Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners

This paper analyzes the effect of competition for bargaining partners on the prices that prevail in thin markets, as well as how the matches are simultaneously determined. Three trading processes or bargaining procedures are described. In all the variants that we consider, except for one case of public offers, either there is no pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium or such equilibria exhibit delay in reaching agreement.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D43.     

Bargaining over Public Goods

In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure, the equilibria of which converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent in the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.     

Bargaining over Interconnection: The Clear-Telecom Dispute

We explore the problem of network interconnection in local telecommunications. We develop a model with a competitive business sector and a regulated residential sector. The model is used to analyze the celebrated New Zealand antitrust case between Clear and Telecom. We discuss implications of the model for the economics of antitrust, including issues of competition versus efficiency and the use of appropriate economic models. We also examine the implications of some proposed rules for interconnection. In particular, we examine reciprocity, 'bill and keep', and the rule that the courts ultimately endorsed, the Baumol-Willig rule.     

Multiperson Bargaining over Two Alternatives

We present a continuous-time model of multiperson bargaining with incomplete information, where only two agreements are possible. We show that under mild informational assumptions, players behave as if they were representing the other players who prefer the same alternative, individually playing a war-of-attrition against a conglomerate player of the opposite side. We also provide a characterization of the perfect Bayesian equilibria in undominated strategies of the game, which yields a unique outcome in most cases.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C78, D72, D74.     

Bargaining over a Menu of Wage Contracts

We investigate an infinite horizon bargaining problem in which a firm and a worker bargain over two dimensions, quality and wage. The worker has private information about his type. Only the uninformed firm makes an offer and it can offer a menu of quality-wage contracts instead of single one. We show that for all discount factors, the unique sequential equilibrium outcome is separating without delay; the firm separates the types of worker with a menu of contracts in the first period. Our result shows that in multi-dimensional bargaining, the "Coase Conjecture" holds in the sense that the game ends in the first period. But it fails in the sense that the uninformed party can preserve the entire bargaining power.     

The Evolutionary Stability of Moral Objections to Free Riding

In this study we explore the endogenous determination of moral objections to free riding. We first derive the individually rational behavior for given preferences. The motivational structure is allowed to evolve evolutionarily based on the comparison of the relative reproductive success of all possible preference types. The tastes that emerge are not necessarily those assumed in models resorting to altruism or moral obligations. In general, an effective social conscience preventing free riding need not be evolutionarily stable. In the first model that we explore, moral objections to free riding and, in turn, voluntary contributions to the provision of public goods are not to be expected with one notable exception, namely unanimity games. In the second model that we explore, the evolutionarily stable probability that an individual develops social conscience is positive.     

Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication

This paper identifies evolutionarily stable outcomes in games in which one player has private information and the other takes a payoff-relevant action. The informed player can communicate at little cost. Outcomes satisfying a set-valued evolutionary stability condition must exist and be efficient in common-interest games. When there is a small cost associated with using each message the outcome preferred by the informed player is stable. The paper introduces a nonequilibrium, set-valued stability notion of entry resistant sets. For games with partial common interest, the no-communication outcome is never an element of an entry resistant set. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72,D82.     

Bargaining over an Uncertain Value: Arbitration Mechanisms Compared

This article explores the theoretical and behavioral impactof conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration (FOA)when parties are bargaining over an uncertain value. In thiscontext, one player receives a fixed payment while the otherplayer receives the uncertain residual. Although both formsof arbitration have identically sized contract zones, we showtheoretically that in FOA the contract zone shifts in favorof the residual claimant. In addition, as the variance of thepossible values rises, the contract zone shifts further in favorof the residual claimant. In laboratory testing, the contractzone roughly reflects the central tendencies of behavior; however,both forms of arbitration increase conflict relative to a no-arbitrationbaseline. This is caused by residual claimants being more aggressivewhen arbitration is available while fixed-payment recipientsare not. However, both parties play a role in the conflict escalationdue to the increased proposal variation.     

Evolutionary Stability in the Investment-Opportunism-Retaliation Game

Can economically efficient outcomes be obtained and sustained in the absence of externally enforced property rights? We study the evolutionary properties of a game that exhibits two well-defined Nash equilibria: one generates an inefficient outcome while the other set generates an efficient outcome supported by the potential for retaliation. Although standard forward-looking refinements eliminate the efficient equilibrium, neither equilibrium type satisfies strict evolutionary stability criteria. However, both types of equilibrium define strategies that are neutrally stable, which makes them vulnerable to drift in dynamic environments. We conduct computer simulation experiments in which players learn adaptively via a tournament selection mechanism called sophisticated experimentation. Our simulations demonstrate that while the system spends a disproportionately high proportion of time in the inefficient equilibrium set, the efficient equilibrium is pervasive as the system drifts back and forth between the equilibrium sets, never settling on one or the other.     

On Forward Induction and Evolutionary and Strategic Stability

We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion of forward induction, as defined by E. van Damme (1989, J. Econ. Theory48, 476-496) in the class of generic two player normal form games preceded by an outside option. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts (including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) capture this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (J. Swinkels, 1992, J. Econ. Theory57, 306-332) is always consistent with forward induction. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.     

关于组织存在的交易费用理论的缺陷及其超越

科斯所提出的企业存在理论虽然揭示了企业的本质特征。但却混淆了企业与市场的关系。市场组织制度是节约企业和个人交易费用的制度，而特定的组织存在并不是由交易费用高低所决定，而是取决于组织的目标和权力结构。     

On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models

We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We propose a new concept, evolutionary robustness, which is stronger than the previous concepts. Evolutionary robustness ensures dynamic stability for replicator dynamics in doubly symmetric games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, 72.     

信誉的价值:以网上拍卖交易为例

本文使用网上拍卖交易数据,就卖者信誉对市场交易的影响进行了实证研究。我们发现,卖者的信誉评价一方面影响物品成交的价格,另一方面还对物品拍卖成功的概率有着显著的正面影响;但相对来说,卖者的信誉评价对后者的效果比对前者要更显著。这是本文的主要发现。该结果验证了在一个没有政府干预、近乎自由放任的“虚拟”市场上信誉机制的积极作用。     

Strategic Analysis of High-tech Auctions

This paper deals with the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell an item Of high-tech. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives that are not mutually consistent. However, if the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. In addition, if he wants to sell his high-tech to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares.     

The Efficiency Principle in Non-Cooperative Coalitional Bargaining

Applying the non-cooperative theory of coalitional bargaining, I examine a widely held view in economic literature that an efficient outcome can be agreed on in voluntary bargaining among rational agents in the absence of transaction costs. While this view is not always true, owing to the strategic formation of subcoalitions, I show that it can hold under the possibility of successive renegotiations of agreements. Renegotiation may, however, motivate bargainers to form a subcoalition first and to exploit the first-mover rent. This strategic behaviour in the process of renegotiation may distort the equity of an agreement.
JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D23, D61, D63.     

Auctions of licences and market structure

Summary. This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to participate in a symmetric market game. Assuming that the rate at which industry profits decrease with repeated entry is not too large, at the unique solution either a single firm preempts entry altogether or entry occurs in every stage, depending on the net benefit of complete preemption to an incumbent. If we relax the assumption, a third outcome can occur: two firms may coordinate their choices to avoid further entry. The analysis employs a new refinement of Nash equilibrium, the concept of recursively undominated equilibrium. Received: February 25, 2000; revised version: September 12, 2000     

Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences

In an auction with a buy price, the seller provides bidders with an option to end the auction early by accepting a transaction at a posted price. This paper develops a model of an auction with a buy price in which bidders use the auction's reserve price and buy price to formulate a reference price. The model both explains why a revenue-maximizing seller would want to augment her auction with a buy price and demonstrates that the seller sets a higher reserve price when she can affect the bidders' reference price through the auction's reserve price and buy price than when she can affect the bidders' reference price through the auction's reserve price only. The comparative statics properties of bidding behavior are in sharp contrast to equilibrium behavior in other models where the existence and size of the auction's buy price have no effect on bidding behavior.     

The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information

We present a model of anonymous collective bargaining where individuals'preferences and information may be significantly interdependent. We showthat the bargaining outcome becomes independent of individuals'preferences and information as the bargaining group increases in size. As acorollary, we show that anonymous voluntary bargaining completely fails inlarge groups. Either the difference between the bargaining outcome and thestatus quo vanishes as the size of the group becomes larger, or, thebargaining becomes coercive and results in a violation of at least someindividuals' rights. The result provides a rationale for the inherentdifficulty of reform in the presence of asymmetric information.
There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful ofsuccess, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order ofthings.
Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (1532)     

员工反生产行为组织控制的演化博弈分析

基于演化博弈理论和员工反生产行为组织控制的行为博弈演化过程,构建企业与员工共同参与的演化博弈模型.博弈的复制动态方程表明:员工选择显性反生产行为的比例、员工因选择反生产行为所获得的额外收益、企业对员工的反生产行为进行监管所投入的成本,企业观测到员工选择反生产行为时所作出的处罚都将对博弈均衡的结果产生影响.对此,应加强人力资源管理,加大组织支持力度,建立有效的控制机制.     

Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders

We investigate bidders’ and seller's responses to ambiguity about the number of bidders in the first price auction (FPA) and the second price auction (SPA) with independent private valuations. We model ambiguity aversion using the maxmin expected utility model. We find that bidders prefer the number of bidders to be revealed in the FPA, are indifferent between revealing and concealing in the SPA, and prefer the SPA to the FPA. If bidders are more pessimistic than the seller then the seller prefers to conceal the number of bidders in the FPA, and prefers the FPA to the SPA.