Inferring Transactions from Financial Statements*

In this paper, we embed the double entry accounting structure in a simple belief revision (estimation) problem. We ask the following question: Presented with a set of financial statements (and priors), what is the reader's “best guess” of the underlying transactions that generated these statements? Two properties of accounting information facilitate a particularly simple closed form solution to this estimation problem. First, accounting information is the outcome of a linear aggregation process. Second, the aggregation rule is double entry.     

Institutional authority and collusion

A “collusion puzzle” exists by which, even though increasing the number of firms reduces the ability to tacitly collude, and leads to a collapse in collusion in experimental markets with three or more firms, in natural markets there are such numbers of firms colluding successfully. We present an experiment showing that, if managers are deferential toward an authority, firms can induce more collusion by delegating production decisions to middle managers and providing suitable informal nudges. This holds not only with two but also with four firms. We are also able to distinguish compliance effects from coordination effects.     

Technology licensing and collusion

This paper considers the possibility of technology licensing via fixed-fee, royalty or two-part tariff and tacit collusion between firms that produce homogeneous goods under asymmetric cost structures and compete in quantities. In contrast to Lin (1996), all forms of licensing facilitate (obstruct) collusion, if the initial cost difference between the firms is relatively less (more). Technology will always be licensed, and the optimal form of licensing is either fixed-fee or royalty or two-part tariff, but collusion may or may not be possible post-licensing. Welfare decreases after licensing if the firms collude only after licensing but not collude under no-licensing.     

Multimarket and multiproject collusion

Summary If firms meet in a number of markets, they may respond to an action in one market by reacting in another market. Fear for such retaliation may induce multimarket firms to collude across markets. The paper assesses available theoretical and empirical evidence on the multimarket collusion theory. Moreover, the paper suggests that the theory can be fruitfully applied in the context of European integration. The focus is on collusion by firms which meet in product markets as well as in joint R&D projects. A model develops three propositions, which shed light on the subsequently provided (tentative) evidence on multidimensional contact in an integrating Europe. The discussion may serve as a framework for future research into both the theoretical and the empirical domain with applications to the issue of European integration.We gratefully acknowledge John Hagedoorn for providing access to the MERIT/CATI database, and two referees for their comments. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies     

Some experimental evidence regarding collusion

The authors are indebted to James M. Walker for helpful comments on this and a related study. We have also benefited from conversations with Jay Stewart, Margaret Ray, and Marjorie Baldwin. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from Indiana University, South Bend, and Indiana University, Bloomington (Office of Research and Graduate Development). We also wish to express our gratitude to the subjects from Indiana University, Bloomington, and the University of Notre Dame who willingly participated in the experiments and interviews.     

Market structure,the exchange rate,and pricing behavior by firms: Some evidence from computable general equilibrium trade models

Zusammenfassung Marktstruktur, Wechselkurs und Preisverhalten der Firmen: Einige Rechenergebnisse aus einem Modell des allgemeinen Gleichgewichts für den internationalen Handel. - Die Verfasserin benutzt ein Modell des allgemeinen Gleichgewichts für den internationalen Handel, um die Auswirkungen einer zehnprozentigen Aufwertung des US-Dollar auf das Preisniveau in den Vereinigten Staaten im Verh?ltnis zu den Preisen auf anderen M?rkten abzusch?tzen. In einigen Industrien werden die M?rkte segmentiert, und von den Firmen wird angenommen, da\ sie den Absatz der jeweils anderen Firmen als fix ansehen. Die Autorin kommt zu dem Ergebnis, da\ eine solche Aufwertung des Dollar das Preisniveau auf dem amerikanischen Markt um 2 bis 3 vH senkt und die Preise in der restlichen Welt um 0 bis 6 vH erh?ht. Das bedeutet, da\ im Gefolge der Aufwertung einer W?hrung signifikante Abweichungen von der Kaufkraftparit?t eintreten k?nnen.

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Resumen Estructura de mercado, tasa de cambio y politica de precios de la empresa: evidencia en modelos de equilibrio general computable de comercio. - La autora utiliza un modelo de equilibrio general computable de comercio para evaluar el efecto de una revaluation del dolar USA del 10 por ciento sobre el nivel de precios prevaleciente en el mercado estadounidense en comparación con los precios de otros mercados. En algunas industrias los mercados están segmentados; se asume que las empresas presentan un comportamiento tipo Cournot. Los resultados demuestran que una revaluatión reduce el nivel de precios en el mercado estadounidense en un 2–3 por ciento y aumenta los precios en el resto del mundo en un 0–6 por ciento. Esto implica que pueden ocurrir deviaciones significativas de la paridad de poder adquisitivo después de una revaluación de la moneda.

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Résumé Structure du marché, taux de change et politique de prix des entreprises: Quelque évidence d’un modèle d’équilibre général de commerce international. - L’auteur se sert d’un modèle d’équilibre général pour estimer l’effet d’une réévaluation de 10 pour cent du US dollar sur le niveau des prix dans les Etats-Unis comparé au niveau des prix sur les marchés dans les autres pays. Les marchés de quelques industries sont segmentés et on suppose que les entreprises regardent les ventes des concurrents comme fixes. L’auteur trouve qu’une telle réévaluation réduit le niveau des prix sur les marchés des Etats-Unis de deux à trois pour cent et augmente les prix dans les autres pays de zéro à 6 pour cent. Cela indique que des déviations considérables de la parité du pouvoir d’achat peuvent se passer en conséquence d’une réévaluation de la monnaie.

     

Exchange rate and pricing behavior: Comparison of Taiwan with Japan for manufacturing industries

This paper investigates a theoretical model that explains the relationship between exchange rate and profit when it takes the effect of exchange rate on both input and output prices into account. Using the panel data of 19 two-digit Taiwanese and 17 two-digit Japanese manufacturing industries over the period of 1984–1994, the empirical evidence shows that a higher degree of net external exposure in Taiwan than it in Japan. The empirical results also suggest that an appreciation of home currency, industries of Taiwan take advantage of the appreciation of the New Taiwan dollar, enjoying a reduction in the price of imported inputs into production. As far as this study shows, however, the merit to imported inputs of a strong Japanese Yen has not been confirmed in Japan.     

Competition and collusion in a government procurement auction market

This paper tests the structure performance hypothesis by examining a highway construction industry in Florida. In the first-price sealed bid auction literature, there is little evidence on how many bidders are required for these markets to be competitive. Two different indicators are used to capture the transition from collusion to competition—a discontinuous effect of the number of bidders on winning bid price, and an associative effect of repeat bidding of a contractor with the same set of firms. The results suggest that winning bids decrease as the number of bidders rises until there are about six to eight firms. Since subsequent entry has no effect on the winning bid price, it is concluded that the highway construction market becomes competitive with about eight bidders.     

Road pricing

Summary Under conditions of congestion, the social costs of motoring will exceed the private costs. The formula is: Social Cost=Private Cost (1+the elasticity of cost with respect to traffic flow). Thus the optimum tax under these conditions is equal to this elasticity coefficient×100 per cent of the private cost. A fluid-dynamic model, borrowed from physics, is used to develop a simple formula for the elasticity ofvelocity with respect to traffic flow. By postulating a relationship between cost and speed, this elasticity is convertedinto an estimate of the elasticity coefficient. And so one can obtain, for any specified speed, a value of this coefficient and cost; the product of these two then gives an estimate of the difference between social and private cost. In practice one cannot determine the speed independently; it emerges from the demand-supply interactions and so one must also postulate a demand function; but data problems are severe on the demand side. Lastly, some developments are considered — including network models and dynamic demand models. Lecture delivered in the Faculty of Economics of the University of Groningen, The Netherlands, on 21st May 1968. The author is Professor of Econometrics and Social Statistics at the University of Birmingham, and Advisor on Research, Graduate Centre for Management Studies.     

Road pricing

Summary Among the main problems in the public sector of the economy are those of road congestion on the one hand and under-utilisation of roads on the other. Partly this is a consequence of inefficient price policies for the use of roads. But road pricing involves many technical and distributional problems. A preliminary survey of the effects suggests that quite simple road pricing systems, such as a differentiated urban rural license fee, may be a most efficient way of introducing road pricing. Tolls on critical access points may be another efficient way of introducing congestion charges. At the same time it is important to attempt to reduce charges on uncongested roads, and this is especially necessary for developing countries. A preliminary survey of the effects of such a rearrangement of road taxation suggest that there would be no marked redistributional effects. But much more work is required on this aspect of road pricing. Adviser on Research, Graduate Centre for Management Studies. This paper was written in 1967 during a period as Visiting Professor at M.I.T., with some special reference to conditions in the United States.     

Cementing the case for collusion under the National Recovery Administration

Macroeconomists have long debated the aggregate effects of anti-competitive provisions under the “Codes of Fair Conduct” promulgated by the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). Despite the emphasis on these provisions, there is only limited evidence documenting any actual effects at the micro-level. We use a combination of narrative evidence and a novel plant-level dataset from 1929, 1931, 1933, and 1935 to study the effects of the NIRA in the cement industry. We develop a test for collusion specific to this particular industry. We find strong evidence that before the NIRA, the costs of a plant's nearest neighbor had a positive effect on a plant's own price, suggesting competition. After the NIRA, this effect is completely eliminated, with no correlation between a plant's own price and its neighbor's cost.     

Platform pricing redux

Platforms such as Airbnb, Amazon, Apple iOS, eBay, Microsoft Windows, and Uber are ubiquitous. The two-sided nature of platform markets, however, requires a reconsideration of the conditions for profit maximization and understanding of how platforms operate. Profit-maximization in two-sided markets is characterized as an intuitive extension of the inverse elasticity pricing rule (Lerner index). This is further expressed in terms of the participants' primitives: users' reservation values and the platform's marginal cost. Differences between one- and two-sided markets are demonstrated and discussed.