Valuation of defaultable bonds and debt restructuring

In this paper we develop a contingent valuation model for zero-coupon bonds with default. In order to emphasize the role of maturity time and place of the lender's claim in a firm's debt hierarchy, we consider a firm that issues two bonds with different maturities and different seniorage. The model allows us to analyze the implications of both debt renegotiation and capital structure of a firm on the prices of bonds. We obtain that renegotiation brings about a significant change in the bond prices and that the effect is dispersed through various channels: increasing the value of the firm, reallocating payments, and avoiding costly liquidation. Moreover, the presence of two creditors leads to qualitatively different implications for pricing, while emphasizing the importance of bond covenants and renegotiation of the entire debt.     

Non-performing loans, prospective bailouts, and Japan's slowdown

The delay in the government bailout of the financial sector played a key role in Japan's slowdown during the 1990s and early 2000s. This argument is articulated in a general equilibrium model in which the government provides deposit insurance to the financial sector. The existence of non-performing loans, combined with a delay in the bailout, leads to a persistent decline in economic activity. Consistent with Japan's experience, the decline in output is caused not only by a fall in investment, but also by a decline in labor and total factor productivity.     

对企业债券和企业负债率关系的重新认识

我国企业以及一些监管部门普遍把企业债券仅仅当成一种债务,这种观念导致了我国严重的"重股票融资、轻债券融资"现象。本文通过对企业债券与企业资产负债率关系的重新梳理,指出我国企业传统理财观念上的错误,并引入"企业的资产流动负债率"重新考察企业债券与企业资产负债率的关系,希望以此推进我国债券市场的发展。     

Savings bonds,retractable bonds and callable bonds

Savings bonds, retractable bonds and callable bonds are each equivalent to a straight bond with an option. Neglecting default risk the value of these contingent claims depends upon the riskless interest rate. This paper employs the option pricing framework to value these bonds, under the assumptions that the interest rate follows a Gauss-Wiener process and that the pure expectations hypothesis holds.     

Conservative financial reporting, debt covenants, and the agency costs of debt

Considerable research has documented the role of debt covenants and conservative financial accounting in addressing agency conflicts between lenders and borrowers. Beatty, A., Weber, J., and Yu, J. [2008. Conservatism and debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming] document interesting, but mixed, findings on the relation between debt covenants and conservative accounting, and the extent to which the two contracting mechanisms act as substitutes or complements. In this paper, I discuss the economic roles of financial reporting, debt covenants, and conservatism within the debt contracting environment, and attempt to fit BWY's findings within this context.     

Transferability, finality, and debt settlement

Payment, fundamental to exchange in a decentralized economy, often takes the form of transfers of inside money, i.e., specialized forms of debt. Associated with each type of inside money is a set of rules that governs both the legitimacy of such transfers as means of extinguishing other debts, and the allocation of the ensuing risks.In this paper we develop a model of debt as inside money. In a simple mechanism design framework we show that transferable debt that can be used to settle other debt obligations with finality can be a welfare improving arrangement in the presence of limited enforcement powers. Transferable debt has two advantages over simple chains of credit: it allows for removal of less-than-perfectly reliable agents from the chain in a timely fashion, and it allows agents to direct payments to the proper party without direct communication with other members of the credit chain.     

Investment incentives,debt, and warrants

This paper models and characterizes investment incentive problems associated with debt financing. The decision problem of residual claimants is explicity formulated and their investment policies are characterized. The paper also analyzes the use of conversion features and warrants to control distortionary incentives. These claims reverse the convex shape of levered equity over the upper range of the firm's earnings, and this mitigates the incentive to take risk. It is shown that, under certain conditions, such claims can be constructed to restore net present value maximizing incentives and simultaneously meet the financing requirements of the firm.     

Inside debt renegotiation: Optimal debt reduction,timing, and the number of rounds

This paper develops a model of debt renegotiation in a structural framework that accounts for taxes, bankruptcy costs and renegotiation costs. To our knowledge, all the previous work on debt renegotiation implies an infinite number of renegotiations. This feature preempts the analysis of the optimal number of renegotiations. We address this drawback by incorporating fixed renegotiation costs in a model of multiple renegotiations, hence obtaining a small finite number of renegotiations. Simple analytical formulae are derived for debt and equity, as well as implicit formulae for the coupon reduction, as a result of a backward recursive technique. The results show that the optimal number of renegotiations, the size and the dynamics of the coupon reductions depend critically on the bargaining power of the claimants. Testable empirical implications regarding multiple costly renegotiations are drawn.     

Criminals,bankruptcy, and cost of debt

Review of Accounting Studies - We examine whether criminal records of CEOs and rank-and-file employees are associated with firms’ likelihood of bankruptcy, and whether lenders adjust their...     

Managerial conservatism, project choice, and debt

We show that the incentive for managers to build their reputationsdistorts firms' investment policies in favor of relatively safeprojects, thereby aligning managers' interests with those ofbondholders, even though managers are hired and fired by shareholders.Tbis effect opposes the familiar agency problem of risky debtthat is imperfectly covenant-protected, wherein shareholdersare tempted to favor excessively risk projects in order to expropriatebondholders. Consequently, when managerial concern for reputationresults in conservatism, it can actually make shareholders betteroff ex ante by allowing the firm to issue more debt. We examinehow the optimal choice of leverage from the shareholders' standpointis influenced by takeover activity, and how the adoption ofantitakeover measures affects a firm's investment policy andleverage choice.     

Common (stock) sense about risk-shifting and bank bailouts

If a bank is facing insolvency, it will be tempted to reject good loans and accept bad loans so as to shift risk onto its creditors. We analyze the effectiveness of buying up toxic mortgages in troubled banks, buying preferred stock, and buying common stock. If bailing out banks deemed “too big to fail” involves buying assets at above fair market values, then these banks are encouraged ex ante to gamble on bad assets. Buying up common (preferred) stock is always the most (least) ex ante- and ex post-efficient type of capital infusion, regardless of whether the bank volunteers for the recapitalization.     

提升债务本币化程度 完善我国外债管理

外债作为对境外资金利用的一种形式,一定程度上是国家综合实力和经济承受力的体现。从别国本币外债的发展趋势看,发达经济体本币外债占比一直较高,新兴经济体近年来普遍呈上升态势。发展本币外债的主要动因,在于其能消除货币错配风险、规避汇率风险以及便利本币跨境使用等。随着人民币跨境使用需求的增长,人民币外债类型和规模将逐渐增多,建议按照国际标准建立统一的全口径外债统计体系等方式,完善我国本外币外债管理。     

Leverage change,debt overhang,and stock prices

We document a significant and negative effect of the change in a firm's leverage ratio on its stock prices. We find that the negative effect is stronger for firms that have higher leverage ratios, higher likelihood of default, and face more severe financial constraints. Moreover, firms with an increase in leverage ratio tend to have less future investment. These findings are consistent with Myers' (1977) debt overhang theory that an increase in leverage may lead to future underinvestment, thus reducing a firm's value.     

Risky debt,jump processes,and safety covenants

The usual assumptions in the continuous-time contingent claims pricing of risky debt are (1) the firm is in default only when the value of its remaining assets falls short of the currently due promised payment and (2) the firm value follows continuous diffusion-process dynamics. It is the joint relaxation of these two simplifying assumptions that motivate this paper in its study of the valuation of risky debt and safety covenants when the firm value follows (possibly) discontinuous sample paths. Explicit solutions are derived and compared to the work of Black and Cox (1976).     

Modelling multiple term structures of defaultable bonds with common and idiosyncratic state variables

In this paper we develop a multi-factor “reduced-form” model that is general enough to capture simultaneously the dynamics of multiple term structures of corporate bonds, each with a different credit rating. In this way, we are able to fully incorporate a number of “stylised facts”, reported on a number of previous empirical studies. More specifically, we are able to estimate the different degrees of covariation between the term structure of each credit rating and the default-free yield curve. Furthermore, we report the differing sensitivities of the credit curves to a number of observable macro-factors that reflect changes in credit conditions, both domestic and international. Finally, the dependence of each credit curve on a number of idiosyncratic state-variables is also documented. Our results are based on two special cases of the model, estimated using US and UK corporate bond data.     

Dynamic capital structure with callable debt and debt renegotiations

We consider a dynamic trade-off model of a firm's capital structure with debt renegotiation. Debt holders only accept restructuring offers from equity holders backed by threats which are in the equity holders' own interest to execute. Our model shows that in a complete information model in which taxes and bankruptcy costs are the only frictions, violations of the absolute priority rule (APR) are typically optimal. The size of the bankruptcy costs and the equity holders' bargaining power affect the size of APR violations, but they have only a minor impact on the choice of capital structure.     

Asset commonality,debt maturity and systemic risk

We develop a model in which asset commonality and short-term debt of banks interact to generate excessive systemic risk. Banks swap assets to diversify their individual risk. Two asset structures arise. In a clustered structure, groups of banks hold common asset portfolios and default together. In an unclustered structure, defaults are more dispersed. Portfolio quality of individual banks is opaque but can be inferred by creditors from aggregate signals about bank solvency. When bank debt is short-term, creditors do not roll over in response to adverse signals and all banks are inefficiently liquidated. This information contagion is more likely under clustered asset structures. In contrast, when bank debt is long-term, welfare is the same under both asset structures.     

美债:历史、现实与前景

2011年注定是风雨变幻的一年,而美债危机所掀起的海啸无疑是重大事件。美债发展到今天似乎成了一种"恶",是一种不安定因素。然而,历史上的美债是被美国政治家掌控的金融战略,不断演绎着会借债、敢借债、兴于国债的历史,乃至形成美国特有的生存与发展的金融方式,请看本栏目文章《追溯美国国     

Mortgage risks,debt literacy and financial advice

A limited understanding of mortgage contracts and the risks involved may have contributed to the outbreak of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. We developed a special questionnaire relating mortgage loan decisions to financial knowledge and financial advice. Our results demonstrate that homeowners appear to be well aware of mortgage risks. Large loans relative to home value are perceived as riskier, as are loans with large mortgage payments relative to income and loans linked to investment vehicles. Homeowners with riskier mortgages indicated that they could encounter financial problems should house prices or their income decline. Homeowners with relatively low debt literacy are more likely to take out traditional mortgages with principal repayments over the maturity of the loan. Riskier mortgages are more prevalent among homeowners with a better understanding of loan contracts. Financially less sophisticated homeowners consulting mortgage brokers, too, hold riskier mortgages.