Pollution abatement with limited enforcement power and citizen suits

Federal environmental laws in the U.S. can be enforced by government agencies or by private parties through citizen suits against polluters. Here, I extend the standard enforcement model to examine the role played by citizen suits. The main results from the paper suggest that in a model with limited enforcement power and citizen suits the regulator fully exercises his enforcement power when the expected penalty from a citizen suit is low, but increases his reliance on citizen suits as the expected penalty rises. Whether an enforcement regime that allows private enforcement is efficient depends not only on the relative costs of private and agency enforcement, but also on the changes in inspection costs that may be caused by private enforcement and the expected penalty from losing a citizen suit. These results suggest that in practice private enforcement may lower social costs as long as relatively inexpensive agency enforcement options, such as administrative proceedings, do not preclude citizen suits.      

Self-Reporting and Private Enforcement in Environmental Regulation

Self-reporting of compliance status has become a common feature in the enforcement of environmental regulation. In this paper, I generalize existing models of enforcement with self-reporting to include the possibility of private enforcement of regulation through citizen suits. This allows me to identify an additional argument for the efficiency of self-reporting: it can increase the likelihood of a successful suit and thus facilitate private enforcement of regulation. Specifically, if self-reporting sufficiently increases the expected penalty for losing a citizen suit, if the costs of private enforcement are low, and if inspection costs are high enough relative to enforcement costs, self-reporting lowers expected regulatory and social costs by allowing the regulator to rely on private enforcement and decrease his enforcement efforts.

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Tax enforcement,tax compliance and tax morale in transition economies: A theoretical model

The focus of this paper is the analysis of the relationship between tax enforcement, tax compliance and tax morale within countries characterised by rapid introduction of market institutions and slow evolution of political regimes, such as transition economies. The paper investigates a coordination game in which the government is ex-ante committed to tax enforcement and can observe the proportion of tax-compliant agents in the economy. In turn, two groups of agents (third-party reporting and self-reported income) are keen to evade taxes unlawfully but have limited information on how many others evade taxes; their tax morale is therefore an endogenous function of agents' perception on tax compliance. The model predicts that the lower the quality of political institutions and the weaker tax morale, the less tax compliance can be achieved. The third-party reporting group will also be bearing higher tax burden than the self-reported income group. The model entails that having political institutions of good quality is not a sufficient condition to conduce to tax enforcement or tax compliance. Due to the endogenous role of tax morale, the government could be pushed ex-post towards poor or no tax enforcement. If good political institutions are not accompanied by good information about the enforcement of tax collection, there is scope for co-existence of poor tax enforcement, low tax compliance and weak tax morale. As such, this model well describes the tax evasion behaviour observed since the outset of transition from planned to market economy.     

Challenging the enforcement of environmental regulation

If a firm can contest the enforcement of an environmental regulation, neither increasing the probability nor severity of the fine will guarantee a reduction in a firm's illegally dumped waste. A policy that can unambiguously decrease illegal dumping is lowering the cost of legal disposal. This result occurs because the use of monitoring and fines to increase the probability or severity of enforcement triggers investment to evade enforcement, while a decrease in the costs of legal disposal does not. Investment in the resources to evade enforcement decreases the attractiveness of monitoring by significantly increasing the costs of environmental audits, administrative hearings, and judicial procedures. This occurs even with a high degree of regulator information about the firm's cost structure and no monitoring errors. In addition, if the regulator can only imperfectly monitor a firm's behavior so the firm can be accused of another firm's behavior, observable commitment to challenge enforcement will lead to overinvestment in resources to evade enforcement, an increased level of illegal dumping, and an overall increase in total costs relative to the unobservable case.     

Inspections,pollution prices,and environmental performance: evidence from China

In environmental economics, monitoring and enforcement issues have attracted relatively little research effort. Moreover, the bulk of the literature on these issues has been of a theoretical nature. Few have empirically analysed the impact of monitoring and enforcement activities on the environmental performance of polluters. Moreover, all existing studies have been performed in the context of developed countries. A purpose of the current paper is to partially fill this important gap by exploring the impact of both inspections and pollution charges on the environmental performance of polluters in China. While pollution charges represent an important pillar of the Chinese environmental regulatory system, our results indicate that inspections dominate and better explain the environmental performance of industrial polluters.     

Impact of government-sponsored pollution prevention practices on environmental compliance and enforcement: evidence from a sample of US manufacturing facilities

A two-way fixed effects Poisson model is used to investigate the impact of 43 EPA-sponsored pollution prevention (P2) practices on compliance and enforcement for a sample of facilities in the US manufacturing sector. I find that P2 adoption reduces environmental violations in three industries while increasing violations in two others. P2 adoption also spurs fewer enforcement actions in three industries. I further partition the P2 practices into three categories based on their approach to improve environmental performance. In doing so, I find that practices that involve changes in operating procedures—about a third of adopted P2 practices—such as instituting a self-inspection and monitoring program to discover spills or leak sources, improving maintenance scheduling and/or labeling procedures, are effective in reducing violations while practices that involve equipment or material changes are not. I also find that adopters of practices that require changes in either procedures or manufacturing equipment—about half of adopted practices—are rewarded with a more cooperative treatment of environmental infractions with fewer enforcement actions.     

Voluntary Environmental Investment and Responsive Regulation

Instances of corporate voluntary environmental investments have been rising in recent years. Motivations for such activities include corporate image building, regulatory preemption, and production cost savings. While some of these investments arise from industry attempts to set environmental standards where none currently exist, many investments seem to be aimed at reducing the costs of complying with existing regulations. Using a simple game-theoretic model, we investigate firm motivations for, and welfare consequences of, these types of voluntary investments by focusing on the role regulatory enforcement might play. We find that such investments unambiguously increase when an enforcement regulator acts as a Stackelberg follower (a regulatory structure we refer to as responsive regulation) in setting its monitoring and enforcement strategy. These additional investments may be socially undesirable, necessitating a restructuring of non-compliance penalties.     

An Integrated Strategy to Reduce Monitoring and Enforcement Costs

A policy of effective environmental protection, inthe present political atmosphere, will requirelow-cost monitoring and enforcement (M&E) strategiesthat do not rely on draconian penalties. Infinite oreven very high penalties for environmental violationsare socially and politically unacceptable.Environmental violations are often classed as civiloffenses, and the occurrence of a violation may bethought insufficient to establish intent. If penaltiesare upper-bounded and each firm is inspected randomly,compliance cannot be maintained with arbitrarily smallinspection probabilities and, hence, small agencycosts. In this paper we examine possibilities forreducing agency M&E costs, including the requirementfor self-reports of effluents and the adjustment ofthe inspection probability to reflect a firm'scompliance or reporting reputation.     

北京市环境经济政策研究

北京市的经济管理体制在由以计划为主转变为以市场为主的过程中，原来所实施的环境经济政策出现了一系列问题，本文针对这些问题，提出了一些建议，即使用者付费政策、环境税、超标罚款政策、环保奖励政策，并对居民的承受能力进行了分析。     

Tax morale affects tax compliance: Evidence from surveys and an artefactual field experiment

Our working hypothesis is that cross-cultural differences in tax compliance behavior have foundations in the institutions of tax administration and citizen assessment of the quality of governance. Tax compliance being a complex behavioral issue, its investigation requires use of a variety of methods and data sources. Results from artefactual field experiments conducted in countries with substantially different political histories and records of governance quality demonstrate that observed differences in tax compliance levels persist over alternative levels of enforcement. The experimental results are shown to be robust by replicating them for the same countries using survey response measures of tax compliance.     

The U.S. Environmental policy experience: A critique with Suggestions for the European Community

This paper recites much of the history of U.S. environmental policy, covering air quality, water quality, hazardous wastes, monitoring and enforcement, integration of environmental considerations into general economic planning, and the issue of federal-state relations. Policies are criticized in terms of excessive cost and lack of effective enforcement, but successful and innovative practices also are identified, especially the use of tradable discharge permits and productive state-federal relationships. Suggestions for European Community policy formulation are made.     

Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable

We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871.     

Environmental Protection,Agency Motivations,and Rent Extraction: The Regulation of Water Pollution in Louisiana

Direct environmental regulation has been in place in the United States for more than twenty-five years. Yet there has been little study of what actually affects regulatory enforcement levels. This study examines enforcement issues by focusing on water quality enforcement by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality. The study finds that penalties are more likely to occur, and are likely to be higher, the more serious a firm's violation of a regulation. Penalties are also more likely, and likely to be higher, if a firm has a previous record of environmental violations. In contrast to other studies, however, we do not find that enforcement varies across regional offices. In addition, we did not find any systematic effects of the Weingast and Moran (1983) theory of legislative dominance. We did, however, find evidence of rent extraction, along the lines of McChesney (1987; 1991).     

Informational Benefits of International Treaties

International treaties allow a minister in one country to learn about the beliefs held by a minister in another country, so allowing each to make better decisions. When the net benefits of environmental policy are uncertain, a country which participates in negotiating an environmental treaty, or which supports strong environmental action, thereby provides information to another country that such action can be worthwhile. This dimension of international environmental agreements helps explain why countries negotiate treaties, why these treaties often implement the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, why agreement to a treaty by a country deemed not particularly favorable to it can strengthen environmental action, and why treaties may invoke a minimum participation clause. The informational mechanism we discuss holds even if physical spillovers are absent, and even if monitoring and enforcement are infeasible. Our approach can explain additional phenomena: how requirements for approval by several bodies within a country can increase support for a policy, and why simultaneous action can lead to better outcomes than sequential action.     

Upstream-downstream transactions and watershed externalities: Experimental evidence from Kenya

Where environmental policies or projects seek behavioral change, understanding underlying norms and preferences is essential to securing environmental outcomes. This study models a payment for environmental services intervention in an experimental field laboratory in Nyanza Province, Kenya. Upstream and downstream individuals are paired in a standard investment game, in which the upstream mover's investment represents land use decisions and the downstream mover responds with a choice of compensation payment. The experimental intervention introduces an enforcement treatment on the downstream movers' compensation decisions for a single round. Underlying social preferences and identity appear to shape individual transactions between upstream and downstream individuals. Upstream first movers are sensitive to the removal of the enforcement on their downstream partners in the second round, and make decisions consistent with crowding out of social preferences. The results suggest that environmental interventions may affect resource decisions for individuals who are not themselves direct targets of enforcement.     

The determinants of cybersecurity risk disclosure in firms’ financial reporting: Empirical evidence

This paper examines the relationship between cybersecurity risk disclosure and financial reporting deficiencies. Using a difference-in-difference approach based on a large, matched sample of breached and non-breached US firms for the period 2006 to 2016, a differential effect is seen between cybersecurity risk disclosures in pre- and post-Breach financial reporting related to cybersecurity incidents. The association between the cybersecurity risk disclosure and subsequent reported financial deficiencies is positive and significant, providing some evidence for regulators that more firm-specific disclosure may provide increased audit quality, to which the auditor responds by increasing audit effort. The empirical findings suggest that firms with prior cybersecurity risk disclosures are more likely to experience financial reporting deficiencies. The results obtained are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks.     

Effectiveness of environmental regulations under imperfect enforcement and the firm's avoidance behavior

This paper explicitly defines enforcement quality and develops a model by incorporating enforcement quality and the firm's avoidance behavior. The results indicate that the effectiveness of environmental regulations is likely to depend upon the level of enforcement quality, as well as upon the nature of the firm's avoidance behavior. Policy instruments may become incompatible under certain circumstances. Enforcement quality should be properly targeted to enhance functional harmonization between instruments. The condition under which emission tax is more effective under imperfect enforcement than under complete enforcement is also identified.     

Preferences for environmental quality under uncertainty

Although the expected effects of environmental policies and interventions are rarely known with certainty, stated preference surveys rarely elicit preferences over uncertain environmental outcomes. This article presents empirical results challenging the view that ignoring such uncertainty during preference elicitation is of no consequence so long as people only care about final environmental states. We show that measured preferences for final environmental states, water quality in this case, depend on whether people choose between final states or between lotteries over final states. In contrast to the typical finding for monetary lotteries, we find significant under-weighting of low probability events related to water quality.     

Rethinking economic development

I provide a summary, reflection and assessment of the current state of economic development in both the policy and academic worlds. In terms of development policy, currently, the primary focus is on policy interventions, namely, foreign aid, aimed at fixing the “deficiencies” of developing countries. Academic research also has a similar focus, except with an emphasis in rigorous evaluation of interventions to estimate causal effects. A standard set of versatile quantitative tools is used, e.g., experimental and quasi‐experimental methods, which can be easily applied in a range of settings to estimate the causal effects of policies, which are typically presumed to be similar across contexts. In this article, I take a step back and ask whether the current practices are the best that we can do. Are foreign aid and policy interventions the best options we have for poverty alleviation? What else can be done? Is our current research strategy, characterized by rigorous but a lack of context‐specific analysis, the best method of analysis? Is there a role for other research methods, for a deeper understanding of the local context and for more collaboration with local scholars?     

Objectives of Financial Reporting with Chinese Characters

Objectives of financial reporting are not immutable--they are influenced by a variety of factors, such as the economic, legal, political, and social environment in which financial reporting takes place. As the environmental contexts have changed in China since 1992, objectives of financial reporting have shown even more Chinese characters. In this paper, we focus on these special characters of objectives of financial reporting in China. In order to understand the objectives featured by Chinese characters, we are trying to find the hidden relationships between the objectives and environmental contexts. Our research shows that many researchers have already tried to establish objectives of financial reporting with Chinese characters, however current studies do have their limitations, and further studies should be done.