Information sharing and lending market competition with switching costs and poaching

We analyze information sharing with repeated banking competition. In the presence of switching costs we find that information sharing renders poaching more profitable in future rounds of competition, since the poaching activities can be targeted towards (more) creditworthy borrowers. We find that information sharing reduces relationship benefits, and, therefore relaxes competition for initial market shares. Information sharing introduces a welfare tradeoff by promoting equilibrium profits at the expense of talented entrepreneurs whenever market power persists in credit market, whereas it is a matter of indifference without market power. Thus information sharing may induce exclusion of creditworthy borrowers from credit markets.     

The Rate of Change in Evolutionary Systems and Evolutionary Economic Modeling

Evolutionary economics seeks to model socio-economic reality as an evolutionary system. This powerful approach entails the implication of the continuous loss of information through the evolutionary process. The implication corresponds to evolutionary biology, although the systems in evolutionary economics are different from those in evolutionary biology. The issue of the loss of information has not been extensively studied in economics. Many open questions remain: Which knowledge is lost under what circumstances? Can loss of information be harmful to the socio-economic system as a whole in the presence of runaway dynamics caused by, for example, network externalities? How can the development of knowledge in economic systems be studied? The present article examines these questions and more.     

International Trade and Collective Bargaining Outcomes: Evidence from German Employer–Employee Data

In theoretical trade models with variable mark‐ups and collective wage bargaining, exposure to international markets might reduce the exporter wage premium. We test this prediction using linked German employer–employee data covering the years 1996–2007. To separate the rent‐sharing mechanism from assortative matching, we exploit individual worker information to construct profitability measures that are free of skill composition. Our results show that rent‐sharing is less pronounced in more export‐intensive firms or in more open industries. The exporter wage premium is highest for low‐productivity firms. In line with theory, these findings are unique to the subsample of plants covered by collective bargaining.     

Political markets? Politics and economics in the emergence of markets for biodiversity offsets

This paper analyses the relationship between politics and performativity of economics in the emergence of markets for biodiversity offsets. While the role of economics in constructing markets has been demonstrated by sociology and social studies of science, it has also become apparent that politics plays an important role in the material outcome of economic experiments. Two case studies of the creation of markets for biodiversity offsets are analysed, in the United States and England. The findings suggest that the creation of both markets is rooted in the language, concepts and models of economics. Politics, on the other hand, functions as a mediator of the material expression of those models. Through this mediation effect, similar economic models are performed differently, resulting in a variety of markets. This suggests that the material outcomes of processes of market creation are not defined at the outset, but can be influenced by political processes.     

Sharing Rules in Teams

We examine the problem of output sharing in a moral hazard in team situation. Although we do not consider any particular procedure, we assume that the team uses some procedure to decide a sharing rule before actual production takes place (for example, this may be a bargaining process or a team welfare maximization problem). This must take into account that the team will play a noncooperative game in the production process conditional on the chosen sharing rule. We show that the procedure for deciding the sharing rule does not have to look for anything more complicated than simple linear sharing rules. We also show that, when there is limited liability, the procedure needs to consider only the slightly more complicated piecewise linear rules. As a consequence of the linear sharing rule result, we are also able to provide a characterization of implementable outcomes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, D2, C72, J54.     

高等财经教育学分制管理模式改革的探索与实践

高等财经教育教学管理模式改革的重点是学分制改革。河南财经学院在推行学分制的过程中,学分制不仅被理解为标准修业年限的上下浮动,也被看作是一种以教育思想转变为先导,以教学改革为核心,以因材施教为原则、以教学计划的灵活性保证修业年限的灵活性和所培养人才知识、能力结构的多样化的教学管理制度。     

Comparative politics and quasi-rational markets

This article synthesises psychology, economics and political science theories that can explain market reaction to elections. In order to test the theories, we conduct event studies of the impact of elections on the interest rates on government bonds for 122 elections in 19 countries. The efficient market hypothesis states that rational markets immediately incorporate all information relevant to asset prices. According to psychology, human decision-making is quasi-rational. Market actors should be slow to accept evidence that conflicts with previously held opinions, leading them to under-react to new information. We show that markets under-react to elections and that under-reaction is greater in majoritarian countries because they provide more information to the market. Assuming fully rational markets underestimates the impact of elections and variations in impact across political systems. Most of the literature on market constraint assumes rational markets and may thus be underestimating the extent of market pressure in the aftermath of elections and its distribution across different types of electoral systems. Our results suggest that markets can calculate risk around elections, but are slow to do so, thereby suggesting that the role of uncertainty and the resort to heuristics is relatively minor.     

Detecting which firm-specific characteristics impact market-oriented R&D

This paper investigates which firm-specific characteristics lead multinational enterprises (MNEs) to increase their R&D expenditure in host countries as a way of expanding their business into local markets (market-oriented R&D). The literature that addresses this topic is quite limited because of the difficulty of separating market-oriented R&D expenditure from knowledge-sourcing R&D expenditure in the data. We argue that determining the relationship between local sales and R&D expenditure is a better way to identify whether MNEs are investing market-oriented R&D than is separating the two types of R&D. For connecting firm-specific characteristics, local-market sales, and R&D expenditure together, we adapt two-stage regressions. By employing data from Taiwanese multinationals from 2003 to 2006, we found that if an MNE moves its technology toward capital-intensive products, it increases its R&D expenditure to promote its sales in the local markets in the host country.     

The Economics and Bioeconomics of Folk and Scientific Classification

Synopsis This paper is the product of a collaboration between a biologist (Ghiselin 1997) who works on the philosophy of classification and an economist (Landa 1981, 1994) who works on the ‘Economics of Identity’: how and why people classify people based on identity in the context of a theory of ethnic trading networks. In developing the ‘bioeconomics’ (the synthesis of economics with biology) of classification, we crossed a number of disciplinary boundaries—anthropology, economics, sociology, biology, and cognitive psychology including evolutionary psychology’s ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics. Using a bioeconomics approach, we argue that folk classifications—the classifications used by ordinary persons—have much in common with scientific classifications: underlying both is the need for economy of information processing in the brain, for the efficient organization of knowledge, and for efficiency of information acquisition and transmission of information to others. Both evolve as a result of trial and error, but in science there is relatively more foresight, understanding, and planning.     

Knowledge and markets

An economy is a coordinated system of distributed knowledge. Economic evolution occurs as knowledge grows and the structure of the system changes. This paper is about the role of markets in this process. Traditionally, the theory of markets has not been a central feature of evolutionary economics. This seems to be due to the orthodox view of markets as information-processing mechanisms for finding equilibria. But in economic evolution markets are actually knowledge-structuring mechanisms. What then is the relation between knowledge, information, markets and mechanisms? I argue that an evolutionary theory of markets, in the manner of Loasby (1999), requires a clear formulation of these relations. I suggest that a conception of knowledge and markets in terms of a graphical theory of complex systems furnishes precisely this.     

New Economic Theories

This paper analyses some of the most important spillovers of recent developments of economic theory into environmental economics. Attention is given to the anlaysis of sustainable economic development paths, where endogenous growth models are used; the implications of environmental dumping and more generally of policies concerning global environmental issues, where new trade theories are very useful; and, the effectiveness of environmental policy instruments when markets are imperfectly competitive, where industrial organisation theory is employed. The paper does not only note recent developments in environmental economics, but also relates these to the previous environmental economics literature. Thus, it can be assessed whether new results actually improve our knowledge of crucial economic and environmental issues.     

Does financial globalization promote risk sharing?

In theory, one of the main benefits of financial globalization is that it should allow for more efficient international risk sharing. In this paper, we provide an empirical evaluation of the patterns of risk sharing among different groups of countries and examine how international financial integration has affected the evolution of these patterns. Using a variety of empirical techniques, we conclude that there is at best a modest degree of international risk sharing, and certainly nowhere near the levels predicted by theory. In addition, only industrial countries have attained better risk sharing outcomes during the recent period of globalization. Developing countries have, by and large, been shut out of this benefit. Even emerging market economies, many of which have reduced capital controls and all of which have witnessed large increases in cross-border capital flows, have seen little change in their ability to share risk. We find that the composition of flows may help explain why emerging markets have not been able to realize this presumed benefit of financial globalization. In particular, our results suggest that portfolio debt, which had dominated the external liability stocks of most emerging markets until recently, is not conducive to risk sharing.     

Limits to Institutional Reforms

The essay draws on the theory of (macro)economic policy, as it has evolved, to discuss implicit policy determinism in the new economics of institutions. The extension of rational-choice methods to new levels of analysis, such as micropolitics, macropolitics, political macroeconomics, and microfoundations of cooperation, has apparently reduced the policy choice set and diminished the role of experts. All outcomes reflect constrained maximization by rational agents. The essay argues, however, that scarcity of knowledge leads to incomplete and variable policy models, and that competition among policy models creates a role for experts in social change.     

Localized technological change and factor markets: constraints and inducements to innovation

The recent advances in the economics of innovation and the analysis of how composition effects influence the introduction of technological change in a global economy, characterized by the variety of production functions in use and different local factor markets, provide new strength to the induced innovation approach. Developing the localized technological change approach, it is argued that because there are irreversibilities, limited knowledge and local learning, the introduction of new technologies is induced by the disequilibrium conditions brought about in each system by all changes in relative factor prices. The direction of technological change in terms of its specific form of bias and how it is introduced and adopted, however, reflects the specific conditions of local factor markets. Well-defined long-term technological paths emerge in each region and they depend on the selection process in product markets. The more rigid and idiosyncratic, the endowment of production factors and the system of relative prices are, the more specific the technological path of each region is likely to be. The divide between the microeconomic and the macroeconomic models of induced technological change is reconciled.     

Applying behavioural economics to public policy in Canada

Behavioural economics incorporates ideas from psychology, sociology and neuroscience to better predict how individuals make long‐term decisions. Often the ideas adopted include present or inattention bias, both potentially leading to suboptimal outcomes. But these models also point to opportunities for effective, low‐cost government policies that can have meaningful positive effects on people's long‐term well‐being. The last decade has been marked by a growing interest from governments the world over in using behavioural economics to inform policy decisions. This is true of Canada as well. In this paper we discuss the increasingly important role behavioural economics plays in Canadian public policy. We first contextualize government policies that have incorporated insights from behavioural economics by outlining a collection of models of intertemporal choice. We then present examples of public policy initiatives that are based upon findings in the field, placing particular emphasis on Canadian initiatives. We also document future opportunities, challenges and limitations.     

Does Transparency of Central Banks Produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?

A recent strand of literature shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information among traders; see Morris and Shin (2001). It is known that this approach works only if the common knowledge in the market is not too precise. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We develop a model in which more transparency of the central bank implies better private information, because each trader utilises public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.     

Remain silent and ye shall suffer: seller exploitation of reticent buyers in an experimental reputation system

By providing incentives for sellers to act in a trustworthy manner, reputation mechanisms can mitigate moral-hazard problems when particular buyers and sellers interact infrequently. However, these mechanisms rely on buyers sharing their private information about sellers, and thus may suffer from too little feedback when provision is costly. We experimentally compare a standard feedback mechanism to one in which sellers can inspect a buyer’s feedback-provision history, thus providing incentives to share private information even when costly. We find fairly high trust and trustworthiness in all markets, with buyers providing costly feedback, especially negative, sufficient to induce trustworthiness. However, feedback-provision histories did not improve outcomes, and at least weakly decreased trustworthiness with experienced participants, as this information enabled sellers to discriminate and ship less frequently to buyers lacking a reputation for information sharing.     

Learning from processing trade: Firm evidence from China

Processing export plays a significant role in international trade. In this paper, focusing on firm-level dynamics, we show that firms learn from their processing export experience to improve their subsequent ordinary export outcomes. Using transaction-level trade data and firm-level production data, we show that firms’ ordinary export performance, at both extensive and intensive margins, is enhanced by their own processing experience. Firms also export products with improved quality after engaging in processing exports of similar products. Furthermore, we investigate potential channels through which firms learn from processing experience. We find that firms potentially learn from processing experience to enhance production efficiency, to better understand how to improve product appeal to cater to specific markets, and to gain better and easier access to inputs. Moreover, we find that exporters benefit more from processing experience for larger markets with fiercer competition. Similarly, stronger learning effects are also observed when processing experience is associated with products that embody less diffused knowledge and are more differentiated. Also, firms learn more from processing experience when they are more actively engaged in processing imports. Lastly, we verify the economic significance and quantify the importance of these potential channels.     

Public versus private risk sharing

Can public income insurance through progressive income taxation improve the allocation of risk in an economy where private risk sharing is incomplete? The answer depends crucially on the fundamental friction that limits private risk sharing in the first place. If risk sharing is limited because insurance markets are missing for model-exogenous reasons (as in Bewley (1986) [8]) publicly provided risk sharing improves on the allocation of risk. If instead private insurance markets exist but their use is limited by limited enforcement (as in Kehoe and Levine (1993) [23]) then the provision of public insurance interacts with equilibrium private insurance, as, by providing risk sharing, the government affects the value of exclusion from private insurance markets and thus the enforcement mechanism of these contracts. We characterize consumption allocations in an economy with limited enforcement and a continuum of agents facing plausible income risk and tax systems with various degrees of progressivity (public risk sharing). We provide conditions under which more publicly provided insurance actually reduces total insurance for agents (excess crowding-out), or under which more public insurance increases total insurance (partial crowding-out).