From the European Monetary System to Economic and Monetary Union — How and why?

The paper starts from the premise that the Delors Report is the main point of reference to create economic and monetary union in the EC countries. After a brief review of the Report, the study focuses on the transition phase leading to union and in particular to the gradual transfer of monetary authority to the EC level. It is argued that the attribution of (i) adjustment of short-term interest differentials, (ii) intervention policy vis-a-vis third countries and (iii) changes in reserve requirements to the European System of Central Banks would give this new collective body significant centralized authority, while leaving ultimate power to national governments concerning realignments in the transition stage.     

Rules,discretion, and international monetary and fiscal policy coordination

This paper considers the implications of international policy coordination when both monetary and fiscal policy choices are endogenous. We show that a movement from insular monetary commitment to international monetary policy coordination will, if fiscal policies are not coordinated, produce higher output and public expenditure levels at the expense of higher inflation rates. We also show that the concurrent coordination of monetary and fiscal policies raises output and inflation while lowering public expenditure relative to a regime of monetary coordination alone. We conclude that the arguments for concurrent monetary and fiscal policy coordination fail to have a clear-cut theoretical basis.     

Monetary Union and the Interest-Exchange Rate Trade-off

By using a multi-country simulation model this paper analyzes the qualitative effects of joining a monetary union. The transition to EMU (European Monetary Union) is shown to produce interest and exchange rate changes with substantial and countervailing effects on the real economy which can be traced through the model. Observable anticipation effects in the wake of the EMU are substantiated; and some policy recommendations for joining any monetary union are derived. It is also shown that fixing conversion rates at last-day market rates produces a unique outcome and not exchange rate indeterminacy as argued by De Grauwe (1997), Obstfeld (1998), and others.     

An endeavor to estimate seigniorage before the end of and immediately after the Pacific War

This is the first research paper to analyze seigniorage in Japan before, during, and after the Pacific War. As a result of logically categorizing various definitions of seigniorage (opportunity cost approach, monetary approach, and inflation tax), we conclude that these differences pivot on the issue of whether to confine the scope of debts, which is reduced by unexpected inflation, to the usual general government debt or to expand it to the integrated government debt including the monetary base of the Bank of Japan. We also point out the possibility that, in light of the degree of reduction in government debt as a percentage of GDP during and after the Pacific War, the monetary approach or inflation tax (the cases of confining the taxation base to the usual general government debt) are appropriate means to estimate seigniorage obtained by the general government.     

Fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union: Credible inflation targets or monetized debt?

Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Credible Inflation Targets or Monetized Debt? —The paper examines the interrelationship between fiscal and monetary policy in a two-country monetary union. The worst scenario occurs when an independent central bank sets the nominal interest rate and responds to rising government debt/GDP ratios by monetization. The result is high inflation, high debt/GDP ratios and a large public sector. Government debt and inflation are contained if the governments bear sole responsibility for solvency, but the public sector remains excessively large. The best scenario occurs if the central bank removes the incentive for the governments to engineer surprise inflation by credible inflation targeting.     

Multiple wage-bargaining systems in the single European currency area

Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to theinteraction between central bank monetary rules and systemsof collective wage bargaining. Analytically and empirically,coordinated wage-bargaining systems respond with real wage restraintto non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determinationis dominated by collective bargaining in all the EMU memberstates and wage coordination within the member states has grownsince 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular,the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting Germaninflation, by a European Central Bank (ECB) targeting Europeaninflation will remove a major institutional support of wagerestraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are workedout under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will begenerated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflectGerman inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developmentsare discussed including government union bargains. The Bundesbankalso played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude: forunderlying structural reasons, therefore, it is possible thatGermany will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraintand low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.     

European monetary unification: a tour d'horizon

This article takes stock of the literature and debate over Europeanmonetary unification. In contrast to other papers, where itis argued that the issues and prospects remain shrouded in uncertainty,I argue that in a number of important areas, a reasonable degreeof consensus now exists, as the result of a decade of scholarship.The subsequent stock-taking concentrates on areas where significantquestions remain, starting with the implications of surrenderingthe exchange rate and an independent national monetary policyas instruments of adjustment; the conduct of fiscal policy underthe Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability Pact; andhow quickly the European union is likely to develop an EU-widesystem of fiscal federalism to accompany its monetary union.Turning from fiscal to monetary issues, I ask whether the EuropeanCentral Bank (ECB) will be as inflation averse as the Bundesbank,what exchange-rate policy the ECB will pursue, and whether theeuro will be a leading reserve currency. I conclude with whatmay be the most contentious issue of all, namely whether Europe'smonetary union could collapse after it begins.     

Post-crisis monetary and exchange rate policies in Indonesia,Malaysia and Thailands

This paper surveys the post-crisis monetary and exchange rate policies of Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia. Malaysia has pegged the ringgit while Indonesia and Thailand have adopted heavily managed exchange rates. Under their IMF programs, Thailand and Indonesia set base money targets, but Thailand has moved, and Indonesia is now moving, to inflation targeting, using interest rates as the short-term instrument. Malaysia also sets interest rates. The ability of the three central banks to set interest rates and also pursue an exchange rate target with an interest rate target has been bolstered by restrictions on the internationalisation of the domestic currency. The three central banks have also had to sterilise the monetary effects of their foreign exchange interventions. It is argued that inflation targeting is now a good policy choice, but that a more freely floating exchange rate would be better than sterilisation of balance of payments surpluses or deficits.     

中央银行利润、财政铸币税和最优铸币税的探讨

中央银行的利润主要受机会成本铸币税以及转移的机会成本铸币税二者共同作用的影响。文章定义的财政铸币税（fiscal seigniorage）包括央行上缴的利润,扣除对央行支付的利息,再加上央行对政府存款所支付的利息,以及央行对政府债权和政府存款的变动等。文章理论分析认为央行利润、财政铸币税和通货膨胀率存在非线性关系,在MIU模型下,铸币税呈U型特征或"倒U型"特征,这与铸币税因子和货币需求函数的变动特征有关。ARDL模型实证结果显示我国中央银行货币铸币税、央行利润和财政铸币税的变动存在"U型"特征;转移的机会成本铸币税呈现"倒U型"特征;机会成本铸币税既没有"U型"特征,也没有"倒U型"特征。以MIU模型中的货币需求函数为前提,铸币税的U型或倒U型特征取决于铸币税因子的变动特征。     

Worldwide Inflation and International Monetary Reform： Exchange Rates or Interest Rates？

The international dollar standard is malfunctioning. Near‐zero US short‐term interest rates launch massive hot money outflows into emerging markets (EM) in Asia and Latin America. Each EM central bank buys dollars to prevent its currency from appreciating but loses monetary control. Despite some appreciation, average inflation in EMs is now much higher than in the old industrial economies and world commodity prices are bid up sharply. This inflation on the dollar's periphery only registers in the US CPI with a long lag. However, the more immediate effect of the Fed's zero interest rate is to upset the process of bank intermediation within the American economy. Bank credit continues to decline while employment languishes. Therefore, constructive international monetary reform calls for the Fed to abandon its zero‐interest rate policy, which is best done in cooperation with the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of England also abandoning their ultra low interest rates.     

Designing and Choosing Macroeconomic Frameworks: The Position of the UK after Four Years of the Euro

Fiscal and monetary policy frameworks have become increasinglypopular as disenchantment with active stabilization policy hasincreased. Frameworks need to be designed to achieve targetsefficiently and stabilize the volatility of the economy. Thecurrent fiscal and monetary frameworks in the UK and the euroarea can be improved. The UK economy went through major regimechanges in the 1990s and as a result it has experienced morestable outcomes in the last few years. Whether the UK remainsoutside EMU or becomes a member, inflation, real interest rates,and the level of government borrowing would be similar. However,further gains to stability and hence to potential productivityare available if the UK becomes a member of EMU. The UK andthe euro-area countries currently have economic cycles thatare coherent, experiencing very similar cyclical positions.Although interest rates differ, it is clear that these smalldifferences in rates have little impact on the cyclical positionof these economies. In addition we find no evidence that outputin the UK is excessively sensitive to changes in interest rates,at least when compared to the other large European countries.     

One Money and Sixteen Needs: Has the ECB’s Monetary Policy Become More Balanced Towards the Needs of the Member States?

In this paper we analyze whether the ECB’s monetary policy has become more balanced towards the needs of the individual member states with the passage of time. We assume that the ECB’s monetary policy stance is in line with a Taylor rule and based on the overall situation in the Euro area, more specifically on the Euro area inflation rate and the overall business cycle position in the area. The question therefore boils down to investigating whether inflation and business cycles have converged since the start of the monetary union. We show that the ECB, if in existence in the 1990s, would have had an impossible task. This is because inflation and business cycles still strongly differed in that time, although convergence substantially increased in the run up to the monetary union. In this respect, the decade under EMU drastically differs from the preceding one. This being said, the evidence for a further improvement in the course of the first decade of the new millennium is mixed. This is because although inflation has further converged, business cycles have shown a tendency for increased divergence. If, however, we are willing to put weights on inflation and output gap divergence (as implied by the Taylor rule), we conclude that also in the course of the period under EMU in general the ECB’s monetary policy has become more in line with the needs of the individual members. Looking at individual countries, we show that during the first decade of its existence the ECB’s interest rate was most fitted to the needs of France and Italy, and least to the needs of Ireland and Greece (both too low) and Germany (too high). To a lesser extent there were also mismatches for Spain and Portugal (both too low). In the more recent period since 2005, the mismatch between the desired domestic interest rate and the desired ECB rate has come down for most countries (most noticeable Germany). For Belgium (for which a higher interest rate was more appropriate), on the other hand, the mismatch increased. These overall positive findings, however, offer no guarantee that the task of the ECB will become easier in the future.     

Bailouts,Inflation, and Risk-Sharing in Monetary Unions

This paper presents a new rationalization for bailouts of sovereign debt in monetary unions, such as those observed during the recent Euro crisis. It introduces a model where member countries of the monetary union are ex-ante identical, and each derives utility from consumption and disutility from the union-wide inflation rate. The union’s central bank is utilitarian and lacks commitment. Countries borrow or save in a market for nominal sovereign debt in response to idiosyncratic income shocks, with countries that receive positive income shocks saving and countries that receive negative income shocks borrowing. Ex post, the monetary union’s central bank will attempt to devalue sovereign debt through surprise inflation, as this will redistribute income from rich creditor countries to poor debtor countries. Creditor countries choose to bailout debtor countries because bailouts will weaken the redistributive motives of the central bank and forestall surprise inflation. As bailouts in this environment constitute a payment from lucky creditor countries to unlucky debtor countries, they mimic a risk-sharing arrangement that insures against income shocks. The payments made by creditor countries are incentive-compatible due to the shared currency and inflation rate in the monetary union. This ability of countries to provide each other with incentive-compatible insurance constitutes a novel theory of optimal currency areas. This insurance benefit of the monetary union is largest for countries with negatively correlated income shocks, in contrast to the classic Mundell-Friedman optimal currency area criterion.

     

基于金融稳定目标的规则型货币政策研究

随着货币政策与金融稳定之间联系的不断深化，中央银行理应在防范金融市场系统性风险中发挥重要的作用。文章首先构建我国金融稳定指数，并将其加入线性货币政策规则，研究结果表明，中央银行在调整名义利率时的确对金融稳定状况有所关注，相比于传统泰勒规则，纳入金融稳定指数的泰勒规则中通胀系数与产出缺口系数均有显著改善，其能够更好地拟合中央银行的实际政策操作。随后，为了进一步考察货币当局对名义利率调整的动态变化特征，文章通过TVP-SV-VAR模型对拓展的时变参数泰勒规则进行了再估计。研究发现，随着经济周期和金融形势的更迭，中央银行也会不断动态调整其政策目标。其中，货币政策对通货膨胀的调控不存在明显的惰性区域，控制通胀始终是中央银行工作的重心。其次，中央银行存在规避经济收缩的偏好，在经济下行时期其对货币政策的调整会向产出缺口倾斜。最后，为了抑制金融机构的过度风险承担，货币当局在本次金融危机之后显著增强了对于金融稳定的关注。     

The interest rate–inflation relationship under an inflation targeting regime: The case of Turkey

This paper examines the relationship between nominal interest rates and the expected inflation rate for the Turkish economy between 2002 and 2009, a period when the inflation-targeting regime was implemented as monetary policy. We use the test of cointegrating rank with a trend-break (a method introduced by Inoue, 1999) and we also apply exogeneity tests. Empirical findings indicate that monetary policy rates depend on inflationary expectations; long-term interest rates are affected by monetary policy; and the weak form of the Fisher effect is valid. This evidence implies that monetary policy has actually influenced the real long-term interest rates; the inflation targeting regime pursued by the Central Bank of Turkey is reliable; and hence realized inflation has remained close to its targeted level.     

Inflation,interest rate policy,and currency substitutions in developing economies: A discussion of some major issues

This paper deals with the management of interest rates in an open economy under rapid inflation and reviews the links between interest and exchange rate policies.To prevent current substitution the rate of interest paid to lenders must equal the equivalent rate after adjusting for differential taxation and intermediation costs. This would probably induce capital inflows and consequent monetary growth. Exchange risks are also considered in this context.The paper concludes that under inflationary conditions it is difficult to use only interest rates to achieve both proper resource allocation and prevention of currency substitution. Some policy measures to cope with this problem are discussed.     

Chinese monetary policy and the banking system

Chinese monetary policy differs from that of many other countries in its use of multiple policy instruments. This paper assesses the effectiveness of some of the instruments employed, using a model of the banking sector and elasticities estimated from Chinese data. We find that direct interest rate changes are a poorer instrument of monetary control in China than changes in reserve requirement ratios and loan-to-deposit ratios. This finding is based on the ambiguous estimated response of deposit demand to such changes, and may help to explain why changes to administered interest rates have been used sparingly as an instrument of Chinese monetary policy. We also find that the ambiguous deposit demand response could pose challenges for the effectiveness of open market operations under interest rate liberalisation, while exchange rate liberalisation is likely to make monetary instruments more powerful.     

Structural Reform and Transparency in a Monetary Union

We assess how central bank transparency affects the incentives for labour market reform in a monetary union. We introduce transparency as affecting unemployment forecasts that provide information that the central bank has to the private sector and the governments. Under conditions of monetary policy opaqueness and inflation bias, we show that monetary union may induce more reform (as governments mitigate inflation surprises under idiosyncratic shocks), albeit to a lesser extent when inflation bias is only present at the national level. In the absence of inflation bias, central bank transparency, by eliminating inflation surprises in the face of idiosyncratic shocks, induces less reform in a currency union relative to monetary autonomy. Altogether, these results point to the need for a strong political commitment to reform so that member states benefit most from the combination of a credible and transparent single monetary policy with measures aimed at improving competitiveness and enhancing long-term growth.     

Monetary Aggregates Targeting,Inflation Targeting and Inflation Stabilization in Ghana

The central bank of Ghana (BoG) has operated monetary aggregates targeting and inflation targeting since the 1980s, to ensure enhanced output growth, low unemployment and stable, low inflation. Under inflation targeting, the inflation rate averaged 13.26 per cent per annum between 2007 and 2015, compared with 29.22 per cent per annum under monetary aggregates targeting. The relatively lower inflation rates notwithstanding, an average inflation rate of 13.2 per cent per annum is far above the medium‐term target of 8 per cent. This paper has examined the effectiveness of monetary aggregates targeting and inflation targeting in keeping inflation at moderate levels. The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model was applied to the data covering the period 1970–2015. The results show that monetary targeting has steered inflation to moderate levels only in the short run while inflation targeting has maintained low inflation rates in both short run and long run. But neither regime has kept inflation at stable levels and within the target band, due to the sluggish transmission of broad money supply and prime rate changes to inflation. We implore the monetary authorities to strengthen the institutional setup for steering short‐term interest rates in Ghana. They should also enhance the BoG Act 2002 (Act 612), to develop secondary anchors and rules around output, money supply and fiscal deficit. Finally, the monetary policy committee should monetary policy credibility and transparency through strengthening its communication framework.     

Uncertainty and Fiscal Policy in an Asymmetric Monetary Union

We examine monetary and fiscal interactions in a monetary union model with uncertainty due to imperfect central bank transparency. It is first shown that monetary uncertainty discourages excessive taxation and may thus reduce average inflation and output distortions. However, as countries enter the monetary union, this tax-restraining effect of uncertainty is mitigated. The monetary union may hence lead to higher fiscal distortions in some member countries, depending on governments’ spending targets and on the change in the degree of uncertainty implied by common monetary policy.