LONG‐TERM AND SHORT‐TERM CONTRACT IN A MIXED MARKET*

With a two‐period mixed oligopolistic framework, this paper analyses the interaction between the length of incentive contracts and market behaviour. Assuming an environment in which firms choose either a long‐term or short‐term contract, we examine how contracts differ between public and private firms. The results show that the contracts would differ completely among firms; public firm prefers to make a short‐term contract while private firm makes a long‐term contract.     

Availability of Long‐term Care Facilities and Middle‐aged People's Labor Supply in Japan

This paper estimates the effect of the availability of long‐term care facilities in the prefecture or medical district where middle‐aged men and women reside on their labor supply. Prefecture‐ and medical district‐ level panel datasets of the capacity of long‐term care facilities are merged with individual level employment data, and each individual's employment status is regressed on the capacities of long‐term care facilities. I find no evidence for a positive impact of the long‐term care availability on labor supply, although the estimates are unstable in sign and not estimated precisely enough to draw any strong conclusions.     

Estate recovery and long‐term care insurance

Estate recovery is a policy under which the state recovers part of long‐term care (LTC) subsidies from the estates of deceased beneficiaries. This paper studies the effect of estate recovery on LTC insurance demand. This effect strongly relies on the bequest motive since the main purpose behind purchasing LTC insurance is to protect bequests from the financial costs of LTC. We find that the impact of estate recovery on LTC insurance depends on the level of parental bequests and on whether and how the parent anticipates the child's preferences with respect to informal care. More specifically, we show that estate recovery encourages the parent to purchase LTC insurance when his child is considered selfish or to like providing care. However, this policy could provide disincentives to LTC insurance purchase by the parent if his child is considered to dislike providing informal care. Our results also show that estate recovery reduces and may even eliminate public support crowding out of private LTC insurance demand. Finally, we characterize the welfare implications of financing LTC public support by estate recovery.     

Long‐term care policy with lazy rotten kids

This paper studies the determination of informal long‐term care (LTC) provided by children in a scenario which is somewhere in between perfect altruism and selfish exchanges. Parents are altruistic but children are purely selfish, and neither side can make credible commitments. The model is based on Becker's “rotten kid” specification except that it explicitly accounts for the sequence of decisions. In Becker's world, with a single good efficiency is achieved. We show that when family aid is introduced the outcome is likely to be inefficient. Still, the rotten kid mechanism is at work and ensures that a positive level of LTC is provided as long as the bequest motive is operative. We identify the inefficiencies by comparing the laissez‐faire (subgame perfect) equilibrium to the first‐best allocation. We first assume that families are identical ex ante and then consider the case where dynasties differ in wealth. We study how the provision of LTC can be improved by public policies. Interestingly, crowding out of private aid by public LTC is not a problem in this setting. With an operative bequest motive, public LTC will have no impact on private aid. More amazingly still, when the bequest motive is (initially) not operative, public insurance may even enhance the provision of informal aid.     

Long‐term care and pay‐for‐performance programs

Pay‐for‐performance programs are gradually spreading across Asia. This paper builds on the longer experience in the United States to offer lessons for Asia. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services has introduced several pay‐for‐performance programs since 2012 to encourage hospitals to improve quality of care and reduce costs. Some state Medicaid programs have also introduced pay‐for‐performance for nursing homes. Long‐term care providers play an important role in hospital pay‐for‐performance programs because they can affect the readmission rate and also total episode payments. A good pay‐for‐performance program will focus on improving quality of care that affects health outcomes. In addition, that quality must vary across providers and be measurable. Furthermore, it is important that the measures be reported in a timely way, that both demand and supply respond to the measures, and that the measures be risk adjusted. Empirical data from Medicare beneficiaries in the state of Michigan show that mean episode payments and readmission rates in skilled nursing facilities vary widely and are sensitive to the number of observations. These practical matters create challenges for implementing pay‐for‐performance in practice. There is an extensive literature review of pay‐for‐performance in long‐term care in the United States and in Asia.     

Exchange Rates and Long‐Term Bonds*

There is tentative evidence to suggest that the well‐documented empirical failure of uncovered interest parity (UIP) is confined to short‐term interest rates. However, tests of UIP for long‐term bonds are thwarted by various data problems. These data problems can be avoided by focusing on short investments in long‐term bonds. This paper concerns the relationship between changes in the US dollar–Deutsche Mark exchange rate and returns to short investments in US and German long‐term government bonds. The hypothesis that expected returns to investments in bonds denominated in the two currencies are equal is not rejected, and the estimated slope coefficients are positive. For corresponding short‐term interest rates, the typical finding of negative and large Fama coefficients is confirmed. We conclude that it is the maturity of the asset, rather than the investment horizon, that matters for the results.     

LONG‐TERM CARE AND FAMILY BARGAINING*

We present a structural model of how families decide who should care for elderly parents. We use data from the National Long‐Term Care Survey to estimate and test the parameters of the model. Then we use the parameter estimates to simulate the effects of the existing long‐term trends in terms of the common but untested explanations for them. Finally, we simulate the effects of alternative family bargaining rules on individual utility to measure the sensitivity of our results to the family decision‐making assumptions we make.     

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON HEALTH IN TAIWAN AND ITS LONG‐TERM ADJUSTMENT*

This paper investigates the dynamic change of the population health status in Taiwan. Specifically, it provides insight into the empirical determinants of health production function and explores the nature of the long‐term adjustment in health performance. For these purposes, panel data are used incorporating dynamic effects as well as controls for unobservable area‐specific effect and area‐invariant time effect. The findings are consistent with the earlier research in terms of the determinants of the health production function. The result of the present paper suggests that after decades of improvement in health care, people in Taiwan have lower age‐adjusted mortality rates. Also, the decreases in mortality rates follow a rapid pace of long‐term adjustment implying that health‐care policy that focuses on the provision of medical care services substantially benefits the nation's health.     

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES FOR STATE‐OWNED ENTERPRISES AS A MEANS TO MITIGATE POLITICAL INTERFERENCE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TWO SWISS STATE‐OWNED ENTERPRISES

When governments act as owners of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), they are both principal and agent at the same time. The literature on steering SOEs has mainly focused on the government as the principal that must control SOEs. However, the government is also an agent, vis‐à‐vis the parliament, because democratic constitutions stipulate some form of parliamentary oversight of the government. This oversight includes checks on how the government steers SOEs. However, this oversight function gives the parliament the power and opportunity to interfere into steering SOEs, which may lead to parliamentary interventions that are not coherent with governmental steering. We draw on principal–agent literature and public‐accountability literature to show that arbitrary and hands‐on parliamentary interference pose problems for steering SOEs. We analyze whether strategic objectives for SOEs, as recommended by public corporate governance guidelines, are appropriate to minimize parliamentary interference. We hypothesize that the Swiss government avoids or mitigates parliamentary interference by mid‐term strategic objectives for SOEs, which counteract short‐term parliamentary requests. We find that the Swiss government uses mid‐term strategic objectives, particularly financial ones, to reject parliamentary demands for more intervention into SOE activities.     

Do socially motivated self‐help groups perform better? Exploring determinants of micro‐credit groups’ performance in Eastern India

Group‐based micro‐credit initiatives, as part of the broader social and solidarity‐based finance initiatives, have gained prominence over the past decade, especially in developing economies like India. Lending to the poor, especially women, through micro‐credit groups, are significantly associated with the utilization of commons. Apart from their financial operations, self‐help groups promote social empowerment activities and collective action following a dual bottom‐line approach. However, the causal role of the group's motivation towards pursuing social objectives has not been explored in the past. The present study, therefore, investigates the interlinkages between the group's intrinsic motivation and efficiency using an innovative two‐stage double bootstrapped DEA‐based methodology. Results from the study affirm that apart from traditional factors like maturity, accessibility and group management, the motivation of the group is a crucial determinant of social efficiency. Additionally, the group's loan‐to‐savings ratio and receipt of cash payments significantly affect its long‐term financial sustainability. Micro‐credit groups cannot contribute sustainably as a viable alternative to traditional means of access to credit if it merely offers innovative forms of financing and consumption. They need to be socially aligned to serve the community better and contribute to the group's overall performance and galvanize community‐based resource management.     

Willingness‐to‐pay for parallel private health insurance: evidence from a laboratory experiment

Abstract Debate over the effects of public versus private health care finance persists in both academic and policy circles. This paper presents the results of a revealed preference laboratory experiment that tests how characteristics of the public health system affect a subject's willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) for parallel private health insurance. Consistent with the theoretical predictions of Cuff et al. (2010), subjects’ average WTP is lower and the size of the private insurance sector smaller when the public system allocates health care based on need rather than randomly and when the probability of receiving health care from the public system is high.     

Distress financing of out‐of‐pocket health expenditure in India

In the absence of a universal health insurance mechanism, the increasing burden of out‐of‐pocket (OOP) health expenditure has become a growing concern in India. To cope with the cost of illness, people use either their savings and income, or they have to rely upon distress means of finance such as depletion of household assets, borrowings from banks and moneylenders, and contributions from family and friends. This paper analyses the changes that have taken place in the incidence and covariates of distress financing in India by using data from National Sample Survey Organisation for the years 2004 and 2014. Results indicate that during this period the incidence of distress sources as a means to finance OOP health expenditure has hovered around 50%. Further, the results reveal a significant socioeconomic gradient in the incidence of distress financing. Socioeconomic and health‐related covariates significantly impact the likelihood of distress financing as a means to cope with OOP health expenditure. The results indicate the need for government action to formulate a comprehensive plan through an increase in public spending on health care that will improve the quantity and quality of the public health‐care system and enhance the scope of health insurance in India.     

How does historical trauma affect political participation? Evidence from the send‐down movement in China

Taking advantage of China's send‐down movement as a natural experiment, we investigate how experiencing a political movement during adolescence affects political participation decades later. Using data from the China Family Panel Survey and the regression discontinuity design, we find that the send‐down experience significantly reduces individuals’ political participation, measured by their participation in community committee elections, time spent on community service activities and how much they care about public news. Further analysis suggests that the send‐down experience negatively affects political participation through poorer mental health and less trust in local government.     

Long‐term care and intrafamily moral hazard: Optimal public policy

The paper studies optimal public long‐term care (LTC) policy in the context of intrafamily moral hazard suggested by Pauly. The model considers a representative family consisting of an adult child and her elderly parent who might become dependent, in which case he places a special value on the LTC provided to him by his child. Since the child's caregiving is decreasing in the amount of insurance coverage, the parent prefers to underinsure, which is socially suboptimal. The child's choice of caregiving is also inefficient since she does not internalize its positive effect on the parent. The paper tackles these inefficiencies and shows that intrafamily moral hazard is a sufficient justification for public intervention targeted at insurance. If not necessarily for the introduction of mandatory public insurance, then at least for the taxation or subsidization of private insurance premiums.     

How does the Price Regulation Policy Impact on Patient–Nurse Ratios and the Length of Hospital Stays in Japanese Hospitals?

This study examines how the 2000 and 2006 revisions of the fee‐for‐service system have affected patient–nurse ratios and the average length of hospital stays in Japan. The empirical results show that hospitals are quite responsive to changes in price policy. The fee revisions have certainly achieved the policy objectives of reducing patient–nurse ratios and the length of hospital stays. As a result, hospitals have responded by greatly increasing the number of expensive beds for acute care. However, this was not exactly predicted by the Japanese government, which has aimed to reallocate health‐care resources, such as beds, to subacute or long‐term care.     

Deprivation and Subjective Well‐Being: Evidence from Panel Data

This paper uses data from the 2000–08 waves of the German Socio‐Economic Panel dataset (SOEP) to assess the impact of deprivation in various life domains upon individual well‐being. Unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for by means of a random effects model extended to include a Mundlak term and explicit controls for the respondents' personality traits. The paper shows that people care about social comparison information in a number of domains, not just income. Using an equivalent income approach, the estimates suggest that a one standard deviation deterioration of the individual position in the income distribution is as important as a 33.5 percent decrease in own income. This monetary equivalent amounts to an income variation of between 25 and 43 percent when it comes to other deprivation domains, including durables, accommodation, health, and social relations. These results recommend that in the fight against deprivation more emphasis should be directed to these non‐monetary relevant dimensions.     

Tax Competition,Investment Irreversibility and the Provision of Public Goods

This article studies the effects of tax competition on the provision of public goods under business risk and partial irreversibility of investment. As will be shown, the provision of public goods changes over time and also depends on the business cycle. In particular, under source‐based taxation, in the short term, public goods can be optimally provided during a downturn. The converse is true during a recovery: in this case, they are underprovided. In the long term, however, tax competition does not affect capital accumulation. This means that the provision of public goods is unaffected by taxation.     

The political economy of public health expenditure and wait times in a public‐private mixed health care system

Abstract This paper investigates the determinants of public health expenditure in a public‐private mixed health care system, where a longer wait time for public care is the major difference between public and private sectors. Voter preferences for health care vary according to their age and by income, and public policy choices are part of a multi‐dimensional, competitive political equilibrium. We show how equilibrium public health expenditure and wait times depend on demographics and explain why they are independent of the distributions of income and political influence. We also show that population aging may not always lead to more public health expenditure.     

MONETARY CREDIBILITY VS. VOTER APPROVAL: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND EXCHANGE‐RATE STABILIZATION DURING CRISES

This paper analyzes how political institutions affect the execution of exchange‐rate policy. By focusing on policy‐makers' responses to the emergence of speculative pressure on their currencies, we argue that the effect of democratic institutions on exchange‐rate stability is likely to be conditioned by the officially announced exchange‐rate regime. Officially fixed exchange rates are the main instrument of autocrats to signal commitment to long‐term stability. Autocratic governments with strictly fixed exchange rates are thus more likely to defend their exchange rates than autocrats with an intermediate regime because the latter implicitly signal that they care less about monetary stability. In contrast, democrats defend more often in intermediately than in fully fixed official regimes by using a combination of external and internal adjustments, which reduce the negative effects of a devaluation on voters. Our analysis of 189 currency crises between 1975 and 1999 supports this conditional effect.     

A Rotated Dynamic Nelson‐Siegel Model

I show how to rotate the factor structure of the well‐known Dynamic Nelson‐Siegel yield‐curve model to enable direct parametrization of the short rate process. This makes it easy to calculate model‐implied term premia and to integrate macroeconomic variables into the model in a Taylor‐rule‐type fashion.