The effects of public deficits on money growth in the European Union

The impact of government debt on the money supply has been studied for different countries, with an emphasis on developing countries and the U.S. This topic becomes especially interesting in European Union countries that have high public deficits and low inflation rates. It is also very relevant in the monetary union, with a European central bank controlling monetary policy and introducing monetary measures for all the member countries. The main goal of this paper is to analyze if there is any relationship between public deficits and monetary growth in the European Union. The conclusions presented in the previous literature are ambiguous. Some studies concluded that there is little evidence that government debt influences money in some of the member countries.     

Budget Deficits and Inflation: The Roles of Central Bank Independence and Financial Market Development

This article investigates the relationship between budget deficits and inflation with the view that the nature of this relationship depends on the characteristics of monetary and financial institutions. The main hypothesis is that budget deficits are especially inflationary when both the central bank is not independent and the financial market is not developed enough to contain inflationary expectations. The empirical analysis using a panel data that comprises 54 developed and less developed countries, with one to two decades of observations for each, supports this hypothesis. The findings are also robust to subsets of the sample. (JEL E58 , H62 )     

Cross-country evidence on the relationship between central banks and governments

The influence of government pressure on central bank behavior is examined for Canada, France, the U.K., and West Germany. With the budget deficit proxying for this pressure, there is evidence of an overall expansionary effect of the deficit on monetary policy response to stabilization objectives. Despite there otherwise being little consistency in the reaction functions estimated across the four countries, the marked tendency is for policy to become more accommodative at higher levels of the deficit. Hence, the results point to a potentially important regularity in the relationship between central banks and governments.     

Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Exit Option

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary policy. A central bank aiming at securing the existence of a monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks has to compensate single countries for the tax distortions arising from fiscal transfers. Monetary policy may become more expansionary or restrictive depending on asymmetries between member countries' inflation aversion and exit costs.     

Transparency and central bank losses in developing countries

Recent evidence shows central banks suffering from losses in some developing countries. This is a surprise to economists and policymakers. At the same time, these banks are asked to conduct monetary policy within a more transparent framework. Therefore, this paper seeks to answer the following question: Would more transparency in developing countries suffering from central bank losses be beneficial?This paper shows that the cost constraints of conducting monetary policy, central bank losses, in both transparency and opacity alike is significant and affects positively the error of the private sector in expected inflation rate and the output gap. In a country suffering from central bank losses, the expected benefits of transparency and the existence of cost constraint move in two opposite directions. As a result, it is unwise for developing countries suffering from central bank losses to focus on transparency. Priority should be given to fixing monetary policy and to developing financial markets.     

Does Capital Account Liberalization Discipline Budget Deficit?

The paper investigates whether free capital mobility leads a government to tighten its budget deficit for fear of being penalized from the international capital market. The author tests the hypothesis using three‐stage least squares (3SLS), which can control for the endogenous nature of capital account liberalization. Even the conservative measure shows that, if capital account liberalization were exogenously imposed, ceteris paribus, government budget deficit would be reduced by 2.275% of GDP. Furthermore, 3SLS results show that this disciplinary effect is stronger for countries under a fixed exchange rate regime or for countries with weak central bank independence. The disciplinary effect is also found to be stronger in more recent periods—the 1990s—during which capital market integration has been most prevalent.     

Regional debt in monetary unions: Is it inflationary?

This paper studies the inflationary implications of interest bearing regional debt in a monetary union. Is this debt simply backed by future taxation with no inflationary consequences? Or will the circulation of region debt induce monetization by a central bank?We argue here that both outcomes can arise in equilibrium. In the model economy, there are multiple equilibria which reflect the perceptions of agents regarding the manner in which the debt obligations will be met. In one equilibrium, termed Ricardian, the future obligations are met with taxation by a regional government while in the other, termed Monetization, the central bank is induced to print money to finance the region's obligations. The multiplicity of equilibria reflects a commitment problem of the central bank. A key indicator of the selected equilibrium is the distribution of regional debt holdings. We show that regional governments, anticipating central bank financing of their debt obligations, have an incentive to create excessively large deficits. We use the model to assess the impact of some policy measures within a monetary union as well as dollarization.     

Deficit financing,liquidity, and the government budget constraint

This article presents a macroeconomic model in which government deficits are bond financed and the stock of bonds may affect both expected income and liquidity. If either of these effects exists, then comparative statics analysis requires the government budget to be balanced. Temporary divergences from a balanced budget and changes in the maturity structure of the government debt may be analyzed in terms of changes in the stock of bonds. It is shown that traditional fiscal and monetary policies may have a perverse effect; that to ensure effective policy, deficit financing and open market operations should be avoided; and that only policies involving a balanced budget or the financing of deficits or surpluses through changes in the stock of money should be undertaken.     

Sovereign credit ratings and central banks: Why do analysts pay attention to institutions?

This paper studies the effect of the governance of modern central banks on the ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies Standard and Poor's and Moody's. Until recently, the rating process was not public. Even still, the factors or precise methodologies used by the agencies remain uncertain and analyst judgment remains important. We argue that, given uncertainty over the future paths of countries, the quality of the central bank governance serves as a useful heuristic for a stable and favorable country trajectory. In particular, the central bank's independence signals that the government is committed to general macroeconomic stability, including debt repayment. Additionally, central bank transparency clarifies who is the principal of the bank and provides information about how the central bank understands the economy and monetary policy. Finally, tensions between the central bank and the government, as reflected by irregular turnover of central bank governors, raise doubts about countries’ future prospects. Empirically, we use a variety of models, including mediation analysis, to ensure that the effect we identify stems from the central bank governance itself, as a heuristic for the future paths of countries, and not the central bank's direct contribution to the macroeconomy, as reflected in the available data.     

The influence of government ideology on monetary policy: New cross‐country evidence based on dynamic heterogeneous panels

Using data of 23 OECD countries over the 1980–2005 period, we examine whether government ideology affects monetary policy, conditional on central bank independence. Unlike previous studies in this line of literature, we estimate central bank behavior using forward‐looking and real‐time data in Taylor rule models and use estimators that allow for heterogeneity across countries. Our models with heterogeneous slope coefficients for the full sample do not suggest partisan effects. We also do not find evidence that central bank behavior is conditioned by the interaction of the ideology of the incumbent government and the electoral calendar.     

DEBT NONNEUTRALITY,POLICY INTERACTIONS,AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY*

We study the consequences of nonneutrality of government debt for macroeconomic stabilization policy in a sticky‐price model. Ricardian equivalence fails because debt has a negative impact on its rate of return and on private savings, which is induced by assuming transaction services of bonds. Under aggressive monetary policy regimes, macroeconomic fluctuations tend to be stabilized if nominal budget deficits are low. A smooth debt path limits inflation expectations, such that inflation variances can be reduced. Under a balanced budget policy, the central bank's output gap–inflation volatility trade‐off is improved relative to an environment where debt is neutral.     

Destabilizing effects of a successful stabilization: a forward-looking explanation of the second Hungarian hyperinflation

Summary. The extreme severity of the second Hungarian hyperinflation is argued to be related to the unusual way in which the inflation was eventually stabilized. The historical features of this episode are represented in a general equilibrium model, which incorporates a transition from one monetary regime to another. During the inflation the government finances a fixed deficit with seigniorage revenue. After the stabilization the government budget is balanced and the central bank engages in a program of subsidized lending to the private sector. Stabilization is achieved by targeting a low inflation rate path through adjustments in the quantity of central bank lending. I show that under this stabilization policy (1) the dynamic equilibrium path of the economy is indeterminate and (2) arbitrarily high pre-stabilization inflation rates are possible. Received: November 5, 1998; revised version: November 30, 1998     

Understanding policy in the great recession: Some unpleasant fiscal arithmetic

I use the valuation equation of government debt to understand fiscal and monetary policy in and following the great recession of 2008–2009. I also examine policy alternatives to avoid deflation, and how fiscal pressures might lead to inflation. I conclude that the central bank may be almost powerless to avoid deflation or inflation; that an eventual fiscal inflation can come well before large deficits or monetization are realized, and that it is likely to come with stagnation rather than a boom.     

Foreign Exchange Intervention and Monetary Policy: A Tale of Two Agencies with Conflicting Objectives

In several industrial countries, the government is responsible for foreign exchange intervention while the central bank is given operational independence in conducting domestic monetary policy. We model the interaction between the two agencies when their views differ and generate empirical implications using lattice‐theoretic techniques. Japanese data from 2001–2004 support the model's predictions with respect to central bank behavior. The evidence is less conclusive as to whether the massive intervention of 2001–2004 by the Ministry of Finance caused the Bank of Japan to raise the monetary target.     

Fiscal Consequences of Monetary Integration within a Common Economic Area: The Case of Belarus,Kazakhstan and Russia

This article analyses the possible impact of planned monetary integration on public sector revenue from seigniorage in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. Using the concept of total gross seigniorage, we investigate the main sources and uses of the central bank revenue in these countries. Special attention is given to the role of seigniorage revenue in financing public sector expenditure. Amounts of yearly transfers from central banks to the state budget in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia are evaluated, and the size of potential gains and losses in seigniorage revenue under different scenarios of monetary integration are estimated.     

News Management in Monetary Policy: When Central Banks Should Talk to the Government

Central banks are often considered to be better informed about the present or future state of the economy than the government. A conservative central bank has an incentive to exploit this asymmetry by strategically managing its information policy. Strategic news management will keep the government uncertain about the state of the economy and increase the central bank's leeway for conducting a conservative monetary policy. We show that withholding information from the government is an equilibrium. However, there are also well-defined limits to strategic information policy as the central bank has to distort monetary policy to be in line with its news management. A simple extension of our findings is that, if the government on occasion learns about the bank's true information, it will then overrule the central bank's decision on monetary policy.     

Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms in a Monetary Union

Abstract. The paper analyzes the relation between monetary uncertainty and government incentives to implement economic reforms in order to reduce structural distortions and make economies more flexible. It is shown that uncertainty about the central bank's behavior leads to more reforms. I relate this result to the debate about central bank structure in a larger European monetary union.     

Budget deficits,money growth and inflation: the Turkish evidence

The paper investigates the long-run relationships between budget deficits, inflation and monetary growth in Turkey considering two alternative trivariate systems corresponding to the narrowest and the broadest monetary aggregates. While the joint endogeneity of money and inflation rejects the validity of the monetarist view, lack of a direct relationship between inflation and budget deficits makes the pure fiscal theory explanations illegitimate for the Turkish case. Consistent with the policy regime of financing domestic debt through the commercial banking system, budget deficits lead to a growth not of currency seigniorage but of broad money in Turkey. This mode of deficit financing, leading to the creation of near money and restricting the scope for an effective monetary policy, may not be sustainable, as the government securities/broad money ratio cannot grow without limit.     

The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence

International organizations (IOs) often drive policy change in member countries. Given IOs' limited political leverage over a member country, previous research argues that IOs rely on a combination of hard pressures (i.e., conditionality) and soft pressures (i.e., socialization) to attain their political goals. Expanding this literature, we hypothesize that IOs can enhance their political leverage through loan conditions aimed at enhancing the political independence of key administrative units. Studying this mechanism in the context of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we argue that through prescribing structural loan conditions on central banks (CBI conditionality), the IMF empowers central banks to gain more political leverage with the aim to limit a government's ability to (ab)use monetary policy for political gain. Divorcing monetary authorities from their respective government, the IMF intends to alter political dynamics towards achieving greater program compliance and enhance long-term macro-financial stability. Relying on a dataset including up to 124 countries between 1980 and 2012, we find that the IMF deploys CBI conditionality to countries with fewer checks and balances, a less independent central bank, and where the government relies more heavily on the monetization of public debt.     

THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL AND MONETARY DISCIPLINE ON BUDGETARY OUTCOMES

This article extends the model of Von Hagen and Harden that analyzed the impact of fiscal discipline on budgetary outcomes. We modify the model by adding monetary discipline to interact with fiscal discipline in order to analyze the effects of both on budgetary outcomes. The model predicts that while both inflation and budget deficits are negatively associated with fiscal discipline, they may be positively associated with monetary discipline, proxied by central bank independence. This result obtains due to optimizing agents internalizing the burden of spending: inflation. Although not conclusive due to data limitations, empirical findings also support these predictions. ( JEL D73, E58, H61, H72)