Size, spillovers and soft budget constraints

There is much evidence against the so-called “too big to fail” hypothesis in the case of bailouts to subnational governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce socially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by inducing direct financing. We show that the ability and willingness of a district to induce a bailout and district size are negatively correlated. Furthermore, we argue that these policies can be equilibrium strategies.     

IMF bailouts, contagion effects, and bank security returns

The Asian financial crisis that started in mid-1997 led to the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) bailout of three previously high growth economies: Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea. Using data for 114 large banks from 16 countries worldwide, we study the impact of the IMF bailout announcements on bank security returns. The announcement that the IMF will provide a rescue package for a country has a positive impact on domestic bank stock prices in the countries receiving the bailouts, which supports the view that these bailouts help ameliorate systemic risk. Our results show that banks in the nonbailout countries generally experience either insignificant or negative abnormal returns, which is contrary to the view of opponents of IMF bailouts, who argue that these bailouts lead to moral hazard among international banks. Our results support the view that the reaction of investors differs from bank to bank, but consistent with the contagion and the heterogeneous creditor hypotheses, banks' stock price reactions are not proportional to their loan exposure.     

Determinants of sub-sovereign bond yield spreads – The role of fiscal fundamentals and federal bailout expectations

This paper investigates how bailout expectations affect the extent to which yield spreads for bonds issued by sub-sovereign entities within fiscal federations price in fundamentals related to default risk. The question is analysed both across and within federations using a novel dataset for sub-sovereign governments that includes Australian states, Canadian provinces, Swiss cantons, German Länder, US states, Spanish communities, and Indian states. The paper finds that sub-sovereign debt and deficit levels relative to GDP are important drivers of sub-sovereign spreads. However, the weight assigned by financial markets to fundamentals when pricing sub-sovereign bonds is reduced when the institutional set-up of the federation allows for bailouts. Moreover, within federations, the market’s expectation of a federal bailout and the capacity of the federal government to provide support to the weaker members of the federation similarly affect the extent to which fundamental factors are priced into spreads. The paper shows that the positive link between debt and risk premia tends to break down when sub-sovereign government debt rises above certain thresholds. This could reflect the market’s expectation of a federal bailout as fundamentals deteriorate. Additionally, larger sub-sovereign entities tend to pay higher premia as fundamentals worsen which could be linked to the limited capacity of the federal government to provide support as the size of the expected bailout increases. A pattern of rising risk premia as fundamentals worsen is also found for sub-sovereign entities when the central government faces borrowing constraints.     

违约与杠杆周期——一个带有救助的金融加速器模型

我国为应对2008年国际金融危机的冲击采取了一系列经济刺激政策,在发挥"稳增长"作用的同时,也在一定程度上导致我国企业部门杠杆水平快速上升,但与此同时,不良贷款率并没有随企业部门杠杆的上升而显著增加。为了解释企业部门违约与杠杆的周期特征,本文在金融加速器模型(Bernanke et al.,1999)基础上,引入政府对企业部门的违约救助机制,建立DSGE模型进行讨论。进一步地,本文还通过一个不合意的去杠杆政策试验表明,忽略资产价格稳定(或者说金融稳定)前提下的去杠杆政策,反而会使企业部门的杠杆和违约率同时上升到一个较高水平。最后,引入一个盯住预期资产价格的动态救助规则能够发挥稳定经济的作用,并提高社会福利水平。     

Bailouts in a Federation

The recent move towards decentralization in countries such as Spain, Hungary, and South Africa and the difficulties that central governments have had in dealing with fiscal irresponsibility on the part of regional governments in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and India has made the study of transfer systems one of the most important areas of research in federalism today. A model of a federation is developed in which regional governments act as Nash competitors with each other but are first-movers in a Stackelberg game with the central government. The central government finds that it will maximize its expected votes by increasing transfers as regions borrow. This bail out of regional governments creates a regional soft budget constraint and results in two incentive effects, a common pool effect on tax payments and an opportunity cost effect. The soft budget constraint lowers the opportunity cost of borrowing for the region, but also increases the tax-cost since a portion of the borrowing must be paid for through increased taxes. The common property problem associated with tax payments implies that the increased tax cost must be less than the decrease in the opportunity cost (leading to excessive borrowing) unless the central government increases grants to other regions when it institutes a bailout. Somewhat surprisingly, in the latter case the additional increased taxes may increase costs enough to offset the lower opportunity cost resulting from the bailout, leading to efficient borrowing decisions as in the case of a hard budget constraint. The results are also useful for understanding the empirical estimation of soft budget constraints.     

Bailing out conflicted sovereigns

How should sovereign bailouts take account of the effects bailouts have on policy reforms? Conflicted recipient governments complicate bailout choices because some reforms that spur growth reduce rents that benefit government decision makers. Our model takes account of whether bailout generosity and policy reforms are strategic substitutes, strategic complements or both, and each case implies a different optimal bailout contract, which generally cannot achieve First Best. Conditional forgiveness of some loan payments when economic outcomes are sufficiently favorable can achieve outcomes closer to First Best, and this is so for a small ex ante amount of the bailout subsidy.     

Observing bailout expectations during a total eclipse of the sun

The literature has not reached a consensus yet regarding the existence of sovereign creditor moral hazard. Exploiting an exceptional historical example, this paper proposes an original method to address this issue. As the corona which is observable only during a total eclipse of the sun, market-specific prices of repudiated bonds are observable only when extreme conditions segment the markets. Such very rare events allow for isolating pure country-specific bailout expectations. The paper shows that bailouts do create creditor moral hazard. Based on an impulse response analysis, the econometric results further emphasize the influence of bailout expectations in sovereign bonds valuation.     

Bank bailouts and economic growth: Evidence from cross-country,cross-industry data

In this paper, we revisit the question of how bank bailouts affect economic growth. We adopt a broad concept of bailouts, which includes both capital injections and liquidity support to the banking system. We employ an identification strategy that controls for the various dimensions of bailout endogeneity and find that liquidity support has a significant positive real economic effect. The effect of recapitalizations per se is not statistically significant, but they reinforce the positive impact of liquidity interventions. Utilizing bank-level data, we provide evidence that this is the case because better-capitalized banks and banks in significantly recapitalized systems have a higher propensity to lend, thus raising aggregate-level real economic growth.     

The effects of corporate bailout on firm performance: International evidence

Not all corporate bailouts are the same. We study corporate bailouts from around the world during 1987–2005. Among these bailed-out firms, some firms are economically distressed while others are financially distressed. Some firms are bailed out with cash (either as equity or as loans) while others are bailed out with debt relief. Some firms are bailed out by the government while others are bailed out by other stakeholders. We examine these firms’ operating performance before and after their bailouts, but specifically across different bailout types, and we also measure their stock returns surrounding their bailout announcements.     

Can European bank bailouts work?

Cross-border banking needs cross-border recapitalisation mechanisms. Each mechanism, however, suffers from the financial trilemma, which is that cross-border banking, national financial autonomy and financial stability are incompatible. In this paper, we study the efficiency of different burden-sharing agreements for the recapitalisation of the 30 largest banks in Europe. We consider bank bailouts for these banks in a simulation framework with stochastic country-specific bailout benefits. Among the burden sharing rules, we find that the majority and qualified-majority voting rules come close to the efficiency of a bailout mechanism with a supranational authority. Even a unanimous voting rule works better than home-country bailouts, which are very inefficient. If we assume additional systemic risk benefits, the efficiency of burden sharing rules comes close to the supranational solution.     

Taxpayer resistance,guarantee uncertainty,and housing finance subsidies

In the absence of external guarantees, a private firm's debt trades in the market at rates reflective of its private default risk. Not all firms go it alone, however. There are entities, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), whose debt obligations enjoy federal guarantees. Federal guarantees affect housing finance indirectly in that they tend to enhance the creditworthiness of the debt obligations of the housing intermediary which lessens the debtholder's exposure to default. The market investor then becomes a willing buyer of GSE debt at a lower (subsidized) rate as a result of the government guarantee.Due to the fact that the subsidy rests on the presumption that the GSE debt will be bailed out by the government it can be seen that the subsidy in turn rests upon the presumption by the GSE debtholder that the taxpayers will honor the guarantee in the event of a GSE default. Hence, government subsidies to the housing intermediaries rest not on ongoing government outlays but rather on the confidence that the taxpayers will be willing, if called upon, to cover GSE losses, i.e., the confidence of a bailout.This article analyzes the effects on the GSE subsidy and on the taxpayer, if the debt markets charge for bailout risk. Bailout risk pricing is an economic event. When debtholders seek to protect themselves by pricing for bailout risk, this increases GSE borrowing costs and cuts into both GSE borrowers' subsidies and stockholder earnings. Higher borrowing costs leave the GSE in a weakened condition and increase the ex ante bailout cost to the taxpayer. When bailout risk premiums become priced by the market, it substantially lessens the government's ability to subsidize housing finance or other GSE activities.     

Does gender diversity on banks' boards matter? Evidence from public bailouts

We are the first to examine the impact of gender diversity on banks' boards on the probability and size of public bailouts. Our findings, based on a sample of listed European banks over the period 2005–2017, suggest that banks with more gender-diverse boards are less likely to receive a public bailout and receive a lower amount of bailout funds as a percentage of total assets than banks with less gender-diverse boards. Specifically, an increase by one standard deviation in gender diversity decreases the probability of a bailout by at least 2.44%, a significant reduction considering that the unconditional probability is 18.7%. Gender diversity is also positively related to bank performance, as proxied by ROA and Tobin's Q and with dividend payout ratios, consistent with the hypothesis that female directors are better monitors than male directors. These results are robust to a variety of econometric approaches and provide support for recent reforms in several EU countries regarding gender quotas.     

Supply and Demand Effects of Bank Bailouts: Depositors Need Not Apply and Need Not Run

We address two key issues concerning bank bailout effects on depositor and bank behavior. The first is whether bailouts weaken or strengthen market discipline by depositors through deposit supplies. The second is if bailed-out banks decrease or increase their deposit demands. These questions can only be adequately addressed by analyzing the effects of bailouts on both deposit quantities and prices. We do so for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) bailouts. Overall, we find that demand changes empirically dominate supply changes, and suggest significantly reduced deposit demand from bailouts. In some cases, however, supply changes dominate and indicate weakened market discipline.     

Financial Networks: Contagion, Commitment, and Private Sector Bailouts

I develop a model of financial networks in which linkages not only spread contagion, but also induce private sector bailouts, where liquid banks bail out illiquid banks because of the threat of contagion. Introducing this bailout possibility, I show that linkages may be optimal ex ante because they allow banks to obtain some mutual insurance even though formal commitments are impossible. However, in some cases (e.g., when liquidity is concentrated among a small group of banks), the whole network may collapse. I also characterize the optimal network size and apply the results to joint liability arrangements and payment systems.     

The association of departures from spending rate equilibrium to municipal borrowing cost

The U.S. municipal bond market has grown dramatically in recent decades. Debt financing has become a more important source of capital for municipalities, yet research into the association of fiscal management and borrowing cost has not been directly addressed since before GASB's formation in 1984. We attempt to fill this void and contribute to the dialog concerning municipal managerial competence and its association with borrowing cost by studying a sample of 3285 county general obligation bonds over a 13-year period. We resolve conflicting and counterintuitive results in prior work and demonstrate that the lowest borrowing cost is achieved where general fund revenues equal general fund expenditures (i.e., equilibrium spending rate). Further, we find that the association between spending rate and borrowing cost is nonmonotonic, nonlinear, and asymmetric. We demonstrate that maintenance of a spending rate equilibrium point may be a way of achieving minimum borrowing cost. In the context of fiscal constraints and the increased reliance on credit markets by municipalities, managing to the spending rate equilibrium may reduce the borrowing costs of providing municipal services.     

Credit spread interdependencies of European states and banks during the financial crisis

We investigate the interdependence of the default risk of several Eurozone countries (France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and their domestic banks during the period between June 2007 and May 2010, using daily credit default swaps (CDS). Bank bailout programs changed the composition of both banks’ and sovereign balance sheets and, moreover, affected the linkage between the default risk of governments and their local banks. Our main findings suggest that in the period before bank bailouts the contagion disperses from bank credit spreads into the sovereign CDS market. After bailouts, a financial sector shock affects sovereign CDS spreads more strongly in the short run. However, the impact becomes insignificant in the long term. Furthermore, government CDS spreads become an important determinant of banks’ CDS series. The interdependence of government and bank credit risk is heterogeneous across countries, but homogeneous within the same country.     

Fiscal Rules and Government Financing Costs

This paper assesses the effect of fiscal rules on sovereign bond spreads over the short and medium term, for 34 advanced countries and 19 emerging market economies, over the period 1980–2016. Our results, based on impulse response functions, show that the dynamic impact of fiscal rules on sovereign yield spreads is negative and statistically significant, at around 1.2–1.8 percentage points, implying lower government borrowing costs. This result stems essentially from the advanced economies subsample. We also find that more fiscally responsible countries are the ones for which a fiscal rule reduces the government's borrowing costs. Moreover, in times of recession, a fiscal rule leads financial markets to reduce the risk premiums on government bonds. Finally, when it comes to design features of fiscal rules, independent monitoring of compliance to the rule, done outside government, also reduces sovereign spreads.     

House prices, consumption, and monetary policy: a financial accelerator approach

We consider a general equilibrium model with frictions in credit markets used by households. In our economy, houses provide housing services to consumers and serve as collateral to lower borrowing cost. We show that this amplifies and propagates the effect of monetary policy shocks on housing investment, house prices and consumption. We also consider the effect of a structural change in credit markets that lowers the transaction costs of additional borrowing against housing equity. We show that such a change would increase the effect of monetary policy shocks on consumption, but would decrease the effect on house prices and housing investment.     

Contagion during the Greek sovereign debt crisis

We examine the impact of news about Greece and news about a Greek bailout on bank stock prices in 2010 using data for 48 European banks. We identify the twenty days with extreme returns on Greek sovereign bonds and categorise the news events during those days into news about Greece and news about the prospects of a Greek bailout. We find that, except for Greek banks, news about Greece does not lead to abnormal returns while news about a bailout does, even for banks without any exposure to Greece or other highly indebted euro countries. This finding suggests that markets consider news about the bailout to be a signal of European governments' willingness in general to use public funds to combat the financial crisis. Sovereign bond prices of Portugal, Ireland, and Spain respond to both news about Greece and news about a Greek bailout.     

A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk

We model a loop between sovereign and bank credit risk. A distressed financial sector induces government bailouts, whose cost increases sovereign credit risk. Increased sovereign credit risk in turn weakens the financial sector by eroding the value of its government guarantees and bond holdings. Using credit default swap (CDS) rates on European sovereigns and banks, we show that bailouts triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk in 2008. We document that post‐bailout changes in sovereign CDS explain changes in bank CDS even after controlling for aggregate and bank‐level determinants of credit spreads, confirming the sovereign‐bank loop.