Rollover Risk and Credit Risk

Our model shows that deterioration in debt market liquidity leads to an increase in not only the liquidity premium of corporate bonds but also credit risk. The latter effect originates from firms' debt rollover. When liquidity deterioration causes a firm to suffer losses in rolling over its maturing debt, equity holders bear the losses while maturing debt holders are paid in full. This conflict leads the firm to default at a higher fundamental threshold. Our model demonstrates an intricate interaction between the liquidity premium and default premium and highlights the role of short‐term debt in exacerbating rollover risk.     

Did the repeated debt ceiling controversies embed default risk in US Treasury securities?

We examine whether the financial market charged a default risk premium to US Treasury securities when the US Federal government repeatedly reached the legally binding debt limits between 2002 and 2006. We show that for the first two of the four recurrences since the first episode in 1996, the financial market charged a small default risk premium to the Treasury securities. However, we find no significant evidence of a pricing effect in the last two recurrences. The results suggest that the financial market gradually perceived the budget standoffs as the boy who cried wolf.     

Managerial ability,information quality,and the design and pricing of corporate debt

We examine if managerial ability affects the efficiency of the contracting environment with lenders. We find that higher ability alters the balance of information-sensitive covenants demanded by outside investors, increases the issuance of bonds with longer maturity, and decreases the issuance of senior secured debt. We also document higher ability reduces the risk premium demanded by investors on information-sensitive debt. These results are collectively consistent with the premise that the mitigation of information risk is an important dimension of managerial ability that has a direct bearing on the structure and pricing of corporate debt.     

Default Risk, Asset Pricing, and Debt Control

The pricing and control of firms’ debt has become a majorissue since Merton’s (1974) seminal article. Yet Mertonas well as other recent theories presume that the asset valueof the firm is independent of the debt of the firm. However,when using debt finance, firms may have to pay a premium foran idiosyncratic default risk and may face debt constraints.We demonstrate that firm-specific debt constraints and endogenousrisk premia, based on collateralized borrowing, affect the assetvalue of the firm and, in turn, the collateral value of thefirm. In order to explore the interdependence of debt financeand asset pricing of firms, we endogenize default premia andborrowing constraints in a production-based asset pricing model.In this context then the dynamic decision problem of maximizingthe present value of the firm faces an additional constraintgiving rise to the debt-dependent firm value. We solve for theasset value of the firm with debt finance by the use of numericaldynamic programming. This allows us to solve the debt controlproblem and to compute sustainable debt as well as the firm’sdebt value.     

A Simple Approach to Valuing Risky Fixed and Floating Rate Debt

We develop a simple approach to valuing risky corporate debt that incorporates both default and interest rate risk. We use this approach to derive simple closed-form valuation expressions for fixed and floating rate debt. The model provides a number of interesting new insights about pricing and hedging corporate debt securities. For example, we find that the correlation between default risk and the interest rate has a significant effect on the properties of the credit spread. Using Moody's corporate bond yield data, we find that credit spreads are negatively related to interest rates and that durations of risky bonds depend on the correlation with interest rates. This empirical evidence is consistent with the implications of the valuation model.     

Mortgage Default with Asymmetric Information

This article analyzes mortgage-market equilibrium when borrower default costs are private information. By applying the approach of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), it is shown that asymmetric information regarding default costs distorts the contract choices available in the mortgage market, preventing safe borrowers (those with high default costs) from fully satisfying their demand for mortgage debt. Large loans are available for a substantial interest-rate premium, but only risky borrowers find this premium worth paying. The article builds on an empirical literature designed to test the ruthless-default principle from option-based models of mortgage pricing. That literature provides evidence against ruthless behavior, suggesting that default costs play an important role in borrower decisions. The article takes a further step by arguing that such costs are private information, which has important implications for market equilibrium.     

DEFAULT RISK PREMIA IN THE NEAR-CASH INVESTMENT MARKET: THE CASE OF AUCTION RATE PREFERRED STOCK VERSUS COMMERCIAL PAPER

Auction rate preferred stock (ARPS) is often regarded as an alternative to other near-cash instruments such as commercial paper while the dividend exclusion for ARPS offers tax advantages to corporate purchasers. The mean default risk premium for ARPS, relative to commercial paper, is estimated at 83 basis points during stable financial markets. This default premium appears to surge during unstable equity markets, having jumped by 192 basis points in November 1987. Lower-rated ARPS shows even larger changes, with yields 40–50 basis points above yields on high-rated ARPS, adjusted for the normal risk premium differential. The perceived risk change of ARPS underscores how quickly market participants re-evaluate default risk, and even the importance of the priority order among debt and equity claimants. Findings suggest ARPS and commercial paper are not an acceptable substitute for commercial paper during times of unsettled equity markets.     

Taxes, Leverage, and the Cost of Equity Capital

We examine the associations among leverage, corporate and investor level taxes, and the firm's implied cost of equity capital. Expanding on Modigliani and Miller [1958, 1963] , the cost of equity capital can be expressed as a function of leverage and corporate and investor level taxes. Based on this expression, we predict that the cost of equity is increasing in leverage, and that corporate taxes mitigate this leverage‐related risk premium, while the personal tax disadvantage of debt increases this premium. We empirically test these predictions using implied cost of equity estimates and proxies for the firm's corporate tax rate and the personal tax disadvantage of debt. Our results suggest that the equity risk premium associated with leverage is decreasing in the corporate tax benefit from debt. We find some evidence that the equity risk premium from leverage is increasing in the personal tax penalty associated with debt.     

Is recovery risk priced?

Recovery risk to explain corporate debt premia has not received much attention so far, most likely due to the difficulties around decomposing the expected loss. We exploit the fact that differently-ranking debt instruments of the same issuer face identical default risk but different default-conditional recovery rates. This allows us to isolate implied recovery under the T-forward measure without any of the rigid assumptions employed by prior studies. We find a pronounced systematic component in recovery rates for which investors should receive a premium. Comparisons to physical realizations show that the premium is quite time-stable and similar for different debt seniorities.     

Strategic Debt Service

When firms experience financial distress, equity holders may act strategically, forcing concessions from debtholders and paying less than the originally-contracted interest payments. This article incorporates strategic debt service in a standard, continuous time asset pricing model, developing simple closed-form expressions for debt and equity values. We find that strategic debt service can account for a substantial proportion of the premium on risky corporate debt. We analyze the efficiency implications of strategic debt service, showing that it can eliminate both direct bankruptcy costs and agency costs of debt.     

A Markov model for the term structure of credit risk spreads

This article provides a Markov model for the term structureof credit risk spreads. The model is based on Jarrow and Turnbull(1995), with the bankruptcy process following a discrete statespace Markov chain in credit ratings. The parameters of thisprocess are easily estimated using observable data. This modelis useful for pricing and hedging corporate debt with imbeddedoptions, for pricing and hedging OTC derivatives with counterpartyrisk, for pricing and hedging (foreign) government bonds subjectto default risk (e.g., municipal bonds), for pricing and hedgingcredit derivatives, and for risk management.     

From equity to default correlation with taxes

For fixed income investment, the preponderant risk is the clustering of defaults in the portfolio. Accurate prediction of such clustering depends on the knowledge of default correlation. We develop models with exogenous debt and endogenous debt to predict default correlations from equity correlations based on a self-consistent structural framework. We also examine how taxes affect the prediction of default correlations based on the two models. The empirical analysis shows that the corporate taxes tend to decrease default correlations, while personal taxes could increase or decrease default correlations. Our default correlation model with exogenous debt does a better job of predicting default correlations for high quality bonds, while the one with endogenous debt predicts more accurately for lower rated bonds. Our studies not only theoretically improve the modeling of default correlation in the structural setting but also shed new light on various aspects of default correlations and thereby help financial practitioners price credit derivatives more accurately and formulate more effective strategies to manage default risk of credit portfolios.     

Legal Restrictions in Personal Loan Markets

This study examines the pricing of personal loans in the form of second mortgages to determine whether state-specific default laws have an effect on the availability and cost of that debt. We examine the pricing of loans to higher risk borrowers and whether borrowers in states that limit lender ability to seek default remedies pay higher credit costs. Our results indicate that, for the most part, lenders rationally price loans to higher risk borrowers. However, when we focus on borrowers with low credit scores, the results indicate that mean actual loan rates are higher than those predicted by our model. The results also indicate that state-specific default laws have an effect on the price of credit. Finally, the results show that there is a greater degree of error in the pricing of second mortgage loans to borrowers with low credit scores than to borrowers with high credit scores.     

On the systematic volatility of unpriced earnings

Some important puzzles in macro finance can be resolved in a model featuring systematically varying volatility of unpriced shocks to firms? earnings. In the data, the correlation between corporate debt and stock market valuations is low. The model accounts for this via the opposing effect of unpriced earnings risk on levered debt and equity prices. The model also explains the low (or nonexistent) risk-reward relation for the market portfolio of levered equity via the opposing effects of unpriced and priced uncertainty (both components of stock volatility) on the levered equity risk premium. Versions of the model calibrated to empirical measures of both types of fundamental risk can quantitatively substantiate these explanations. Variation in residual earning dispersion accounts for a significant fraction of observed disagreement between debt and equity valuations and of realized stock volatility. The implication that the two components of risk should forecast the levered equity risk premium with opposite signs is also supported in the data. The results are a notable advance for risk-based asset pricing.     

Risk-based pricing of interest rates for consumer loans

By focusing on observable default risk's role in loan terms and the subsequent consequences for household behavior, this paper shows that lenders increasingly used risk-based pricing of interest rates in consumer loan markets during the mid-1990s. It tests three resulting predictions: First, the premium paid per unit of risk should have increased over this period. Second, debt levels should have reacted accordingly. Third, fewer high-risk households should have been denied credit, further contributing to the interest rate spread between the highest- and lowest-risk borrowers.For people obtaining loans, the premium paid per unit of risk did indeed become significantly larger after the mid-1990s. For example, for a 0.01 increase in the probability of bankruptcy, the corresponding interest-rate increase tripled for first mortgages, doubled for automobile loans and rose nearly six-fold for second mortgages. Additionally, changes in borrowing levels and debt access reflected these new pricing practices, particularly for secured debt. Borrowing increased most for the low-risk households who saw their relative borrowing costs fall. Furthermore, while very high-risk households gained expanded access to credit, the increases in their risk premiums implied that their borrowing as a whole either rose less or, sometimes, fell.     

Distressed debt prices and recovery rate estimation

This paper has two purposes. First, it uses distressed debt prices to estimate recovery rates at default. In this regard, estimates are obtained for three recovery rate models: recovery of face value, recovery of Treasury, and recovery of market value. We show that identifying the “economic” default date, as distinct from the recorded default date, is crucial to obtaining unbiased estimates. The economic default date is defined to be the first date when the market prices the firm’s debt as if it has defaulted. An implication is that the standard industry practice of using 30-day post default prices to compute recovery rate yields biased estimates. Second, we construct and estimate a distressed debt pricing model. We use this model to implicitly estimate the parameters of the embedded recovery rate process and to price distressed debt. Our distressed debt pricing model fits market prices well, with an average pricing error of less than one basis point.      

American options and callable bonds under stochastic interest rates and endogenous bankruptcy

A new characterization of the American-style option is proposed under a very general multifactor Markovian and diffusion framework. The efficiency of the proposed pricing solutions is shown to depend only on the use of a viable valuation method for the corresponding European-style option and for the transition density of the model’s state variables. Under a Gauss-Markov stochastic interest rates setup, these new American option pricing solutions are shown to offer a much better accuracy-efficiency trade-off than the approximations already available in the literature. This result is also used to price callable corporate bonds under an endogenous bankruptcy structural approach, by decomposing the option to call or default into a European put on the firm value plus two early exercise premium components.     

How much of the corporate bond spread is due to personal taxes?

Existing term structure models of defaultable bonds have often underestimated corporate bond spreads. A potential problem is that investors’ taxes are ignored in these models. We propose a pricing model that accounts for stochastic default probability and differential tax treatments for discount and premium bonds. By estimating parameters directly from bond data, we obtain significantly positive estimates for the income tax rate of a marginal corporate bond investor after 1986. This contrasts sharply with the previous finding that the implied tax rates for Treasury bonds are close to zero. Results show that taxes explain a substantial portion of corporate bond spreads.     

Corporate bond default risk: A 150-year perspective

We study corporate bond default rates using an extensive new data set spanning the 1866-2008 period. We find that the corporate bond market has repeatedly suffered clustered default events much worse than those experienced during the Great Depression. For example, during the railroad crisis of 1873-1875, total defaults amounted to 36% of the par value of the entire corporate bond market. Using a regime-switching model, we examine the extent to which default rates can be forecast by financial and macroeconomic variables. We find that stock returns, stock return volatility, and changes in GDP are strong predictors of default rates. Surprisingly, however, credit spreads are not. Over the long term, credit spreads are roughly twice as large as default losses, resulting in an average credit risk premium of about 80 basis points. We also find that credit spreads do not adjust in response to realized default rates.     

Corporate capital structure and pension-funding strategy

This article provides an integrated analysis of pension funding and corporate financing strategies in the presence of default risk. The article shows that when the marginal personal income tax rate is constant, the financing decision with respect to pension funding is influenced entirely by tax considerations. When the marginal personal income tax is progressive, the optimal financing of pension funding depends on the cyclical nature of the firm (as characterized by the sign of beta), the riskiness of pension assets, and ERISA regulations concerning the pension-benefit guaranty rate, the marginal pension insurance premium and the firm's legal responsibility for its unfunded pension obligations. It is shown that a necessary condition for partial pension funding is that the marginal insurance premium imposed by PBGC must be less than actuarially fair, and a necessary condition for pension funding to be financed by both debt and equity is that beta must be positive.