Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation

We consider an environment in which agents' skills are private information and follow arbitrary stochastic processes. We prove that it is typically Pareto optimal for an individual's marginal benefit of investing in capital to exceed his marginal cost of doing so. This wedge is consistent with a positive tax on capital income. We also prove that it is Pareto optimal for the marginal rate of substitution between any two consumption goods to equal the marginal rate of transformation. This lack of a wedge is consistent with uniform taxation of consumption goods within a period.     

公平、效率与最优税收理论

帕累托效率不保证竞争过程导致的分配与广为接受的公平概念相一致，因而具有分配功能的税收政策在其理论与实践中，必须考虑公平与效率的权衡问题。正如我们在税收理论的发展历程中看到的，公平优先，效率优先，还是二者兼顾，直接地导出了不同的理论形态和政策结论。本文主要从公平与效率的角度分析了税收理论的发展脉络，在对不同理论模型及其政策含义进行评介的同时，着着分析其间蕴藏的公平与效率含义。     

Optimal Age-Specific Income Taxation

This paper studies optimal earnings taxation in a three‐period life‐cycle model where taxes can be differentiated according to age. Agents choose their level of education when young and their retirement age when old. I study the problem both without and with borrowing constraints. It is shown that, without borrowing constraints, a first‐best optimum can be decentralized by setting a zero tax rate in the third period and a first‐period tax lower than the second‐period one. With borrowing constraints, the first best can no longer be achieved. The gap between the first‐ and second‐period tax rates is larger, while the third‐period tax rate is generally different from zero.     

Green Technology and Optimal Emissions Taxation

Unless an active environmental policy exists, firms have no incentive to engage in abatement or environmental R&D so policy design is of paramount importance. This design heavily depends on the way R&D spillovers operate. There are two distinct types of R&D spillover: output spillover and input spillover. An input spillover operates on the expenditure toward pollution reduction, whereas an output spillover manifests as the achieved abatement. Under optimal emissions taxation, significant differences arise due to this distinction, in particular, when the spillover operates on R&D inputs. In an oligopolistic setting, the result is higher R&D expenditure, but also higher aggregate emissions and, consequently, higher emissions taxes. By contrast, when spillovers occur in R&D output, there is a U‐shaped relationship between the optimal tax and the spillover, showing a trade‐off between the optimal tax rate and spillovers when these are low. In terms of the relative effectiveness of different R&D organization setups, combining emissions taxes with R&D cooperation, this paper shows that under low levels of R&D spillover R&D cooperation gives higher emissions reductions, whereas when spillovers are high this is not the case.     

Black Markets and Optimal Evadable Taxation

In a simple model of evadable indirect taxation, some surprises emerge. Because of a 'market-thinning' effect of high prices, high taxes induce multiple equilibria (low-price black markets and high-price legal markets). Further, evadability introduces a bifurcation to optimal taxation: For less effective tax administrations, the optimal tax system follows a 'cash cow' pattern, with one sector bearing all of the tax; but for relatively effective administrations, the optimum follows a slightly modified Ramsey rule. This discontinuity results from the mathematics of evasion incentives, and may help explain tax reforms commonly seen over the course of economic development     

Budget Balancedness and Optimal Income Taxation

We make two contributions to the theory of optimal income taxation. First, assuming conditions sufficient for existence of a Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism, we show that if agents' preferences satisfy an extended notion of single crossing called capacity constrained single crossing, then there exists a Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism that is budget balancing. Second, we show that, even without capacity constrained single crossing, existence of a budget balancing Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism is guaranteed if the set of agent types contains no atoms.     

Optimal Income Taxation and Job Choice

In this paper, we study optimal income taxation when different job types exist for workers of different skills. Each job type has some feasible range of incomes from which workers choose by varying labor supply. Workers are more productive than others in the jobs that suit them best. The model combines features of the classic optimal tax literature with labor variability along the intensive margin, with the extensive‐margin approach where workers make discrete job choices and/or participation decisions. We find that first‐best maximin utility can be achieved in the second‐best, and marginal tax rates below the top can be negative or zero.     

最优税收理论与我国税制改革

在对最优税收理论进行系统研究的基础上,将最优税收理论与我国的实际相结合,提出了优化我国税制改革的建议,力图设计出一套比较符合国情的最优税制,从而更好地促进我国的经济发展。     

Optimal Piecewise Linear Income Taxation

Given its significance in practice, piecewise linear taxation has received relatively little attention in the literature. This paper offers a simple and transparent analysis of its main characteristics. We fully characterize optimal tax parameters for the cases in which budget sets are convex and nonconvex respectively. A numerical analysis of a discrete version of the model shows the circumstances under which each of these cases will hold as a global optimum. We find that, given plausible parameter values and wage distributions, the globally optimal tax system is convex, and marginal rate progressivity increases with rising inequality.     

Optimal Taxation in Life-Cycle Economies

We use a very standard life-cycle growth model, in which individuals have a labor-leisure choice in each period of their lives, to prove that an optimizing government will almost always find it optimal to tax or subsidize interest income. The intuition for our result is straightforward. In a life-cycle model the individual's optimal consumption-work plan is almost never constant and an optimizing government almost always taxes consumption goods and labor earnings at different rates over an individual's lifetime. One way to achieve this goal is to use capital and labor income taxes that vary with age. If tax rates cannot be conditioned on age, a nonzero tax on capital income is also optimal, as it can (imperfectly) mimic age-conditioned consumption and labor income tax rates. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E62, H21.     

Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation and Heterogeneous Preferences

An attempt is made to find a nonlinear optimal income taxation structure for the Japanese income taxation system, assuming that individuals have heterogeneous preferences between income and leisure. Attention is paid to the horizontal equity considerations and the implications for income as distinguished between skilled and unskilled labour.
JEL Classification Numbers: H20, H55, I31.     

Uncertainty, Commitment, and Optimal Taxation

This paper examines the optimal tax design problem in the presence of wage uncertainty. The wage has a continuous distribution, individuals are ex ante identical, preferences are separable in labor supply and goods, public policy aims at providing the population with social insurance, and the only restriction on the tax instruments is that emanating from lack of public observability of realized wages and labor supplies. We show that optimal tax structures depend crucially on whether it is labor supply or goods that consumers have to commit to before the resolution of uncertainty. Specifically, we prove that, in the absence of commitment, the social insurance problem collapses to the traditional optimal tax problem. Second, if labor supply is precommitted, it would be possible to effect a first-best outcome. Third, commitment to goods would make indirect taxation a useful instrument of tax policy even in the presence of a general income tax; it requires differential tax treatment of committed and noncommitted goods. Finally, if preferences are separable between the two types of goods, precommitted goods must be taxed at a uniform rate lower than that on the noncommitted goods.     

Optimal Income Taxation and International Labour Mobility

This paper considers how a linear income tax should be set optimally when individuals are internationally mobile. The optimum tax analysis is founded on a social welfare function where each individual counts in the social welfare according to residence time in the home country. The discussion of the optimal income tax is organized from two perspectives. The first relates to the optimum income tax when a uniform lump sum transfer is used, while the second concerns the optimal rate of tax when a transfer is used which depends on time of residence in the taxing jurisdiction.     

法治之用:公共支出、税收与经济绩效

法治对经济绩效的影响可以从公共支出和税收两方面解释.税收与再分配所造成的激励扭曲是决定公共支出乃至经济绩效的关键因素.在其他条件不变的情况下,法治的完善会降低经济体的均衡税率水平,减少税收与再分配造成的激励扭曲和总产出损失.在法治与民主的协同作用下,公共支出与社会总产出水平都会得到提高.从现实经济生活来看,法治之用主要体现在两方面:协调经济利益,实现"非自我实施型"交易收益.     

Indirect Taxation and Gender Equity: Evidence from South Africa

Abstract

This study adds to the growing literature on the distributional effects of indirect or consumption taxes in developing countries by exploring whether these taxes have differential gender outcomes. Using data from Statistics South Africa's 2000 Income and Expenditure Survey, the study investigates differences in tax incidence between “female-type” and “male-type” households, classified according to their demographic and economic attributes. The results suggest that zero-rating a well-targeted selection of basic foodstuffs and fuel for household use is important in protecting female-type households, especially those in the lowest quintiles and with children, from bearing an otherwise disproportionate share of the tax burden. In contrast, high taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and fuel for private transport result in a larger incidence on male-type households. The study also suggests ways in which the indirect tax structure could be refined to further reduce the large gender (and income) inequities that exist in South Africa.     

Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information

We study dynamic optimal taxation in a class of economies with private information. Optimal allocations in these environments are complicated and history-dependent. Yet, we show that they can be implemented as competitive equilibria in market economies supplemented with simple tax systems. The market structure in these economies is similar to that in Bewley (1986) ; agents supply labour and trade risk-free claims to future consumption, subject to a budget constraint and a debt limit. Optimal taxes are conditioned only on two observable characteristics—an agent's accumulated stock of claims, or wealth, and her current labour income. We show that optimal taxes are generally non-linear and non-separable in these variables and relate the structure of marginal wealth and income taxation to the properties of agent preferences.     

Gambling Taxation: Public Equity in the Gambling Business

Government's intrinsic role in sustaining a viable gambling industry, and its significant revenue stake in industry profitability, can make the public effectively shareholders in the industry. An important social cost of gambling is the potential for corruption of democratic processes through close industry and government links. Government can increase gambling revenues by expanding the tax base, rather than by raising tax rates. Gambling tax rates have fallen in recent decades, while revenues have increased dramatically. This paper analyses the forces encouraging governments to give excessive priority to protecting gambling revenues. It finds gambling taxation is regressive, and increasingly so as access widens. 'Children, madmen and fools' are significant to the market. The transition to a goods and services tax, along with the recent inquiry by the Productivity Commission into gambling, provides an opportunity for gambling policy to be made in a coherent social and economic framework, rather than as ad hoc and short-term solutions to State governments' revenue problems. Such an outcome rests on the Commonwealth government playing a leadership role.     

Optimal Taxation with Private Government Information

The Ramsey model of fiscal policy implies that taxes should be smooth in the sense of having small variances. In contrast, empirical labour tax processes are smooth in the sense of being random walks; they provide prima facie evidence for incomplete government insurance. This paper considers whether private government information might lie behind such incomplete insurance. It shows that optimal incentive compatible policies exhibit limited use of state contingent debt and greater persistence in taxes and debt, and it argues that they are better approximations to empirical fiscal policies than those implied by the Ramsey model. The paper also establishes that optimal incentive compatible allocations converge to allocations such that the government's incentive compatibility constraint no longer binds. Generally, these limiting allocations are ones in which the government is maximally indebted. Their credibility and the interaction of incentive compatibility and credibility is briefly discussed.     

Optimal Taxation of Elderly Care Services

This paper explores optimal taxation of market purchases of an elderly care service, which can also be produced in the home. Home production cannot be taxed. If children discount parents' utility relative to their own utilities, an intergenerational externality arises in the family. When home production of the service is significant, the optimal tax rate on market purchases should be: (i) high , if the service and leisure are complements and the externality is strong, (ii) low , if they are substitutes , irrespective of the degree of the externality.     

Constrained Inefficiency and Optimal Taxation with Uninsurable Risks

When individuals' labor and capital income are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, should capital and labor be taxed, and if so how? In a two‐period general equilibrium model with production, we derive a decomposition formula of the welfare effects of these taxes into insurance and distribution effects. This allows us to determine how the sign of the optimal taxes on capital and labor depend on the nature of the shocks and the degree of heterogeneity among consumers' income, as well as on the way in which the tax revenue is used to provide lump‐sum transfers to consumers. When shocks affect primarily labor income and heterogeneity is small, the optimal tax on capital is positive. However, in other cases a negative tax on capital is welfare‐improving.