A study on promotion with strategic two-stage customized bundling

In order to enhance both purchase willingness and consumer satisfaction, firms may sell products in a customized bundling way, with which consumers are allowed to select their preferred products to form a bundle. However, such a way needs to be carried out with an efficient strategic tool. This study contributes to the literature by proposing a two-stage customized bundling strategy with the aims of maximizing the firm's profit and satisfying the consumers' demands. The proposed strategy may assist managers in enhancing consumer satisfaction and loyalty under consideration of consumer heterogeneity. Consumers can select one main product with the greatest utility from the main product category at the first stage, and then, at the second, consider the associations between the chosen main and possible add-on products in the add-on product category, and finally select an add-on product to form a customized bundle with the greatest overall utility. Pricing strategies are investigated and compared for the customized and other traditional bundling strategies. The results show that when consumers are highly sensitive in their preferences, the use of a customized bundling strategy would be more profitable. However, in an extreme case when the consumer's perceived value of the add-on product and product association are both high, the traditional individual sales strategy would earn more profits than the customized bundling strategy.     

Temporal product bundling with myopic and strategic consumers: Manifestations and relative effectiveness

Bundling in this era of eCommerce and high technology is a potent and widespread selling tool. The literature has focused on three static bundling strategies under which the products are sold separately (pure components or PC) or only in a bundled form (pure bundling or PB) or both (mixed bundling or MB). In a generalization, and motivated by real world examples, this paper examines the relative effectiveness of temporal bundling. We consider a firm that sells to a market of myopic and strategic consumers, and a selling season consisting of two stages. We compare four strategies – PC-PC (i.e., pure components in each of two stages), PB-PB, PB-PC and PC-PB – relative to MB. Our results show that PB-PB maximizes profits under low marginal costs; PC-PC prevails under high marginal costs given a large proportion of myopic consumers; and PB-PC is profit maximizing under moderate marginal costs when most consumers are strategic. These temporal strategies dominate MB except when the market is comprised entirely of strategic consumers. Finally, while temporal mixed bundling – MB-MB – is weakly superior to other temporal strategies, the latter are much easier to implement, as shown by real-world uses, and suffice to capture most of the profits. Related interesting pricing implications are discussed. Three extensions to the main model are also proposed.     

Strategic Role of Retailer Bundling in a Distribution Channel

We study retailer bundling in a distribution channel when the manufacturer for one bundled product can strategically set the wholesale price. We show that the retailer can use a bundling option as a strategic leverage to extract concessions from the manufacturer in form of a lower wholesale price. This finding contributes a novel rationale for retailer bundling to the bundling literature. Whenever the bundling option causes this concession-extraction effect, the retailer always benefits from the lower wholesale price. The manufacturer, nevertheless, does not necessarily suffer because bundling can lead to a higher consumer demand. We also show that the manufacturer's marginal production cost plays a critical role in driving the retailer's bundling decision, concession extraction behavior and consequently the total channel profit.     

Partitioning or bundling? Perceived fairness of the surcharge makes a difference

Partitioned pricing charges a base price and a surcharge instead of an equivalent all‐inclusive price. In contrast, a bundling strategy offers a bundled price instead of separate prices for products in one package. Which pricing practice is more profitable? Previous research has shown conflicting results. This research identifies the boundary conditions which circumscribe the profitability of partitioned and bundled pricing. Results of three experiments indicate that the relative significance of the surcharge to the base price influences consumers' perception of the fairness of the surcharge, which in turn influences consumer purchase intentions. Furthermore, given the same level of surcharge, consumers' perceptions of the fairness of the surcharge moderates the effect of the pricing strategies. Thus, perceived fairness of the surcharge appears to be the key in determining whether or not the partitioning strategy is more profitable than the bundling strategy. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Product Differentiation,Industry Concentration and Market Share Turbulence

Building on the current theory of industrial concentration, we analyze the relation between market size and product differentiation, and show how product differentiation impacts market share turbulence. We first propose that in markets where vertical product differentiation dominates, firms will have an incentive to escalate investment in advertising and/or R&D as market size increases. Secondly, such (firm‐specific) investments will make competitive advantage more sustainable as the firm is less imitable. This will not be the case if the market is primarily characterized by homogeneous products or horizontal product differentiation. Our predictions are tested using an original EU dataset for 1987 and 1997. Our results strongly support our predictions – the degree of market share turbulence increases with market size. However, this relation is weakened by competitive investment in advertising and R&D.     

Pricing and persuasive advertising in a differentiated market

This paper examines the effects of consumer preferences, firms’ costs, and advertising efficiencies on firms’ pricing and persuasive advertising strategies. We show that as the firms’ horizontal differentiation increases, the firm with a lower value-added product tends to increase persuasive advertising, whereas its competitor tends to reduce advertising. Second, the firm receiving a favorable shock in product valuation will complement the favorable change with additional persuasive advertising rather than reduce advertising spending. Third, an equal improvement in advertising efficiency in the industry will lower the profits for both firms, whereas a decrease in advertising efficiency in the industry can benefit both firms. Fourth, a larger shock that improves a firm’s product valuation or unit cost is more likely to induce higher advertising spending in the industry. Lastly, an exogenous increase in the separation between firms’ product valuations or perceived qualities may actually reduce the price dispersion in the industry.     

Marketing and advertising practices of Turkish entrepreneurs in transition economies: Evidence from Georgia

As a transition economy, Georgia has an uncertain, complex, and immature business environment, typical of transition economies in the Eurasian region. In an effort to provide insights into marketing and advertising practices in the Eurasian transition economies, this study empirically examines the marketing and advertising practices in Georgia through two surveys conducted with Turkish entrepreneurs in Georgia and Georgian consumers. On the one hand, the findings of the survey of the Turkish entrepreneurs indicated that an overall adaptation strategy is needed in Georgia; in addition, foreign entrepreneurs willing to enter the Georgian market are advised to offer a variety of products by collaborating with local distributors and agents. Although Georgian consumers do not have high income, low-price strategy does not always work as consumers equate low price with inferior quality. Marketing of prestigious products are to be sold at higher prices and appropriate product positioning strategies must be developed for each target market segment. Merchandising strategies must be congruent with the target market served as well as retail stores/outlets utilized. On the other hand, the Georgian consumers demand better customer service and increased variety of products; advertising is welcomed to a certain extent as long as advertising provides useful product/brand and company information.     

National advertising,dual-channel coordination and firm performance

With the rapid development of e-commerce, many manufacturers nowadays opt to open an online channel to engage in direct online sales. The mix of retailing with an online channel adds a new dimension of competition and complementarity to a product's distribution channels. Our model focuses on the strategic effect of the manufacturer's national advertising on alleviating the channel competition. We use a game-theoretical model to show that opening an online channel with the added national advertising effectively alleviates the channel conflict and thus helps improve the whole channel and each channel member performance. Depending on the different product categories and the degree of channel substitutability, the manufacturer's investment in the national advertising also will be different. The value of national advertising increases as product is more compatible with online sales and channel substitutability increases.     

Advertising and Steiner’s Dual Stage Model: Our Assessment

Between 1967 and 1979, we produced a number of studies that explored different facets of the economics of advertising. This work culminated in our 1974 book entitled Advertising and Market Power. Our leading hypothesis was that heavy advertising expenditures often but not always had anti‐competitive effects. And our primary empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis was that industries with heavy advertising expenditures also reported higher profit rates, which we interpreted as indicating that higher prices followed when manufacturers can effectively spend large amounts on advertising. Since that time, Robert Steiner has developed a model of firm behaviour for consumer goods industries. He finds that distribution margins are generally higher where manufacturer prices are lower. Furthermore, heavy manufacturer advertising is likely to depress distribution margins for heavily advertised products. While our earlier work implicitly assumed that distribution margins are generally the same regardless of the volume of advertising, Steiner’s results raise doubt on this assumption. Steiner’s model must therefore be acknowledged when interpreting our earlier findings.     

Strategies for new product development

In spite of much evidence of its success, many managers hesitate to establish a policy for new product development. Their indecision often arises from two reasons: they fear that a defined strategy may discourage innovation and they are uncertain how to formulate a new product strategy. The author of this article discredits the former notion and, in reply to the latter, proposes the guidelines for developing such a statement. As new products are essential to the continued success of most firms, the strategy must exist and must be operant if the firm is to avoid wasted time, effort, and money as well as employee confusion and discouragement.     

Strategic Implications of Keeping Product Value Secret from Competitor’s Customers

Customers can sometimes learn unanticipated or hidden use value of a firm’s product whereas the non-customers remain uninformed about that extra value. A monopolist will increase its profit by informing the non-customers of its product’s hidden value. However, our analysis reveals that this may not be true when the firm faces competition in the market—the firm may actually make a higher profit if it keeps its hidden value secret from its competitor’s customers even if advertising to inform those customers is costless. This is because no advertising leads to information heterogeneity among consumers about the existence of the firm’s hidden value, which gives an incentive for both firms to continue targeting their own existing customers rather than poaching each other’s customers, alleviating price competition and increasing firms’ profits. This beneficial strategic effect of keeping some product value secret from the competitor’s customers can persist even when the firms anticipate the hidden value and compete more aggressively for customers in the early period. Our research suggests that firms can benefit from an “under-promise and over-deliver” strategy if they refrain from communicating their extra value to the competitor’s customers. Moreover, positive word of mouth about a firm’s product will not necessarily benefit the firm and can in fact make all firms worse off.     

The role of complementarity and partner brand price level in new product introduction strategy using bundle offers: A study on the quality perception of bundle components

The quality perception of a new brand improves when it is bundled with a product having a strong brand image, moderated by the level of complementarity between the bundle components. This study takes this research forward with the help of two experiments. The first experiment uses anchoring and adjustment process to conclude that the quality perception of a new brand further strengthens if bundled with a strong brand of a higher price category than itself. The second experiment concludes that the quality perception of the strong brand can also deter if bundled with a new product of uncertain quality.     

Designing the content of advertising in a differentiated market

In many markets, consumers use attribute information to assess the value they expect from purchasing a product or service. This includes many low involvement experience goods including take-out food, many packaged good categories and restaurants. In these markets, quality differences exist but many differences are horizontal in nature: the consumer is interested in finding a product that meets her unique tastes. Beyond ensuring that consumers know the brand, the category and the price; it seems advertising should provide consumers with attribute information. However, a significant proportion of advertising does not provide it. In fact, within the same category, competitors respond to messages that emphasize detailed attribute information with messages that are devoid of attribute information. These messages are uninformative about product attributes. We explore how competition in a differentiated market is affected by the ability of a firm has to choose uninformative messages. We construct a model to investigate the factors that affect a firm’s decision to use advertising with detailed attribute information or advertising that does not provide it. The model demonstrates that content decisions about advertising are affected by the differences between products, the range of heterogeneity in consumer tastes and the degree to which costs increase as a function of the quantity of information in advertising. Surprisingly, even when the cost to increase the quantity of information in advertising is low, uninformative campaigns can be more profitable than campaigns with attribute information. The analysis also demonstrates that firms can be more likely to provide attribute information when there are less consumers that are attribute-sensitive. Finally, the model shows that uninformative messages can create “artificial differentiation” in some situations.     

To Bundle or Not to Bundle: Firms’ Choices under Pure Bundling

We examine the economic implications of pure bundling under the settings of monopoly and duopoly. We show that under monopoly and pure bundling of goods with independent demands, the bundled price is strictly less than the sum of the unbundled prices. In the setting of duopoly and Nash prices, we examine whether bundling can be used as a tool to deter entry. In contrast to the findings of previous studies, we show that with low entry costs, entry is deterred by unbundled as opposed to bundled sales. With high entry costs, however, the incumbent chooses to bundle.     

Consumer deliberation and quality signaling

Consumers are often uncertain about their product valuation before purchase. They may bear the uncertainty and purchase the product without deliberation. Alternatively, consumers can incur a deliberation cost to find out their true valuation and then make their purchase decision. This paper proposes that consumer deliberation about product valuation can be an endogenous mechanism to enable credible quality signaling. We demonstrate this point in a simple setup in which product quality influences the probability that the product has high valuation. We show that with endogenous deliberation there may exist a unique separating equilibrium in which the high-quality firm induces consumer deliberation by setting a high price whereas the low-quality firm prevents deliberation by charging a low price. Compared to the case of complete information, the price of the high-quality firm can be distorted upward to facilitate consumer deliberation, or distorted downward to avoid the low-quality firm’s imitation. In an extension we show that dissipative advertising can facilitate quality signaling. The high-quality firm can utilize advertising spending to avert imitation from the low-quality firm without distorting price downward, earning a higher profit than that without advertising. However, advertising mitigates the distortion at the expense of consumer surplus and social welfare.     

Complementary effect of entrepreneurial and market orientations on export new product success under differing levels of competitive intensity and financial capital

The literature implies that entrepreneurial and market orientations are market-based resources that are essential for securing business success, but their performance impacts are unclear. In the specific field of export research, there is limited information on the interactive effect of these two market-based resources on export new product performance. Accordingly, the current study investigates the joint impacts of these two resources on export new product performance under differing levels of competitive intensity and financial capital. Using a survey of 212 British exporters, the study shows that seeking complementarity between entrepreneurial-oriented and market-oriented behaviors is a useful strategy for export new product success, especially when there is a suitably high level of competitive intensity in the export market environment, and when the export unit has greater access to financial capital. Theoretical and managerial implications of the results are discussed.     

Market convergence and advertising standardization in the European Union

In this study, we draw on industrial organization and institutional research to explore the relationship between market convergence and standardization of advertising programs. We argue that environmental isomorphism, which maintains that the external market environment is a principal driver of firms’ institutional structures, places pressure on firms to adapt their organizational structures and strategies to changing institutional conditions. We propose that the convergence associated with European market integration will lead firms to emphasize three advertising strategies: creating a uniform brand image, appealing to cross-market segments, and increasing cost performance in advertising. Further, we hypothesize that these strategies will be associated with an overall tendency to standardize advertising strategy and execution. Results of a survey of managers of subsidiaries of Japanese and U.S. firms operating in the EU suggest that firms that believe the EU is converging are more likely to engage in these standardized advertising strategies. Additionally, our findings suggest that firms that seek to create a uniform brand image and appeal to cross-market segments are more likely to standardize their overall advertising programs. Finally, we find that firms’ desire to create a uniform brand image is a function of their goal of building brand equity, regardless of the level to which markets converge. We draw implications for research and practice regarding firm responses to market convergence.     

隐性与显性的优势互补——内容营销与传统广告的全方位解析

内容营销作为一种隐性的广告形式，已经成为显性传统广告的有利补充，但二者又有着本质的差别。内容营销所要传达的广告信息往往是隐藏在娱乐内容之中，在潜移默化之中引起消费者对品牌的共鸣，这是内容营销与传统广告的最大不同。同时，由于二者表现形式的不同，导致广告主的传播策略、广告创意空间及广告效果测评等方面也存在很大差别。本文通过对内容营销与传统广告的全方位解析，探求二者如何实现优势互补。