Fiscal rules, budget deficits and budget projections

Fiscal rules are mentioned as instruments to commit political actors on long-term fiscal sustainability. However, fiscal rules may have stronger effects on projected than on realized fiscal outcomes because of window-dressing measures or because they alter the bargaining situation in the budget process. In our analysis for Swiss cantons, fiscal rules significantly lower the probability of projected and realized deficits with the former effect being twice as large. Projections are generally over-pessimistic but fiscal rules increase the probability of accurate projections. Thus, fiscal rules seem to substitute for finance ministers’ over-pessimistic projections intended to reign in fellow ministers and legislatures (100 words).     

Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies

Like other recent studies, we find a political deficit cycle in a large cross-section of countries, but show that this result is driven by the experience of “new democracies”. The political budget cycle in new democracies accounts for the finding of a budget cycle in larger samples that include these countries and disappears when they are removed from the larger sample. The political deficit cycle in new democracies accounts for findings in both developed and less developed economies, for the stronger cycle in weaker democracies, and for differences in the political cycle across governmental and electoral systems. Our findings may reconcile two contradictory views of pre-electoral manipulation, one that it is a useful instrument to gain voter support and a widespread empirical phenomenon, the other that voters punish rather than reward fiscal manipulation.     

Unraveling the political budget cycle nexus in Greece

This paper studies whether the Greek budget deficit is systematically affected by changes of government in the context of two political parties alternating in office. We advance the existing literature by constructing a tax evasion variable specific to the Greek economy and incorporating into our models. Testing the impact of each party upon the budget deficit during election and non-election years in the presence of tax evasion, we find a strong and persistent relationship between them independently of party political ideology. We assert that our finding constitutes a stylized fact of the Greek drama. Our results suggest that tax evasion together with the incident of two political parties alternating in office have tended to exacerbate the Greek government budget deficit accounting for about half the variation in it over the period examined. Moreover, GDP growth is found to exert a mitigating and permanent effect on budget deficit fluctuation.     

GDP manipulation,political incentives,and earnings management

Political decisions often affect macroeconomic activity, which triggers effects on corporate decisions. Using satellite night light data to proxy for economic activity, we show that manipulation of GDP figures is associated with earnings management by local companies, especially when local politicians face more promotion pressure. We show that local politicians seeking career advancement exchange favors with local companies and pressure them to inflate earnings to increase local GDP numbers. Our findings illustrate how the macro-level political agenda and GDP manipulation can affect micro-level corporate earnings management.     

Fiscal severity and the choice of budget gap closing strategies

The great recession of 2008 forced US local governments to pursue a series of measures to maintain a balanced budget. The authors investigated local governments’ response to the great recession with a focus on Florida, where a crash in the housing market led to a severe erosion of the property tax base. Following the classic cutback management theory, the authors examine how the severity of fiscal stress affected the choice of budget-balancing strategies by Florida’s local governments. The severity of fiscal stress was found to affect not only the number of budget gap closing strategies but also the pattern of adoption of these strategies consistent with the administrative response model.     

Fiscal incentives,financial support for agriculture,and urban-rural inequality

Urban-rural inequality is a significant social problem for developing countries in the process of economic development. Using regional-level panel data from 2004 to 2018, this paper estimates the effect of financial support for agriculture on the urban-rural income gap in China via a staggered difference-in-difference method. In 2009, the finance department issued a Notice on Launching the Pilot Work of Incremental Reward for Agricultural Loans by County Financial Institutions (IRAL) and established an incentive mechanism to leverage financial funds to guide and motivate county financial institutions to increase their investment in agriculture-related credit and support agricultural development. The results show that, through fiscal incentives, financial institutions have more incentives to increase agricultural loans and urban-rural income inequality significantly declined throughout the study data period, particularly in underdeveloped areas. We propose that this policy reduces urban-rural income inequality via three mechanisms: financial availability, shift of labor, and human capital. Furthermore, we also examined the effect of IRAL on the urban-rural consumption inequality, although no significant relationship was found.     

Fiscal incentives, corporate structure and financial aspects of treasury management operations

This paper presents evidence that tax policy affects corporate structure and intra-group financial flows, using a data base of Irish registered firms. How MNC's corporate structure and financial flows react to tax policy is complex. Fiscal incentives play a key role in Irish industrial policy. The paper examines certain financial characteristics of financial subsidiaries (those managing group treasury functions) in Ireland. These characteristics are a tax haven connection, high ratios of revenues to pre-tax profits (in some cases greater than 100%), high intra-group borrowing or lending, large gross assets (in excess of €500 million) and low or zero employment. While these firms pay corporation tax in Ireland (at reduced rates), there is considerable loss to other exchequers. The paper concludes that such tax haven type activities are unlikely to remain a viable part of future industrial policy in Ireland.     

对我国财政风险及化解对策的探讨

财政风险可分为显性财政风险和隐性财政风险.显性财政风险主要指债务风险,隐性风险主要指金融风险、社会保障资金缺口对财政造成的风险、各类的"准国债"的规模失控造成的风险、县和乡财政赤字逐年增加及大量欠发工资造成的潜在财政风险.为此,应发展经济,振兴财政;加强国债资金的管理,提高国债的使用效益;统一政府财政权;积极稳妥地推行债传股改革;加快社会保障制度的改革;积极推进政治体制的改革,转变政府职能.     

中国的财政宏观调控

财政宏观调控是指国家利用财政政策来调节经济,目的是保证国民经济的稳定增长.财政政策是指财政收入政策和财政支出政策.财政收支政策是通过财政收支的制度安排来贯彻的.财政宏现调控的基本原理是:以市场经济为基础,通过财政收支政策的变动来调节总需求,解决宏观经济中的主要问题.     

政府间财力分配与中国地方财政能力的差异

近些年来,我国地方财政能力的差异呈现不断扩大的趋势。财政分权改革过程中政府间财力分配体制设计的缺陷,是导致我国地方财政能力差异扩大的体制性原因。本文从中国政府间财力分配的两次过程,来分析这一制度对地方财政能力差异的影响,并对如何完善我国政府间财力分配体制、缩小地方财力差异提出对策建议。     

Bank lending incentives and firm investment decisions in China

This study investigates whether and how banks’ lending incentives influence firms’ investment behaviors in China. First, empirical results show that loans granted to politically connected firms are less influenced by those firms’ profitability and tangibility. Second, political connection is a violation factor in debt markets, and our study finds that firms with political ties invest less efficiently than firms without political ties when they can access abnormal debt. Finally, we find that regional development with regard to market development and government quality improvement reduces the negative impact of politically connected lending on firms’ investment efficiency.     

Fiscal Decentralisation and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from a Fiscal Reform in China

This paper uses a fiscal decentralisation reform in China – namely, the province‐managing‐county (PMC) reform – to examine the effects of fiscal decentralisation on local economic growth. The PMC reform abolished the subordinate fiscal relationship between prefectures and counties and transferred much of the tax and spending authority from the prefecture to the county level. Exploiting a county‐level panel data set over 2001–11, we find that the reform has led to a significant increase in the GDP growth rate. The effect is considerably more pronounced in regions with superior initial institutional quality. We also identify channels: the PMC reform induced county governments to exert lower tax burdens on firms and increase spending on infrastructure construction.     

Bank political connections and performance in China

We examine the effects of bank’s political connection on bank performance and risk in China. We use hand-collected information on CEOs’ professional background to identify their political affiliations, and find that banks whose CEOs have former government experiences have higher return on assets, lower default risk, and lower credit risk. Additionally, politically connected banks have disproportionally higher performance when the CEOs previous worked in the same city where the current bank’s headquarter locates, had past banking experiences, spend more on entertainment and travel costs, and have higher previous administrative rankings (e.g., at the provincial or state level). These results suggest that politically connected banks have better access to lending to politically connected firms, which are high yield assets and more likely to be bailed out when in distress. Our results offer a mechanism of political rent seeking, consistent with the institutional environment of China’s banking and political system.     

美国财政悬崖及对我国的影响

近日,关于美国"财政悬崖"的消息遍布各大媒体,根据美国国会预算办公室(CBO)的最新估计,财政悬崖可能拖累2013财年(2012年10月1日至2013年9月30日)美国实际GDP增长约0.5个百分点,将严重冲击美国经济复苏,2013年四季度美国失业率将超过9%。欧债危机还在继续发酵,如果美国又陷入衰退,必定会对东亚生产网络带来更大冲击,中国及其他新兴市场国家的出口将更加乏力。实际上,最新的海关数据已经表现出市场的担忧:2012年11月,我国出口同比仅增长2.9%,远低于1～10月11.6%的出口增长率。且11月我国对美国出口增长一2.6%,是鲜有的负增长,远低于10月的11%。尽管我国11月的宏观数据     

我国财政透明度的度量及改进策略

财政透明度主要是指政府向公众公开政府的结构与职能、财政政策目标、公共部门账户、财政筹划和预算信息的程度。国际货币基金组织对财政透明度有四个方面的要求，即政府应当明确其职能和责任范围、必须全面公开财政信息、合理公开其预算编制和决策程序和提供真实的财政数据。对照这些规范，我国财政的整体透明度较低，并且存在着许多问题。最后文章还给出了增强我国财政透明度的若干对策。     

中国的财政均等化与转移支付体制改革

中国日益扩大的地区间基本公共服务差距已远远超过备受瞩目的经济差距,成为经济可持续发展与和谐社会建设的主要威胁因素.事实证明,扩张转移支付总量远不足以促进财政均等化,更重要的是必须对侧重控制功能的现行转移支付体制作根本的结构性改革,大大强化其再分配功能.     

Government spending,political cycles,and the cross section of stock returns

Using a novel measure of industry exposure to government spending, we show predictable variation in cash flows and stock returns over political cycles. During Democratic presidencies, firms with high government exposure experience higher cash flows and stock returns, while the opposite pattern holds true during Republican presidencies. Business cycles, firm characteristics, and standard risk factors do not account for the pattern in returns across presidencies. An investment strategy that exploits the presidential cycle predictability generates abnormal returns as large as 6.9% per annum. Our results suggest market underreaction to predictable variation in the effect of government spending policies.     

关于积极财政政策的若干认识

积极财政政策是反周期扩张性财政政策的中国式表述，代表性事项是政府举借长期建设国债筹资而用于投资、扩大内需，投资的重点体现了政府职能的优化调整和短期目标与中长期目标的结合衔接。我国这一扩张性政策在支持发展的同时，赤字控制在可接受范围内，其在过去五年内对国民经济的贡献应充分肯定，其成效将会发生长久影响。2003年这一政策继续实行，在实现反周期基本目标之后这一政策必然要淡出。     

对我国政府间管制所引发财政问题的思考

随着经济体制改革的深入，政府间管制的情况也日益增多，而在我国这些政府间管制已经对财政体制产生了较大的冲击，使得原有的管制目标难以实现，并伴随产生新的财政问题和制度变异。应借鉴西方国家的政府间管制理论和经验，对我国的财政体制、行政体制、法律和民主体制等方面进行完善，减少政府间管制产生的财政风险。