaneous move setting.     

Beta distributed market shares in a spatial model with an application to the market for audit services

We show that if firms locate on a circle according to a uniform distribution, their market shares will be beta distributed. The result implies that concentration ratios will be skewed. We apply the result to the market for auditing services in the US and show the beta distribution outperforms other relevant distributions.     

Detecting Collusion

Detection and deterrence of collusion are longstanding antitrust problems, made difficult because collusive arrangements are usually surreptitious. In this paper, I discuss factors that facilitate or inhibit collusive schemes, as well as circumstances where detection is possible. I describe how industrial organization economists diagnose collusion (both explicit and tacit) among firms.     

Non-cooperative Tacit Collusion,Complementary Bidding and Incumbency Premium

This article focuses on testing the intuitive idea of Folk Theorem in a repeated game, and the existence of complementary bidding and incumbency premium. Through careful analysis of bidding behaviors in the Dallas-Ft. Worth (DFW) school-milk industry, I find that cooperation based on rationality and repetition satisfies the conditions for a kind of Folk Theorem. The data also strongly suggest that all major milk processors are engaged in complementary bidding to allocate consumers geographically and command statistically significant incumbency premia in their incumbent districts. Even if the equilibrium outcomes are largely non-cooperative, some pieces of circumstantial evidence uncovered in this school-milk market study may be sufficiently convincing to enable dispensing with evidence of actual communication.     

国有企业主导与行政性垄断下的价格合谋——“京沪空中快线”引发的若干思考

本文基于民航产业的价格同盟进行的模型分析和经验研究，在一定程度上解释了行政垄断和企业间合谋的关系。研究发现，在规制缺失或默许的条件下．包含惩罚方式的价格合谋是一个可行和可实施的机制安排，而寡头垄断和行政垄断的结合是诱发规制者干预价格竞争，最终形成所谓“价格同盟”的结构和制度条件。规制者和垄断国有企业关系的交织和错位下的反竞争行为，是未来《反垄断法》实施的主要障碍。     

Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings and Collusion

Review of Industrial Organization - This article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and...     

The timing of market entry and firm performance: A perspective of institutional theory

Integrating literature from institutional theory with that from market entry research, we study the effects of a firm's early marketing entry on other firms' behaviors and performances. In addition, we also consider the moderating effect of other institutional factors, such as the firms' home-country culture and institutional environments in an emerging economy. Based on a review of all the relevant research, we develop a theoretical model with testable hypotheses. With empirical data from multi-national enterprises (MNEs) competing in China's insurance-service market, we test the hypotheses. Our data analyses show evidence that, other things being equal, early market entry can cause institutional imitation, in terms of market diversification, among imitators. At the same time, the imitation can be moderated by the home-country culture of the MNEs. In addition, the imitation of early market entry firms has some significant effects on the performance of imitators, including less deviation from the industry norm and better financial performance.     

Teams investing their knowledge shares in the stock market of virtuality: a gain or a loss?

Best knowledge-sharing practices in team-based work are a 'must' for success in flexible and adaptable organisation forms. This research study provides actionable insights on how managers can enhance the knowledge worker's willingness to collaborate in a specific type of virtual teaming, the learning team, and build better communication and collaboration practices in and between these teams.     

Horizontal mergers, entry, and efficiency defences

In standard models of Cournot competition, it is well-known that if large-scale entry is impossible, then any merger failing to create technological synergies must harm consumers through a higher price level. This paper shows that this is true irrespective of entry conditions: any profitable Cournot merger failing to generate synergies must raise price, even if large-scale entry is possible or if the merger allows the avoidance of fixed cost duplication.     

Sustaining Collusion Via a Fuzzy Trigger

Probability theory is the standard economic representation of uncertainty, although it is not always an accurate one. Fuzzy logic is an alternative representation that does not require individual beliefs regarding the explicit functional form of uncertainty. This paper applies fuzzy logic to an oligopoly trigger pricing game. The fuzzy trigger pricing game reverses the standard cyclical price war prediction; collusion-sustaining price wars are most likely to occur during times of high demand. The fuzzy model also predicts that markets with relatively volatile prices are more likely to undergo collusion-sustaining price wars. The predictions are consistent with available empirical evidence.     

The competitive effects of resale versus facility-based entry: evidence from the long-distance market

This paper examines the ability of entry by either resellers or facilities-based carriers to discipline the pricing behavior of a vertically integrated incumbent supplier. Theoretical considerations suggest that, once a sufficient amount of entry has occurred at both vertical stages—transmission and retail functions—additional entry at either stage can push final output toward the competitive level. Under these conditions, entry at either stage may serve as a gross complement or substitute for entry at the other stage. Data from the interLATA telecommunications market are used to test the relevant hypotheses. Our findings are not expected to be directly applicable to the local exchange and electricity markets as those markets are currently constituted. When these industries begin to exhibit structural characteristics that resemble the long-distance market, however, our findings should become relevant there as well.     

工程招投标串通行为研究及其防治建议

文章结合国内外关于串通招投标的研究成果并根据工作中遇到的串通招投标现象,总结了串通招投标的类型及表现形式,并对我国建筑业发展情况进行了统计,分析了串通招投标的原因.文章从提高招投标参与者整体素质、加大执法力度和调整建筑市场结构3个方面,提出了防治串通招投标的几点建议.     

Pricing strategy, quality signaling, and entry deterrence

I investigate a pricing strategy that is aimed at deterring entry by applying a two-period model of a durable-goods monopolist. There exists an incumbent that is of two types, that is, high and low quality types. They differ in terms of their R&D capabilities, and the incumbent's type is assumed to be unknown to an entrant. If the entrant decided to enter the market, Nash–Bertrand price competition ensues between the incumbent and the entrant. I show that not only limit pricing but also prestige pricing signals the incumbent's quality type, which serves to discourage entry. In the prestige pricing, the high-quality type sells the products at an intentionally higher price. I also show that although limit pricing is more desirable than prestige pricing from a social welfare viewpoint, the incumbent can still choose prestige pricing.     

Partial Ownership Arrangements and Collusion in the Automobile Industry

This paper develops a conjectural variation model that allows for partial ownership arrangements and foreign trade. This model is applied to the Japanese and US automobile industries. Although collusion is found to occur in the Japanese automobile industry, it is found to be more competitive than the US automobile industry. The effect imports have on firms' price–cost margins in both countries is also found to be different.     

规制分权化、组织合谋与制度效率--基于中国电力行业的实证研究

产业组织理论中关于规制合谋的研究分为芝加哥学派和图卢兹学派，研究结果均表明，规制机构与被规制企业之间的合谋行为降低了规制效率．降低了社会福利水平。文章主要研究中国当前规制分权化背景下的地方规制机构与被规制企业之间的合谋问题，并且用计量方法对规制的效果进行了检验．结果表明规制分权化没有显著的正面效应，即规制低效率。因此，规制分权化产生的合谋导致了规制低效率．而解决问题的关键是机制设计。     

Bid Roundness Under Collusion in Japanese Procurement Auctions

We analyze the “roundness level” of bids—defined as the number of zeros at the end of the bid—in public procurement auctions for construction works in Okinawa Prefecture, Japan, where a bid-rigging case was filed. We hypothesize that bid rigging increases the roundness of bids through the bid coordination process. Specifically, winners choose round numbers to avoid any miscommunication when they announce their planned bids to other ring members, and losers prefer round numbers when they arbitrarily bid above the winning bid. We find that (1) there is a positive relationship between the roundness of a bid and its relative value as a fraction of the reserve price, (2) the roundness of bids is higher when collusion is active than when it is inactive, (3) among the ring bids, the roundness of the lowest bids is even higher than that of the other bids, and (4) bids by non-ring members are also round when collusion is active.     

建设工程领域工程合谋现象研究综述

建设工程领域存在合谋现象是一个不争的事实.合谋在给项目利益带来损失的同时,也给建筑行业带来了负面的影响.本文对国内外学者目前已开展的有关工程合谋现象的研究进行了梳理,从工程合谋现象的诱因、形成条件、表现形式及合谋参与方态度等视角进行归纳,并就现有研究成果中工程合谋现象的检测与判定,以及针对工程合谋现象的遏制措施进行了介绍.论文在此基础上做出判断——对合谋预防(遏制)机制的评价应是工程合谋问题下一研究重点方向.