FORECASTING AND POLICY EVALUATION IN ECONOMIES WITH RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS: THE DISCRETE TIME CASE*

Several techniques for solving dynamic rational expectations models have been proposed. This paper puts forward an alternative method for discrete time models, which is significantly simpler to use in practice. That solution is used to derive and compute optimal policy selections (incorporating ‘noncausal’ effects) which, by exploiting the discrete time framework, are also time consistent when sequentially reoptimized. Those decisions are shown to contain an optimal open loop component plus an innovations dependent correction mechanism. A numerical example is used to verify these properties, and to demonstrate the superiority of this policy selection technique over recursive methods (e.g. dynamic programming).     

THE LIQUIDITY TRAP,THE REAL BALANCE EFFECT,AND THE FRIEDMAN RULE*

This article studies the behavior of the economy and the efficacy of monetary policy under zero nominal interest rates using a model with population growth that nests, as a special case, the conventional specification in which there is a single infinitely lived representative agent. The article shows that with a growing population, monetary policy has distributional consequences that give rise to a real balance effect, thereby eliminating the liquidity trap. These same distributional effects, however, can also work to make many agents much worse off under zero nominal interest rates than they are when the nominal interest rate is positive.     

BILATERALISM IN THE INTERWAR WORLD ECONOMY*

Discriminatory protectionist policies in the 1930s are assumed to have led to a collapse of multilateral trading patterns. This paper examines the trends in bilateralism during the interwar period for a sample of ten countries. The findings show that, with the exception of Germany between 1934 and 1938, the level of bilateralism fluctuated but did not see a significant trend increase in the period of increased protectionism during the 1930s.     

MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION POLICIES IN THE EMU: SPILLOVERS, ASYMMETRIES AND INSTITUTIONS

This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. The specific policy recommendations in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) context depend on the particular characteristics of the shocks and the economic structure. In the case of a common shock, fiscal coordination or full policy coordination is desirable. When anti‐symmetric shocks are considered, fiscal coordination improves the performance but full policy coordination does not produce further gains in policymakers' welfare.     

EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: ANTIDISCRIMINATION POLICIES IN THE LABOR MARKET

Some have criticized government antidiscrimination programs for causing efficiency losses both by devoting public resources to monitoring and enforcement and by distorting personnel decisions. This paper examines the efficiency consequences of such programs when discrimination is caused by a market failure and when regulators are imperfectly informed about individual firms' personnel policies.
This paper outlines a simple model of "statistical discrimination" and shows that an equal opportunity rule, which constrains employers from offering different wage schedules to different groups, will improve the efficiency of this economy. Employers will attempt to evade such regulation, and the paper describes an evasion strategy in which employers search for worker "qualifications" that can act as proxies for race or sex. The paper discusses problems involved in monitoring and enforcing compliance, and considers two possible responses by the regulatory agency. The first is analogous to "disparate impact" judgments in which the type of information that employers can use in personnel decisions is regulated. The second is an affirmative action-type policy that monitors the outcomes, rather than the process, of hiring and compensation decisions. Affirmative action policies have some advantages since they permit employers to use information more efficiently than do policies that attempt to regulate personnel decisions directly. However, affirmative action policies are likely to lead to charges of preferential treatment.     

JAPAN IN THE NEW WORLD CONFRONTATION: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE*

In terms of the history of modern economic growth the major axis of world confrontation has always been between early and late comers to industrialization. Severe confrontation arises typically when a late-comer is believed to have developed a model of economic development capable of allowing it to catch up with or even overtake the economic power of the countries that industrialized early. Rises and falls of the various catch-up models in the modern history are examined. In this historical perspective the characteristics of confrontation are identified between the system of developmental market economies in Japan and Asian NIES and the system of liberal market economies in Western countries.