流动性过剩的影响及中央银行应对措施

流动性过剩是一个全球性的问题,本文旨在对流动性过剩的原因、可能产生的影响及中央银行的应对措施进行分析,讨论了流动性的主要来源,流动性水平及对货币政策传导机制产生的影响;最后,探讨了在流动性过剩背景下央行解决流动性过剩问题的主要方法。     

货币市场利率、流动性供求与中央银行流动性管理——对货币市场利率波动的新分析框架

2013年我国货币市场利率大幅波动时出现了明显的利率回滞现象,传统的流动性供求分析框架难以解释。本文基于冲击不确定性、银行多样性和不完全的中央银行融资可得性假设,从微观出发构建了涵盖货币市场利率、流动性供求和中央银行流动性管理的分析框架,并基于我国数据进行实证分析。当货币市场利率上升突破合理水平时,中央银行应投放大量流动性至阈值水平,改善融资可得性,使利率快速回落。中央银行的适宜工具是通过常备借贷便利直接调控货币市场利率,为此需要提高其透明度和适用性。     

商业银行流动性管理新论

通过理论和实证两方面在对流动性管理的必要性进行分析的基础上，得出流动性管理在我国仍处于缺位状态的结论，并通过列表方式对缺位的具体表现进行直观的描述，最后对我国不存在真正意义上的流动性管理的原因进行简要分析，并为银行实行流动性管理指明了方向和徐径．     

我国商业银行流动性管理研究

本文以招商银行为例,对商业银行流动性管理进行实证分析,构建了向量误差修正(VEC)模型,该模型在对商业银行存贷比方面的解释具有较强能力,为中国商业银行流动性管理问题提供参考和借鉴。     

我国中央银行分支机构执行货币政策的有效性研究

中央银行是发行的银行,银行的银行,政府的银行。它集中存款准备金,充当最后贷款人,制定和实施一国的货币政策。央行的分支机构是其执行货币政策的重要环节,本文通过对其分支机构履行职能过程中各种内外因素加以综合分析,研究其执行货币政策的有效性,并提出建设性的意见。     

近年来我国中央银行货币政策工具分析

近年来随着我国经济形势的变化,中央银行货币政策工具也发生了不小的调整。这种调整是适当的,也是必要的。从我国中央银行货币政策工具的执行和调节情况看,目前还存在着许多不足之处,需要从发展方向、职能分工和选择搭配等三个方面加以完善。     

对我国商业银行流动性管理问题的思考

2010年下半年以来,我国商业银行明显出现了流动性过剩的问题,加强流动性管理对于商业银行的稳健经营和宏观经济的健康运行具有重要的意义。本文阐述了商业银行流动性过剩及原因,并分析了我国商业银行在流动性管理中存在的问题,在此基础上提出了加强流动性管理的政策建议。     

企业的财务流动性管理

财务流动性管理包括事前、事中和事后对流动性风险进行防范、评估、监控和补救的一整套方案。基于流动性管理的公司财务理念，重点阐述流动性风险日常管理中的资产负债管理     

中央银行独立性与货币政策有效性

货币本位制的确立和二战后各国经济的发展,使得货币政策的重要性日益增强,相应地中央银行独立性问题也引起了广泛的争论。这是因为各国经济发展的实践表明,中央银行能否有效地制定和执行货币政策,保持货币稳定,在很大程度上取决于中央银行的独立性。     

跨国公司流动性管理

<正> 流动性管理(也叫现金管理)包括有效收款、付款和短期性的现金投资。企业用来提高流动性管理效率的各种收款和付款方法构成了同一硬币的两面。它们对企业现金管理的总的效率产生了一个综合影响。一般认为企业将通过加速现金回收和推迟现金支付而获益。企业希望加速收回应收账款,从而可以更早地使用资金。与此相对,企业希望在不损害它在供应商处的信用地位的前提下,尽量推迟支付应付账款,从而充分利用它手头的现金。加速收款和推迟付款相结合可导致可用现金的增加。近十年以来,新技术、区域货币的出现、内部业务的外购和协调作为跨国公     

The Repo Auctions of the European Central Bank and the Vanishing Quota Puzzle*

Until June 2000 the European Central Bank (ECB) used fixed rate tenders for its weekly repo auctions. A switch to variable rate tenders became necessary due to massive overbidding by banks. In this paper we introduce a stylized game among banks to investigate this overbidding phenomenon. Our results confirm the weakness of the fixed rate tender format and indicate that the ECB's liquidity management has significantly improved since the switch to the variable rate system. Yet recent episodes of rate cut expectations suggest that the ECB's practice of setting a minimum bid rate should be abandoned in favor of a more symmetric interest rate target.     

央行货币政策使用的工具及其在我国的具体运用

2007年,经济“过热”,物价涨幅“过快”,通货膨胀“压力”等字眼频频见报,中央银行采取什么措施应对成为大家关注的焦点。从2007年初至今,中国人民银行已经多次调整了存款准备金率,多次上调人民币存贷款基准利率,这些都是为了控制经济过热。最明显的“过热”,恐怕是2007年大盘指数上扬步伐,在第四次加息声刚落,上证指数就轻松地突破5000点。人们一方面对股市充满了信心,经中报调整后的动态市盈率仍然高于国际平均水平的2倍。男一方面人们的信心改变不了殷价高悬、风险增大酌事实．     

The Myth of Market Neutrality: A Comparative Study of the European Central Bank’s and the Swiss National Bank’s Corporate Security Purchases

ABSTRACT

Monetary policy operations in corporate security markets confront central banks with choices that are traditionally perceived to be the prerogative of governments. This article investigates how central bankers legitimise corporate security purchases through a comparative study of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB). As we show, central bankers downplay the novelty of corporate security purchases by relying on familiar pre-crisis justifications of Central Bank Independence. Citing an ideal of ‘market neutrality’, central banks present corporate security purchases as pursuing a narrow objective of price stability and obfuscate their distributive consequences. In this way, central bankers depoliticise corporate security purchases: they reduce the potential for choice, collective agency, and deliberation concerning both the pursuit of corporate security purchases and the choices made in implementing these policies. We also describe the undesirable democratic, social and environmental dimensions of these practices, which we propose to address through enhanced democratic accountability.     

Central Bank Digital Currency: optimization of the currency system and its issuance design

Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) contributes to optimizing payment functions of fiat money, reducing reliance on payment services provided by the private sector, alleviating regulatory burdens and pressure on the central bank, and strengthening the authority of fiat money. Moreover, issuance of CBDC helps to address dilemmas of modern monetary policies, including inefficiencies in policy transmission, difficulties in countercyclical control, flow of currency away from the real economy to the virtual economy and inadequate management of policy expectations. This paper proposes a CBDC issuance framework based on forward contingencies. The incorporation of time, sector, and loan rate contingencies in the activation of CBDC will realize real-time transmission of monetary policy, enable targeted supply of money and prevent the currency from circulating beyond the real economy. The economic state contingency makes it possible to exercise countercyclical control of currency. The embedment of these contingencies also enables currency to perform the function of forward guidance.     

Central Bank independence: Low inflation at no cost? A numerical simulations exercise

The independent nature of the Central Bank is often associated with achieving low and stable inflation. Further to that the merits of independence are stretched to achieving low(er) output variability when compared to a government run monetary policy. In this paper we use the Alesina (1989) and Alesina and Gatti (1995) model to examine how often an Independent Central Bank can achieve an improvement on both counts. To do that we run numerical simulations where we change the ex ante probability of elections (and hence the degree of electoral uncertainty) with a view to determining how the private sector’s perceptions affect the level of output variability. Our conclusions agree with the Alesina and Gatti assertion that there will exist occasions when all political parties will be better off by consenting to the running of monetary policy by an independent institution but more often than not this comes at some cost to output. On theoretical grounds therefore, the trade-off between inflation and output variability (à la Rogoff) is still a valid one.     

非均衡经济中区域中央银行金融调控与监管研究

本文从我国区域经济、金融发展不平衡和地域特殊性较强的现实出发,分析了区域中央银行宏观金融调控和金融监管的尴尬境地,提出了应加强中央银行各级分支行,尤其是大区分行的相对独立性,充分调动其调控与监管的积极主动性,以适应我国的现实国情,在“掌握精神,灵活处理”的原则指导下积极监管、适当调控,全面提高金融调控与监管的效率。     

Transparency and trust: the case of the European Central Bank

We examine how the transparency of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy affects the amount of trust that the citizens of the European Union have in this institution. We use nearly half a million individual responses from the European Commission’s Eurobarometer survey from 2000 to 2011 and estimate probit regressions with sample selection. We find that transparency exerts a non-linear effect on trust. Transparency increases trust, but only up to a certain point; too much transparency harms trust. This result is robust to controlling for a number of macroeconomic conditions, financial stability transparency measures, and economic and socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, including examining respondents in European Union countries that do not use the euro and addressing clustering issues.     

Central Bank transparency in theory and practice

We study the effects of Central Bank transparency on inflation and the output gap. Our intention is to illustrate, with the help of a small analytical model, how an imperfectly transparent Central Bank affects the two main macroeconomic variables, inflation and the output gap. The model tells us that transparency affects the variability of inflation and output but not their average levels. Then we examine the extent to which this conjecture is justified by the index of transparency constructed by Eijffinger and Geraats. Given the limitations of such indices, we only examine the correlations between the index of transparency and the macro variables in question. This analysis shows that the average magnitudes are not affected by transparency but their variability is. In the case of inflation, its variability benefits from the reduction of transparency and about 50% is explained by the variability in the transparency index. The effect on output volatility on the other hand is less clear, and in any case transparency seems to increase it rather than decrease it.     

中央银行在宏观审慎监管体系中的地位与权限

全球金融危机后,欧美等主要国家加快了金融监管改革步伐。在新的金融监管框架中,中央银行的监管地位明显加强。实际上,中央银行在履行最后贷款人职能、实施货币政策、开展宏观审慎监管和维护支付清算系统运行中都扮演着金融稳定的重要角色。因此,强化中央银行监管权限有着充分的理论依据。中国人民银行担负着维护金融稳定的法定职责,在构建我国宏观审慎监管体系中,应进一步明确其监管地位,赋予其应有的监管权限。     

银行流动性过剩的自愿性与非自愿性因素辨析——兼论对货币政策的影响

本文将很行的流动性资产分为自愿性(预防性)流动资产和非自愿性流动资产两部分,并建立银行自愿性流动资产需求模型,进一步的实证分析表明:自愿性因素和非自愿性因素共同促使我国银行流动性过剩,自愿的预防性流动资产过剩和非自愿的流动资产过剩并存,银行的部分流动性过剩资产是为了规避融资成本、汇率风险和存款波动风险而自愿持有的.脉冲响应分析表明银行流动性过剩制约了我国贷币政策有效性的发挥.