策略性采购联盟、集体谈判与最优贸易政策选择——基于广义Cournot-Nash谈判函数的分析

文章发展了一个关于由本国企业组成的中间品策略性采购联盟与外国垄断性供给者进行集体谈判的模型一—该模型以中国的制造业外包服务,即出口加工贸易实践为基础,其中,中间品的采购价格与数量通过有效的Nash谈判过程同时决定。当采购联盟的效用函数的数量弹性高于（低于）价格弹性,则该联盟的偏好为数量（价格）导向的。文章证明：（1）当本国与外国的中间品与最终产品贸易具有互补性时,政府贸易政策调整的价格、数量以及福利效应是不确定的,它们依存于本国采购联盟的偏好、最终产品需求曲线的弹性与曲率、外国企业的技术以及生产专业化程度;（2）政府贸易政策的干预功能与企业策略性联盟的自主调整功能存在重叠与冲突。     

逆向竞价的采购联盟中的收益分配问题

逆向竞价利用网络技术取代了以往采购中的谈判、竞价，在北美、欧洲以及亚洲部分国家已经取得了很好的效果．为采购方节省了巨大的成本。但逆向竞价技术在我国还是较新的概念，仍处于探索推广阶段。很多企业本身规模小．采购额也小。为取得更显著的效果，需要采购相同物品的企业结成采购联盟是一个办法。但是获得收益后．如何在联盟内部科学合理地分配这些利益的问题有待解决。本文阐述了逆向竞价的概念．介绍了其在国外的应用情况．分析了目前国内推广逆向竞价面临的问题和机会，并在沙普利(Shapley)模型的基础上建立了基于战略联盟价值创造与预期收益分配的模型．对买方结成采购联盟后．如何合理分配收益提出了建议。     

产业结构对贸易政策的影响

有别于其他讨论上下游进出口策略性贸易的文献,我们将产业结构因素加入技术领先国(外国)与技术落后国(本国)之间的贸易问题,在中间产品市场和最终产品市场都是古诺竞争的假设下,利用两阶段博弈模型,考虑当技术先进国同时出口中间产品和最终产品到技术落后国时,技术落后国的策略性贸易政策问题.文中的研究结论,可以解释我国一些产业发展中的现象,同时也可以给我国在制定上下游企业的国际贸易政策时提供一定的理论依据和参考思路.     

企业技术联盟能力与联盟成功的关系研究

企业技术联盟运作成功与否在于企业技术联盟能力是否具备。文章运用动态能力理论,构造了一个技术联盟能力与联盟成功的拓展模型。研究结论认为,企业技术联盟能力是由联盟职能能力与联盟动态能力所共同构成的协同有机体;联盟职能能力主要担负起联盟生命周期各阶段的运营任务,由联盟构想、伙伴选择、协议谈判、联盟实施与联盟退出等职能子能力所构成,其直接促使了技术联盟运作的最终成功;而联盟动态能力则是技术联盟能力的根本驱动力,主要由环境跟踪能力、联盟学习能力、联盟协调能力以及资源重置能力等子能力所构成。     

中小企业R&D战略联盟合作伙伴选择研究

近年来,R&D战略联盟作为一种新的组织形式成为中小企业提高自身实力、实现可持续发展的有效途径.本文分析了我国中小企业RD战略联盟的现状以及存在的问题,提出了联盟合作伙伴选择的基本策略和原则,建立了基于含偏好DEA的中小企业R&D战略联盟合作伙伴选择模型,并对模型进行了实证分析.实证结果表明,本文建立的模型能够针对企业的不同需求使企业对候选伙伴进行评价选择,从而可以帮助企业寻找到符合自身要求的R&D战略联盟合作伙伴.     

浅论采购联盟体

当前,世界正大步迈向开放型经济时代,全球化市场竞争日趋激烈,采购联盟的出现是企业组织为了加强竞争力、适应多变的市场环境而演变的必然结果。其中,横向采购联盟克服了传统的单个企业孤立采购的劣势,降低了采购成本,增强了采购方的势力,以保证所购物资的质量;纵向采购联盟则充分利用了企业的核心竞争能力以获取更高的利润。这两种联盟策略越来越多地被更多企业所采用,因此有必要对这两种联盟方式作出分析和探讨。鉴于纵向采购联盟较复杂,在论述横向采购联盟的作用后,将详细探讨纵向采购联盟的依据、意义,并简要阐述采购联盟伙伴的评价、选择步骤。     

基于专用性资产及其套牢效应的战略联盟不稳定性分析

战略联盟的不稳定性与投入联盟的专用性资产及其套牢问题有关。在一个关于交易模式选择决策的模型中,战略联盟能够带来交易效率的提升,而专用性资产的投入同时改变了联盟成员企业之间的谈判能力对比状态,专用资产投入方将面临承受被迫降低交易价格的风险,由此引发了联盟成员之间争夺可剥夺准租的合作冲突,这一冲突可以通过一个囚犯困境的博弈模型来分析。专用资产投入方也可以采取虚报投资成本的策略性行为来规避套牢问题,但这种策略性行为引发的对方成员的策略行为最终使得联盟偏离帕累托最优。     

基于生态经济环境下的企业绿色持续创新联盟初探

企业是生态经济建设的主体,单个企业的绿色持续创新并不能真正适应生态经济的发展需要,通过企业间绿色持续创新项目带动和市场化利益共享机制建立组成的绿色持续创新联盟,既具有通常意义的技术创新联盟的优势,同时有助于产生生态化产业集群效应、学习效应,促进生态产业链的形成,提升企业乃至产业、产业间绿色技术创新水平.本文介绍了基于生态经济环境要求下的企业绿色持续创新联盟的概念、特点和重要性,进而提出了建立企业绿色持续创新联盟的应关注的关键问题.     

军事联盟溢出效应与国防费支出

作为典型的公共物品,国防产品有着很强的外部性。跨国军事联盟在联盟国之间必然带有溢出效应。文章以新古典框架为分析基础,发现人均收入、人口规模、联盟国数量、联盟的紧密程度、消费偏好等因素均会对国防费支出产生影响。     

中小企业R＆D战略联盟合作伙伴选择研究

近年来,R＆D战略联盟作为一种新的组织形式成为中小企业提高自身实力、实现可持续发展的有效途径。本文分析了我国中小企业R＆D战略联盟的现状以及存在的问题,提出了联盟合作伙伴选择的基本策略和原则,建立了基于舍偏好DEA的中小企业R＆D战略联盟合作伙伴选择模型,并对模型进行了实证分析。实证结果表明,本文建立的模型能够针对企业的不同需求使企业对候选伙伴进行评价选择,从而可以帮助企业寻找到符合自身要求的R＆D战略联盟合作伙伴。     

Tariffs, licensing and market structure

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing against another firm. Competition against a less-efficient firm weakens the power that a host country can exert on the incumbent in the form of its tariff policy. We show that this gives a motive for a monopolist to license its technology to another foreign firm. A host country gains more from increased competition if it can induce the foreign incumbent to transfer technology to the host country firm. We show that the host country can do so by tariff commitment. We also discuss the implications of bargaining under licensing and Bertrand competition in the product market. Hence, this paper qualifies and extends the recent work of Kabiraj and Marjit [Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer. European Economic Review 47, 113-124].     

Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment

We analyze strategic environmental standards in the presence of foreign direct investment. A number of foreign firms located in a host country compete with a domestic firm in another country to export a homogeneous good to a third country. When the number of foreign firms is exogenous, the host country applies a stricter environmental regulation than the other producing country. However, under free entry and exit of foreign firms, the host country may apply a less severe standard under both non-cooperative and cooperative equilibrium. We also find that the nature market structure does not affect the equilibrium values of total pollution if export subsidies are also used.JEL Classification: F2, H2     

Market Structure and Foreign Direct Investment

During the last decade the extent of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in the US has increased dramatically. An important aspect of industries where most FDI takes place is their high level of concentration. This paper investigates how strategic interactions among domestic and foreign producers influence the structure of the industry. Especially, it focuses on the foreign firms' choice between exporting versus servicing these markets by investing in a plant located in the host country when facing competition from a domestic oligopoly. The empirical investigation reveals that the relationship between FDI and tariffs is not as simple as previously thought. In highly concentrated industries, where strategic behavior may play an important role, high tariffs rather than low tariffs may lead to less FDI and more imports.     

中国OFDI逆向技术溢出效应 的影响因素研究* ——基于国别面板数据的非线性门槛技术回归

本文首先对对外直接投资逆向技术溢出效应的机理进行了分析,然后以2003-2013年中国对外直接投资的13个主要发达国家的数据为样本,考察了中国对外直接投资逆向技术溢出效应的影响因素。本文的实证结果发现,中国与东道国之间的技术差距、东道国研发（R&D）支出、全要素生产率、人力资本、技术创新能力、制度环境是对外直接投资逆向技术溢出效应的正相关因素。同时,本文以技术差距作为门槛变量进行门槛效应检验,结果表明,技术差距存在单一门槛值,当中国与东道国之间技术差距较大时,技术差距对逆向技术溢出产生了正向影响;当技术差距缩小后,正相关关系仍然存在,但影响程度有所下降。     

Multilateral institutions for international economic policy coordination: bargaining vs voting

We study a world economy where worldwide policy coordination is essential to optimally stabilize unfavorable common supply shocks. We develop a two-stage game to investigate how to implement the first-best response to these shocks via a multilateral institution, whose board of directors is composed of a representative per each member country. In a first stage, national governments nominate their representatives on the board. In a second stage, the board collectively chooses stabilization policies. We compare the relative merits of two collective choice mechanisms – bargaining and majority voting – in avoiding manipulation of the cooperative agreement through the strategic nomination of national representatives.     

Trade and unions: Does size matter?

Our empirical analysis builds upon the hypothesis that unions are detrimental to a firm's efficiency. Using a rich survey of German manufacturers, we investigate firm-level determinants on the probability of collective wage bargaining with particular focus on the impact of a firm's engagement in foreign markets. An interesting and very robust finding is that exporters are less likely to engage in union wage bargaining. This finding is in line with a pessimistic perception of unions. The negative effect of collective bargaining can be offset by efficiency gains for larger exporters, who can benefit from operation cost saving effects. Size does matter as larger firms export and may find bargaining with a single entity representing the workforce more convenient than bargaining with each worker individually. We are using firm level information on IT investment as instrument for the export dummy and successfully test for the validity of this instrument.     

外资质量与引资优惠政策分析——基于博弈论的分析框架

从东道国与外商投资者的博弈行为出发,构建了一个用于分析外资优惠政策调整的动态博弈模型,据此模型得到三个命题:东道国引资过程满足边际收益等于边际成本条件,优惠政策的边界条件取决于收益系数、成本系数以及最佳外资规模的大小;优惠政策与投资环境具有反向的替代关系,与外资的最佳规模呈正比关系;低质量的投资对环境的敏感系数要小于高质量投资,低质量的投资对优惠政策的敏感系数要大于高质量投资。并用这三个命题对中国外资政策调整的历程做了解释。     

Profit sharing under the threat of nationalization

A multinational corporation engages in foreign direct investment for the extraction of a natural resource in a developing country. The corporation bears the initial investment and earns as a return a share of the profits. The host country provides access and guarantees conditions of operation. Since the investment is totally sunk, the corporation must account in its plan not only for uncertainty in market conditions but also for the threat of nationalization. In a real options framework, where the government holds an American call option on nationalization, we show under which conditions a Nash bargaining leads to a profit distribution maximizing the joint venture surplus. We find that the threat of nationalization does not affect the investment threshold but only the Nash bargaining solution set. Finally, we show that the optimal sharing rule results from the way the two parties may differently trade off rents with option values.     

International joint venture,commitment and host-country policy in an integrated market

To highlight the importance of bargaining power for both host and foreign partners, we envisage two modes, commitment and no-commitment, respectively, to examine the issue on international joint venture (IJV)’s profit-splitting and optimal host-country policy in an integrated market. With a three-stage Nash bargaining model, it turns out that in an integrated market, tax rate under commitment does not exactly equal zero unless the host partner does not benefit at all in terms of production efficiency by the IJV. Government shall subsidize joint venture while the host partner has more bargaining power than the foreign partner. Furthermore, subsidy is the optimal policy under no-commitment.