Site Value Taxation and the Timing of Land Development

A bstract . Recent writers have challenged the traditional view that a tax on site value is neutral, but there is still disagreement as to the effects of the tax. The site value tax affects the timing of land development in that it provides an incentive for landowners to develop land sooner than under a property tax levied on improvements also. Confusion has resulted from a failure to distinguish market value from development value. The incidence of the site value tax must take into account the dynamics of untaxing capital and of the capitalization of the tax increase on land values , as well as of the resulting increase of land supply and its effect in further reducing land values. The increased profitability of capital improvements could then increase land rent from the demand side. Obviously, amidst such dynamic changes, the overall effect on land values and rents is unsettled pending further research.     

Three-rate property taxation and housing construction

This paper examines the effect of property taxation on housing construction. In 2001, Finnish municipalities were allowed to levy an extra property tax on undeveloped land zoned for housing. Municipalities that adopted the new tax instrument have a three-rate tax property tax system with different tax rates on land before development, land after development and buildings. The remaining municipalities have a two-rate system with a uniform land tax and a building tax. A theoretical model of decisions by landowners suggests that the pre-development land tax ought to lead to faster development, but also the density of development may be affected. In the two-rate system land tax is neutral. The empirical results suggest that landowners respond to the tax incentives. Municipalities that adopted the three-rate property tax system saw an increase in single-family housing starts of roughly 12 percent.     

Land Value Taxation and Housing Development

A bstract . The effects of land value taxation on housing development are studied in three disparate cities: Pittsburgh, McKeesport, and New Castle, Pennsylvania. These places are examples of three different types of city: central city, suburban city , and relatively isolated city , respectively. Shifting taxes from buildings to land is hypothesized to have different effects in the different types of cities. A liquidity effect , due to increases in the land tax rate , is expected to operate in all three types of cities. An incentive effect , due to decreases in the tax rate on improvements , is expected to function in central cities and, possibly, in relatively isolated cities. It is not expected to be important in suburban cities such as McKeesport. An incentive effect was found in Pittsburgh, but not in the other two cities. No evidence of a liquidity effect was found in any of the three cities. An explanation of why observed effects may not conform with hypotheses is given.     

Neighborhood Revitalization and New Life: A Land Value Taxation Approach

When a neighborhood declines, the poor get poorer, crime rises, and those who can leave the area. The tax base shrinks, so the rates paid by those least able to pay increase. The prevailing system of a low tax on land values leads to land speculation and private land banking, assuring that the landowner can hold out for a very high price for a very long time. A higher tax on land values (coupled with reduction in building taxes) creates an incentive to sell that land or do something with it rather than waiting. In cities that use land‐value taxes, real‐estate markets start to work again and neighborhoods recover. Clairton, Pennsylvania's adoption of a land‐value‐taxation system demonstrates the neighborhood revitalization to which it leads, as owner‐occupied residences and multi‐family units saw a relief in their tax burden. In contrast, vacant properties' contribution to the city budget tripled, providing the resources to pay for the education of Clairton's children and liberate working and middle‐class families from the bonds of labor and capital taxation.     

Taxation for Low Cost Wood Fiber*

Abstract . If forest industry taxation is to be put on a sound economic basis, the Federal Government, the largest land owner, should pay the same taxes as any other landowner, so that the social and economic effects of taxation are realized. Specialists report that the form of the property tax preferred for the taxation of the property of the forest industry, under most circumstances, is land value taxation, not the property tax based on income realized at some point In the future which presumed the continued existence of virgin forests. This paper recognizes that the forest industry now is based on harvests of tree crops and proposes a further development of the land value taxation principle in the form of a forest tax composed of a land value tax combined with a tax on tree growth which increases as growth as a percentage of volume growth decreases with the tree's increasing age.     

Land Value Taxation in Vancouver: Rent‐Seeking and the Tax Revolt

At the beginning of the 20^th century, Vancouver obtained international acclaim as a “single‐tax” city. Supporters claimed that land value taxation was responsible for the spectacular growth of the city. Even critics believed that it had produced a building boom and declining rents. Yet, over several decades, the system was scaled back and ultimately ended in 1984. This article argues that the property tax revolt can be understood with Mancur Olson's model of collective action. Property owners are better organized than other parties impacted by housing policy because they have financial resources and a salient economic concern in housing. Thus, the special interests of property owners in higher values and unrestricted use prevailed over the interests of tenants and prospective buyers. While the property tax revolt was often articulated in the progressive language of ability to pay, when confronted with progressive counterarguments, it collapsed into explicit arguments for rent‐seeking.     

TAXING LAND VALUE IS JUST ANOTHER QUESTIONABLE TAX

There has recently been much public debate about the introduction of a land value tax. To its supporters such a tax promises to achieve several goals simultaneously. On closer inspection, however, the arguments in favour of land value taxation are not convincing. On the contrary, the economic foundations on which proponents of this tax rely are dubious, and there are significant legal, moral and practical problems with land value taxation.     

Site Value Taxation in a Declining City

A bstract . The relationship is analyzed between the economic decline of a central city and the likelihood that a site value tax will be politically acceptable. Public choice and land use models are combined to generate a scenario of land use changes and changes in improvements to land ratios which determine whether a specific property owner will gain or lose from a revenue-neutral site value tax. A case study is presented which substantiates many of the effects suggested by the model. In general, private and public sector responses to a city's decline result in an atmosphere that is relatively hostile to site value taxation.     

Curing Slums: The Jane Jacobs Way and the Henry George Way

Henry George and Jane Jacobs were both self‐taught public figures who shared an appreciation of the density, productivity, diversity, and cultural creativity of big cities. A century separated them, during which architects and planners designed cities according to abstract principles, but George and Jacobs expected the creative potential of a city to emerge from its inhabitants, not from a central planner. Although the interests and concerns of George and Jacobs overlapped on only a few topics, they both believed that slum dwellers could solve their own problems, given the right tools. For Jacobs, the solution to dilapidated housing lay not in bulldozing neighborhoods, but in rehabilitating them through a process she called “unslumming,” a gradual process of self‐improvement that has at times been accused of being gentrification. Henry George offered a different solution, involving taxation of land values, one that did not focus on particular neighborhoods and thus avoided the paradox that local improvements would raise the price of real estate too high for local residents to stay. An example is given of how George's solution actually worked in the Rosslyn neighborhood of Arlington, Virginia. In this case, no change in tax policy was needed to bring about a local economic renaissance in the 1960s, merely the realignment of property assessments that correctly reflected the actual value of land.     

Property taxation and the demand for housing: An econometric analysis

There is disagreement among economists regarding the effect of a local increase in property taxation on the housing market. In defining the price of housing services studies of the demand for housing have treated the property tax exclusively as an excise tax on housing consumption. Two recent theoretical developments suggest this is a misrepresentation of the tax. One theory holds that the excise effects of property taxation may be shifted backward to the factors employed in the production of housing. The other theory concludes that the property tax is not an excise, but rather serves as an efficient price for local public services. To investigate these hypotheses, data from the Annual Housing Survey were employed to estimate a housing demand model which included the net effective property tax rate among the set of independent variables. In addition to revealing the property tax-housing demand relationship, the model provides more reliable estimates of income and price elasticities by eliminating specification errors found in previous studies. Results indicate that the property tax reduces the housing consumption of central city homeowners, but does not distort the suburban housing market.     

Pennsylvania's Success with Local Property Tax Reform

A bstract Fifteen cities in Pennsylvania are pioneering an innovative approach to local tax reform that harnesses market incentives for urban renewal .
Opting for the so-called "two-rate" or "split-rate" property tax , these cities are lowering taxes on buildings, thereby encouraging improvements and renovations , while raising the tax on land values, thus discouraging land speculation . The resulting infill development as indicated by increased building permits means downtown jobs , efficient use of urban infrastructure, an improved housing stock, and less urban sprawl .
Cities in other states are poised to follow Pennsylvania's example.     

Political Economy of Property Tax Reform: Hawaii's Experiment with Split‐Rate Property Taxation

Economic theory suggests that switching from a general property tax to a split‐rate tax increases land use efficiency and stimulates urban core development while preserving the environment and reducing urban sprawl. Under split‐rate property taxation, land is typically taxed at a significantly higher rate than improvements. Beginning in 1965 Hawaii experimented with a statewide split‐rate property tax system to encourage economic growth and effect land reform. The experiment was ended in 1977. Following the transfer of property taxing powers to the counties in 1978, some counties brought back the split‐rate property tax at times. Since 2006, Kauai County has adopted the unusual practice of taxing improvements at a higher rate than land for most property classes. This article chronicles and explains the rationale behind Hawaii's state and county experiments with split‐rate property taxation.     

Coordinating Opposite Approaches to Managing Urban Growth and Curbing Sprawl: A Synthesis

The purchase of development rights to farmland and open space has recently gained in popularity as a growth management tool. A purchase of development rights program pays the landowner for the unearned increment in exchange for strong deed restrictions, limiting the use of the property. On the other hand, land value taxation, a modification of Henry George's Single Tax, would tax land more heavily than improvements, thus encouraging the development of land. While land value taxation and the purchase of development rights appear to be opposing fiscal policies, they could be employed together as part of a regional planning strategy to encourage in-fill development within and near cities and to curb sprawl by retaining farm, forest, and ranch lands.     

Housing, taxation and retirement provision

This paper considers the tax treatment of housing and the issue of savings for retirement in the context of a simplified model that still allows key aspects of the household context to be realistically represented. A model is developed in which both housing and financial assets can be used as vehicles for household saving. Individuals face perfect capital markets and choose between owner-occupied and rented accommodations. For the model developed, it is shown that the tax advantage of owner-occupied housing is not fully removed even if imputed rents are subject to income taxation. However, deferred income taxation for both housing and savings in the form of financial assets would result in an equal treatment of tenants and owner-occupiers.     

On Optimal Taxation of Housing

This paper studies the question of optimal taxation of housing, when the set of tax instruments at the government's disposal is not artificially restricted. There are two groups of persons, who differ in earning abilities and in tastes, and two types of housing goods (high- and low-quality). The paper characterizes the Pareto-efficient allocations that are attainable through the tax policy. It demonstrates that optimality calls for differential tax treatment of housing and that the required tax rates are nonlinear. It derives conditions under which consumption of housing by the poor must be subsidized. It also notes the circumstances under which taxation, rather than subsidization, is the required policy.     

Transaction costs, capital-gains taxes, and housing demand

The paper considers the effect of transaction costs—particularly in the form of capital-gains taxes—on the aggregate demand for owner-occupied housing. The framework is an overlapping-generations model, where consumers can avoid the transaction costs (taxes) by keeping the same house for both periods of life. The first part of the paper analyzes the consumer's choice problem. It distinguishes between costs that are fixed irrespective of the size of the house bought or sold, and costs such as capital-gains taxes that are related to the house value. It is shown that higher transaction costs have lock-in effects, inducing consumers to keep the same house for both periods. Also it is found that under a wide variety of circumstances the amount of housing demanded will increase as the household is being locked in. Finally, the paper looks at the effects on aggregate demand from an increase in capital-gains taxes. It is shown that an increased rate of taxation decreases demand for low tax rates. But for high tax rates, when lock-in effects become important, one generally gets the opposite effect; high tax rates tend to increase housing demand.     

Suburban Encroachment on the Old North 40: The Search for Effective Measures to Preserve Agricultural Land

A bstract . Since 1956, more than 40 states have passed some form of legislation to preserve agricultural land. These statutes or constitutional amendments invoke a variety of economic and/or legal strategies to obtain their objectives, but the most common strategy is that of the differential tax. None of the various strategies is entirely effective, however, although land resource allocation problems have prompted some economists to reexamine the merits of land value taxation. A survey of pertinent literature on land value taxation is examined in an effort to determine whether a system based on single tax principles might offer a simpler, more equitable, and therefore preferable solution to the problem of land resource allocation according to criteria believed to foster environmental conservation or social goals.     

On Modernizing Local Public Finance

Abstract . Urban economists tend to agree that land value taxation is both equitable and efficient. Then why won't American urban areas reform their property taxes into a land value tax? One explanation may be that the climate of opinion is that the taxation of wealth is wrong. This may be another of the legacies of the Great Depression. In the 20 years preceding, levels of property taxation increased very substantially; this was associated with rapid urbanization and big increases in public expenditures. Even with the collapse of property values urban governments extended expenditures and hence taxes on real property—as they did again with inflation in the 1970s. But in the 70s residents were predominantly owner-occupants—a result of counter depression policy. Their hostility to taxing unrealized capital gains is the obstacle advocates of land value taxation have to overcome.     

General Property Reassessment: Relative Tax Impacts on Land and on Structures

A bstract . Many jurisdictions require periodic mass reassessment of real property to bring assessed values closer to market values and to reallocate tax burdens among property types. This paper examines the influence of general reassessment on the tax burden on land relative to that on improvements in Indiana, a state using elected local assessors, statewide mass reassessment on a regular cycle, and assessment of structures at hypothetical reproduction cost. Examination of data over the 1950-51 to 1974-75 period shows that economic growth and development reallocates property tax impact away from land: the share of land in the base declines and the effective rate paid on any given parcel of land declines. Reassessment adjusts these impacts. While reassessment increases the share of improvements in the total base, the readjustment for land is larger. From this analysis, the most recent mass assessment (1968) increased the land to improvement ratio by about 42 percent.     

The Economic Effects (Neutrality) of Taxes on Land

A bstract A recent review of the economic effects of land taxation by Steven Bourassa created the misleading impression that a tax on land will have pro-development or non-neutral effects where there are non pecuniary returns from land or where there are capital market imperfections preventing developers from obtaining all the land that they want for development This note argues that a tax on land value is generally neutral, and that this will be the case whether or not there are non pecuniary returns and capital market imperfections, provided that the existence and extent of the imperfections are independent of the tax