分而治之：防范合谋的不对称机制

歧视现象广泛存在于各种类型的组织中，但经济学家一直未能就其合理性做出令人满意的解释。在本文中,我们采用一个简单的锦标赛模型指出了组织中歧视的作用在于有效地防范合谋。我们证明了带有显性歧视的不对称机制优于无歧视的对称机制。进一步地。通过引入委托人对信息的操纵，我们揭示了隐性的歧视机制的作用。并且证明了它优于显性的歧视机制。     

政企合谋视角下的环境污染:理论与实证研究

生态环境问题已经成为影响中国经济可持续发展乃至社会稳定的重要因素。文章从政企合谋的视角,根据企业的逐利性以及地方政府官员对政治利益和经济利益的双重考量,构建了动态博弈模型来刻画导致地方环境污染的内在机制:即在中央和地方政府信息不对称的情形下,企业具有向地方政府行贿以寻求环境规制的放松,从而扩大生产的动机;而地方政府则出于政治和经济两种利益的考虑,均有放松环境规制以帮助企业扩大生产的动机,由此形成企业和地方政府的政企合谋,加剧环境污染。进一步地,文章运用中国28个省份1991-2010年的面板数据,构建了普通面板和空间面板模型加以验证,结果均证实了文章的核心结论:政企合谋将加剧地区环境污染。因此,缓解中国环境污染问题的重要举措之一就是通过监督机构或公众的双重监督,解决中央和地方的信息不对称,防止政企合谋。     

非对称信息下防范合谋的政府采购机制设计

非对称的信息和复杂的委托代理关系使政府采购成为腐败高发的领域之一.如何设计出最优的采购机制,最大限度地防范腐败的发生,实现公共资金的最优使用,这一直是困扰着政策制定者的难题.本文在委托-监督-代理三级组织结构的框架下对这一问题进行了规范的分析,应用防范合谋原理,文中给出了非对称信息下防范合谋的采购机制.在一定程度上,本文的结论为政府选择最佳采购方式、抑制腐败提供了理论依据.     

信息不对称与资产评估中的合谋问题

目前理论界对审计合谋的讨论非常热烈，但对资产评估合谋问题却鲜有专门的研究。大量存在的虚假评估现象预示着我国资产评估中也存有合谋行为。本文从信息不对称的角度，通过分析资产评估中的信息不对称问题与由此而产生的合谋的机会及动机，从理论层面对资产评估合谋的形成进行初步的分析，认为资产评估过程中的信息不对称及由其而带来的舍谋动机与机会使得在某种程度上资产评估合谋成为必然，因此，有必要进一步研究资产评估合谋的控制问题。     

能效认证机制设计与合谋防范

探讨能效认证机制的基本框架及流程设计,运用博弈论构建第三方认证机构和监管者之间的有、无声誉机制下的合谋防范模型,在此基础上分析博弈双方的策略选择。研究结果表明在不对称信息条件下具有激励与惩罚双向功能的声誉机制能减少合谋的收益,提高合谋交易成本,增加不合谋的收益,从而有效治理合谋行为。     

社会医疗保险中"医患合谋"的道德风险问题浅析

"医患合谋"造成了医疗保险资源的过度使用,不仅影响到保险机构对医疗保险业务的开展,而且阻碍了医疗保障制度改革的进行.本文利用委托一代理模型对这一问题进行深入分析,并提出了相应的改革措施.     

大股东和经理人合谋的博弈分析与防范研究

文章通过博弈分析方法探讨了我国公司大股东和经理人合谋的原因。研究表明,我国目前的公司治理环境和治理机制下大股东和经理人易于达成合谋。为了打破这种合谋均衡,必须建立科学完善的防范机制。     

企业内部控制：合谋及其防范对策研究

文章在假设内部控制制度外部设计框架合理有效的前提下（在我国由财政部企业内部控制标准委员会制定）,从我国企业组织内履行或者根据企业特点对内部控制度规范进行适应性改造设计角度出发,着重研究委托人（董事长、经理和总会计师）与监管者（内部审计）之间、代理人（内部控制各项业务或职务执行者）之间、以及代理人与员工之间三层组织内的合谋问题．通过分析模型给出具有价值的防范对策。     

基于审计合谋的监管机制分析

审计作为经济市场的"警察",是防止财务舞弊不可或缺的工具之一.然而,近年来我国注册会计师与上市公司的审计合谋使审计逐渐丧失了其原有作用.自2007年1月1日起,我国实行了新企业会计准则,以及相应的新审计准则,新准则的技术难度加大,影响范围广泛,成为审计工作者以及监管机构的一大挑战.本文首先解释了审计合谋的现状,回顾了审计合谋监管问题的研究文献,然后对上市公司、注册会计师以及政府监管机构的行为分析,建立了两阶段动态博弈模型,且在监管过程中引入了信誉机制,利用三方既得利益的比较,得出影响审计质量的关键因素,最后参照英美等国的监管模式,试图找寻在新准则制度下降低审计合谋的监管策略.     

民事法对市场信息不对称的防范

消除信息不对称所造成的“逆选择”、“道德风险”等市场失灵问题,关系市场体系的稳定及效率。平权的民事法律所建构的财产权、契约权、现代公司和知识产权等方面的具体法律制度在缓解市场信息不对策的过程中发挥了重要作用。当然,这种缓解是初步的,它需要政府及非平权的政治法的进上步规制。     

OPTIMAL POLICY FOR PRODUCT R&D WITH ENDOGENOUS QUALITY ORDERING: ASYMMETRIC DUOPOLY*

We examine the optimal R&D subsidy/tax policy under a vertically differentiated duopoly. In a significant departure from the existing work, we consider the case of asymmetric costs of product R&D where there is a small technology gap between firms. In our analysis, the endogeneity of quality ordering is explicitly taken into account. We demonstrate the possible anti‐leapfrogging effect of R&D subsidy/tax policy. By committing to a firm‐specific subsidy schedule contingent on firms’ quality choices, the government can not only correct distortions in product quality but also select the socially preferred equilibrium. The latter role is fulfilled by preventing the technologically inferior firm from becoming a quality leader in the industry. Both Bertrand and Cournot cases are analysed.     

PRICE AND QUANTITY COMPETITION WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS IN A MIXED DUOPOLY: A TECHNICAL NOTE

We consider a mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities when the public firm is less efficient than the private firm. Thus, even with cost asymmetry, we obtain exactly the same result (i.e., Bertrand competition) of Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) if Singh and Vives’ (1984) assumption of positive primary outputs holds. However, compared to endogenous determination of the type of contract without cost asymmetry, our main finding is that in the wider range of cost asymmetry, different type(s) of equilibrium related to or not related to the limit‐pricing strategy of the private firm can be sustained. Thus, when considering an implication on privatization, we may overestimate the welfare gain of privatization because Cournot competition takes place after privatization even though cost asymmetry exists between firms. While the result of Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) holds true if the goods are complements, we find the novel results in the case of substitutes.     

ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION: WITH APPLICATION TO AUSTRALIA*

This paper presents a general framework for defining the economies of scale in household consumption. It allows commodity specific economies of scale (taking into account the substitution effects). The chief contribution of the paper is to show how one can estimate economies of scale from cross section budget data without price information. The problem of identification that is inherent in these models is overcome by making use of some assumptions about the nature of goods and services employed in the estimation. The methodology developed in the paper is applied to Australian Household Expenditure Survey for 1984 to calculate item wise and overall economies of scale.     

RIDGE ESTIMATORS FOR PROBIT REGRESSION: WITH AN APPLICATION TO LABOUR MARKET DATA

In this paper we propose ridge regression estimators for probit models since the commonly applied maximum likelihood (ML) method is sensitive to multicollinearity. An extensive Monte Carlo study is conducted where the performance of the ML method and the probit ridge regression (PRR) is investigated when the data are collinear. In the simulation study we evaluate a number of methods of estimating the ridge parameter k that have recently been developed for use in linear regression analysis. The results from the simulation study show that there is at least one group of the estimators of k that regularly has a lower mean squared error than the ML method for all different situations that have been evaluated. Finally, we show the benefit of the new method using the classical Dehejia and Wahba dataset which is based on a labour market experiment.     

轮流拍卖在公共资源配置中的应用-兼与讨价还价模型比较

该文提出了一种将轮流拍卖应用于公共资源配置的机制.通过让最低标价的成员最先使用公共资源这样一种简单的配置办法,该文提出的新机制鼓励更有耐性的成员选择等待而得到更高回报,相对于平均分配和随机分配(抽签),可以明显地提高资源的配置效率.该文还比较了在不同的环境参数下,第一价格拍卖规则和第二价格拍卖规则的有效性和适用性问题.这些结论同时也为特定环境下讨价还价和拍卖的比较提供一个研究思路.