Keynes and Wagner on government expenditures and economic development: the case of a developing economy

This paper investigates the Keynesian view and the Wagner’s Law on the role of public expenditure on economic growth for Malaysia (1970–2004). The empirical results using the Auto-Regression Distributed Lag (ARDL) model and the ‘bounds test’ (Pesaran et al. in J Appl Econ 16:289–326, 2001) showed evidence of a long run relationship between total expenditures (including expenditures on defense, education, development and agriculture) and Gross National Product. The results also show that with the structural break in 1998, the long run causality is bi-directional for GNP and expenditures on administration and health, supporting both Keynes view and Wagner’s Law. For all other expenditure categories the long run causality runs from GNP to the expenditures, which supports Wagner’s Law. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Agreeing on generalised Darwinism: a response to Pavel Pelikan

Pelikan (J Evol Econ 21:341–366, 2011) develops an interesting conceptual framework that adds to prior work on generalised Darwinism. Despite claims to the contrary we show that it is similar to the approach developed by Hodgson and Knudsen (J Evol Econ 16(4):343–366, 2006a, J Econ Behav Organ 75(1):12–24, 2010a, b), Aldrich et al. (J Evol Econ 18(5):577–596, 2008) and others. Pelikan also mischaracterises the Hodgson–Knudsen position over Lamarckism. We show why the term is misleading (rather than strictly wrong) when applied to social evolution.     

Moments of truncated <Emphasis Type="Italic">t</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">F</Emphasis> distributions

Truncated distributions commonly arise in economics and related areas, see, for example, Lee (Econ Lett 3:165–169, 1979), Lien (Econ Lett 19:243–247, 1985; Econ Lett 20:45–47, 1986), Burdett (Econ Lett 52:263–267, 1996), Sercu (Insur: Math and Econ 20:79–95, 1997), Abadir and Magdalinos (Econom Theory 18:1276–1287, 2002), and Horrace (J Econom 126:335–354, 2005). In this note, we consider the most commonly encountered truncated distributions with heavy tails: the truncated t distribution and the truncated F distribution. For each of these distributions, we derive explicit expressions for the moments and estimation procedures by the method of moments and the method of maximum likelihood. An application is illustrated to a popular data set in the econometric literature.      

The Zilcha criteria for dynamic inefficiency reconsidered

We reconsider necessary and sufficient conditions for dynamic inefficiency given in Zilcha (J Econ Theory 52:364–379, 1990, J Econ Theory 55:1–16, 1991) and a critique by Rangazas and Russell (2005). First, we show that the characterization given in Zilcha (1990) for nonstationary economies is correct and correct Zilcha’s proof. Second, using this insight, we complement Rangazas and Russell’s (Econ Theory 26:701–716, 2005) discussion of the counterexamples to Zilcha (J Econ Theory 55:1–16, 1991). Third, we discuss consequences of our results for applied tests of (in-)efficiency based on the Zilcha criteria. We would like to thank Itzhak Zilcha, and in particular Peter Rangazas and Steve Russell for detailed and very helpful comments.     

The social costs of gun ownership revisited

Cook and Ludwig (J Public Econ 90:379–391, 2006) use data on homicide rates and gun prevalence proxies from US counties over the period 1980–19     

Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents

We provide several different generalizations of Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem by allowing for asymmetric information and a continuum of agents. The results not only extend the ones in Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77:330–353, 1977), Yannelis and Rustichini (Stud Econ Theory 2:23–48, 1991), but also new theorems are obtained which allow for a convexifying effect on aggregation (non-concavity assumption on the utility functions) and non-convex strategy sets (pure strategies). This is achieved by imposing the assumption of “many more agents than strategies” (Rustichini and Yannelis in Stud Econ Theory 1:249–265, 1991; Tourky and Yannelis in J Econ Theory 101:189–221, 2001; Podczeck in Econ Theory 22:699–725, 2003). To the memory of Gerard Debreu. A preliminary draft was presented in Paris, in April of 2005. I have benefited from the discussion, comments and questions of Erik Balder, Jean-Marc Bonnisseu, Bernard Cornet and Filipe Martins Da-Rocha and Conny Podczeck. A careful and knowledgeable referee made several useful comments and rescued me from a mishap.     

Macroeconomic changes and mortality in Mexico

While previous studies examine how the business cycle affects mortality in developed countries, less is known about this relationship in developing countries. In this paper, we investigate whether the procyclical nature of mortality in developed countries found by Ruhm (Q J Econ 115(2):617–650, 2000) and others is also present in Mexico. We assemble a unique panel data set that contains state-level data on mortality rates by age and cause of death, GDP per capita, and socioeconomic status. We find that for Mexico total mortality rates are procyclical, with the largest impact on those aged 20–49. While these findings are similar to those in Ruhm (Q J Econ 115(2):617–650, 2000), the effects of business cycles on mortality rates differ for several specific causes of death. These results suggest that whereas total mortality may be procyclical in both developed and developing countries, significant differences may exist for some causes of death.     

Is the monetary policy rule responsive to exchange rate changes? The case of Indonesia,Malaysia, the Philippines,and Thailand

Extending Obstfeld and Rogoff (J Econ Perspect 9:73–96, 1995), Ball (Monetary policy rules, University of Chicago Press, pp. 127–144, 1999), Svensson (J Int Econ 50: 155–183, 2000), Taylor (Am Econ Rev 91: 263–267, 2001), Gali and Gertler (J Econ Perspect 21:25–46, 2007), and others, this paper finds that central banks in the Philippines and Thailand respond negatively to the current real exchange rate and positively to the lagged real exchange rate whereas central banks in Indonesia and Malaysia do not react to the current or lagged real exchange rate. For the Philippines and Thailand, the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of the current and lagged real exchange rates is zero cannot be rejected at the 5% level. Central banks in these four countries respond positively to the inflation rate and the output gap, suggesting that the concept of a simple or an extended Taylor rule would apply to these countries. Monetary policy reaction functions for Indonesia and Thailand are steeper than those for Malaysia and the Philippines and would be more responsive to a change in the inflation rate.      

A Note on Clean Technology Adoption and its Influence on Tradeable Emission Permits Prices

In this paper, we give an example in which the price of tradable emission permits increases despite firms’ adoption of less polluting technology, a result that is in contrast with Montero (J Environ Econ 44:23–44, 2002) and Parry (J Regul Econ 14:229–254, 1998), among others. If two Cournot players switch to a cleaner technology, the price for permits may increase due to an increase in the net demand for permits and a decrease in the net supply of permits after the clean technology is adopted. This is only the case when output demand is quite elastic.     

Sensitivity analysis of job-training effects on reemployment for Korean women

The main difficulty in treatment effect analysis with matching is accounting for unobserved differences (i.e., selection problem) between the treatment and control groups, because matching assumes no such differences. The traditional way to tackle the difficulty has been “control function” approaches with selection correction terms. This paper examines relatively new approaches: sensitivity analyses—sensitivity to unobservables—in Rosenbaum (Biometrika 74:13–26, 1987), Gastwirth et al. (Biometrika 85:907–920, 1998) and Lee (J Appl Econ 19:323–337, 2004). These sensitivity analyses are applied to the data used in Lee and Lee (J Appl Econ 20:549–562, 2005) to see how the assumption of no unobserved difference in matching affects the findings in Lee and Lee, to compare how the different sensitivity analyses perform, and to relate the “sensitivity parameters” in the different sensitivity analyses to one another. We find (i) the conclusions in Lee and Lee are weakened in the sense that only the “strong” ones survive, (ii) the sensitivity analysis in Rosenbaum (Biometrika 74:13–26, 1987) is too conservative (and inferior to Gastwirth et al.’s), and (iii) Gastwirth et al.’s and Lee’s approaches agree on some findings to be insensitive, but the two approaches also disagree on some other findings. The authors are grateful to the Editor and anonymous reviewers for their constructive and helpful comments.     

Optimal pricing of a two-sided monopoly platform with a one-sided congestion effect

This paper studies the optimal pricing of a two-sided monopoly platform when one side is affected by congestion. We show that the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy (or skewed pricing) depends not only on the relative magnitude of the sides’ price elasticities of demand but it also depends on the marginal congestion cost that an agent imposes on the others. Compared with the no-congestion case, this pricing strategy gives rise to some interesting features that violate the results of Rochet and Tirole (J Eur Econ Assoc 1:990–1029 in 2003, Rand J Econ 37:645–667 in 2006). In the case of equal price elasticities of demand, the no-congested side is charged the highest price. On the other hand, in the case of different price elasticities, the platform congestion pricing depends on a certain threshold of the marginal congestion cost. We show, under some conditions, that the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy is reversed. In the social context, the Rochet and Tirole’s (J Eur Econ Assoc 1:990–1029 in 2003) cost allocation condition is modified by the congestion cost. We show that the congestion does not only affect the buyers’ contribution to the sellers’ surplus, but it also affects the sellers’ contribution to the buyers’.     

State-owned enterprises as indirect instruments of entry regulation

In the context of mixed markets, Matsumura and Kanda (J Econ 84(1): 27–48, 2005) show that social welfare in free entry equilibrium is maximized when there exists a public firm in the market. En passant, these authors state that this outcome is connected to the entry-deterring influence of a public firm. In this way, they counter-act the excess entry problem of Mankiw and Whinston (Rand J Econ 17(1): 48–58, 1986). We explain this result arguing that the state-owned firm can be an indirect instrument to regulate entry. In fact, under free entry equilibrium welfare may be greater with the presence of a public firm than with a social planner.      

Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry

Campbell (J Econ Theory 82:425–450, 1998) develops a self-enforced collusion mechanism in simultaneous auctions based on complete comparative cheap talk and endogenous entry, with two bidders. His result is difficult to generalize to an arbitrary number of bidders, since the entry-decision stage of the game is characterized by strategic substitutes. This paper analyzes more-than-two-bidder, symmetric-prior cases. Two results are proved: (1) as the number of objects grows large, a full comparative cheap talk equilibrium exists and it yields asymptotically fully efficient collusion; and (2) there is always a partial comparative cheap talk equilibrium. All these results are supported by intuitive equilibria at the entry-decision stage (J Econ Theory 130:205–219, 2006; Math Soc Sci 2008, forthcoming). Numerical examples suggest that full comparative cheap talk equilibria are not uncommon even with few objects.     

On purification of measure-valued maps

This paper presents new methods to obtain purification results for continuum games, which don’t make use of the “many more players than strategies” assumption (Yannelis in Econ Theory (in press) 2007) or of Loeb spaces (Loeb and Sun in Illinois J Math 50, 747–762, 2006). The approach presented doesn’t use nonstandard analysis; it is based on standard measure theory and in particular on the super-nonatomicity notion introduced in Podczeck (J Math Econ (in press) 2007). Thanks to Erik Balder, Peter Loeb, Yeneng Sun, and Nicholas Yannelis for helpful comments.     

Measuring chronic and transient components of poverty: a Bayesian approach

After the publication of Ravallion’s Econ J 98:1171–1182, 1988 seminal work on chronic and transient poverty, wide attention has been given to the components of poverty. We propose a Bayesian mixture model to measure poverty and divide it into chronic and the transient poverty using the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) measure. These two types of poverty are illustrated using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data.      

Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment

The Dixit (Econ J 90:95–106, 1980) hypothesis that incumbents use investment in capacity to deter potential entrants has found little empirical support. Bagwell and Ramey (J Econ 27:660–680, 1996) propose a model where, in the unique game-theoretic prediction based on forward induction or iterated elimination of weakly-dominated strategies, the incumbent does not have the strategic advantage. We conduct an experiment with games inspired by these models. In the Dixit-style game, the incumbent monopolizes the market most of the time even without the investment in capacity. In our Bagwell-and-Ramey-style game, the incumbent also tends to keep the market, in contrast to the predictions of an entrant advantage. Nevertheless, we find strong evidence that forward induction affects the behavior of most participants. The results of our games suggest that players perceive that the first mover has an advantage without having to pre-commit capacity. In our Bagwell–Ramey game, evolution and learning do not drive out this perception. We back these claims with data analysis and a theoretical framework for dynamics. Financial support by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia and Tecnología (SEC2002-01352 and SEJ2006-11665-C02-01) and the Barcelona Economic Program of CREA and excellent research assistance by David Rodríguez are gratefully acknowledged. The authors thank Aurora García Gallego and Armin Schmutzler for helpful comments.     

On locally optimal programs in the Robinson–Solow–Srinivasan model

In the context of a model due to Robinson, Solow and Srinivasan (the RSS model), we report results on the existence and characterization of locally optimal programs, a concept taken from theoretical physics. In particular, we propose a (new) transversality condition under which all locally optimal programs are good. An extended introduction places our theorems in the context of previous work on the existence question, including that on agreeable programs. It appears that there is no completely rational way to attack [the] problem without considering development programmes over an infinite horizon (Gale in Rev Econ Stud 34:1–8, 1967). The analysis of simple models is essential if we are to understand the corresponding situation for more complex models of the economy (Mirrlees and Stern in J Econ Theory 4:268–288, 1972). The technical convenience, for clear and quantitative results, of using an infinite time horizon is rather great (Hammond and Mirrlees in Models of economic growth, Wiley, New York, pp 283–299, 1973).     

Testing for cointegration using the Johansen methodology when variables are near-integrated: size distortions and partial remedies

We investigate the properties of Johansen’s (J Econ Dyn Control 12:231–254, 1988; Econometrica 59:1551–1580, 1991) maximum eigenvalue and trace tests for cointegration under the empirically relevant situation of near-integrated variables. Using Monte Carlo techniques, we show that in a system with near-integrated variables, the probability of reaching an erroneous conclusion regarding the cointegrating rank of the system is generally substantially higher than the nominal size. The risk of concluding that completely unrelated series are cointegrated is therefore non-negligible. We suggest ways of identifying the problem and different approaches to reduce the size distortions of the tests.     

Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences

I include a role for time preferences within a version of the Young (J Econ Theory 59:145–168, 1993b) evolutionary model of bargaining. With or without time preferences, the stochastic stable convention yields a generalized version of the Nash (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) Bargaining Solution. When time preferences are added to the model, agents’ discount factors enter into the stochastically stable convention in a natural manner. That is, an agent’s discount factor acts as a bargaining weight within the Nash Bargaining Solution. By taking appropriate limits, an evolutionary foundation for the Rubinstein (Econometrica 50:97–110, 1982) Bargaining Solution is provided. I thank Lew Evans, Jack Leach, Collin Starkweather, Aaron Strong, a referee and associate editor. All errors are my own.     

Optimal balanced growth in a general multi-sector endogenous growth model with constant returns

I will study a multi-sector endogenous growth model with general constant returns to scale technologies and demonstrate the existence, uniqueness and the saddle-path stability of the balanced growth equilibrium. I will first demonstrate the existence of a balanced growth equilibrium, by showing that the balanced growth rate associated with the balanced growth equilibrium is solely determined by solving a Frobenius root problem of the price equations derived from the Euler equations and the property of the nonsubstitution theorem. Then I will show the saddle-path stability of the balanced growth equilibrium without any capital intensity conditions, which is a generalized property proved in the two-sector endogenous growth models by de Guevara et al. (J Econ Dyn Control 21, 115–143, 1997), Bond et al. (J Econ Theory 68, 149–173 1996) and Mino (Int Eco Rev 37, 227–251 1996). The theorem clearly implies that the balanced growth equilibrium has a transition path in the neighborhood of the balanced growth equilibrium. The paper was presented at the conferences “Irregular Growth: Beyond Balanced Growth” held on June 19–21, 2003 in Paris and “Economic Growth and Distribution: On the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” held on June 16–18, 2004 in Lucca, Italy. From the discussion with Alain Venditti at CNRS-GREQAM, Gerhard Sorger at University of Vienna and the conference participants, I have been benefited much by writing this paper. Especially Alain Venditte had given me a chance to take a look at his unpublished paper titled ” Indeterminacy and the Role of Factor Substitutability” jointly written with Kazuo Nishimura at Kyoto University and published in Macroeconomic Dynamics, Vol. 8. The author also would like to thank an anonymous referee for useful suggestions.