我国电力产业扩展的产业组织分析

传统产业组织理论认为,市场结构是影响产业绩效的关键因素.对于电力产业而言,产权结构和规制制度也是影响产业绩效的根本因素.因此,电力产业的市场结构(S)、产权结构(P)、规制制度(R)-企业行为(C)-经济绩效(P)的扩展产业组织分析比传统的SCP分析具有更强的解释力.从20世纪80年代起我国对电力产业就进行了规制改革,但其资源配置效率、价格水平、价格结构、企业内部效率都存在不足.规制改革绩效不明显的根本原因在于区域垄断和厂网未完全分开的市场结构、国有制主导的产权结构和尚不规范的规制制度.     

中国电力产业的产业组织学分析

电力产业是国民经济的重要基础能源产业,对促进国民经济发展和社会进步起重要的作用。传统产业组织理论的SCP分析范式(即结构一行为一绩效分析)的根本要义是强调市场结构决定企业行为,进而在给定的市场结构中企业行为又决定市场绩效。我国的电力产业具有国有企业为主、较强的各级政府垄断和行政管制等特点,所以产权结构变化和规制体制的有效性也是影响市场绩效的重要结构性因素。本文基于传统SCP分析范式,结合对电力产业产权结构和规制体制的分析,解读我国电力产业的现状。     

论用户垄断

本文考察了用户垄断存在的基础及其对市场绩效的影响。指出 ,虽然不能断言所有的用户垄断都一定会损害市场绩效 ,但由于厂商或某些政府部门挟持用户垄断势力 ,进入公用事业的上游产业 ,从而必须对排斥竞争的垄断行为作出政策限制。限制某些处于自然垄断或政府垄断地位的公用事业企业投资上游的制造业 ,是市场经济中政府反垄断的核心 ,是鼓励公平竞争的反垄断法的精髓。     

自然垄断规制理论述评

规制(regulation)是政府对市场进行干预的一种行为。结合中外各类文献，规制可以分为狭义和广义两种，狭义的规制指对自然垄断产业的规制，广义的规制又分为两个层次：经济性规制与社会性规制。经济性规制除对自然垄断产业的规制以外，还包括金融规制等对比较重要的非自然垄断产业的规制。     

双边市场视角下的平台企业行为研究

具有双边市场特征的平台企业行为具有独特的经济特征,这些经济特征与传统单边市场中的企业行为有着根本的区别。传统的基于单边市场特征的产业规制理论,无法解释平台企业的经济行为,也就无法解决具有双边市场特征的平台产业中的垄断与竞争问题。对平台企业进行有效的政府规制亟须建立一套新的、基于双边市场特征的产业规制理论。     

行政垄断的形成机制及改革思路研究

对于存在市场失灵的行业,政府对竞争进行限制和排斥;但如果价格规制没有达到效果,则可认为政府规制实际造成了一种不合意的行政垄断的后果。行政垄断的博弈各方都是追求自身利益最大化的行为主体,尤其是政府追求其自身利益导致了行政垄断的产生;行政垄断程度大小受很多因素影响,大致可分为需求因素和供给因素两类。这些因素不但决定了行政垄断程度,而且决定了政企之间的利益分配。电信业改革启示我们,中央政府下一步可以从市场结构、规制改革、反垄断法三个方面破除行政垄断;要彻底根除行政垄断,政治体制改革不可避免。     

行政垄断、放松规制与产业绩效——基于原油开采业的实证分析

我国原油开采业是行政垄断而不是自然垄断,而行政垄断下原油开采业的市场绩效表明了其危害性.通过对我国原油开采业1998年的隐性放松规制进行界定,建立计量模型对这次放松规制的效果进行了实证分析,从理论和实践两方面证实了放松规制有利于我国原油开采业产业绩效的提升.     

自然垄断产业的治理:一个基于规制框架下竞争理论的视角

传统规制理论认为,为了实现资源的最优配置需要政府对自然垄断产业进行进入规制和价格规制乃至质量规制。但新近出现的规制框架下的竞争理论则提出对自然垄断产业进行竞争治理,如特许经营权竞标、可竞争市场、标尺竞争、直接竞争。前两者被认为是适合于市场的竞争,主张在规制领域引入事前或潜在竞争,来替代规制,达到社会最优化效果;标尺竞争试图让被规制企业与影子企业进行竞争,以解决效率问题;直接竞争从理论上讲比较完美,能促进生产效率和配置效率。但本文分析表明特许经营权竞标和可竞争市场两种间接竞争无法替代规制,而只能是对规制的一种补充;标尺竞争由于被规制企业往往差异很大,使用回归分析也无法抹平异质差异,且企业间存在合谋问题等,也只能是对规制的一种补充;直接竞争在实践中面临一系列的问题,无法完全替代规制。因此,为了兼顾社会福利的最大化和企业利润的最大化,对自然垄断产业不能完全实现竞争治理,而需要竞争与规制两种资源配置方式进行互补。     

基于拓展SCP框架下的长三角物流产业组织研究

物流产业的发展及企业物流合理化对策研究是一种宏观和微观层面的分析,成为近期研究和讨论的热点。但是从产业经济学角度出发,研究区域物流发展的文献相对较少。本文以长三角物流产业为对象,在产业组织SCP分析范式的基础上,通过引入市场环境和政府规制因素,从市场环境、政府规制、产业结构、市场行为和市场绩效五个方面来对长三角物流产业的总体发展水平进行比较全面的分析,并根据分析结果提出对策建议,为长三角物流产业未来的发展提供理论基础。     

信息、串谋与自然垄断产业规制

串谋现象的存在破坏了机制设计中的直接显示原理,使机制设计的信息空间维数增加从而使机制设计变得更为复杂。在转轨经济国家的自然垄断产业规制过程中,内部规制者对自然垄断厂商信息结构上的改进使规制政策的设计倾向于低激励强度的成本加成契约,而且串谋现象的存在使规制过程更带有规制掠夺的特征。同时,这一事实也成为转轨国家中多部门共同参与对自然垄断产业进行规制的重要原因。     

Collusion analysis of the Alabama liquid asphalt market

The Alabama liquid asphalt market in the USA is examined over the period 1961–1978 for evidence of activity consistent with collusion. Some 14 conditional collusion-facilitating factors that could influence a market's tendency towards collusion, not all equally important or necessarily in agreement with every other factor, were considered. While some of these factors are controversial and can help or harm a collusion, the net balance of factors and all of the important factors and evidence pointed towards being consistent with a conspiracy. While not examined as extensively, it was also found that the circumstantial evidence in the market was also consistent with collusion. This article suggests a procedural methodology for initiation and resolution of suspected collusion for determining appropriate damages. While the precise law and damages allowed will be country-specific, the general methodology should have wide application in many countries whose laws attempt to foster and preserve competition and punish and deter monopoly acquired and maintained by acting badly, such as by colluding or exclusionary conduct.     

The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth

This paper analyses the link between the internal organization of the firm and the growth process. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which monopoly firms face agency costs due to collusion between managers inside the organization. These costs affect incentives to invest and the rate of innovation in the economy. When collusion is self-enforcing, higher growth and more creative destruction shortens in turn the time horizon of colluding agents in the organization and makes internal collusion more difficult to sustain. We analyse this two-way mechanism between growth and agency problems and show how the transaction costs of side-contracting within the firm and the growth rate of the economy are simultaneously derived.     

Price collusion with free entry: the parasitic competition

The market equilibrium that is generated in the presence of both price collusion and free entry is analyzed taking under consideration the case of a homogeneous product and the case of differentiated products. The outcomes of this market regime are compared with those of other regimes, including competition (or monopolistic competition), monopoly, fixed price with collusive entry limitation. Some welfare implications of the market regime of price collusion with free entry are examined, with respect to the maximum social welfare allocation and the allocations of other market regimes, so to highlight the inefficiency of price collusion with free entry. The number of producers results to be the maximum number of firms that can produce without incurring into losses. Therefore, social distress is caused by a displacement from the price collusion equilibrium with free entry. Its defence can thus be considered in reference to the desirability of social goals that are in contradiction with economic efficiency.     

Viscous demand

In many markets, demand adjusts slowly to changes in prices, i.e., demand is “viscous”. This viscosity gives each firm some monopoly power, since it can raise its price above that of its competitors without immediately losing all of its customers. The resulting equilibrium pricing behavior and market outcomes can differ significantly from what one would predict in the absence of demand viscosity. In particular, the model explains the importance of market share as an investment, as well as “kinked demand curves”. It also explains how apparently “competitive” pricing behavior can lead to outcomes that mimic those of collusion.     

Collusive Long-Run Investments Under Transmission Price-Caps

In the short run, constraints in the electricity transmission system may give market power to generators. This paper examines whether the constraints themselves are a long-run equilibrium outcome in a competitive environment. We show that independent transmission companies and generators can tacitly collude to raise prices to consumers and divide the resulting profits. We also show that price cap regulation does not prevent this behavior and may in fact contribute to it. The mechanism for collusion is that generators locate their plants so that a capacity-constrained transmission line lies between them and their consumer market. We show that this constraint-based collusion can be sustained in a static game without any punishment strategies.     

垂直差异化与合谋稳定性关系分析

市场行为中的默契合谋能使企业获得超额利润,现存的关于生产同质品和差异化产品的经验性研究经常能发现默契合谋的证据.在现实经济的默契合谋行为中,不同的成本结构适用于不同的经济环境或者不同的行业、产业分析,也直接影响着合谋和背离合谋所得的利润,对合谋稳定性有着重要的影响.在垂直差异化的不同成本(固定成本、可变成本)结构下,企业参与竞争的不同竞争类型(古诺竞争和伯川德竞争)对合谋稳定性的影响也是有差异的.     

Does Institutional Linkage of Bank‐MFI Foster Inclusive Financial Development Even in the Presence of MFI Frauds?

Growing reports indicate the presence of frauds in microfinance institutions (MFIs), as it can occur in any organization in countries where there are weak institutions, weak rule of law, and fraudulent behavior of MFI officers for personal gain. While there are increasing calls to launch financial governance of these NGO MFIs, there are concerns as to whether frauds of this nature can damage MFIs’ contributions to the credit market, particularly in the bank‐linkage program where the NGO MFIs act as third party intermediary. The purpose of this study was to analyze the collusion decisions faced by MFIs and their impact on the bank‐linkage program, which has been offered as a solution to help overcome adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the credit market by harnessing local information via MFIs. Our results show that even when there is a chance of collusion between MFI and the borrower, the linkage between MFI and bank can still increase the probability that the borrower puts in full effort, and therefore decreases the probabilities of both credit rationing and strategic default. Such linkage in financing viable projects can make micro‐financing more effective in achieving inclusive financial development and thereby poverty reduction in rural areas.     

流通产业组织结构优化中的自然垄断趋势

流通产业的组织结构是产业经济学关注的重要理论问题之一,人们或是根据产业组织学理论从商品流通企业的市场关系对其进行分析,或是从流通产业内部的资源配置结构及关联对其展开考察,或是在"结构、行为、绩效"框架下对其进行研究.其实,产业的组织结构涉及的层面很复杂,它与自然垄断之间有可能存在的关联尚未引起学者们应有的关注.本文认为,依据产业经济学对自然垄断的理解或定义,流通产业组织结构的优化与自然垄断之间存在着关联,这种关联可以通过流通产业运行的内部性和外部性予以揭示,对这种关联的分析,可以发现在流通产业组织结构的优化中蕴含着自然垄断的趋势.     

公用企业限制竞争行为的规制

随着中国社会主义市场经济体制的逐步建立和完善,竞争在市场经济中的作用越来越重要,但是一些企业特别是公用企业利用自身的独占地位想方设法限制竞争,扰乱了自由和公平的竞争秩序。为此,有必要对公用企业限制竞争行为进行规制。     

竞合行为对装备制造业市场拓展的影响

以我国装备制造业20家上市公司的市场经营数据为样本,从市场效率、市场份额、产品差异等角度考察竞合对市场拓展产生的影响。研究发现,竞合行为的模式不同对装备制造业市场拓展产生的影响也不同,竞合行为并不会必然使双方都获得收益。从分析数据看,以关联联盟形式进行的竞合更能导致企业相对市场效率的改变,以规模联盟形式进行的竞合更有利于产品差异化,而在市场进入方面两种形式的竞合没有显著差异。显然,装备制造业如何理性选择竞合行为和实施策略以参与国际竞争成为亟待解决的问题。