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1.
Brennan and Hamlin [(2002) Constitutional Political Economy 13(4): 299–311] noted that expressive voting still holds at the constitutional phase. The argument, when taken to its necessary conclusion, proves quite problematic for Constitutional Political Economy. Veil mechanisms following Buchanan induce expressive voting at the constitutional phase, removing the normative benefits ascribed to the hypothetical unanimity principle. If the constitution is authored by a small group and the veil is thereby removed, instrumental considerations come to bear and the authors of the constitution establish themselves as Oligarch. 相似文献
2.
This paper, which builds on Chipman (The economist’s vision. Essays in modern economic perspectives, 131–162, 1998), analyzes a simple model formulated by Hurwicz (Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) of two agents—a polluter and a pollutee—and two commodities: “money” (standing for an exchangeable private good desired
by both agents) and “pollution” (a public commodity desired by the polluter but undesired by the pollutee). There is also
a government that issues legal rights to the two agents to emit a certain amount of pollution, which can be bought and sold
with money. It is assumed that both agents act as price-takers in the market for pollution rights, so that competitive equilibrium
is possible. The “Coase theorem” (so-called by Stigler (The theory of price, 1966) asserts that the equilibrium amount of pollution is independent of the allocation of pollution rights. A sufficient condition
for this was (in another context) obtained by Edgeworth (Giorn Econ 2:233–245, 1891), namely that preferences of the two agents be “parallel” in the money commodity, whose marginal utility is constant. Hurwicz
(Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) argued that this parallelism is also necessary. This paper, which provides an exposition of the problem, raises some questions
about this result and provides an alternative necessary and sufficient condition. 相似文献
3.
William A. Niskanen 《Constitutional Political Economy》1990,1(2):53-62
Massive changes in the effective constitution—primarily bearing on the economic powers of the federal government, primarily
in the past 60 years—have revived interest in the problem of constitutional maintenance. This paper finds the conventional
American theory of constitutional maintenance to have at least three major problems. The paper then suggests three propositions
about constitutional maintenance, building on the developing theory ofproprietary government. The most important conclusion is how little we know about this subject.
Paper presented at Panel on Constitutional Political Economy: Annual Meeting of the Southern Economic Association; Orlando,
Florida; 19–21 Nov. 1989 相似文献
4.
Simone M. Cuiabano Jose Angelo Divino 《International Advances in Economic Research》2010,16(4):345-357
The goal of this paper is to test a variant of the monetary exchange rate determination model, described by Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1996), for the Brazilian economy in the recent period. The model starts with the Cagan (The Journal of Political Economy, 66(4):303–328,
1958) money demand, which is complemented by the hypotheses of purchase power parity (PPP) and uncovered interest parity (UIP).
We used monthly data of exchange rate, GDP, interest rate for Brazil, and U.S. interest rate and inflation as proxies for
international variables. We applied cointegration tests to identify a long run relationship among the variables. The estimated
error correction model offers an exchange rate determination model in the short run. Due to potential endogeneity of some
variables, GMM was applied to estimate a long-run model of exchange rate determination. The forecasting results of both estimatives
were compared with a random walk approach. The results point to the existence of a long and short run equilibrium Real/dollar
exchange rate using the structural model, which may be the achievement of this paper. 相似文献
5.
Pelikan (J Evol Econ 21:341–366, 2011) develops an interesting conceptual framework that adds to prior work on generalised Darwinism. Despite claims to the contrary
we show that it is similar to the approach developed by Hodgson and Knudsen (J Evol Econ 16(4):343–366, 2006a, J Econ Behav Organ 75(1):12–24, 2010a, b), Aldrich et al. (J Evol Econ 18(5):577–596, 2008) and others. Pelikan also mischaracterises the Hodgson–Knudsen position over Lamarckism. We show why the term is misleading
(rather than strictly wrong) when applied to social evolution. 相似文献
6.
Khaled Bennour 《International Review of Economics》2009,56(2):163-173
This paper extends the prey–predator model of Grossman and Kim (J Political Econ 103:1275–1288, 1995) to analyze the relation between the value of a contested rent and the emergence of conflict. We show that an increase in
the value of the rent makes a conflict equilibrium more likely. We also analyze the case where the valuation of the rent is
different for the two players. We find, for example, that a conflict equilibrium may occur even though the predator has an
important disadvantage in warfare. That is when his valuation of the rent is sufficiently high compared to that of the prey.
相似文献
Khaled BennourEmail: |
7.
Gianluigi Guido M. Irene Prete Alessandro M. Peluso R. Christian Maloumby-Baka Carolina Buffa 《International Review of Economics》2010,57(1):79-102
The aim of the present study is to examine the role of ethical dimensions and product personality in the purchasing intention
of organic food products. The Prospect method (Caprara et al. in Test Psicomet Metodol 7(3–4):113–128, 2000), which integrates the Five factors model of personality (cf. Digman in Annu Rev Psychol 41(1):417–440, 1990) and the Theory of planned behavior (Ajzen in Organ Behav Hum Decis Process, 50(2):179–211, 1991) extended to an ethical dimension, was employed, by using a Structural Equation Modeling approach. Results showed that moral norms—i.e., personal beliefs regarding what is right or wrong (Parker et al. in Br J Soc Psychol, 34(2):127–137, 1995)—can be considered the main motivator of purchasing intention, and they are, in turn, affected by subjective norms and product personality traits of Naturalness and Authenticity. Marketing implications for firms operating in the organic food industry are discussed, in their intent to shift from a “niche”
market to a broader diffusion of these products. 相似文献
8.
The Coasean theory of the firm (Coase in Economica 4:386–405, 1937) has flourished with the theory of incomplete contracts. Transaction costs in the form of enforcement costs have been deemed to be the main determinants of the decision to ‘make’ versus ‘buy’. Surprisingly, this stream of literature has almost neglected that transaction costs may also generate incomplete property rights (Coase in J Law Econ 3:1–44, 1960). As firm’s activities entail both contractual and property rights, these two domains interfere each other on the decision to carry out a transaction within the firm. When property rights are incomplete, potential externalities may increase the cost of using the price mechanism to procure the assets needed in a given transaction. The resulting ‘Coasean firm’ would not only centralize incomplete contracts under a unified governance system, but it will also aggregate incomplete property rights under a unified ownership structure. 相似文献
9.
Constitutional Political Economy - Anthropologists, historians, and political economists suggest that private violence—feuding—provides order and enforces agreements in the absence of a... 相似文献
10.
Siegfried K. Berninghaus Karl-Martin Ehrhart Marion Ott Bodo Vogt 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2007,17(3):317-347
It is the main aim of our paper to study network formation in experimental setups in discrete and continuous time. Our design
is inspired by the theoretical model on network formation by Bala and Goyal (Econometrica, 68(5): 1181–1229, 2000) as well as the experiments by Callander and Plott (J. Public Econ., 89: 1469–1495, 2005) and Falk and Kosfeld (IEW Working Paper, University of Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland, No. 146, 2003). In particular, we analyze the role of star-shaped networks which are strict Nash-equilibria of the corresponding network
formation game. Our experimental results show that strict Nash networks prove to be a good indicator for predicting network
formation, particularly in continuous time. In explaining our results, it turns out that, among others, the complexity in
coordinating on stars, the inequity aversion against unequal payoff distribution in the network, and the groups’ degrees of
activity are the most important determinants for the formation of strict Nash networks.
相似文献
11.
This paper considers the impact of the Constitutional Court on legislative output in Italy. Following Tsebelis’ ((2002) Veto Players: Foundations of Institutional Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press) veto players model and the stylised facts as regards the Italian Constitutional Court’s activity, this paper presents a multi-stage game in the spirit of Gely and Spiller ((1990). A rational choice theory of supreme court statutory decisions with applications to the state farm and grove city cases. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6, 263–300). In the first stage, the legislative veto players, namely the parties in government, choose whether to change or not the policy status quo by enacting new legislation. In the second stage, the Court makes a constitutional interpretation: it decides whether to alter or not the outcome of the first stage through a sentence of constitutional illegitimacy. The Court has both the power of annulling laws and a limited power of creating new legally binding norms. Moreover, in the third stage, a constitutional law voted by a parliamentary qualified majority can overturn the Court’s decisions. The model predicts that the presence of the Court lowers legislative policy change and tests this prediction with 1956–2001 annual time series data for Italy.
相似文献
Michele SantoniEmail: |
12.
Paresh Kumar Narayan 《International Advances in Economic Research》2008,14(3):280-290
In this paper we analyze per capita incomes of the G7 countries using the common cycles test developed by Vahid and Engle
(Journal of Applied Econometrics, 8:341–360, 1993) and extended by Hecq et al. (Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 62:511–532, 2000; Econometric Reviews, 21:273–307, 2002) and the common trend test developed by Johansen (Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 12:231–254, 1988). Our main contribution is that we impose the common cycle and common trend restrictions in decomposing the innovations into
permanent and transitory components. Our main finding is permanent shocks explain the bulk of the variations in incomes for
the G7 countries over short time horizons, and is in sharp contrast to the bulk of the recent literature. We attribute this
to the greater forecasting accuracy achieved, which we later confirm through performing a post sample forecasting exercise,
from the variance decomposition analysis.
相似文献
Paresh Kumar NarayanEmail: |
13.
Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (J Law Econ 3:1–44, 1960), most economic analyses of property rights disregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide to rightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers in terms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstate the role of “private ordering” and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, the essential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and, second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable of making truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactions on the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting both elements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of both property and corporate contracting. 相似文献
14.
Ensar Yilmaz 《Empirica》2010,37(3):253-269
This paper firstly discusses the impact of inflation on real output in different theoretical models and then investigates
this impact empirically in an economy facing persistent high inflation. We find some evidence of Sidrauski’s (Am Econ Rev
57:534–544, 1967) superneutrality of money for Turkey in the long run. However, it seems that inflation affects real output negatively in
the short run. These results are more compatible with a class of utility functions in which real money balances and consumption
are perfect complements as Asako (Econometrica 51(5):1593–1596, 1983) elucidates. 相似文献
15.
Truncated distributions commonly arise in economics and related areas, see, for example, Lee (Econ Lett 3:165–169, 1979), Lien (Econ Lett 19:243–247, 1985; Econ Lett 20:45–47, 1986), Burdett (Econ Lett 52:263–267, 1996), Sercu (Insur: Math and Econ 20:79–95, 1997), Abadir and Magdalinos (Econom Theory 18:1276–1287, 2002), and Horrace (J Econom 126:335–354, 2005). In this note, we consider the most commonly encountered truncated distributions with heavy tails: the truncated t distribution and the truncated F distribution. For each of these distributions, we derive explicit expressions for the moments and estimation procedures by
the method of moments and the method of maximum likelihood. An application is illustrated to a popular data set in the econometric
literature.
相似文献
16.
We report four repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld’s (Am. Econ. Rev. 96(5):1611–1630, 2006) low and medium control treatments with 476 subjects. Each repetition employs a sample drawn from a standard subject pool
of students and demographics vary across samples. We largely confirm the existence of hidden costs of control but, contrary
to the original study, hidden costs of control are usually not substantial enough to significantly undermine the effectiveness
of economic incentives. Our subjects were asked, at the end of the experimental session, to complete a questionnaire in which
they had to state their work motivation in hypothetical scenarios. Our questionnaires are identical to the ones administered
in Falk and Kosfeld’s (Am. Econ. Rev. 96(5):1611–1630, 2006) questionnaire study. In contrast to the game play data, our questionnaire data are similar to those of the original questionnaire
study. In an attempt to solve this puzzle, we report an extension with 228 subjects where performance-contingent earnings
are absent i.e. both principals and agents are paid according to a flat participation fee. We observe that hidden costs significantly
outweigh benefits of control under hypothetical incentives. 相似文献
17.
Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with semipublic firms 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed market where a firm jointly owned by the public sector and private domestic
shareholders (a semipublic firm) competes with n private firms. We show that there is an equilibrium in which firms take production decisions simultaneously. This result
is strikingly different from that obtained by Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998), who shows that when a public firm competes with n private firms all firms producing simultaneously in the same period cannot be sustained as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
outcome. Our result differs from that of Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) for two reasons: firstly, we consider that there is a semipublic firm rather than a public firm. Secondly, Pal (Econ Lett
61:181–185, 1998) considers that the public firm is less efficient than private firms while in our paper all firms are equally efficient. 相似文献
18.
Constitutional Political Economy - What sort of country has Russia become since the collapse of the Soviet Union? Scholars have tracked Russia’s political economy closely for almost three... 相似文献
19.
Spatial Welfare Economics Versus Ecological Footprint: A Sensitivity Analysis Introducing Strong Sustainability 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
The aim of this paper is a sensitivity analysis with the core-periphery model of ‘new economic geography’ put forward in Grazi
et al. (Environ Resour Econ 38:135–153, 2007). This model comprises interregional trade, agglomeration advantages and resource (land) use or environmental externalities.
Grazi et al. (2007, GBR) compare a social welfare (SW) indicator with the ecological footprint (EF) indicator for measuring spatial sustainability
of a set of land use configurations. Their main result is that the SW and the EF indicator can yield completely different
rankings and only for extreme parameterizations of environmental externalities the rankings coincide. We adapt the model by
interpreting total natural land as a resource constraint and differentiate between weak and strong sustainability. In a sensitivity
analysis we show that the main results of GBR (2007) correspond to the case of weak sustainability in our adapted model version. In the case of strong sustainability our adapted
model version shows the same welfare rankings for both indicators without the extreme parameterization that is necessary to
obtain the same results in the original GBR (2007) model. 相似文献
20.
Erik J. Balder 《Economic Theory》2011,48(1):47-65
For games with discontinuous payoffs Simon and Zame (Econometrica 58:861–872, 1990) introduced payoff indeterminacy, in the form of endogenous sharing rules, which are measurable selections of a certain payoff
correspondence. Their main result concerns the existence of a mixed Nash equilibrium and an associated sharing rule. Its proof
is based on a discrete approximation scheme “from within” the payoff correspondence. Here, we present a new, related closure
result for games with possibly noncompact action spaces, involving a sequence of Nash equilibria. In contrast to Simon and
Zame (Econometrica 58:861–872, 1990), this result can be used for more involved forms of approximation, because it contains more information about the endogenous
sharing rule. With such added precision, the closure result can be used for the actual computation of endogenous sharing rules
in games with discontinuous payoffs by means of successive continuous interpolations in an approximation scheme. This is demonstrated
for a Bertrand type duopoly game and for a location game already considered by Simon and Zame. Moreover, the main existence
result of Simon and Zame (Econometrica 58:861–872, 1990) follows in two different ways from the closure result. 相似文献