Do markets overreact: International evidence

In this paper, using the Conrad and Kaul's methodology we test for the overreaction hypothesis – which maintains that stock prices systematically overshoot and therefore their reversal can be predicted from past performance — in seven industrialized countries. Consistent with the findings of Conrad and Kaul, we see no evidence of overreaction in the US. However, returns to long-term contrarian strategies in other countries seem to be generally significant. Moreover, we find that in the majority of the countries, while returns to arbitrage portfolios based on price are higher than those based on size, the latter generally outperform the winner–loser arbitrage portfolios.     

Long‐Term Return Reversals: Overreaction or Taxes?

Long‐term reversals in U.S. stock returns are better explained as the rational reactions of investors to locked‐in capital gains than an irrational overreaction to news. Predictors of returns based on the overreaction hypothesis have no power, while those that measure locked‐in capital gains do, completely subsuming past returns measures that are traditionally used to predict long‐term returns. In data from Hong Kong, where investment income is not taxed, reversals are nonexistent, and returns are not forecastable either by traditional measures or by measures based on the capital gains lock‐in hypothesis that successfully predict U.S. returns.     

Is the Mean Return of Hotel Real Estate Stocks Apt to Overreact to Past Performance?

This study examines the return patterns of hotel real estate stocks in the U.S. during the period from 1990 to 2007.We find that the magnitude and persistence of future mean returns of hotel real estate stocks can be predicted based on past returns, past earnings surprise, trading volume, firm size, and holding period. The empirical evidence found from this paper confirms that short-horizon contrarian profits can be partially explained by the lead-lag effects, while in the intermediate-term price momentum profits and long-term contrarian profits can be partially attributed to the firms’ overreaction to past price changes. Our results support the contrarian/overreaction hypothesis, and they are inconsistent with the Fama-French risk-based hypothesis or the underreaction hypothesis. The study also confirms the earning underreaction hypothesis and finds the high volume stocks tend to earn high momentum profits in the intermediate-term. The study finds that the earning momentum effect for hotel stocks is more short-lived and smaller in magnitude than the market average. Price momentum portfolios (or contrarian portfolios) of big hotel firms underperform small hotel firms and the hotel price momentum portfolio (or contrarian portfolios) significantly underperform the overall market over the intermediate-term (or the long-term). These findings imply that the U.S. hotel industry, particularly the big hotel firms, have experienced relatively conservative growth in the sample period. It suggests that a conservative hotel growth strategy accompanied by an internal-oriented financing policy is proper in a period of prosperity.     

Does the market overweight imprecise information? Evidence from customer earnings announcements

We examine how supplier-firm shareholders respond to the earnings announcements of their major customers to test the moderated confidence hypothesis, which predicts overreaction to imprecise signals. In our setting, the moderated confidence hypothesis predicts that supplier shareholders will overreact to customer earnings news because that news contains imprecise information about the suppliers’ future cash flows. We find evidence that supplier earnings announcement abnormal returns are negatively correlated with supplier abnormal returns at the earlier customers’ earnings announcements, consistent with supplier overreaction. We also find evidence that the overreaction declines with the strength of the economic ties between the supplier and the customer.     

Underpricing, Subsequent Equity Offerings, and the Long-Run Performance of Japanese IPOs

Using data on IPOs that are issued in Japan during January 1975–March 1989, we examine the deliberate underpricing and overreaction hypotheses to explain high initial returns at offering dates. Specifically, we analyze the cross-sectional pattern of the short- and long-run performance of IPOs. The obtained results indicate that the deliberate underpricing theories which we examine are unable to explain the high initial returns on the Japanese IPOs. Furthermore, for the average of the IPOs, the empirical results are not consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. However, there is evidence consistent with the hypothesis that for a certain minority group of IPOs, the high initial returns occur due to overreactions by investors. We interpret the overall results as indicating that the high initial returns on the Japanese IPOs can be attributed to a mixture of both underpricing and investor overreaction. We conjecture that the binding regulations in Japan led to underpricing. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Long-Term Market Overreaction or Biases in Computed Returns?

We show that the returns to the typical long-term contrarian strategy implemented in previous studies are upwardly biased because they are calculated by cumulating single-period (monthly) returns over long intervals. The cumulation process not only cumulates “true” returns but also the upward bias in single-period returns induced by measurement errors. We also show that the remaining “true” returns to loser or winner firms have no relation to overreaction. This study has important implications for event studies that use cumulative returns to assess the impact of information events.     

Consistency of firms' past financial performance measures and future returns

In this study, I show that growth consistency in firms' past financial performance measures is useful in predicting future stock returns. Firms consistently ranking in the lowest 30 percent of past financial growth measures have greater rates of returns relative to their inconsistent low-growth firm counterparts. The return differential between these two groups increases uniformly with the length of estimation intervals of past performance data. Firms consistently ranking in the top 30 percent of growth rates earn slightly lower returns than inconsistent high-growth firms. These findings indicate that investors overreact to consistency in financial metrics, but this overreaction is more pronounced and persistent for consistent low-growth firms than that for consistent high-performing firms. Regression analyses reveal that consistency of firms' past financial performance predicts subsequent price movement. This association between past growth consistency and future returns is stronger for consistent low-growth firms relative to consistent high-growth firms.     

Do Stock Market Investors Overreact?

This paper investigates the evidence on the stock market overreaction hypothesis (ORH), which holds that, if stock prices systematically overshoot as a consequence of excessive investor optimism or pessimism, price reversals should be predictable from past price performance. The ORH stands in contradiction to the efficient markets hypothesis which is a cornerstone of financial economics. This study is unique in the overreaction literature because it is restricted to larger and better-known listed companies, whose shares are more frequently traded. This restriction more or less eliminates two alternative explanations to the overreaction hypothesis: it minimises the influence of bid-ask biases and infrequent trading, and reduces the possibility that reversals are primarily a small-firm phenomenon. The paper also investigates a third alternative explanation, namely that time-varying risk explains the reversal effect. The study employs unbiased methods of return computation and uses data from 1975 to 1991 for nearly 1,000 UK companies. Overall, the evidence appears to be consistent with the overreaction hypothesis, subject to certain qualifications.     

Is Stock Market Overreaction Persistent Over Time?

This paper examines the stability and persistence of the market overreaction hypothesis as posited by DeBondt and Thaler (1985 and 1987), and reinforced by Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992). Using monthly CRSP data for the period 1926 through 1992, we find that returns obtained from a contrarian investment strategy are not time-stationary. Specifically, there is no winner-loser portfolio relationship during the post-war period of 1940_50s. The relationship resumes during the pre-energy-crisis subperiod, but weakens again during the post-energy-crisis subperiod. The effectiveness of trading based upon the overreaction hypothesis is, therefore, suspect.     

Momentum,contrarian, and the January seasonality

This paper reexamines the apparent success of two prominent stock trading strategies: long-term contrarian and intermediate-term momentum. The paper demonstrates that long-term contrarian is entirely attributable to the classic January size effect, rather than to investor overreaction, as argued by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). Further, the paper also resolves the Novy-Marx (2011) concern about whether return autocorrelation “is really momentum” by demonstrating that the superior performance of intermediate-term momentum is due to strong January seasonality in the cross-section of returns. The implications are that long-term contrarian must be considered largely illusory, and intermediate-term momentum must take account of annual seasonalities in returns.     

Overreaction in the Brazilian stock market

The overreaction hypothesis on a new set of data for the Brazilian stock market over the period 1970–1989 is investigated. Both market adjusted returns and the standard Sharpe-Lintner CAPM adjusted returns are used. Price reversals in 2-year returns are detected and the results contrast with the U.S. evidence in that the magnitude of the effect is more pronounced than in the U.S. The results also suggest that differences in risk, as measured by CAPM-betas using the method suggested by Chan (Chan K.C., 1988, On the contrarian investment strategy, Journal of Business 61, 147–163), cannot account for the overreaction effect. I also examine the issue of asymmetry versus symmetry in the overreaction effect. Using the criterion proposed by Dissanaike (Dissanaike G., 1992, Are stock price reversals really symmetric? University of Cambridge Department of Applied Economics Discussion Paper, AF series, No. 4) I find evidence that the price reversals are asymmetric.     

分析师评级修订对股票收益的过度反应：一种“合谋”

采用2003-2014年的数据,考察分析师评级修订时是否会对股票收益过度反应,哪些因素有可能加剧或者抑制过度反应的程度.研究发现:仅明星分析师评级修订时会对无形股票收益反应过度;当机构投资者重仓持股或上市公司高管计划减持股票时,明星分析师评级修订对无形股票收益的过度反应程度会加剧;当法律环境变得更加严格或明星分析师所任职券商的规模加大时,其评级修订对无形股票收益的过度反应程度将会降低.这一研究结论与本文提出的"合谋假说"更加一致,但与以往文献中基于行为金融学视角所提出的"过度自信假说"以及基于利益冲突视角所提出的"迎合假说"并不一致.     

WINNERS AND LOSERS ON NYSE: A RE-EXAMINATION USING DAILY CLOSING BID-ASK SPREADS

We study a sample of NYSE stocks that experienced a large one-day price change during 1992 and were reported as daily largest percentage gainers and largest percentage losers in the Wall Street Journal. The sample indicates significant reversals during the immediate post-announcement period. We test for market efficiency by using bid-ask spreads obtained from the transactions data for the days immediately after the announcement. The overall results indicate that the returns during the reversal period are less than the average bid-ask spread during the same time. We also find that major losers, firms with ?20 percent to ?50 percent event-date abnormal returns, experience price reversals generating returns that are significantly greater than the average bid-ask spread during that period. We interpret this result as consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. A test of a trading rule to exploit this overreaction is not profitable, providing support for weak-form market efficiency.     

Asymmetric reverting behavior of short-horizon stock returns: An evidence of stock market overreaction

This paper investigates the uneven mean reverting pattern of monthly return indexes of the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, using asymmetric non-linear smooth-transition (ANST) GARCH models. It also evaluates the extent to which time-varying volatility in the index returns support the stock market overreaction hypothesis. The models illuminate patterns of asymmetric mean reversion and risk decimation. Between 1926:01 and l997:12, not only did negative returns reverse to positive returns quicker than positive returns reverted to negative ones, but negative returns, in fact, reduced risk premiums from predictable high volatility. The findings support the market overreaction hypotheses. The asymmetry is due to the mispricing behavior on the part of investors who overreact to certain market news. The findings also corroborate arguments for the “contrarian” portfolio strategy.     

Reexamining momentum profits: Underreaction or overreaction to firm-specific information?

We design a new measure and find that the predictability of past returns on future returns increases as stocks respond with delay to firm-specific information. Our results suggest that momentum is caused by both investors’ underreaction and overreaction to information. However, underreaction to information seems to be the primary cause, particularly during the more recent period. Our findings are robust for recent explanations of momentum profits and alternative methods for computing our measure. We also find that stocks respond with delay to firm-specific information, partly due to certain firm characteristics, and partly because they escape investor attention due to their low visibility. Our paper extends and refines Jegadeesh and Titman’s (J Financ 56(2):699–720, 2001) finding that momentum profits are consistent with behavioral models’ predictions regarding investors’ overreaction.     

Long-Term Market Overreaction: The Effect of Low-Priced Stocks

Conrad and Kaul (1993) report that most of De Bondt and Thaler's (1985) long-term overreaction findings can be attributed to a combination of bid-ask effects when monthly cumulative average returns (CARs) are used, and price, rather than prior returns. In direct tests, we find little difference in test-period returns whether CARs or buy-and-hold returns are used, and that price has little predictive ability in cross-sectional regressions. The difference in findings between this study and Conrad and Kaul's is primarily due to their statistical methodology. They confound cross-sectional patterns and aggregate time-series mean reversion, and introduce a survivor bias. Their procedures increase the influence of price at the expense of prior returns.     

OPENING RETURNS,NOISE, AND OVERREACTION

In this article a partial‐adjustment model, which shows how equity prices fail to adjust instantaneously to new information, is estimated using a Kalman filter. For the components of the Dow Jones Industrial 30 index I aim to identify whether overreaction or noise is the cause of serial correlation and high volatility associated with opening returns. I find that the tendency for overreaction in opening prices is much stronger than for closing prices; therefore, overreaction rather than noise may account for differences in the return behavior of opening and closing returns. JEL classification: G15     

Overreaction after Controlling for Size and Book-to-Market Effects and its Mimicking Portfolio in Japan

In this paper we observe that firm size (SZ) and book-to-market (BM) cannot fully explain stock returns on prior-return- (PR-) based portfolios in the Japanese stock market. The overreaction effect after controlling for the SZ and BM effects is significant and persistent, and accounts for a large part of the zero-investment returns on the loser to the winner. We therefore propose a new mimicking portfolio whose returns mimic the common factor in returns related to overreaction. Our evidence shows that the proposed four-factor model captures common variation in returns on portfolios, based on stocks SZ, BM, and PR, better than the well-known three-factor model does.     

Continuous overreaction,insiders trading activities and momentum strategies

The paper investigates the influence and explanatory power of aggregate insiders trading activities on momentum trading strategies. We find that insiders trading activities can predict cross-sectional returns and can strengthen the naı̈ve momentum effects. The risk factors such as size and BM cannot explain the strong momentum effects in our refined momentum strategies. We interpret our findings as that the continuous overreaction causes the mediate term momentum effects and over pricing. In the long term, these overly priced stocks will be corrected with passing time. The correction of over pricing causes long-term reversals.     

Does the Stock Market Overreact?

Research in experimental psychology suggests that, in violation of Bayes' rule, most people tend to “overreact” to unexpected and dramatic news events. This study of market efficiency investigates whether such behavior affects stock prices. The empirical evidence, based on CRSP monthly return data, is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. Substantial weak form market inefficiencies are discovered. The results also shed new light on the January returns earned by prior “winners” and “losers.” Portfolios of losers experience exceptionally large January returns as late as five years after portfolio formation.